Cover Page

The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/39726 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

Author: Akker, M.L. van den
Title: Monument of nature? An ethnography of the world heritage of Mt. Kenya
Issue Date: 2016-05-25

MONUMENT OF NATURE?

AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE
WORLD HERITAGE OF MT. KENYA

Marlous van den Akker

Cover photo: Mt. Kenya from Mukima, a housing estate just outside Nanyuki town

                     Photo by Marlous van den Akker

MONUMENT OF NATURE?

AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE
WORLD HERITAGE OF MT. KENYA

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van

de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,

op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof.mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,

volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties

te verdedigen op woensdag 25 mei 2016

klokke 16.15 uur

door

Maria Louise van den Akker

geboren te Gouda

in 1983

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A great number of people inspired and contributed to this dissertation. To those whom are not listed below I emphasize that I have treasured each conversation, each debate, and each shared cup of coffee that came to pass in the course of this project.

In the first place, I am indebted to the individuals who made my introduction to Kenya easier, and whose contacts and connections helped to smooth the first phase of this research. Among them have been Rachel Spronk, her Nairobian friend Janet and her family, Angela Kronenburg García, Adriaan Tas, Charles Nzioka, Eleanor Monbiot, and Paul Benson. I am particularly grateful to those who helped me gain access to Mt. Kenya's conservation scene and who, apart from sharing with me their own insights and points of view, aided me in building networks of informants. Thank you Susie Weeks, Humphrey Munene, Anthony King †, Jonathan Moss and Robert Obrien.

In alphabetical order, I thank George Abungu, Rashid Butt, Geoffrey Chege, Ian Craig, Martin Dyer, Michael Dyer, Flemming Dyhr †, Amos Egal, Shawn Evans, Gideon Gathaara, Ramesh Gathogo, Simon Gitau, Max Graham, Tim Hobbs, Peter Howard, Danson Kamau, Mercy Kendi, Edwin Kinyanjui, Oliver Kinyua, Julius Kipng'etich, Christian Lambrechts, Richard Leakey, Benson Lengalen, Dominic Maringa, James Mathenge, Gordon Murray, James Murray, Paul Muya, James Mwangi, John Mwangi, Margareth Mwangi, Robert Myall, Daniel Maina Ndoria, Solomon Maina Ndoria, Leo Niskanen, James Njogu, Karanja Njoroge, Maurice Nyaligu, Anthony Ochino, Mordecai Ogada, Charles Oluchina, Elizabeth Ouma, Edward Parfet, Deirdre Prins-Solani, John Sikote, Mark Simpkin, Malte Sommerlatte, Chris Thouless, Tom Traexler, Richard Vigne, Peter Viljoen, Ben Wandago, Hoseah Wanderi, Sammy Warigia, Satish Wason, Mike Watson, David Western, Charlie Wheeler, and Bongo Woodley. You, as well as others I have not mentioned by name, offered me your perspectives on Mt. Kenya's World Heritage status and took the time to share your knowledge and experiences with me. I am extremely appreciative of this.

I think warmly of Leiden University's Institute of Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology. Over the years the institute has been a stimulating academic environment. In particular, I consider myself fortunate to have received the guidance of Peter Pels. His expertise, his

Timau

Nanyuki

Nano Moru

Nyeri

Karatina

Meru

Mt. Kenya National Park

Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve

Chogoria

Chuka

Embu

KENYA

KENYA

Equator

Mt. Kenya Forests

UNESCO
World Heritage Site

Main road

0   10 km

© ASCL/ DeVink Mapdesign 2016

DeVink Mapdesign Ltd

INTRODUCTION

DOING ETHNOGRAPHY ON MT. KENYA'S WORLD HERITAGE STATUS

In August 2010, a man called Teddy Munyao climbed to Point Lenana, the lowest of Mt. Kenya's three peaks. The act itself was not exceptional. Each year, thousands of tourists visit Mt. Kenya National Park and many of them come for mountaineering. The hike to Point Lenana is not particularly harsh: under the instructions of a good guide even inexperienced climbers generally pull it off. But Teddy Munyao's trek meant to write history. He carried with him a copy of the new Kenyan Constitution, which had just passed parliament, to plant it on top of the mountain. He succeeded and his action received national media coverage (see for instance *Daily Nation*, 24 August 2010, 29 August 2010; *Standard Media*, 24 August 2010).

Nearly three years prior to Teddy Munyao's deed, Kenya had witnessed an outburst of extreme violence. The brutality had been sparked by the outcome of the general elections held in December 2007, after which the supporters of two opposing political parties had attacked one another. The atrocities lasted until late February 2008. By that time, more than a thousand people were confirmed dead, and an estimated three hundred thousand people had left their homes and possessions to escape the bloodshed (Anderson & Lochery 2008: 328). Roughly a month into the conflict, United Nations' Kofi Annan intervened in an attempt to calm the hostilities. Under his mediation, the leaders of the two competing parties eventually agreed to a comprise and divided the country's key administrative positions amongst their members. In the years that followed, the international community pressured Kenya's politicians into drafting a new constitution, so that future elections would not end in such

mayhem again. Teddy Munyao's climb marked the end of this process – it meant to symbolize that former difficulties in organizing the country's leadership democratically had finally been surmounted.

It was not the first time that Mt. Kenya got caught up in nationalist propaganda. In fact, Teddy Munyao's hike was a reiteration of an earlier event that had taken place in 1963. In December that year, Kisoi Munyao, Teddy Munyao's father, had climbed Mt. Kenya to mark the end of colonial rule. While the British made preparations for the transfer of governance an assistant of the soon-to-be president Jomo Kenyatta had asked Kisoi, who was a trained porter boy, to raise the republic's new flag on Mt. Kenya at the exact moment of Kenyatta's inauguration. The act was part of a larger celebration programme that one Kenyan journalist later recounted as follows:

> Midnight December 11-12 found two elderly men standing in the middle of the huge arena of the Uhuru Stadium in Nairobi. The band played the British national anthem. Then suddenly the lights were dimmed. There was a profound silence among the 250,000 people who filled the Stadium that night. Once I heard a boo, but it sounded as stupid as it was mannerless. Then the lights went on, and all I could hear was the deafening roar of the crowd as they cheered the raising of the black, red and green flag of the new Kenyan nation. Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, for whom this was the crowning moment of his forty-year political life, walked back to the Royal Pavilion waving his white fly whisk. At his side walked the grey-haired Malcolm MacDonald, the last but most popular of British Governors in Kenya and the country's first Governor-General. Then fireworks exploded to light the sky and, as it were, officially announced the birth of the new nation.
>
> Ng'weno (1964: 36)

While in Nairobi groups dressed in tribal costumes were performing indigenous dances, and while men of faith were leading public prayer ceremonies (Ng'weno 1964: 37), Kisoi Munyao and his crew struggled on Mt. Kenya. The group had aimed for the highest of Mt. Kenya's three summits, called Batian, but bad weather conditions had forced them to settle for Mt. Kenya's second highest peak Nelion (Ng'weno 1964: 38). On arrival, Kisoi took the Kenyan flag from one of the backpacks and planted it firmly on Nelion's rocky surface. According to popular belief, this happened exactly at midnight and it is said that while Nairobi exploded into fireworks and cheers, Kisoi watched the cloth flutter in the wind.

Kisoi Munyao's expedition was one of symbolic reconquest. As we will see in the course of this dissertation, both the country's Kikuyu population as well as British administrators had claimed ownership over Mt. Kenya in the past – the latter even named the entire colony after it (Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 1920: 404). Kisoi's flag hoisting adventure was to supplant these histories and turn Mt. Kenya into a national symbol that belonged to all citizens. By implication, Kisoi became a national hero. On his way down from Nelion he was picked up by helicopter, shipped straight to the capital, and welcomed into the independence festivities as a celebrity (Nyamweru 2012: 282).

***

In December 1997, Mt. Kenya obtained World Heritage status. The World Heritage listing was vested in the mountain's natural characteristics and celebrated its moorlands, its indigenous forests, its lakes and glaciers, and its distinguished flora record. Because Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site focuses exclusively on ecological processes and geological formations, it might seem a far cry from the political events described above. Nevertheless, I began this dissertation with father and son Munyao because their hikes epitomize what became this work's core theme – namely, Mt. Kenya's involvement in struggles over power and recognition, as well as its association with nation-building and statecraft, in a political climate in which ethnic and racial tensions predominate.

In this dissertation I examine Mt. Kenya's 1997 World Heritage designation (chapters two and three) as well as modifications to that designation that materialized roughly one and a half decades later (chapters four and five). World Heritage is a state affair, yet so far World Heritage case studies have largely failed to engage with the notion of 'state' critically. In light of this, I set myself the task of unpacking the 'Kenyan state party' that was responsible for Mt. Kenya's original World Heritage nomination, and unpacking the 'Kenyan state party' that initiated later site adjustments. This revealed a number of things. For instance, both events were brought about by a small group of stakeholders that meant to capitalize on World Heritage to secure property rights and management authority; both events drew heavily on natural scientific arguments for nature conservation and in the process obscured various struggles over decision-making power; and, most importantly, both events were a response to the present-day legacies of Kenya's colonial history.

There are important insights to gain from breaking down World Heritage state parties into the actual individuals who drive World Heritage initiatives. Such an exercise reveals, among other things, the histories and political processes that World Heritage's professional technical idiom obscures, and in doing so it can make contributions to the anthropology of heritage and World Heritage studies. But there are not only academic merits. When we conserve and celebrate heritage sites without paying attention to how these sites came about in the first place, we might fail to recognize how heritage articulates and reinforces social, cultural and political boundaries. This is particularly pertinent in the case of Mt. Kenya, because, as we will see, its World Heritage status is intimately tied up with the country's colonial history. I develop this thought in the chapters to come. In the remainder of this introduction I address how I organized my project methodologically.

'Following around' Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site

Since its foundation in 1972 there has been ample critique on the World Heritage Convention. Among others, scholars have pointed to the top-down implementation of Western heritage values and practices in other parts of the world (Butler 2007; Byrne 1991; Derrida 2002; Elliot & Schmutz 2012; Rowlands

& Butler 2007); to the favouring of well-known heritages, particularly religious buildings and historic towns, over less well-known places and places with a negative connotation (Breen 2007; Meskell 2002; Labadi 2005; Rico 2008); and to its static understanding of heritage, vested in the idea that heritage sites have a permanent value and meaning (Bianchi 2002; Harrison 2004; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004; Scholze 2008; Smith 2006). These are all legitimate points, but I chose to approach World Heritage differently – this dissertation is not about how and why the World Heritage Convention is inappropriate, and it is not about all the different ways in which World Heritage failed Mt. Kenya. Instead, it focuses on how World Heritage status affected and complicated the mountain, and on how it served as a mobilizer in its own right. As such, it for instance considers how Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site engendered negotiations and the formation of alliances, or how it gave expression to and got entangled in existing conflicts. In doing so, this dissertation intends to walk the middle ground between instrumentalist and critical views of World Heritage. I found inspiration for this in David Mosse's (2005) work on development policy.

In search of answers to the kind of questions posed above I applied a methodology of 'following around' (Marcus 1995). This is a method in which the issue under study comes to identify chains, paths, threads and conjunctures (*Ibid*.: 105), thus revealing to the researcher relevant social networks. The method of following around typically results in multi-sited ethnographies that examine the relations, translations, and associations between different settings (*Ibid*.: 102). Although I applied Marcus's method, I am hesitant to call this work multi-sited for at least two reasons. First, for Marcus, 'different settings' translates into physically different places of fieldwork. Following around Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site brought me to all sorts of research sites, which I describe below, but all these sites were connected to just one fieldwork locale, namely a town located on Mt. Kenya's west slopes that I introduce below. Secondly, I am reluctant to use the term multi-sited given the hype surrounding this concept in recent years. Proponents have claimed, and continue to claim, that multi-sited research marks a radical break with classical anthropological fieldwork traditions. Yet, it is debatable whether this is really the case. Bronislaw Malinowski and Edward Evans-Pritchard arguably already did very similar things – they were just less explicit about it (Herzfeld 2015: 338; Hannerz 2003: 202).

In practice, following around Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site took various forms. Firstly, it brought me to a large variety of organizations and institutes. These included government institutes such as the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), the Kenya Forest Service (KFS, before called the Forest Department), and the former Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife, as well as NGOs such as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the Mount Kenya Trust, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Space for Giants (SFG), the Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF), the Green Belt Movement, the Kenya Forest Working Group (KFWG), Ngare Ndare Forest Trust (NNFT) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC). In addition, it brought me to the National Museums of Kenya (NMK), to the World Heritage Centre in Paris, to Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, and to a range of other

private conservancies located in the vicinity of Mt. Kenya. All these organizations and institutes have been key to my understanding of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site, but I did not do in-depth ethnographic work on any of them. Rather, my interest in them was largely restricted to their link with Mt. Kenya's World Heritage status, and my contact with them typically consisted of conversations with one or two specific staff members who had an explicit connection to the mountain. In addition, I participated in a number of institutional events: I for instance sat in on community meetings organized by conservation NGOs and joined NGO staff on field patrols or project visits.

Secondly, following around Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site brought me to a variety of written sources that included websites, newspapers, policies, conventions, maps, agreements, management plans, evaluation reports and World Heritage application files. I have approached these written sources as authoritative texts deserving ethnographic attention in their own right. I examined how they constructed subjects, objects and social realities, and I focused explicitly on how they meant to foster administrative control (Hull 2012: 257-259; see also Shore & Wright 1997). In doing so, I followed in the footsteps of scholars such as Anders (2008, 2009), who analysed World Bank and IMF reports in relation to the implementation of good governance reforms in Malawi; Erikson (2001), who analysed the UNESCO document 'Our Creative Diversity' in relation to UNESCO's definition of the concept 'culture'; and Ferguson (1990), who analysed a World Bank Country Report in relation to the formation of development projects in Lesotho.

Lastly, following around Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site brought me to a wide range of informants who were largely, but not exclusively, associated with one or more of the above institutes. Among them were (former) KWS rangers, wardens and executives; KFS foresters and forest guards; politicians and ex-politicians operating regionally, nationally, or both; trained biologists, geographers and ecologists working as professional conservationists or having done so in the past; heritage specialists including freelance consultants and museum employees; Kenyan and foreign NGO workers; mountain guides; fellow researchers; recent settlers and descendants of colonial settler families; and the owners or managers of private conservancies. I invited these informants into my study for different reasons – sometimes their names appeared in one of the aforementioned written documents, sometimes organizations or institutes directed me to them, and sometimes my contact with one informant led to my introduction to another. How exactly I dealt with this colourful collective I discuss at the end of this introduction.

In sum, following around Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site marked out a scattered and fragmented research field that lacked an obvious geographic centre. This is something that increasingly complicates anthropological research today. In part, this is due to the way in which the discipline has come to conceptualize global interconnectedness and has come to organize fieldwork in line with this, and in part, this is due to how anthropology recently expanded its interest in topics such as policy or the functioning of bureaucracy (see for instance Gupta 2012; Mosse 2005; Müller 2013; Shore & Wright 1997; Wedel et al. 2005). For this reason, Gupta & Ferguson suggest conceiving of

contemporary ethnographic fieldwork not as a commitment to one particular local setting, but as 'an attentiveness to social, cultural, and political *location* and a willingness to work self-consciously at shifting or realigning our own location while building epistemological and political links with other locations' (1997: 5, original emphasis). I have aimed to do precisely this.

Nanyuki, a hub of sorts

I followed around Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site from Nanyuki, a town located on Mt. Kenya's western slope. Nanyuki was founded as a colonial township in 1920 in anticipation of the wave of Europeans that moved to the area in the course of the decade (Duder & Youé 1994: 261). Initially, it was fairly remote, but this changed when a branch of the larger Mombasa-Uganda railroad connected it to Nairobi in 1930. After that, Nanyuki attracted more and more Europeans and it became the typical white men's meeting ground (*Ibid*.: 260). Such developments characterized the region at large, and Nanyuki was part of an area that became known as the White Highlands, due to the massive number of white settlers. To this day, the area's colonial history complicates the distribution of land and struggles over ownership rights, as we will see in the course of this dissertation. My stay here had direct consequences for the themes I came to discuss in this work, and it inevitably turned my attention to the colour bar.

Nanyuki ceased to be exclusively white long ago, and today it is a colourful and multi-ethnic place. Nevertheless, it still has a distinct settler feel to it. This is due to, among other things, the presence of the British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK), which has a camp in town, and the presence of the Nanyuki Sports Club, which attracts white landowners and conservationists from all over the region. For a long time, Nanyuki continued to be the somewhat isolated and tranquil place that it once was, but this changed in the course of the 2000s. For one thing, in the aftermath of the 2007 elections, many residents of the Rift Valley, which was one of the epicentres of election violence, fled to Nanyuki for safety and stuck around afterwards. Secondly, in 2010, a new highway was completed that runs from Nairobi to Isiolo, a town some seventy kilometres northeast of Nanyuki that grew out of Somalian military camps established during the First World War. This highway greatly improved Nanyuki's access and, as a result, it now attracts a far larger number of tourists and white settlers than before. Correspondingly, the town swelled, house prices skyrocketed, and coffee corners, restaurants, curiosa shops and tourist camps continue to mushroom all over the place.

I first visited Nanyuki in January 2011, when I conducted a short three-week pilot study during which I travelled around the mountain in search of a suitable fieldwork base. I eventually chose Nanyuki, primarily for its proximity to two different Mt. Kenya National Park gates as well as for its facilities. I returned to Nanyuki from July to December 2011, and again from April to September 2012. In these ten months I rented a small cottage just outside town, which had been offered to me

after I had placed a small notice in a regional newsletter. From here I took a car, which I bought for the purpose and sold afterwards, to meet my various informants – many of them lived somewhere in the area, but I also made frequent excursions to Nairobi. In the capital, I paid regular visits to, among others, the Kenya Wildlife Service headquarters, the National Museums of Kenya, the offices of organizations such as IUCN and UNESCO, and a range of conservation NGOs.

In June 2013, roughly six months after I completed my last stretch of fieldwork in Nanyuki, I made one final fieldwork trip to Paris, to visit the World Heritage Centre. At the time, the Centre was in the midst of preparing for that year's annual World Heritage meetings. I was not invited to these meetings. But, due to the event, the Centre turned into a meeting place for different heritage experts, several of whom I was able to meet. The meetings themselves, during which decisions were made about the modifications to Mt. Kenya's original World Heritage designation, I later watched online[1] (see UNESCO n.d.[A]).

Informant engagements

The way in which the method of following around came to identify the informants of this study demanded a careful reflection on fieldwork possibilities. On the one hand, my informants were dispersed over many different locations and organizational settings, which meant that I continuously moved from one place to another and did not spend a prolonged period of time anywhere. On the other hand, many informants had demanding professional lives. Some were even considered leading experts in their field of specialization and, as a result, informants typically only had limited time to spare to contribute to my studies. In short, this type of informant did not allow for participant observation.

Ever since Bronislaw Malinowski, participant observation has been central to anthropology and the mystique that surrounds it has had direct consequences for the identification of 'suitable' ethnographic research topics (Gupta & Ferguson 1997; Shore 2002). Laura Nader, for instance, exemplified just how strongly the discipline's identity and self-esteem seems to depend on participant observation:

> The degree to which our field choices might be determined by whether or not we can observe as participant was made clear to me when two of my students went to Washington to study a law firm that did not want to be studied (even though individual members were willing to cooperate in a limited way). How could they participant-observe if the firm wouldn't let them in the door, and *if they couldn't participant-observe then how could they do anthropology*?
>
> Nader (1972: 306, original emphasis)

The method of participant observation fits the study of the marginalized and the subaltern best. As a result, these groups have long formed, and arguably continue to form, anthropology's main field of

interest. But already in the early 1970s Nader pointed out that such a limited vision hampers the discipline's development. She argued that the insights that anthropologists can offer are inevitably distorted, and likely play into stereotyping and stigmatization, as long as anthropologists fail to study 'the colonizers rather than the colonized, the culture of power rather than the culture of the powerless, the culture of affluence rather than the culture of poverty' (Nader 1972: 289). A study on white collar crime amongst middle-class corporate staff and business elites would, for instance, put crimes amongst the residents of a shanty town in a different perspective, and it would unsettle the idea that criminality is confined to the poor (*Ibid*.: 299). Clearly, participant observation does not lend itself well to the study of the rich and the powerful (see also Konrad 2002; Shore 2002), and it has even been suggested that ethnographic invisibility is in itself one of their many privileges (Gusterson 1997: 115). Yet, this does not mean that anthropologists should not, or cannot, study elites. Rather, we must think of ways to engage that can replace participant observation but that do not compromise ethnographic authority.[2]

I have tried to do this in two ways: I have critically analysed various written documents that informants composed themselves or used for administrative purposes, and I have sought dialogue. Schrijvers (1991) has drawn attention to how dialogue is complicated by power differences, and she suggested that anthropologists are largely unable to build dialectical relations with elite groups on equal terms because the latter are unlikely to 'climb down' to the level of the researcher (*Ibid*.: 177). I do not necessarily disagree with this, but I believe that her evaluation deserves at least two additional comments. First, I would describe my encounters with informants as conversations that I guided towards certain topics and themes, but during which I also shared my own ideas and insights (see also Hannerz 2003: 209). Especially the latter helped to establish my position as an 'expert', which, in turn, contributed to levelling power differences. Secondly, Schrijvers's claim raises the question of whether it is always necessary to aspire to equality in dialogue, if such a condition is even possible at all. I have experienced that sometimes it may work in one's advantage to be taken as unknowing and unthreatening, and being exposed to how informants try to establish and maintain power differences during conversations can in itself be a useful source of information.

Over time, I came to discuss Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site with roughly one hundred informants. Not all of them appear in this dissertation, but even those I do not directly refer to are implicitly present, for they helped to ground my understanding of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site, as well as of Kenya's overall political conditions. I visited about twenty informants on different occasions and I met a handful regularly – they became my key informants. On three or four occasions I failed to meet people face-to-face and only spoke to them by phone or email. More often, however, first-hand conversations and emails complemented one another, with private meetings continued online or vice versa. I have a very basic understanding of Kiswahili and always communicated in English. To my knowledge, this never caused problems or created misunderstandings.

I did not tape-record my conversations but took extensive notes. Occasionally, I asked informants to pause for a moment, so that I could write down their words verbatim – whenever a block quote appears in this work it was recorded in this way. Shortly after each informant consultation I used my notes to write a detailed report. This meant that a considerable part of my time in Nanyuki was spent behind the screen of a laptop. This had advantages and disadvantages: on the one hand, it limited the time I could spend 'out in the field'; on the other hand, it also aided me in processing the information I collected analytically. This helped to identify themes that needed further attention.

While writing this dissertation I ran into two types of difficulties, both related to the nature of this study. First, some of the issues I deal with in this work are politically sensitive and often informants only wanted to discuss them off the record. One of the more critical problems of elite studies is that the use of pseudonyms does not necessarily help to hide an informant's identity, especially not when the person in question is a public figure and his or her steps are therefore easily retraceable. For this reason, at times I only mention that I learned about something through 'a landowner', 'a conservationist', or 'a KWS employee', and on a few occasions I even leave out those comments. As a result, the reader will not always be informed on how I gathered my data and will be left in the dark on how I obtained certain information. I have chosen to do this to protect my informants – I hope that when the situation occurs readers will accept my judgement and have confidence in my analyses. At the same time, there are numerous instances where I do mention people by name. In fact, unpacking the Kenyan state party was one of my prime goals, as I mentioned earlier, and this specifically requires that identities are made public. Where I link statements and remarks to individuals I clarify in a footnote where and when I consulted them.

Secondly, my dependence on a diverse range of informants raised questions on the issue of loyalty. The conventional idea still seems to be that an anthropologist's paramount obligation is to the people he or she studies. I believe that such reasoning oversimplifies how researcher and researched produce knowledge jointly – besides, it is a principle grounded in an ethnographic focus on the subaltern that is untenable for elite studies (Shore 2002: 11). Especially when applying a method of following around, a researcher occasionally works with – and at other times works against – continuously changing sets of subjects (Marcus 1995: 114). To deal with such contradictions, and to prevent anthropologists from losing touch with informants altogether, Marcus suggests taking a stance:

> In conducting multi-sited research, one finds oneself with all sorts of cross-cutting and contradictory personal commitments. These conflicts are resolved, perhaps ambivalently, not by refuge in being a detached anthropological scholar, but in being a sort of ethnographer-activist, renegotiating identities in different sites as one learns more about a slice of the world system.
>
> Marcus (1995: 113)

Throughout this work I have tried to follow Marcus's advice and take a stance in relation to the issues discussed. On some occasions, specific informants may feel offended by my interpretations.[3] Taking this into account, I want to emphasize that I do not mean to make personal allegations. I position myself vis-à-vis subjects and themes, and I look into the role that informants play in relation to particular structural conditions, but without the intention of criticizing anyone personally.

Finally, in light of the diversity of informants and sources I have used, I feel the need to address one of the more fundamental critiques on Marcus's method. This critique holds that when anthropologists follow too many research paths and explore networks too widely, there is a real risk that ethnographic data spreads too thin. As a result, the anthropological account dilutes, touching upon surfaces rather than examining in depth. I share these concerns and I can see how networks can become overwhelming in scale and extent. At the same time, such comments need further sophistication. Firstly, when applying the method of following around it can be perfectly valid to pay more ethnographic attention to some parts of the networks that emerge than to others (see Marcus 1999: 8). I, for instance, relied heavily on a handful of key informants and mainly used conversations with others to contextualize their comments and actions. Secondly, Michael Herzfeld (2015) recently suggested that what matters most in multi-sited research, or in research that lacks a specific geographic focus, is not the number of sites or the scope of the networks that one studies but the level of social intimacy that one manages to cultivate (*Ibid*.: 339). In my particular case, relations with informants were reinforced by the growing awareness that my interaction with them was part of a larger scheme that also included co-workers, superiors, partners in other organizations, former business associates, and so on – Hannerz (2003) calls this a form of ethnographic embeddedness that follows from mutual acquaintance, rather than from deepening relations with any particular individual (*Ibid*.: 204). I like to believe that this, together with informants' increasing willingness to confide things to me off the record, or to share critiques with me that were potentially harmful to them, marked the social intimacy that Herzfeld speaks of. After more than ten months of fieldwork in Nanyuki I felt I was a 'local' in the social networks that I studied, not least because my presence and interest in Mt. Kenya's World Heritage status had itself tangible consequences – it mobilized people, as we will see in the course of this dissertation, and had repercussions for what Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site looks like today.

I.

THE RISE OF HERITAGE CONSERVATION

World Heritage in Historical Perspective

A number of themes recur throughout this dissertation. On different occasions, for instance, I deal with ongoing struggles over management authority, which have come to pit different government institutes against one another but which also complicate private-public partnerships. At times I emphasize the various ways in which Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing naturalizes and depoliticizes, thus obscuring cultural, political and racist histories and enabling a variety of political projects to appear as if they are technical affairs. And, of course, I deconstruct the Kenyan state party, in an attempt to disentangle the processes and actors that initiated Mt. Kenya's 1997 World Heritage listing as well as the 2013 modifications to Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site.

These themes resonate with different key characteristics of World Heritage. These characteristics include uncertainties over who 'owns' and is responsible for World Heritage; the relationship between World Heritage, the state, and nationalism; World Heritage's categorical separation of natural and cultural heritage sites; World Heritage's technical idiom; and World Heritage's present-day popularity. In this first chapter, I make an effort to historicize these characteristics by tracing World Heritage's genealogy. This will bring me to, among other things, the French Revolution's iconoclasm, to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century aristocrat endeavours to cultivate obedient national citizens, to the emergence of a particular American nature conservation ethos from the turn of the twentieth century onwards, and to the campaign to save the Nubian temples in Egypt in the 1950s. By discussing these developments, I draw attention to how the 1972 World Heritage Convention emerged from a wider set

of historical developments. Thus, I mean to underscore that while Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation is the product of a relatively recent set of developments in Kenya, at the same time it articulates longer traditions of heritage conservation.

World Heritage as collective ànd state-owned property

Until the late eighteenth century, European countries showed relatively little interest in the preservation of historical sites and objects. In France, for instance, old buildings were generally left to deteriorate, or they were dismantled and their construction material reused (Sax 1990: 1150). The French Revolution, which lasted from 1789 to 1799, brought about major changes in this regard and laid the foundations for contemporary conservation practices.

During the French Revolution, France's common masses challenged the sovereignty of the gentry and clergy. Their protest manifested itself in, among other things, the widespread destruction and expropriation of church and aristocratic valuables. The taking over of the Louvre and the Tuileries illustrates this: in 1791, the French king Louis XVI declared the Louvre's buildings and gardens a national palace, but a year later he was imprisoned and the revolutionary government took possession of both the palace as well as of the scientific and artistic collections that it contained.

Revolutionists plundered at a steady rate – revolting masses looted monasteries and royal graves, and those noblemen who were not executed fled abroad, leaving numerous art collections unattended (Grijzenhout 2007: 7). As a result, the body of confiscated goods expanded rapidly, but the revolutionary government was ambivalent about what to do with all these objects. It meant to sell parts of it, and in 1790 it founded a Monuments Commission that was to distinguish the saleable from the non-saleable items (Sax 1990: 1152). But the broader populace soon protested against the commission: it maintained that the artefacts were too reminiscent of former repression, and they demanded their wholesale destruction. Initially, the revolutionary government paid heed to such calls and in 1792 it even adopted legislation that justified and encouraged demolition (Sax 1990: 1153).

While France struggled to cope with the material relics of the old regime, different commentators began to call for conservation. Among them was the bishop of Blois, Henri Baptist Grégoire, who was a fierce critic of the widespread destruction and even invented a word for it: vandalism (Grijzenhout 2007: 8). Rather than giving prominence to how church and aristocratic treasures had come to represent ecclesiastical and feudal power, Grégoire underscored their artistic value – he was an advocate of the fine arts and the sciences, and he argued that the revolutionary slogan *liberté, égalité et fraternité* was merely an empty catchphrase as long as the country at large failed to respect talent and creativity (Sax 1990: 1155).

Henri Baptist Grégoire's calls resonated with other advocates of conservation such as Alexandre Lenoir. Like Grégoire, Lenoir strongly disapproved of the public's cry for demolition, and it has been

suggested that he especially deplored the looting of the Church of St. Denis as well as the plunder of the Abbey of Cluny (Ter Keurs 2011: 10). Yet, unlike Grégoire, Lenoir was far less successful in streamlining his arguments with the revolution's credos – he always struggled to 'get in line with the appropriate revolutionary rhetoric of the day' (Sax 1990: 1165). Nevertheless, Lenoir made significant contributions to the preservation of the objects that revolutionists targeted. Already in the early 1790s he used his political contacts to press for safekeeping. Surprisingly, he received support from the revolutionary government, which hired him as well as two assistants to collect as much as possible and store it in the Petits-Augustins convent in Paris (Ter Keurs 2011: 10). In 1795, Lenoir opened the Musée des Monuments Français, after which his collection became accessible to the larger public.

The advocacy of men such as Henri Baptist Grégoire and Alexandre Lenoir gave way to a catchall term for the objects under threat of the revolution, for which hitherto no collective name had existed. This term was *patrimoine*, introduced by the politician Armand-Guy Kersaint in 1791 (Grijzenhout 2007: 7). Prior to Kersaint's usage of the word, patrimoine had been a strict juridical category that had referred to an individual's possessions obtained through patrilineal inheritance and that were inalienable. Such legal restrictions to what one could do with bequeathed goods were not exclusive to France. In the Netherlands, for example, the notion *erfgoed* imposed similar constraints (Van den Berg 2007: 24): erfgoed made a juridical distinction between the possessions one had inherited from ancestors and the possessions one had acquired oneself, called *koopgoed*. Contrary to koopgoed, erfgoed was subjected to various norms and constraints that sought to prevent family capital from breaking up or from being handed over to in-laws. Similar juridical regulations were in force in Germany (*Ibid.*).[4]

Presumably, the kinship values on which patrimoine and erfgoed rested began to disintegrate already from the thirteenth century onwards, and possibly even earlier (Van den Berg 2007: 30). Gradually, the legislative distinction between possessions bought and possessions inherited lost its relevance. Particularly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, juridical arrangements in general took progressive account of individual rights, and the protection of private interests gained the upper hand over the custody of family resources (*Ibid.*: 29-31). The French Revolution further reinforced this process and marked the end of the legal separation of bought and inherited goods in France (*Ibid.*: 37). However, and partially due to Armand-Guy Kersaint, the word patrimoine did not vanish from French vocabulary.

In the course of the French Revolution, patrimoine came to signify the objects that the revolutionary government had seized from the gentry and clergy. Armand-Guy Kersaint called these objects *le patrimoine de tous* (Grijzenhout 2007: 7) and, as such, he had identified the French people as the legitimate and ultimate heirs of the revolutionary loot. When Henri Baptist Grégoire, Alexandre Lenoir and likeminded thinkers adopted Kersaint's application of patrimoine and made it central to their conservation jargon, its meaning shifted permanently from a juridical arrangement on family inheritances to a conservation philosophy that concerned goods that belonged to society at large (see

also Sax 1990: 1157). This philosophy was vested in a collective commemoration of the past that was already seen elsewhere, for instance during the celebration of Bonfire Night in seventeenth-century England (Harvey 2001). At the same time, there was something truly novel in the French Revolution's notion of patrimoine: it made the safekeeping of the historic relics that belonged to all a task of the state.

The historical development of the term patrimoine may encourage us to consider heritage as the expression of a property relation. Yet, the kind of property relation that formed during the French Revolution created a *contradiction in terminis*: patrimoine suggested that goods could be collective property and state property at the same time, and in doing so it confused different types of ownership rights. MacPherson (1978) defines collective property as a bundle of individual rights that pertain to the same use or the same benefit, and that gives all individual members of a group access to something (*Ibid*.: 4). State property on the other hand, seen from the perspective of the recipients of collective rights, is a right of exclusion reserved to the state (*Ibid*.: 5-6). MacPherson's definitions thus suggest that collective property can never be state property, or vice versa, for the former endows members of society with access rights that the latter denies them. It follows that state ownership over heritage, which is by its very nature the property of a collective (Handler 1985; Strother 2012), is inevitably contradictory – it communicates that heritage is simultaneously of the state, and of all the people who are not the state.

The 1972 World Heritage Convention echoes patrimoine's idea of state supervision over collectively owned heritages. In the preamble it states:

> Considering that parts of the cultural and natural heritage are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole
>
> UNESCO (1972: 1)

And:

> Considering that, in view of the magnitude and gravity of the new dangers threatening them, it is incumbent on the international community as a whole to participate in the protection of its cultural and natural heritage of outstanding value, by the granting of collective assistance which, although not taking the place of action by the State concerned, will serve as an efficient complement thereto
>
> UNESCO (1972: 1)

The convention grants state parties the exclusive power to select and manage the world's heritages, it dictates that all decision-making should go through state parties, and it constantly reiterates state authority over World Heritage preservation. On a very practical level, this means that stateless territories cannot host World Heritage Sites – Antarctica, for instance, has an extraordinary landscape but no government to put forward World Heritage nominations (Anthamatten & Hazen 2007: 265),

and the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem was only recently added to the World Heritage List after the United Nations recognized Palestine as a state party in November 2012 (UNESCO document WHC-12/36.COM/19). At the same time, the convention indicates that World Heritage exceeds national interests and serves mankind as a whole. As such, the friction between collective property rights and state property rights became one of World Heritage's core features: on the one hand, World Heritage is identified as a global common tantamount to a global public domain (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2006: 185); on the other hand, World Heritage's protection is entrusted to the state. Among other things, this friction has translated into ongoing discussions over who is ultimately responsible for the preservation of World Heritage Sites. Elizabeth Ouma,[5] who in 2011 worked for the regional UNESCO office in Nairobi, indicated to me that especially poorer countries tend to demand from UNESCO that it takes responsibility, for instance by offering financial support. She said that these countries 'misunderstand' the organization's role in the World Heritage Programme, and underscored that the convention is very explicit about state parties' obligations.

What seems to further complicate the confusion over who precisely should be in charge of World Heritage preservation is that neither the principle of state ownership, nor the principle of collective ownership identifies where exactly supervision over the property in question should be located: the first assigns control to all and thus to no one in particular, and the latter assigns control to an institution of which the representatives change (MacPherson 1978: 5-6). Thus, even if one had a clear idea about whether World Heritage is more 'of the state' or more 'of the world', it would still not be obvious exactly which individuals or institutions should be entitled to deal with World Heritage. Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site illustrates how this may manifest itself in daily struggles over management authority. What is particularly interesting about the case of Mt. Kenya is that different sets of stakeholders have tried to capitalize on the confusion that the convergence of collective property rights and state property rights create, and have deliberately tried to mobilize a global heritage community in the competition over the power to manage. Indeed, as chapter two shows, in 1997, the idea of World Heritage as a global commons was used in attempts to remove the mandate over Mt. Kenya's forests from one state institution and locate it with another, and, as indicated in chapter five, in the late 2010s, it was employed in an endeavour to bypass Kenya's state apparatus altogether.

World Heritage and the failure to problematize 'the state'

This section continues to focus on the central role of the state in the 1972 World Heritage Convention. It specifically looks at how the notion of the state is dealt with both by the convention itself as well as by the majority of World Heritage studies. Before I discuss this below, I first briefly turn to how the link between heritage and state-making consolidated across Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution.

In the course of the nineteenth century, nationalist sentiments gained momentum on the European continent: populist movements, which challenged the hegemony of the aristocracy, sprang up roughly from the 1820s onwards (Anderson 1983). Europe's ruling classes typically responded pragmatically to the rise in nationalist ideologies – rather than trying to supress or challenge emerging nationalist rhetoric, they began to work their way into it (*Ibid*.: 109-111). They had multiple strategies for this that included, among other things, the implementation of state-controlled education, propaganda that meant to naturalize and justify existing power structures (*Ibid*.), and the glorification of heritage (Willems & Comer 2011: 160).

Europe's aristocrats understood the political potential of the symbolic mediation of a shared national past, and different ruling elites began to employ the celebration of official histories for governmental purposes. The institution of the Victorian public museum in Britain for instance is a case in point. Victorian public museums were to introduce 'high culture', which was previously restricted to the aristocracy, to Britain's proletariat. By bringing visitors in direct contact with the aristocratic lifestyle, the Victorian public museum intended to regulate morale – in essence these museums were highly controlled environments that meant to foster specific normative and ethical standards among the broader public (Bennett 1995).

The nineteenth-century celebration of national heritage, which manifested itself in the establishment of museums, but also in the institution of national traditions (Hobsbawm 1983[B]), articulated a wider change in government strategies. Roughly until the middle of the eighteenth century, hegemonic rule had been vested in law, regulation, and discipline. But, among other things, the collapse of mercantile theories and practices, as well as rapid population growth, had commanded a reorientation of power relations (Foucault 2003 [1978]: 239). This had given way to a political frame of mind that aimed at the cultivation of self-regulating citizens. This self-regulation depended on an ensemble of institutions, procedures and tactics, all designed to manipulate the population's behaviour (*Ibid*.: 244). Central to this ensemble was a complex of disciplinary technologies, or governmental strategies that meant to promote the internalization of specific knowledge systems, truths and ethics. Foucault called this 'the governmentalization of the state' (*Ibid*.: 245), and the national celebration of heritage came to play a key role in this. In the words of Bennett:

> Culture was increasingly thought of as a resource to be used in programmes which aimed at bringing about changes in acceptable norms and forms of behaviour and consolidation those norms as self-acting imperatives by inscribing them within broadly disseminated regimes of self-management.
>
> Bennett (1995: 23)

World Heritage articulates the historical link between states and heritage, and the convention prescribes that all World Heritage designations require state endorsement (UNESCO 1972, article three). In practice, this fuels conflict, for instance between states and marginalized groups that feel that their heritage is excluded from the official history of their country, or between states when different

governments lay claim on heritage sites in border areas. Numerous scholars have called attention to such conflicts and the case studies abound. For instance, citizens of Turkish North Cyprus struggle to have their heritage acknowledged on the World Heritage List because Cyprus's government seeks to establish a Greek identity for the island (Scott 2002); in the 2000s, the governments of Cambodia and Thailand fought over the right to nominate the Temple of Preah Vihear for World Heritage status (Silverman 2011); Tibetans continue to lament that the Mountain Resort and its Outlying Temples became Chinese World Heritage in 1994, for this placed the Buddhist site firmly within the PRC's multi-ethnic propaganda (Hevia 2001); and the government of Laos deliberately downplayed the social and ceremonial functions of the Town of Luang Prabang when it nominated the place for World Heritage status on the basis of its architecture and aesthetics only (Long & Sweet 2006). All these case studies emphasize that the 1972 World Heritage Convention offers state parties a tool with which to disseminate national messages, and with which to buttress nationalist schemes. In doing so, these studies make a valid point and they offer important insights into how World Heritage fosters conflict, opposition and alliances. Yet, at the same time, there is also an important hiatus in these studies – they fail to engage with the notion of the state critically.

Already more than seventy-five years ago, the anthropologist Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1940) suggested that 'the state' does not exist. He wrote:

> In writings on political institutions there is a good deal of discussion about the nature and the origin of the State, which is usually represented as being an entity over and above the human individuals who make up a society, having as one of its attributes something called 'sovereignty', and sometimes spoken of as having a will (law often being defined as the will of the State) or as issuing commands. The State, in this sense, does not exist in the phenomenological world; it's a fiction of the philosophers. What does exist is an organization, i.e. a collection of individual human beings connected by a complex system of relations. Within that organization different individuals have different roles, and some are in possession of special power or authority, as chiefs or elders capable of giving commands which will be obeyed, as legislators or judges, and so on. There is no such thing as the power of The State; there are only, in reality, powers of individuals – kings, prime ministers, magistrates, policemen, party bosses, and voters.
>
> Radcliffe-Brown (1940: xxiii)

Abrams (1988) suggested that since Radcliffe-Brown did not believe in the state he saw no use in examining it – to understand relations of power it sufficed to study governance and politics (*Ibid*.: 75). Abrams himself took a different perspective: he accepted Radcliffe-Brown's comment that the state does not exist as a tangible thing in itself, but simultaneously stressed that there are, nevertheless, powerful ideas of the state that suggest otherwise. These ideas, Abrams suggested, mask political practice as it is and serve to convey ideological power. For Abrams, 'the state' is a governmental technique, or a form of moral regulation (*Ibid*.: 77) that means to legitimize and reinforce the subordination of the larger public.

From the 1990s onwards, and in the wake of Abrams' landmark study, various scholars further worked on how the idea of the state aims to foster national obedience. Attention has been drawn to, among other things, how an image of the state as distinct from the rest of society is socially produced and maintained (Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Li 2005; Mitchell 1991); to how the effectiveness of the state depends on its mystification and fetishization (Taussig 1993); or to how the idea of the state creates effects beyond government and national institutions and surfaces throughout society (Li 2005; Trouillot 2001). This literature underscores the hegemony of the notion of the state and at the same time suggests that, in order to understand how this hegemony works, we must look into the actual institutions, individuals, policies, power structures, and so on, where the idea of the state is productive. Many World Heritage case studies fail to do precisely that – they buy into the idea of the state without scrutinizing or unpacking it, and in doing so they mistake the state's symbolic purpose for empirical reality. This is furthermore sustained by World Heritage's depoliticized and technical rhetoric, which I discuss later, that presents state parties as simple administrative entities that serve a mere bureaucratic purpose.

Those World Heritage case studies that neglect to address the idea of the state critically typically pay little or no attention to the actual individuals and institutions that are responsible for specific World Heritage nominations (but see Scholze 2008). However, the coming chapters reveal that doing so is vital for understanding how World Heritage functions: if we do not deconstruct World Heritage state parties into their actual agents, then we may fail to recognize the social and political processes that propel and complicate World Heritage designations. One consequence of such a failure seems to be that, at times, World Heritage is too easily portrayed as a nationalist tool (see for instance Askew 2010). Sharma & Gupta (2006) have indicated that the terms state, nation, and nation state are often used interchangeably and without much consideration or awareness. This has historical reasons, for the conjunction of 'nation' and 'state' normalized from the nineteenth century onwards (Trouillot 2001: 130) – one implication is that the two are seldom distinguished from one another theoretically:

> The concept of the nation-state has so thoroughly conjoined the state with the nation that it is almost impossible to think of one without the other […]. Theories of the state always have implicit in them theories of nationalism; similarly, theories of nationalism assume some theory of the state in that nationalism is often seen as a state project.
>
> Sharma & Gupta (2006: 7)

In quite a few World Heritage case studies the amalgamation of nation and state has come to translate into the logic that because World Heritage Sites depend on state approval they inevitably carry a nationalist message in them (see for instance Hevia 2001; Long & Sweet 2006; Scott 2002; Silverman 2011). I disagree with this and stress that World Heritage status might be pursued for reasons other than nation-building. Different parts of this dissertation illustrate this. In chapter two, for instance, I show that Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site primarily sprang from struggles between government

institutes over management authority. In chapter five, furthermore, I demonstrate that the 2013 modification to Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site rested on an explicit intention to challenge the Kenyan state administration.

Natural World Heritage is culture

In the second half of the nineteenth century two prominent figures emerged within Britain's conservation scene: John Ruskin and William Morris. Both were at the forefront of the preservation of historic relics and personified a particular British conservation ideology. Roughly a century later this ideology helped to shape the World Heritage Programme.

Painter, architect and critic John Ruskin was one of the few early advocates of a 'conserve as found' conservation ethos (Smith 2006: 19). At the time, Victorian renovators restored ancient buildings such as medieval churches and cathedrals based on an idea of what such buildings had looked like in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries – they aimed to recover a building's original appearance and often made major architectural interventions (*Ibid.*). Ruskin, however, criticized such practices and argued that buildings acquire a soul over time, which was to be protected against Victorian renovators' brutal methods:

> Neither by the public, nor by those who have the care of public monuments, is the true meaning of the word *restoration* understood. It means the most total destruction which a building can suffer: a destruction out of which no remnants can be gathered; a destruction accompanied with false descriptions of the things destroyed. Do not let us deceive ourselves in this important matter; it is *impossible*, as impossible as to raise the dead, to restore anything that has ever been great or beautiful in architecture. […] that spirit which is given only by the hand and eye of the workman, never can be recalled. Another spirit may be given by another time, and it is then a new building; but the spirit of the dead workman cannot be summoned up, and commanded to direct other hands, and other thoughts. And as for direct and simple copying, it is palpably impossible. What copying can there be of surfaces that have been worn half an inch down? The whole finish of the work was in the half inch that is gone […] There was yet in the old *some* life, some mysterious suggestion of what it had been, and of what it had lost; some sweetness in the gentle lines which rain and sun had wrought. There can be none in the brute hardness of the new carving.
>
> Ruskin (1899 [1849]: 161-162 original emphases)

Ruskin called for conservation methods that merely prevented further decay. His critical writings on Victorian restoration techniques, and in particular his popular essay *Seven Lamps of Architecture* published in 1849 from which the above is an excerpt, inspired William Morris (Burman in Smith 2006: 20).

William Morris was a textile designer, poet and novelist born some fifteen years after John Ruskin in 1834. In 1887, he founded the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB) in Bloomsbury, a British conservation initiative that is still active today. The SPAB's ideology was firmly grounded in Ruskin's ideas on proper conservation and it advocated a kind of 'conservation repair' that intervened with the fabric of buildings as little as possible (Smith 2006: 20). The SPAB's approach eventually proved decisive for the development of a typically British heritage philosophy, not in the least because in the course of the twentieth century the organization came to direct official legislation and policy setting (*Ibid*.) – to this day, British heritage regulations echo Ruskin's outlook on acceptable conservation practices and the country's current legal instruments continue to lean on the architect's ideals (*Ibid*.). The explicit concern with conservation techniques distinguished British heritage customs from heritage practices elsewhere in Europe, for instance in France. But there was also another important difference: the notion of patrimoine confined to the preservation of cultural objects, yet Ruskin and Morris also pressed for the conservation of ornamental landscapes and sceneries (Grijzenhout 2007: 10).

Both John Ruskin and William Morris were admirers of the British countryside. They had a taste for the picturesque and the pastoral (Smith 2006: 20), which they considered threatened by the country's advanced state of industrialization and urbanization. Above all, Ruskin and Morris advocated conserving medieval rural homes and churches and they pressed for the safekeeping of the aesthetic landscapes in which these homes and churches were found – for both men, the preservation of buildings and sceneries was inevitably entwined (see for instance Lowenthal 2005: 84). In the course of the twentieth century, Britain's national imagination increasingly formed around such rural panoramas (Soper 1995: 196, see also Williams 1973), and eventually country houses became central to Britain's body of national heritage.[6]

John Ruskin's and William Morris's calls for the conservation of rural landscapes resonated with developments taking place elsewhere, namely American patriots' efforts to cultivate a sense of national belonging. In European countries, literary and artistic achievements had been central to the formation of a unique national identity, but in the United States, which lacked such achievements, nationalist rhetoric came to revolve around the splendidness of nature (Nash 1967). The continent's wilderness turned into a collective source of pride – as such, the United States became one of the few places where nature played an explicit role in summoning national solidarity (Haila 1997: 133).

The American pride for nature gave way to concerns for nature conservation, which were formulated for the first time in George Perkins Marsh's book *Man and Nature; or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action* published in 1864 (Lowenthal 2005: 83). In this publication, Marsh indicated that, unless the United States would learn to manage its natural resources better, the continent's wilderness would eventually succumb to the pressure of urbanization and industrialization. Marsh's work prompted the naturalist and travel writer John Muir to take action and, in 1892, the latter cofounded the Sierra Club, an environmental movement that included nature lovers, scientists,

and activists. Muir's travel writings were widely read and he managed to mobilize broad national support (Tsing 2005: 95-97). These writings echoed Muir's compassion for the United States' wilderness, and presented American nature as God-like and worthy of worship in its own right. It drew heavily on spiritual rhetoric – to Muir, nature had an intrinsic value and deserved religious devotion (*Ibid.*: 96).

The advocacy of John Muir, in turn, paved the way for the emergence of the American National Parks model. This model found its origin in the foundation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872 (see for instance Neumann 1998). It rested on the presumption that nature was best maintained in closed-off sanctuaries where wilderness was protected against human destruction and exploitation. The national parks model departed from an understanding of nature as pristine, Eden-like, and ideally unspoilt, which, for instance, also informed the landscape portraits of American painters such as Thomas Cole, Asher Brown Durand, Frederic Edwin Church, Albert Bierstadt, and Thomas Moran (Nash 1967), or the writings of American authors such as Ralph Waldo Emerson or Henry David Thoreau (Wolmer 2007: 13).

Such understandings of nature found their roots in Romanticism, which experienced its heyday in the first half of the nineteenth century and which, for instance, also came to inspire John Ruskin (Smith 2006: 20). Romanticism was partially a response to Europe's industrial developments and it articulated a nostalgic longing for nature not yet affected by the polluting and destructive effects of industrial demands. The separation of man and nature that is implicit in the Romanticist nostalgia for virgin nature has its own and much longer genealogy – it has been suggested that in medieval times the orthodox concept of nature still included man (Williams 1980: 74), but that during the Renaissance period that followed nature came to stand out as a 'realm apart from the everyday present' (Lowenthal 2005: 82). With the onset of technological developments in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, nature was increasingly perceived in mechanistic terms and a view of nature as animistic made way for a view of nature as employable to satisfy human needs (Soper 1995: 43).

Under the influence of Romanticism, the conceptual distinction between human-shaped environments and a nature existing in isolation from human intervention became increasingly authoritative. It gave way to the modern ideology of naturalism (Escobar 1999)[7] that conceived of nature as a place devoid of history and culture (see also Schama 1995). Through the popularity of the National Parks model, which soon spread beyond the United States, the separation of man-made and natural environments became key to environmentalist rhetoric worldwide. This had important consequences, especially on African territory where pristine understandings of nature came to inform colonial policy and administration. In the next chapter, I deal with this in more detail and discuss its effects on Kenya more specifically.

The American celebration of nature as it materialized from the late nineteenth century onwards had repercussions for the development of World Heritage. When the convention was drafted at the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, the United States pressed for the inclusion of natural sites (UNESCO

2008[B]: 7; see also Adams & Hutton 2007: 150) – a handful of international heritage treaties and agreements already existed, as the next section points out, but all these treaties and conventions focused exclusively on cultural historic relics. The motivation for the United States' lobby was evident: without the inclusion of natural heritage, the continent could not partake in the exhibition of masterpieces that the convention aimed to promote. Besides, to American patriots the United States' wilderness was equivalent to European monuments (Tsing 2005: 96) and deserved equal recognition.

The World Heritage Convention indeed came to include natural sites, and treated these as fundamentally different from cultural heritage. The first two articles of the convention immediately describe their differences and emphasize their mutual exclusiveness. Article one reads:

> For the purpose of this Convention, the following shall be considered as "cultural heritage":
>
> monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;
>
> groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science;
>
> sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.
>
> (UNESCO 1972, article one)

Article two reads:

> For the purpose of this Convention, the following shall be considered as "natural heritage":
>
> natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations, which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view;
>
> geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation;
>
> natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science, conservation or natural beauty.
>
> UNESCO (1972, article two)

Although these two articles do not explicitly mention it, they allude to the Romantic separation between human-shaped and natural environments. This division is also visible in the World Heritage

guidelines, which subject natural heritage and cultural heritage to different standards and principles. Criteria for the designation of cultural sites, for instance, focus on human creative genius, town planning, architecture, and artistic and literary achievements, while the criteria for the designation of natural sites focus on ecological processes, geological formations, and ecosystems (UNESCO 2013: article 77). In addition, cultural heritage sites and natural heritage sites must stand different tests of credibility: cultural sites are assessed on authenticity vested in an idea of historical truthfulness, while natural sites are assessed on biological integrity. Here, it is not historical depth and accuracy that matters but ecological intactness (*Ibid*.: articles 79-95). In practice, this means that nature does not have to be 'old' to become World Heritage – chapter five illustrates this and shows how a property that only recently converted to nature conservation managed to obtain World Heritage status. Finally, World Heritage's separation of natural and cultural heritage also finds expression in their institutional subdivision: the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) is responsible for the evaluation of natural heritage sites, while the Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM) are responsible for the evaluation of cultural heritage sites. In sum, the World Heritage Convention rests on a categorical separation of nature and culture – it allows for valuing both a property's cultural and natural features, for instance through the designation of cultural landscapes[8] or 'mixed heritage sites', but it nevertheless treats the two as intrinsically different.

It seems that the separation of natural heritage and cultural heritage also echoes in academia: natural and cultural heritage studies have come to occupy two distinct fields of academic interest that rarely overlap or engage with one another (but see Byrne & Ween 2015). Cultural heritage scholars have typically taken on the task of identifying problems associated with heritage's identification, its commodification, its recent popularity, and so on. Among other things, they have demonstrated that heritage claims are contemporary social, cultural and political constructions (see for instance Handler 2003; Harrison 2004; Probst 2011; Weiss 2007); they have drawn attention to struggles over heritage's definition, meaning and ownership (see for instance Berliner 2012; Creighton 2007; Herzfeld 1991; Rowlands & Butler 2007); and they have pointed out the principles on which current dominant understandings of heritage rest (see for instance Byrne 1991; Smith 2006).[9] Scholars dealing with the preservation of nature, on the other hand, largely deal with the social implications of conservation programmes and primarily focus on issues of access, resource use, resettlement, and the like (see for instance Adams & Hutton 2007; Brockington 2004; Duffy 2000; Igoe 2004; Neumann 1998; Nishizaki 2004). Such studies are essentially different from studies on cultural heritage because they do not explicitly address nature conservation as a form of heritage celebration. This split between cultural and natural heritage, both in practice as well as in academia, can be partially explained historically – the conservation of cultural relics and nature emerged under different historical circumstances and commented upon different political contexts, as this and preceding sections pointed out. Nevertheless,

I suggest that natural and cultural heritages are far more alike than is currently acknowledged – the reason for this is that our understandings of nature are culturally informed.

That ideas about nature are essentially cultural ideas is a theme that has received significant scholarly attention over the decades. Anthropologists, for instance, underscored the Western-centric character of nature/culture dichotomies while pointing out its inapplicability to other cultures (Barth 1975; Strathern 1980), and different suggestions have been made to replace dualistic models with alternative conceptual frameworks that account for the culturally diverse ways in which people interact with their physical environments (cf Descola 1996; Haila 2000; Latour 1993). Likewise, it has been argued that the nature/culture dichotomy is always incapable of capturing man's relation to his surroundings, regardless of one's whereabouts or one's cultural background, because this relation is perpetually in-the-making, shaped and reshaped, and thus unavoidably temporal (Bender 2002; Ingold 1993; Ronayne 2001).

These works, as well as specific historical developments such as Europe's industrialization, the rise of Romanticism, or the emergence of the American National Parks model, suggest that when the term 'nature' is used one should consider which cultural model for nature is taken for granted in the act (Beck 1996: 2). I do not mean to reduce nature to a mere discursive construct, and there are natural powers and processes that operate independently of how we talk about them. In the words of Kate Soper: 'it is not the discourse of 'global warming' or 'industrial pollution' that has created the conditions of which it speaks' (1995: 249). But the point here is that the ecological rhetoric that World Heritage and the environmental movement at large employ, which relies on a purely scientific presentation of nature and which presents itself as neutral through the recital of 'hard scientific facts' such as biodiversity records, is a political discourse – it conceals that nature is not only ecological processes, but also cultural practice, and it conflates the reality of nature with its ideological representation (*Ibid.*: 251).

Approaching nature in this way, cultural heritage and natural heritage no longer appear radically different. In fact, they look quite similar: both are the tangible evidence of specific cultural ideas about how to deal with our material surroundings. Mt. Kenya's 1997 natural World Heritage designation was not an inevitable outcome of the mountain's natural extraordinariness. Rather, it marked the victory of one particular cultural idea over a range of others. This entire work rests on that assumption, but in chapter three I engage with it directly and discuss how Mt. Kenya's naturalization marginalized cultural and political pasts.

World Heritage's depoliticizing technical idiom

By the late nineteenth century, the loss of national heritage, especially during times of warfare, had become a shared concern between European nations. This concern led to the establishment of

international treaties in which signatories promised to respect each other's historical sites and objects (Grijzenhout 2007: 11-12). One of the first such treaties was the Declaration Concerning Laws and Customs of War drafted in 1874 (Elliot & Schmutz 2012: 262-263), which was followed by the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. The latter specifically stated that sacred edifices, historic monuments, buildings used for artistic purposes and a number of other places were to be spared in bombardments – it even encouraged countries to identify such places with clearly visible rectangular panels that could be seen from the air (*Ibid*.).

During the First World War, several countries made additional efforts to protect heritage against warfare demolition, and in the aftermath of the war the preservation of heritage was further institutionalized within the League of Nations (Elliot & Schmutz 2012). Among other things, this resulted in the adoption of the Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic Monuments in 1931, and in the adoption of the Roerich Pact in 1935 (*Ibid*.: 264). The Second World War had a similar effect, and after 1945 renewed attempts were made to offer still better protection for monuments and important cultural sites. This led to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict in 1954, but it also gave way to different lobbies that called for the preservation of specific sites. Amongst these was the lobby to save the Abu Simbel Temples in Egypt.

Shortly after the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, the Republic of Egypt announced its plan to erect a dam at a place called Aswan. The revolution had brought an end to the British occupation of Egypt as well as to the dynasty of Muhammad Ali, and the post-revolution government sought a prestige project to demonstrate its newly obtained power and its capacity for modernization. It aimed for a massive dam that meant to regulate the floodwaters of the Nile – Egypt struggled to meet demands for water and energy, and dams in general summoned a sense of progress and prosperity:

> Dams were unique in the scope and manner in which they altered the distribution of resources across space and time, among entire communities and ecosystems. They offered more than just a promise of agricultural development or technical progress. For many postcolonial governments, this ability to rearrange the natural and social environment became a means to demonstrate the strength of the modern state as a techno-economic power.
>
> Mitchell (2002: 21)

The project communicated to Egyptians and the international community alike that the government was in full control, and the Aswan dam was to be the centrepiece of post-independent state building (Mitchell 2002: 43).

The Egyptian government intended to expand an earlier dam that had been built by the British in 1902. That dam had already been extended in 1912 and again in 1933 (Hassan 2007: 75), but still failed to control the Nile effectively. In the 1950s, different experts expressed their worries and indicated that further expansion would bring about salinization, a decline in soil fertility, the spread of disease, coastal erosion and loss of water due to evaporation and seepage (Mitchell 2002: 45). Despite

such worries, the Egyptian government pursued its plans, even though it lacked the financial resources. Initially, Western countries supported the project and offered funding: in 1955 the World Bank agreed to lend $200 million and both the United States and Britain made further financial contributions (Boyle 2005: 104). These developments took place against the background of the Cold War and it has been suggested that Western countries primarily subsidized the Aswan dam to prevent Egypt from turning to the Soviet Union. When the country nevertheless reinforced its relations with the USSR and recognized the communist government of China, Western donors took their hands of the project and withdrew funding (*Ibid*.: 104-105). In response, Egypt's leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal as well as the British-French Suez Canal Company. This further increased tensions and resulted in the 1956 Suez crisis, during which Israel, France and Britain attempted to remove Nasser from power.

In the meantime, international protests against the Aswan project began to emerge. These protests were not rooted in the dam's possible ecological effects, but rather were concentrated on the cultural harm it would cause. The Aswan dam was planned in a region called Nubia, which included a number of valleys that harboured old temples such as the Abu Simbel Temples. These valleys would be flooded and, as a result, the last remnants of ancient Egypt civilizations would disappear under water (Hassan 2007). The lobby against the loss of such cultural heritage became mixed up with Cold War politicking (Basu & Modest 2015: 18), which once again underscores my earlier point that it is vital to unpack state parties in order to understand heritage politics, but in 1959 the Egyptian and the Sudanese governments themselves requested support in saving Nubia's treasures. This prompted UNESCO to organize a relocation campaign and the organization began to collect money for dismantling and rebuilding the temples. The operation that followed was unprecedented in scale: it was extremely laborious to document everything item for item, and archaeologists as well as other specialists from around the world contributed to the task. Afterwards, some of the twenty-three temples that were saved were shipped to other parts of the world, and today Nubian temples decorate the exhibition halls of museums in, among other places, New York, Madrid, Turin, Berlin, and Leiden (Hassan 2007: 80). The entire undertaking eventually cost $80 million and was funded by roughly fifty countries (Elliot & Schmutz 2012: 265) – the United States made the largest contribution and paid $12 million for the rescue of the Abu Simbel Temples alone (Berg 1972: 34).

UNESCO's salvage operation concluded in 1968. The project was considered an overall conservation triumph: not only had important temples been saved, the scheme had also shown 'the importance of solidarity and nations' shared responsibility in conserving outstanding cultural sites' (UNESCO 2008[B]: 7). Abu Simbel became a token for the urgency of international cooperation in heritage conservation (Stoczkowski 2009: 9) and triggered a range of other international conservation campaigns, among others in Italy, Pakistan and Indonesia. It also created momentum for a renewed interest in heritage conventions and existing treaties were again revised – this brought about the 1964

Venice Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites and, finally, it paved the way for the World Heritage Convention.

The World Heritage Convention, and to a lesser degree also the Venice Charter, differed from earlier treaties in at least one regard. Older arrangements had stemmed from national concerns for heritage safeguarding, and they had meant to foster mutual respect for heritage assets between countries. But the World Heritage Convention did not draw on such rhetoric. Rather than underscoring heritage's national merits, it introduced heritage sites as universal treasures that enrich humanity at large (UNESCO 1972: preamble), and in doing so it aimed to cultivate a sense of global communality that would feed into an ethic of shared custody (see for instance Elliot & Schmutz 2012). Thus, World Heritage came to incorporate two ill-matching principles, as I already indicated at the start of this chapter: it granted state parties the exclusive right to identify and nominate World Heritage Sites, but at the same time it introduced World Heritage as a global good belonging to the world at large (Hitchcock 2004; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004).

Six years after the adoption of the convention the World Heritage List was founded. The list meant to offer an overview of all the sites that the convention acknowledged and intended to record all the world's most outstanding sites. Yet, the text of the World Heritage Convention primarily focused on World Heritage's definition and only gave limited clues as to how such sites were to be identified. For this reason, UNESCO drafted guidelines that were to aid state parties through the World Heritage application procedure. Over the years, these guidelines have been adapted and republished many times. The basic outline of the application procedure remained the same, although the requirements have become stricter – in the past, for instance, hand-drafted World Heritage Site maps were accepted, but today GIS maps are the norm.

The World Heritage guidelines describe the nomination procedure as follows. First, countries must endorse the convention. At present, nearly all countries have, but in the past this provision limited the number of state parties that could put forward World Heritage nominations.[10] Second, countries must compile a tentative list of potential World Heritage Sites. Only when a property has been on this list for a number of years is it eligible for World Heritage nomination. Third, state parties must draft a nomination file, which, among other things, should refer to a set of pre-defined selection criteria and make a statement on a site's outstanding universal value. This file must then be submitted to the World Heritage Centre in Paris, which checks if the document contains all the stipulated information. If this is the case, it forwards it to an advisory body, which is IUCN for natural heritage nominations and ICOMOS and/or ICCROM for cultural heritage nominations. These advisory bodies evaluate the nomination file on its content and send an expert for a field visit. After the field visit, the advisory body delivers its recommendation on whether or not the site in question merits World Heritage status. This recommendation is passed on to the World Heritage Committee, which consists of twenty-one state representatives who meet annually. Finally, the Committee votes on the nomination – if it receives a majority outcome it is added to the World Heritage List.

The World Heritage guidelines present the identification and designation of World Heritage Sites as a technical problem that is solvable through the intervention of the right kind of expertise. This idea is further reinforced by how the notions of authenticity and integrity serve to assess the legitimacy of respectively cultural and natural heritage sites – authenticity reduces history to something that can be revealed through the recollection of historical facts (see also Rowlands & de Jong 2007) while integrity reduces nature to something that can be revealed through the recollection of scientific facts (see also Latour 2004). This 'rendering technical' (Li 2007: 7-10) of World Heritage has at least two effects. First, it takes heritage away from the laymen (Smith 2006: 30) and puts it under the authority of archaeologists, historians, biologists and ecologists. In doing so, it constitutes boundaries between those who are positioned as trustees and those subjected to expert direction (Li 2007: 7). In the process, it reproduces hierarchies of knowledge and it should therefore be understood as a display of power (Mitchell 2002). Joyce's (2005) study on the Maya staircases in Copàn, Honduras, illustrates this. It shows how plans to replace the staircases with a replica brought about struggles between archaeologists, historians and conservationists who fought over decision-making power. Within these struggles there was no place for the 'non-professional' inhabitants of the area, and they were never invited into the debate.

Secondly, in presenting the designation of World Heritage Sites as a technical undertaking, World Heritage depoliticize in a way that recalls James Ferguson's (1990) work on an aid project in Lesotho. Ferguson described how the project reduced the notion of poverty to a statistically measurable condition and argued that this was a highly political undertaking: it pre-empted discussion on the root causes of poverty, including the perpetuation of inequality grounded in discriminatory land distribution or access to jobs, while at the same time it enabled the Lesotho state to expand its power into formerly inaccessible regions where it then continued maintaining such inequalities. Ferguson claimed:

> By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of "development" is the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-politicized in the world today. At the same time, by making the intentional blueprints for "development" so highly visible, a "development" project can end up performing extremely sensitive political operations involving the entrenchment and expansion of institutional state power almost invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical mission to which no one can object.
>
> Ferguson (1990: 256)

Such dynamics also apply to World Heritage. In the coming chapters, I draw attention to the various ways in which technical definitions of 'state party' and 'nature' depoliticized Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation and catered for a number of political operations. In chapter two, for instance, I address how these definitions came to obscure that Mt. Kenya's 1997 World Heritage listing was

partially the result of struggles between two government institutes, which harked back to colonial policies; in chapter three, I illustrate that they concealed Kenya's mid-1990s political conditions, which sustained Mt. Kenya's naturalization; and in chapters four and five I reveal that they covered up racial struggles over landownership.

World Heritage's depoliticization thus resonates with Mt. Kenya's particular conditions, but it also has wider implications that touch upon all World Heritage designations – World Heritage's technical idiom obscures the politicking that takes place within the World Heritage Committee and it masks how state representatives form coalitions. It has been suggested that these coalitions resemble alliances between UN member states more generally and attention has been raised to the BRICS bloc that consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Meskell & Brumann 2015: 33-34). Recently, the representative of China, for instance, supported a South African World Heritage application, presumably in exchange for South Africa's support for the expansion of Chinese trade and industry ventures (Meskell 2012[B]: 150). Due to alliances like these, the members of the World Heritage Committee have become increasingly indifferent to the recommendations that IUCN, ICOMOS and ICCROM put forward. This development can be traced to 2010, when the World Heritage Committee changed in composition and came to include several countries that have experienced difficulty in adding their national heritage to the World Heritage List for reasons that I discuss in the next section. Since their appointment, these countries have employed their decision-making power to catch up, and many of them have come to perceive IUCN, ICOMOS and ICCROM as 'spoil sports' (Brumann 2014[B]: 2185). In the past, World Heritage state representatives typically had a background in heritage conservation, but today many of them are trained career diplomats (Brumann 2014[B]: 2186) – this hints at the type of skills considered most useful, and at present voting sessions are preceded by aggressive lobbying (Meskell 2013).

Finally, World Heritage's technical idiom is vested in an extensive bureaucratic framework. This framework is central to how the convention tries to foster heritage management and conservation, for its lacks official sanction and fully relies on governments' goodwill. One IUCN specialist,[11] for instance, described World Heritage to me as a voluntary club in which the members do what they want. A Kenyan cultural heritage expert,[12] moreover, stressed that the World Heritage Committee can do nothing to impose the convention's rules and regulations – in theory, it could de-list a site, but this is considered highly insulting and it has only happened twice throughout World Heritage's entire history.[13] Maswood's (2000) study on how the World Heritage Committee failed to prevent uranium mining in Kakadu National Park, Australia, further underscores World Heritage's lack of sanction, as does Burns's (2009) study on how the United States' refusal to address climate change undermines the committee's credibility.

In light of the World Heritage convention's lack of power to enforce, governing through cultivating desired behaviour has become all the more important – I suggest that Foucault's work on the governmentalization of the state, which I discussed earlier, applies to World Heritage as well. The

circulation of authoritative texts, a practice that has been considered to be at the heart of statecraft (Gupta 2012; Hull 2012), is key in this regard. In cooperation with IUCN, ICOMOS and ICROM, UNESCO frequently publishes conservation manuals and best practice directives. Also, it constantly produces site evaluation reports, decision documents, statistics, maps, and so on. Moreover, the World Heritage guidelines demand a similar effort from state parties, and every World Heritage designation leans on heaps of paperwork. Together, all this documentation forms the kernel of World Heritage governance and is intended to convey World Heritage's legitimacy. At different moments in this dissertation I deal with this issue explicitly: in chapter two, for instance, I examine how the file on Mt. Kenya's 1997 World Heritage designation constructed subjects and social realities so as to foster administrative control, and in chapter five I do the same for the file on the 2013 extension.

World Heritage as a contemporary fascination for the past

In 1978, the first twelve World Heritage Sites were identified. The year after, another forty-five followed and by the mid-1980s the list already counted more than two hundred designations. In short, there was an instant enthusiasm for World Heritage. This enthusiasm echoed the increasing popularity of heritage more generally (Lowenthal 1998; Probst 2012), which itself mirrored important cultural and political changes: immediately after the Second World War the emphasis had been on progress and technological development, but by the 1980s the focus on the future had made way for a focus on the past. The celebration of memory became a key concern in Western societies (Huyssen 2000: 21), and over the past decades certain heritage expressions have become 'imbued with a sacrality' (Meyer & De Witte 2013: 276-277), to the extent that heritage could be considered a contemporary religion.

World Heritage marked the beginning of a large, international heritage movement (Smith 2006). From its inception, the World Heritage List aspired to be balanced and representative (Labadi 2005). But as the number of sites grew exponentially throughout the 1980s a pattern nevertheless revealed itself. By the late 1980s, World Heritage was concentrated in European countries and largely comprised historic towns and religious buildings, particularly Christian ones (*Ibid.*: 90). It advantaged elitist architecture over vernacular buildings (UNESCO 1994[A]), and especially the number of African World Heritage Sites lagged behind (Breen 2007). The World Heritage convention claimed to watch over the world's most extraordinary places, but slowly it was becoming apparent that its particular understanding of extraordinariness only applied to certain parts of the world (Anthamatten & Hazen 2007; Byrne 1991; Labadi 2007).

As the uneven distribution of heritage sites became more pronounced, critics began to reject World Heritage for its Western-centric disposition (see for instance Elliot & Schmutz 2012; Eriksen 2001; Rowlands & De Jong 2007; Smith 2006) and its 'West knows best' (Kersel & Luke 2015: 71) attitude. In response to such criticism, UNESCO took a number of measures. For instance, it carried

out a study between 1987 and 1993 that meant to identify gaps in the World Heritage List and that aimed to encourage the nomination of sites in underrepresented categories (Labadi 2005: 90). In 1994, it also organized a meeting that brought together a handful of heritage professionals from Canada, Brazil, France, Australia and Germany (see UNESCO 1994[A]) to explicitly address the disparities and to develop a new overall vision to tackle the issue. This meeting resulted in a document called Global Strategy for a Representative, Balanced and Credible World Heritage List that continues to guide World Heritage applications to this day. But UNESCO not only actively motivated the designation of marginalized heritages – one of World Heritage's key concepts, authenticity, also came under review following controversy over one particular nomination.

In 1993, the government of Japan applied for World Heritage status for a temple complex called Hôryûji, in Ikaruga, Nara Prefecture. Records traced Hôryûji's origins to the seventh or eighth centuries, but the temple consisted of wooden buildings that had been rebuilt numerous times since. Taking this into consideration, World Heritage experts maintained that the temple was no longer in its 'original' condition and rejected the nomination. Japanese stakeholders fiercely protested against the decision: they objected to World Heritage's restricted understanding of authenticity, and claimed that the survival of the skills needed to rebuild the temple time and again was of greater value than its actual physical shape (Brumann 2014[B]). Eventually, the experts gave in, and in 1994 UNESCO published a paper that reconsidered the notion of authenticity (see UNESCO 1994[B]). This paper adopted a cultural relativist definition of the concept and stated: 'the respect due to all cultures requires that heritage properties must be considered and judged within the cultural contexts to which they belong' (UNESCO 1994[B]: article 11).

While UNESCO undertook a number of measures to reduce regional and thematic imbalances in the World List, a range of other concerns began to emerge. Under UNESCO's encouragement, the list had continued to grow rapidly, and each year dozens of sites had been added to it – by 2000, the total number of World Heritage Sites counted nearly seven hundred. In consideration of this, heritage experts began to argue that the World Heritage List was defeating its purpose: they claimed that UNESCO had been so concerned with a fair distribution that it had accepted countless sites that failed to meet World Heritage criteria, and they argued that the list had ceased to be a collection of the most extraordinary places only (see for instance Anthamatten & Hazen 2007; Askew 2010). Such critiques prompted widespread discussion among heritage experts about what it meant to be of 'outstanding universal value' as well as about how such values were to be measured.[14] One of the effects of these debates was that the World Heritage application procedure became stricter, more time consuming, and far more expensive (see also Willems & Comer 2011: 161). Poorer countries, which typically were also the underrepresented countries, once again found themselves in a marginalized position, although in recent years different funds have been established to support them. Among these initiatives is, for instance, the African World Heritage Fund that was founded in 2006, which seeks to offer assistance

in the application for World Heritage status and which aims to train local heritage experts and site managers.

More than forty years after its inception, it has been suggested that, today, the World Heritage Convention might be considered dead (Meskell 2012[B]: 147). In addition to the increased politicking that I discussed earlier, and in addition to what has been considered an inflation of World Heritage status due to the large number of designations,[15] World Heritage is currently suffering serious budget cuts that appear to have brought the entire programme to an impasse (Meskell 2013). World Heritage's financial troubles were a direct result of the United Nation's decision to accept Palestine as a non-member observer state in November 2012, after which the United States, previously World Heritage's largest sponsor, withdrew its funding – this again articulates just how much World Heritage is entangled in global politics, and it is reminiscent of how the Cold War complicated the rescue of the Nubian temples in Egypt in the 1960s.

Throughout this chapter I have dealt with different historical episodes, all of which have had a bearing on what World Heritage looks like today. The argument implicit in this is that World Heritage is the most recent phase in a chain of events that goes back more than two centuries. Interestingly, however, the current phase is one that largely ignores its own genealogy, for it conceives of heritage as static and unchanging. Scholars have repeatedly argued that heritage is not a quality located in an object or a place, but a mode of cultural production (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998; see also Smith 2006) that has recourse to the past, but which is also inherently different from that past:

> We use objects to refer to, or think about, the past. But those cultural links to the past can exist only in the present and only within present-day semiotic activities. To save or conserve the past, tradition, or heritage is to do something new, today.
>
> Handler (2003: 355)

Heritage is a temporal social construction, which reveals more about those who make heritage claims than about the sites or objects that are claimed. The World Heritage Convention fails to accommodate this and instead departs from a static definition of heritage that presumes that objects and places have a constant and permanent meaning. Chapter five illustrates this and describes how a 2010 request to expand Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site was unsuccessful because it did not match the description used for the 1997 designation. World Heritage defines heritage in a way that does not allow for change – cultural, political or otherwise. As such, it fixates meaning, and fails to fully understand the ramifications of its own historical roots.

BECOMING WORLD HERITAGE

The 'State Party' Behind Mt. Kenya's 1997 Heritage Listing

The World Heritage Committee declared Mt. Kenya a natural World Heritage Site during its twenty-first session, held at the beginning of December 1997 in Naples. The World Heritage Committee welcomed Mt. Kenya, together with forty-five other heritage sites, onto the World Heritage List with the following official statement:

> The Committee inscribed this property under natural criteria (vii) and (ix) as one of the most impressive landscapes of Eastern Africa with its rugged glacier-clad summits, Afro-alpine moor lands and diverse forests, which illustrate outstanding ecological processes.
>
> <div align="right">UNESCO (1997: 38)</div>

A year earlier, the Kenyan state party had submitted an application to grant Mt. Kenya World Heritage status. In this chapter, I unpack this 'Kenyan state party': among other things, I consider whom it consisted of, how it legitimized itself and where it caused friction. In short, I give the Kenyan state party that prompted Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation a face – or better still, faces. This will reveal a range of conflicts and negotiations that the abstract notion of state party otherwise conceals.

In this chapter, I take the position that it is crucial to consider the actual people involved in individual World Heritage designations, in order to begin formulating an answer to the question of what World Heritage really represents and conserves. I reveal that the actors behind Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing did not have a nationalist agenda, as is often assumed of World Heritage

participants, but that they were primarily interested in securing management authority. This was a result of long-standing conflicts over resource control. These conflicts have their roots in how colonial administrators shaped forest and wildlife supervision, both legislatively and practically, from roughly the beginning of the twentieth century onwards. In light of this, I will argue that Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation reinforces a set of colonial histories. Thus, it is not only a tribute to outstanding ecological processes, as UNESCO's official statement suggests, but also to former colonial rule.

The 1996 application

David Western, who in the mid-1990s served as director for the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), the national institute for the preservation of Kenya's wildlife and nature (that is introduced in more detail later), told me that the idea to nominate Mt. Kenya for World Heritage status had come from someone within IUCN. At a certain moment in 1995 or 1996 Jim Thorsell, a Canadian conservationist who headed IUCN's World Heritage Programme between 1984 and 2003, had contacted Western and had pointed out Mt. Kenya's World Heritage potential to him. Western[16] remembered how Thorsell had said that the 1990s were 'a good time' to nominate Mt. Kenya for World Heritage status. Western himself explained to me that he had interpreted this as a compliment regarding his directorship. He stressed that his predecessor had left the KWS in chaos, and indicated that only after he had cleaned up did the KWS become an efficient and transparent institute. He reckoned that IUCN had witnessed and appreciated his efforts, and that by 1996 it was ready to accept the KWS as a credible World Heritage partner.

But there were also other explanations of what 'a good time' could have referred to. A former IUCN employee who used to be stationed at IUCN's head office in Gland, but who moved back to Kenya a few years ago to take up another job, offered a different perspective. To him, the 1990s marked a period in which IUCN tried to gain control over the excessive growth in World Heritage Sites. He indicated to me that the institute foresaw that this growth would inflate World Heritage status and, in response, IUCN began to take measures to slow down the number of designations. One of these measures was benchmarking, i.e. making sure that at least the most extraordinary places were on the World Heritage List so that these places could serve as a threshold to prevent the designation of less remarkable or less exceptional sites. Together with a range of other African alpines, for instance the Ruwenzori mountains in Uganda and Kilimanjaro in Tanzania, Mt. Kenya was such a benchmarking site the former IUCN employee stressed to me, and he believed that Jim Thorsell's comment primarily related to these institutional dynamics. It should be added that Thorsell himself did not recall he had said anything about timing at all – in fact, he wrote in an email to me that he was unsure whether he had taken the initiative for Mt. Kenya's World Heritage application at all.

Nevertheless, in a recent interview, Thorsell did point out exactly those developments that the former IUCN employee had also described to me (IUCN n.d.).

Regardless of precisely whose idea it had been to nominate Mt. Kenya for World Heritage status, and regardless of whether it had been developments within IUCN, the KWS or both that had paved the way for the application, David Western immediately recognized the possible benefits of World Heritage status. Although he had not known in advance whether Mt. Kenya's application would be approved, he nevertheless thought of the project as a positive way to inform international communities on the conservation progress that Kenya was making at the time. In short, he said to me, World Heritage was good advertisement. He could use such an advertisement, he stressed, because his predecessor had left Kenyan conservation stigmatized by corruption, militarization and violent top-down fortress conservation. He believed that World Heritage status for Mt. Kenya could improve the KWS's reputation, and could reconcile it with international donor organizations that had backed out after previous misdeeds.

With this in mind, David Western contacted Bongo Woodley[17] and asked for the latter's assistance. Woodley was the senior warden of Mt. Kenya National Park, and hence the person Western deemed most knowledgeable about the area. Woodley agreed to participate, and together with another KWS colleague called Joseph Mburugu he drafted Mt. Kenya's World Heritage application – Mburugu delivered a map on which the boundaries of the proposed heritage site were drawn, and Woodley wrote a short document of some ten pages that emphasized the uniqueness of Mt. Kenya's natural habitat, the content of which is discussed in more detail later.

After Bongo Woodley and Joseph Mburugu completed the document, David Western authorized it and signed it on behalf of the Kenyan State Party (The Government of the Republic of Kenya 1996: 6). The small bundle of papers was subsequently delivered to the World Heritage Centre in Paris, which considered it complete and forwarded it to IUCN for specialist evaluation. Next, IUCN sent one of its advisors to Mt. Kenya. This happened to be Jim Thorsell. After his field visit, Thorsell drafted an evaluation report, in which he raised a few concerns in relation to Mt. Kenya's potential World Heritage listing. Most importantly, he noted that parts of Mt. Kenya's forests were logged extensively and had degraded into arid and eroded lands (IUCN 1997: 69-70). Woodley and Mburugu had suggested designating all of Mt. Kenya's forests as a World Heritage Site, but Thorsell maintained that certain parts were not worthy of World Heritage status. He therefore advised the World Heritage Committee that Mt. Kenya was qualified for World Heritage listing, yet only on the condition that severely logged areas were removed from the application. This demonstrates that arguments for World Heritage justification are strongly embedded in processes of boundary setting, and it offers some insight into how World Heritage cuts out sites piecemeal from wider surroundings in order to satisfy, in this case, criteria of ecological integrity.

In reaction to Jim Thorsell's evaluation, Bongo Woodley composed a new map of what Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site was to look like, and drafted a site that excluded the most critically affected areas.

Like Joseph Mburugu's map, this one was rudimentary and basic, and the adjusted boundaries were simply drawn in by hand. Today, such practices are unthinkable and at present World Heritage applications must be accompanied by GPS maps, which are time-consuming and expensive to produce. But, at the time, IUCN and the World Heritage Committee accepted Woodley's revised nomination. Subsequently, the World Heritage Committee voted in favour of Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing. From December 1997 onwards, Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site was a fact.

The above shows that the 'state party' that applied for Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing only comprised two wildlife officers, namely Bongo Woodley and David Western. Western, moreover, hardly contributed to the preparation of the nomination, and only validated it afterwards. In essence, Woodley was the sole creator of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site. With hindsight, Woodley told me that he had taken on the task opportunistically: neither him, nor Western, had had a clear understanding of what World Heritage would bring them, for Mt. Kenya would be the country's first World Heritage Site.[18] He explained to me that, although Western and he had had certain ambitions for Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing, it had nevertheless been unclear where the project would end up, if anywhere at all. 'We just went ahead and thought let's see where it leads' he remarked. Like Western, Woodley had aspirations that Mt. Kenya's appearance on the World Heritage List would improve the KWS's reputation. But for Woodley, the importance of this exceeded the mere purpose of positive PR: since his appointment in the late 1980s he had been caught in an unresolvable administrative dilemma with regard to Mt. Kenya's daily management, and he had hoped that World Heritage Status would help him to gain international support for solving the dilemma to his benefit.

Bongo Woodley's management problems were rooted in administrative structures inherited from the British colonial government. Imperial laws and regulations had problematized the supervision of Kenya's natural resources ever since their introduction in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The next two sections deal with this matter further and lay the basis for a lengthier discussion of Woodley's plight that follows later in this chapter.

A Game Department, a Forest Department, and the Royal National Parks

In 1895, the British administration established the East African Protectorate, which included the territory that in 1920 became the Colony of Kenya. The regulation of the protectorate's game and forests was one of the administration's immediate concerns, and already before the turn of the century it founded a Game Department. This Game Department paid heed to the spirit of the age, for in 1891 the British Foreign Office had called for the need to implement stricter game regulations on the African continent. This was a reaction to the fierce decline in game numbers that was especially apparent in South Africa, where large mammal hunting was the order of the day (Prendergast & Adams 2003: 252).

Hunting had always played an important role in British society and was a key social practice for elite classes in Victorian England (see MacKenzie 1988). By the end of the nineteenth century, it had largely come to play a symbolic role in England, not least because of a decline in hunting possibilities. But when the African continent opened up it made available a wilderness that offered ample opportunity to revive the sport. The colonies presented the British with seemingly limitless opportunities to again exercise the sport, and to confirm class, status and pedigree (*Ibid*.). This took place against a backdrop of white settlers' collective awe for Africa's wilderness, which was embedded in an imperial ideology that separated enlightened and culturally superior colonists from savage, wild and uncivilized Africans, who stood in direct contact with nature (see for instance Birch 1998; Comaroff & Comaroff 1991; Garland 2008). For Kenya, such awe later resonated in the popular writings of authors such as Elspeth Huxley and Karen Blixen, who romanticized big game hunting and brought glamour to the white hunter myth (Steinhart 1989: 254; Steinhart 2006: 102). Indeed, under safari hunters such as Blixen's husband Baron Bror Blixen, or her lover Denys Finch Hatton, Kenya's hunting industry bloomed in the early twentieth century (Adams & McShane 1996: 29).

While hunting experienced a renaissance in the empire, a group of prominent Englishmen in the metropole began to protest against it. Among them was Edward North Buxton, who cofounded a conservation organization that turns up in a later chapter and who argued that colonial hunting was reckless and irresponsible. He and likeminded advocates claimed that the sport had been stripped of its former ethics and rules of play, and had turned into mere killing that lacked any true sense of sportsmanship (Prendergast & Adams 2003). Together, these men succeeded in putting tighter control over colonial hunting on the agenda, and in 1900 the 'Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa' was adopted in London. It was within this setting that the protectorate's Game Department came into being in 1899.

During its first ten years, the protectorate's Game Department was hardly operational – between 1901 and 1907 it only knew one ranger (Steinhart 2006: 149). This ranger was Captain Arthur Blayney Percival, who was born in Newcastle and had participated in an ornithological expedition in Arabia before coming to East Africa at the turn of the century. Percival was joined by Colonel T.H. Patterson in 1907, who directed the game department for roughly a year or two (*Ibid*.: 151). Afterwards, Patterson became somewhat of a celebrity due to the publication of his memoir called *The Man-Eaters of Tsavo* (1907), in which he recounted his experiences with an exceptionally aggressive pride of lions that he had fought while supervising the construction of a railway bridge near Tsavo[19] on the Mombasa-Uganda line. The book became an instant success.

In 1919, Arthur Blayney Percival officially became the Game Department's managing director, but in practice he already had long been the department's most influential figure (see MacKenzie 1988: 245). Percival was largely oblivious to the calls of Edward North Buxton and associates to curtail colonial hunting (Steinhart 1989: 255). In fact, he was an ardent hunter himself and he maintained that it was the Game Department's primary task to protect white settler estates against the

invasion of dangerous and destructive wildlife. Contrary to the upcoming conservation lobby in the metropole, Percival regarded Africa's wildlife a notorious pest, as did many other administrators and settlers (Steinhart 2006: 150). Besides, Percival understood the economic benefits that derived from the sport: he saw how Nairobi was developing into the centre of elite hunting, and he observed how the money derived from licence fees and duties paid on trophies significantly contributed to the treasury (Mackenzie 1988: 247).

When Arthur Blayney Percival retired in 1923, Captain Archie Ritchie succeeded him. Ritchie further cemented the Game Department's prioritization of settler needs and, like Percival, he paid little attention to England's rising game conservation lobby. Ritchie was a man of military distinction, and he reorganized the Game Department into an army-like corps that drilled its black workforce. He always insisted on being called by his military rank, and he recruited his rangers on the basis of sporting skills and soldierly qualities (Steinhart 2006: 158). Percival and Patterson had been military men as well, but both had shown more indulgent and lenient methods and neither had been as strict as Ritchie was (*Ibid*.). Yet, Ritchie's military attitude was not at all uncommon in the protectorate. The enforcement of law was a constant concern, and settlers continuously called upon the administration to tighten control over African subjects in order to protect them and their possessions (Anderson 1991; Killingray 1986). Immediately after annexation, the British administration had employed martial law, which it soon replaced with locally recruited police forces that were considered less confrontational, and less costly (Waller 2010: 525). These police forces continued to employ aggressive and coercive methods, and most of the Europeans hired to direct them had gone through some sort of military training. They were often brought in from other colonies, most notably South Africa, where they had learned the ropes (Anderson 1991: 184). Overall, the protectorate established a thoroughly militarized society that incorporated all branches of administration – Ritchie's Game Department was no exception in this regard.

A few years after the foundation of the Game Department the colonial administration also established a Forest Department, which was meant to oversee the protectorate's commercial logging. The Forest Department was founded on the ambition to make the protectorate's forests as profitable as possible, for the protectorate's annexation had been much more expensive than calculated. This was largely due to the high costs of the construction of the Mombasa-Uganda railroad, which started in 1896 and lasted until 1901. Through commercial forestry the metropole hoped to earn some of its investments back (Kantai 2007) – it was eager, as Lonsdale put it, to 'capitalize on the politics of conquest' (1992[A]: 19).

C.F. Elliot was the Forest Department's first leading man, recruited in 1902. Elliot had studied forestry in France and before coming to the protectorate had served as a forester in India. He strongly believed in European scientific forest management, as did many of his contemporaries, and he considered African forest usage a threat to forest survival (Ofcansky 1984). During the eighteenth century, African communities had been romanticized into noble savages who lived in harmony with

nature. In fact, as Grove (1989) notes for South Africa, eighteenth-century state interventions in natural resource control were mainly directed at curtailing settler agriculture rather than at restricting the activities of Africans. But, in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the presumption that African primitives lacked the knowledge to understand nature's working replaced the earlier image of the noble savage (see also Brantlinger 1988: 38-39). As a result, it became widely accepted that Africans needed close supervision, in order to prevent them from destroying their surroundings (Ranger 1989; see also Beinart 2003).

C.F. Elliot at once drew up a set of regulations and restrictions concerning the use of the protectorate's forests. But since the Forest Department only hosted three forest rangers he lacked the manpower to enforce his ordinances (Ofcansky 1984: 138-139). Elliot retired from the department in 1905, after which the institute lapsed into administrative paralysis. Elliot's successor, called D.E. Hutchins, came in in 1907 but his appointment did not immediately solve the impasse. Hutchins advocated forest conservation rather than exploitation, and he actively went against the administration's ambition to make forestry profitable. For instance, he objected to private enterprise and thus angered the entrepreneurs who had come to the protectorate for the purpose of setting up wood firms (Castro 1995: 46). In general, Hutchins paid little attention to commercial interests (Ofcansky 1984: 140), but instead launched forest stations and tree nurseries, and expanded the department's staff.

Hutchins's directorship over the Forest Department lasted until 1911. As the protectorate's leading forester, he had called into question the administration's stance on forest exploitation, but with the onset of the First World War such debates largely ebbed away. After the war, and in the course of the 1920s, the colonial administration established more tree nurseries and plantations. These plantations were modelled on the Southeast Asian example (see Rajan 1997; Vandergeest & Peluso 2006), and operated on the basis of agro-forestry labour arrangements. The model came to be referred to as the *shamba* (cultivated field or garden) system. Within the shamba system individual farmers were allotted forest plots for cultivation, on the condition that they planted trees amongst their crops and moved on to other plots once these trees had matured. The system was justified on the grounds that it offered benefits to all parties involved: it provided Africans access to land under conditions of rapid population growth and food scarcity, and it guaranteed the Forest Department a source of inexpensive manpower in an institutional context of continuous cutbacks (Castro 1995: 70).

Some fifteen to twenty years after its foundation the Forest Department had developed into an authoritative institute that upheld a comprehensive system of penalties and licences. It strictly supervised and curtailed African use of forest products and it was suggested that, in doing so, it became one of the most unpopular colonial bureaus among colonial subjects (Castro 1995: 77). At the same time, the Forest Department had its own adversary: the Game Department. Initially, the Forest Department and the Game Department had had little to do with one another, as each focused on its own tasks. But as the number of tree nurseries and forest plantations grew steadily after the First

World War a problem emerged. Seeds and saplings attracted foraging game, and due to financial constraints the Forest Department was mostly unable to defend its nurseries and plantations against invading wildlife. It considered this a responsibility of the Game Department, but the latter, also on a constrained budget, gave priority to settler needs. It dedicated its scarce resources to the protection of European farms, and it hardly responded to the Forest Department's complaints (Ofcansky 1984: 141). Over time, the relationship between the two institutes toughened and grew more vexatious, as we will see.

There was yet a third administrative development that interfered with how the supervision over forest and wildlife gained shape in colonial Kenya. The previous chapter showed how thanks to, among others, John Muir, a typically American mentality towards nature and nature conservation emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These American circumstances resonated with the African continent in different ways. For example, colonial Africa offered new outlets for the macho confrontations with wilderness and savagery that characterized American chauvinism, and different key American political figures participated in African travels. Theodore Roosevelt was one of them: He undertook a collecting and hunting trip to East Africa under the auspices of the Smithsonian Institution between 1909 and 1910 (Steinhart 2006: 115). Roosevelt's travels contributed to the rising popularity of East African safaris. In fact, Steinhart claims, it was only with the particular event of Roosevelt's expedition that the word *safari* entered the English vocabulary as game hunting. Prior to that, the term safari, a derivative of the Kiswahili verb *kusafiri*, had referred to travel more generally and had long since been associated with Arab mercantile, trading caravans and slave trades (*Ibid.*: 113).

A few years before Theodore Roosevelt's expedition, the British politician Winston Churchill had also gone on a trip to East Africa. Yet, Churchill had had different intentions than Roosevelt: Churchill was not so much interested in big game hunting and natural history, as in promoting the empire before the British populace. At the time, the British public was sceptical about the expenses that had been made to annex the territory, and Churchill set out to show that East Africa was a justifiable investment that would soon pay off (Neumann 2013). Neumann suggests that the different orientation of the two men was illustrated in the memoirs that they later published: in Roosevelt's *African Game Trails: An Account of the African Wanderings of an American Hunter-Naturalist* (1910) the African landscape was presented as a vast expanse heaped with game, but in Churchill's *My African Journey* (1908) the African landscape was dotted with cotton, rubber and fibre plantations, and showed a railway line that brought modernity and development (Neumann 2013: 1379-1380).

Especially after the Second World War, conservation advocates in the metropole and in North America began to object to African trophy hunting more strongly (Steinhart 2006: 174). These advocates argued that game stocks had dwindled in the course of only a few decades due to excessive wildlife killing, and they asserted that Africa's large mammals found themselves on the verge of extinction. On the one hand, such protests resulted in increasing numbers of former white hunters who

began to employ the skills and knowledge they had obtained through safari hunting for the benefit of conservation work. On the other hand, such protests and calls to 'manage scarcity' (Shiva 1992: 229) paved the way for the introduction of the American national parks model on African territory. This model found its ways to the continent in various ways: administrators and hunters, for instance, became acquainted with it following participation in international fora such as the British East and Central Africa Conferences (Matheka 2008: 121; see also Mackenzie 1988[20]), or they brought home ideas after visiting the United States themselves.

Colonel Mervyn Cowie specifically played a key role in relation to the introduction of the national parks model in Kenya (Steinhart 2006). Cowie was a Kenyan-born descendent of Scottish farmers, who had briefly left the colony for an education at Oxford University in the 1920s. When he returned from Britain in the early 1930s he observed that Kenya's wildlife stock had greatly diminished in the years that he had been abroad. He witnessed how this trend continued in the years that followed, and he soon fully committed himself to conservation. Cowie obtained a position on Kenya's Game Policy Committee, which was founded in 1937 in response to his calls to consider the future of wildlife more seriously (*Ibid*.: 190), and he began to advocate the need for wildlife sanctuaries. The Second World War briefly interrupted his petitions, but in 1944 he finally managed to get his plans off the ground: a new institute, called the Kenya National Parks, was founded and Cowie himself became its first director (*Ibid*.: 182). By that time, there was a ready audience in Europe and North America for adventure stories like Cowie's and in 1951 a film recounting his struggles was released, called 'Where No Vultures Fly' (see also Paris 2003).

In the years that Mervyn Cowie ran the Kenya National Parks, renamed the Royal National Parks of Kenya in 1950, he maintained that it was essential to establish closed-off areas to protect the colony's last strongholds of wild nature (see for instance Cowie 1955: 9). He envisaged these areas as conservation islands to balance the processes of modernization that swept over the colony. 'It would be illogical to seek the protection of all wildlife since there must be development' he wrote, addressing the Fauna Preservation Society in 1955. 'It is, however, reasonable that, before it is too late, Africa should be divided into zones so that each claimant for the use of land can have a fair share. And in this division there must be a place for wildlife' (*Ibid*.: 10). Cowie's campaign illustrated how the American national parks model, once it gained ground on colonial territory, translated to fit African circumstances: in the United States national parks had primarily been established to protect extraordinary landscapes, but on the African continent the emphasis was on the survival of large mammals (Adams & McShane 1996: xvi). Both interpretations, however, seemed to carry the ability to arouse nationalist sentiments. In South Africa, for instance, the popularity of game viewing partially ameliorated tensions between former sportsmen, elite white classes, and poor white classes (Carruthers 1989: 188-189, but see Brooks (2005) for the political and material limits to conservation's contribution to South African nation-building).

Mervyn Cowie's National Parks added yet another layer of policing to an already stringent and repressive colonial regime. As mentioned, he carried military stripes, and he recruited men with a similar background. In 1949, for instance, he hired David Sheldrick, who had commanded the Fifth Battalion of the King's African Rifles, and appointed him warden of Tsavo National Park. Tsavo National Park had been founded a year earlier, and Sheldrick was to bring down the high levels of poaching. Bill Woodley (father of the aforementioned Bongo Woodley), then a nineteen-year-old junior, soon joined him as assistant warden and together the two men came to master the art of military conservation in unprecedented ways (Steinhart 2006: 192-193). They optimized wildlife patrolling based on army principles, and they caught poachers through intelligence gathering as well as by conspiring with former poachers who worked for them as local spies (*Ibid.*: 198).

David Sheldrick's and Bill Woodley's military conservation methods gained shape alongside growing African opposition to the colonial regime. In the 1950s, the administration announced the Mau Mau Emergency, which I discuss in more detail in the next chapter, and Woodley joined the troops that aimed to combat native resistance. One journalist later suggested that Woodley was extremely dedicated to the task, going as far as dressing like Mau Mau, wearing the scalps of his victims on his head to resemble Mau Mau, and eating only forest fare so that his excrement smelled the same as those of the people he chased (Brown 2008). Woodley's contributions to fighting the Mau Mau have been mythologized, but his efforts nevertheless earned him a Military Cross and on his return to Tsavo he brought with him the war techniques he had picked up and employed them in Sheldrick's anti-poaching campaigns (Steinhart 2006: 197). This further reinforced the military character of Tsavo's management, and of the National Parks more generally, and virtually all the officers who later served alongside Sheldrick and Woodley were experienced counter-insurgency warriors or veterans of the Mau Mau war (*Ibid.*).

The Game Department watched the successes of men like Mervyn Cowie, David Sheldrick and Bongo Woodley with unease. Prior to the 1940s, the department had been the sole caretaker of the colony's game, and since the beginning of the century it had been in full control of regulating and policing. But from the mid-1940s onwards, the National Parks began to interfere with its monopoly (Steinhart 1994: 61). In addition, the Game Department and the National Parks had diametrically opposed goals: the first set out to protect settler interests and routinely killed wildlife, while the second combined forces to prevent 'the disastrous destruction of God's great beasts' (Cowie 1955: 11). Needless to say, the National Parks and the Game Department found themselves in opposite positions, and while the National Parks steadily gained the reputation of a professional and efficient institute, the Game Department increasingly appeared as a demoralized lot that failed to understand the importance of wildlife conservation. A long-lasting rivalry over prestige and influence ensued (Steinhart 2006: 192).

On the whole, the aggressive enforcement of colonial game and forest legislation articulated and, at least initially, consolidated imperial authority (Neumann 1996). All over the continent, colonial

policies criminalized African subsistence hunting and forest use, and after the National Parks ideology had gained a foothold entire populations were relocated and displaced so as to create safe havens for African wildlife (Beinart 1989; Carruthers 1989; Duffy 2000; Grove 1989). By the time the end of the Colony of Kenya began to appear inevitable and the prospect of independence was ushered in, European and American conservationists feared that a transfer in governance would mark the abolishment of nature conservation – they assumed that Kenya's new leaders would be hostile towards it, because it had become such a vivid symbol of repressive governance and discriminatory laws (Matheka 2008: 122). But their fears proved unwarranted and the political elite that emerged after independence largely continued colonial conservation practices (see also Gibson 1999), as the next section discusses.

Former colonial offices turned into state corporations

When the Colony of Kenya was declared an independent nation in 1963 both the Game Department and the Forest Department were incorporated in the new administrative system. They were put under the supervision of different ministries, and an African workforce largely replaced their former white staff. The situation differed for the National Parks: it had been a corporate body directed by a board rather than a colonial office all along (see the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 1944) and, as such, it had never been part of the imperial bureaucracy. After independence, the National Parks retained its autonomous status and continued to fall outside Kenya's state apparatus (Leakey & Morell 2001: 31). Mervyn Cowie nevertheless retired. A man called Perez Olindo succeeded him, and a new board was appointed.

Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, the Game Department and the Forest Department were hardly operational. Both had been financially constrained for a long time, but during the last stretch of colonialism serious budget cutbacks had immobilized them entirely (Poole & Leakey 1996). This inertia continued after 1963 since both remained dependent on government funds, which they were mostly denied. The National Parks, on the other hand, managed to designate more and more land as protected area, and collected revenues through the entrance fees that it raised. While the National Parks supervised all wildlife inside officially gazetted conservation areas, the Game Department was supposed to control wildlife outside such sanctuaries (*Ibid*.: 55-56) – in practice, however, the latter for the most part lacked the resources to do anything at all.

In 1976, and due to further financial constrains within both institutes, the Game Department and the National Parks merged. The organization that thereby came into existence was called the Wildlife Conservation Management Department (WCMD). The union took place under pressure from the World Bank, which had promised a loan for $26 million on the condition that Kenya organized its conservation bureaucracies more efficiently (Leakey & Morell 2001: 31). Shortly after the

transformation, Perez Olindo resigned and Daniel Sindiyo, from the Game Department, assumed directorship of the WCMD.

A range of conservationists inside and outside of Kenya favoured the fusion of the Game Department and the National Parks, but there were also sceptics. They pointed out that park wardens, trained as conservationists, would have to kill wildlife to secure farmlands and other white properties. At the same time, Game Department rangers, whose job it had been to hunt down problem animals, were relocated to national parks where they were likely to continue their habits (see for instance Leakey & Morell 2001: 31). Moreover, with the fusion the National Parks lost its former independent corporate status and was absorbed into the state administration. As a result, the revenue collected through park fees, which used to fund the maintenance of parks, disappeared into the treasury of the centralized government. The Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, which hosted the WCMD, subsequently refused to deliver adequate funding, just as it had withheld resources from the Game Department. From its foundation, the WCMD was hampered by a lack of decent equipment and by ill-paid salaries. The institute was generally perceived as highly corrupt (Poole & Leakey 1996: 56) and the acronym WCMD was soon translated into 'Wildlife Poaching and Mismanagement Department' (see for instance The David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust n.d.).

By the late 1980s, a little more than a decade after the establishment of the WCMD, the Kenyan government was again pressed to reorganize the nationwide administration of wildlife conservation. Due to the lack of government funds, the WCMD had become highly dependent on money provided by NGOs, which were eager to sponsor the institute directly because this saved them the trouble of going through state bureaucracies, where statesmen were likely to cream off their funds (see also Poole & Leakey 1996: 57). But when reports of increased poaching began to mushroom in the 1980s, and because WCMD wardens and rangers were widely implicated in the killings (Martin 2012: 30), these NGOs eventually delivered an ultimatum: either the Kenyan government would clean up the WCMD and discharge its corrupt staff, or organizations would simply cut off the money supply. This ultimatum was made in the context of alarmist prognoses that marked the 1980s more generally, and that were fed by a number of ecological disasters as well as by a rising concern for global warming. Environmental lobbies gained in influence, and the basis was laid for what Bindé came to call a 'tyranny of emergency' (2000) that legitimizes radical and far-reaching conservation interventions on the basis of the argument that time is running out – it was against this background that NGOs began to exert pressure on the Kenyan government.

In response to the demands by international aid organizations, the president of Kenya appointed a new WCMD director in 1989, called Richard Leakey. Leakey replaced Perez Olindo, who had been reappointed two years earlier. Initially, Olindo had refused to work for the WCMD (Leakey & Morell 2001: 31), but after Daniel Sindiyo had been removed for nepotism and corruption Olindo had nevertheless taken on the job (*Ibid*.: 9). According to his own recollection of events, Leakey was never consulted, or even asked whether he wanted the position – instead, he learned about his promotion

through a newsflash on the radio (Leakey & Morell 2001: 9). At the time, Leakey was the director of the National Museums of Kenya in Nairobi, and he was already somewhat of a national celebrity. His grandfather, reverend Harry Leakey, had come to the protectorate as a missionary at the beginning of the twentieth century. Ever since, different members of the Leakey family stood in the academic and political limelight. Both of Richard Leakey's parents, Mary Leakey and Louis Seymour Bazett Leakey, had been central to the development of palaeoanthropology in Kenya and the latter had furthermore been a noted advisor to the colonial administration during the Mau Mau Emergency. Richard Leakey himself, moreover, gained academic acclaim when, following in the footsteps of his parents,[21] an archaeological team under his supervision stumbled upon a near-complete hominid skeleton near the Nariokotome sand river around Lake Turkana in 1984 (Walker & Leakey 1993).

After he became WCMD's new director, Richard Leakey dismissed most of the institute's workforce and hired experts from the private sector, mostly expatriates. He believed that, in general, well-trained people were reluctant to work for the Kenyan government due to bad working conditions. He believed that, as a result, the country's state apparatus largely lacked competence (Poole & Leakey 1996: 60). In consideration of this, he offered his newly hired staff terms of employment that were considerably better than in any other government office. In addition, Leakey managed to revive the National Parks' former independent corporate status and, with presidential approval, moved the WCMD out of the state bureaucracy. To this end, the Kenyan government adopted a new Wildlife Act that officially dissolved the WCMD and established the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS). Like the National Parks in earlier times, the KWS was allowed to keep the revenue it earned so that it could sponsor its own operations. Leakey had also demanded that the KWS be responsible to the office of the president only, so that the institute was spared the clientelistic politics that played out on a ministerial level – yet, this was never fully achieved and different ministers and politicians continued to interfere with the KWS's mode of operation, Leakey later admitted (Poole & Leakey 1996: 56). To enable the entire reorganization, the World Bank promised a loan for $60 million, and Leakey managed to guarantee further funding from different donors in the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States and the Netherlands (Leakey & Morell 2001: 134).

After the KWS had been established and new staff had been recruited, Richard Leakey began to train his ground troops. Without adequate skills and decent equipment, the KWS would never be able to fight Kenya's well-organized poaching syndicates, he argued (see for instance Leakey & Morell 2001). He convinced the president of the need to arm his rangers, and began to organize training camps where newly recruited staff were disciplined in military manners. At the time, different photos circulated that showed Leakey as an army general presiding over his forces. For instance, there was one that showed him marching between two lines of uniformed ranger-soldiers, all facing forward and gazing into the distance with chins up, weapons down and boots clasped. Leakey passes them sideways in a lighter uniform with shoulder chain, in a military tread with clenched fists and arms stiff to the body (see Leakey & Morell 2001: photo appendices at the centre of the book).

Through the KWS, Richard Leakey reinvigorated the military nature of former colonial policies, and his conservation approach was reminiscent of Mervyn Cowie and other one-time National Park figureheads such as David Sheldrick and Bill Woodley. Thus, the KWS became part of a wider post-colonial tradition in which African states continue to replicate repressive imperial conservation regimes (see for instance Duffy 1999; Ellis 1994; Igoe 2004). Like his colonial predecessors, Leakey was a strong proponent of fortress conservation based on principles of human exclusion, and he considered strict control key to effective wildlife management. Some fanatical nature lovers admired Leakey's hands-on techniques, but his methods also raised eyebrows. Especially the KWS's shoot-to-kill regulations, which made it possible for Leakey's rangers to use lethal force against suspected poachers without being prosecuted, shocked critical observers and academics alike (see for instance Gibson 1999; Haynes 1999; Neumann 2004) and it has been suggested that within two years of Leakey's directorship more than a hundred alleged poachers were killed without a chance for defence or trial (Peluso 1993: 205-206).

In the first years of his appointment Richard Leakey managed to free the KWS of the stigma of corruption and ineffectiveness that had clung to the WCMD. In 1991, he even managed to secure another loan worth $150 million from the World Bank, of which $60 million was paid immediately and the remaining $90 million spread out over the next five years (Leakey & Morell 2001: 192) – apparently, the World Bank had no objections to Leakey's martial methods. But from roughly 1993 onwards, the authority he had built began to splinter. In early July his private aircraft crashed, in what many believed was an assassination attempt organized by one of his political adversaries involved in a poaching cartel. Leakey lost both legs in the accident and his recovery was slow. Early the next year he was forced to resign after what he himself called a 'nearly month-long vilification campaign' (*Ibid.*: 272): national newspapers painted him as a racist imposter, and suggested that he was as corrupt as his predecessors (Martin 2012: 150).

In March 1994, the president appointed a new KWS director, called David Western, who was, in many respects, the complete opposite of Richard Leakey. Since the late 1960s, Western had worked in Amboseli, a conservation area in southern Kenya close to the border with Tanzania. Here, he had studied the symbiotic relationship between pastoralists and the Amboseli ecosystem, and while doing so he had become convinced of the need to involve communities in conservation programmes (see for instance Western 1989). Western's community-based approach contrasted sharply with Leakey's fortress conservation methods, which had banned communities from conservation areas and which had been firmly grounded in an idealized image of unspoilt African nature untouched by human interference.[22]

The opposition between David Western's community-based philosophy and Richard Leakey's fortress conservation doctrines resonated with a broader shift in global conservation rhetoric taking place at the time. Throughout the 1980s, and even more so in the 1990s, NGOs and multilateral lending agencies had begun to link nature conservation to the aims of economic growth and social

justice. This connection illustrated the upcoming trend of participatory development programmes more generally, which claimed to offer a more just alternative to state-orchestrated development programmes (Brosius et al. 1998; Gibson & Marks 1995; Jones 2006). Such intentions notwithstanding, it did not take critical observers long to point out that community-based tenets came with a set of problems of their own. Critics found fault with, among other things, how both development and conservation agencies tended to take communities as homogeneous and harmonious entities, thus disregarding the dynamics of internal power inequalities (see for instance Brosius et al. 1998; Dzingirai 2003; Li 1996), and some pointed out how the jargon of community empowerment concealed that many programmes in practice continued to be top-down or state-controlled (see for instance Cooke & Kothari 2001; Hill 1996; Marks 2001). Nevertheless, the shift from one ideology to another was nearly absolute, and with the introduction of community-based conservation principles fortress conservation was no longer politically defendable (Brockington 2004).

As the second KWS director, David Western openly criticized Richard Leakey for what the latter had made of the institute, and neither of the two men made a secret of their mutual rancour. Western had intended to gear the KWS towards a more people-friendly approach, but renewed budget constraints made this difficult. Among other things, the World Bank became less forthcoming with the loan that it had promised Leakey since Western meant to turn the entire organization on its head again, and the ongoing rumours of corruption troubled Western in making international donors enthusiastic for his plans. After serving a four-year term Western was written off, both by the public as well as by Kenya's political establishment. The latter fired him twice: the first time he was rehired because of demands made by a number of embassies and funding organizations.

By 1998, the KWS hit bottom. The larger public considered it thoroughly fraudulent and demoralized, and on the verge of bankruptcy (see for instance The David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust 1998). In a somewhat unforeseen twist of events Richard Leakey was brought back in and reinstated as KWS director in September that year. A clear message went out from this decision: David Western's community-based approach had spared the rod and spoiled the child, and a firm hand was needed again. This time, Leakey stayed in office only for a short period, and roughly a year later he retired from the KWS for the second time to become the country's Head of Civil Service. It was the highest administrative position after the president, and Leakey's political upgrade caused considerable commotion. African newspapers reported that the IMF and other donor organizations had commanded the promotion (see for instance *Africa Confidential*, 6 August 1999), and the larger public maintained that it marked a neo-colonial mindset in which former imperial powers tried to resume control over Kenya's administrative system.

After Richard Leakey's second term with the KWS the institute became characterized by a high turnover in leadership. Numerous directors followed in his and David Western's footsteps, among whom Nehemiah Rotich, Joseph Kioko, Michael Wamithi, Joseph Mutia, Evans Arthur Mukolwe, Julius Kipng'etich and William Kibet Koprono. This, as well as ongoing financial setbacks, hampered

the KWS's performance and not long ago Leakey was quoted as saying that he had come to think of the institute as a complete failure (Martin 2012: 155).

Whereas after independence the Game Department and the National Parks went through a number of institutional reorganizations the Forest Department was largely left intact. In 1963, the colony's forest plantations had been nationalized, and legal ownership shifted from the British administration to the government of Kenya. Like the WCMD later, the Forest Department was not granted the revenue that it generated with commercial forestry and returns went straight into the public treasury. Similar to the Game Department's fate, the ministry that hosted the Forest Department subsequently withheld funding and, like other government agencies after independence, the Forest Department became fully reliant on international donors. It lapsed into excessive illegal logging in which it cut far more than its plantations could sustain – and while the government abused its mandate to allocate timber concessions, Forest Department executives and politicians shared the profits (see for instance Kariuki 2006; VanLeeuwe 2004).

Illegal logging manifested itself in various ways. For instance, when the Forest Department was brought under the Ministry of Environmental and Natural Resources in the 1990s a bureaucratic infrastructure emerged that consolidated and institutionalized illegal logging: the Forest Act allocated the right to adjust forest boundaries to the minister in charge, but the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources was a political appointee of the president who continuously excised forestland and gave out concessions to foster patronage (Klopp 2012: 356). The reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1991, which is discussed in the next chapter, further intensified illegal logging, since politicians suddenly gave out plots of forestland to their constituencies in exchange for votes (*Ibid*.: 354). Besides, Klopp (2012) suggests, multiparty politics in general encouraged politicians to get their hands on as much forestland as possible in the shortest possible time, because they were always unsure how long their term would last. She quotes an informant who confided to her: 'if there were an election every year, there would be no forests left' (*Ibid*.).

In addition to these developments, modifications to the shamba system accelerated logging practices. Initially, the colonial government had introduced the shamba programme to foster commercial tree growing and to improve food security among African peasants. Before and immediately after independence the shamba programme at least partially contributed to such goals, some maintain (see for instance Standing & Gachanja 2014). But after Kenya's rising intelligentsia had begun to argue that the system relied on the exploitation of cheap African labour the programme was adjusted: after 1975 shamba farmers received levies for the trees they grew, and were under the obligation to pay rent for the plots they cultivated. The motivation for these changes had arguably been noble, but the new regulations turned agro-forestry into a lucrative business opportunity (*Ibid*.). People began to cut Kenya's forests merely for the purpose of replanting for payment, and Forest Department officials hired and sold plots to landless farmers while putting the money in their own pockets (Kariuki 2006: 7).

The Forest Department's overall reputation worsened, both nationally and internationally, up to the point that it was widely and routinely distrusted. This led to the withdrawal of most of the department's international funding, especially during the wave of structural adjustment programmes that hit Kenya in the 1980s and 1990s. Among other things, this caused the dismissal of about six thousand officers between 1994 and 1998 (Standing & Gachanja 2014). Meanwhile, the Forest Department's malpractices gave way to a national forest conservation lobby, marked by platforms such as the Green Belt Movement founded in 1977 by Wangari Maathai, at the time a university lecturer who had studied in the United States. Initially, the Green Belt Movement merely meant to criticize the revised shamba programme, but the more Maathai depicted the shamba system as just one example of how Kenya's corrupted political regime operated, the more she gained the reputation of a political activist, rather than a conservationist (see for instance Klopp 2000).

It did not take the Green Belt Movement long to gain the support of international watchdogs such as UNEP and the World Bank. In 1987, this impelled a number of policy changes, including the total banning of the shamba system. But the ban, in turn, created new problems: from one day to another former shamba peasants had lost their rights to land and their income. Those who refused to leave shamba plantations became illegal squatters on state land, and in different locations this subsequently led to large-scale evictions (Standing & Gachanja 2014: 6).

Notwithstanding the efforts made by national and international pressure groups, the Forest Department refused to change its habits or tackle its widespread corruption. Instead, it continues to practice excessive tree felling. This is a thorn in the flesh of the KWS, which claims that Kenya's forests are indispensible wildlife habitat that must be preserved at all costs. Forestry and wildlife officers have never been on good foot (for the former felt the latter failed to protect nurseries and plantations, as I indicated in the previous section), but due to the Forest Department's ongoing logging the already tense relation was exacerbated from the 1990s onwards. Today, the KWS is hardly free from corruption itself, but at least it has managed to raise its public profile to some degree. With the reorganization of the WCMD into the KWS, the Forest Department's corrupted nature began to stand out even more and at present a sense of inferiority plagues foresters. 'When [KWS] rangers are armed and we are armed,' one of them told me when discussing the problems that he faced in running his forest station, 'we still feel that they are *more* armed'.[23] He added that the KWS receives the most conservation donor money, which was later confirmed by a zoologist working for one of the larger international conservation NGOs. This zoologist indicated to me that forestry in Kenya continues to be disadvantaged in terms of budget, and that forest executives and wildlife executives are continuously in direct competition over funds and authority. How this competition affects Mt. Kenya, and how it complicated the mountain's 1997 World Heritage nomination, is the topic of the remainder of this chapter.

KWS and Forest Department rivalry on Mt. Kenya

From the moment that Bongo Woodley became Mt. Kenya's senior warden in 1989, his task to police and to conserve the mountain was complicated by the Forest Department's sway over Mt. Kenya's lower forest ring, which dated back to the 1910s. In 1912, the colonial administration issued the first large logging concession for Mt. Kenya's forests (Castro 1995). Prior to that, D.E. Hutchins, the colonial Forest Department's second director after C.F. Elliot, had largely managed to prevent the release of such permits. When the concession was eventually given out, it was never practiced: the Forest Department failed to attract a suitable candidate for the job, and a few years later it abandoned the idea of one large concession altogether. Alternatively, it began to hand out small-scale and short-term licences (*Ibid*.).

The First World War brought most of Mt. Kenya's small-scale and short-term logging to a halt, because the involved businessmen entered the military en masse. After the war, Mt. Kenya's timber industry revived a little: this was mostly due to an extension of the Mombasa-Uganda railroad that headed for Nanyuki. These developments notwithstanding, Mt. Kenya's timber commerce remained largely local. Transporting logs out of the highlands was simply too laborious and expensive, and Mt. Kenya's timber entrepreneurs did not participate in world markets (Castro 1995: 72-73). Nevertheless, in 1932, all of Mt. Kenya's forests below an altitude of 11,000 feet were designated as a forest reserve (Emerton 1998: 6). The colonial administration had already drawn boundaries in 1913 that had formally ended the right of Africans to enter Mt. Kenya's forests without permission (Castro 1995: 49), but with the official designation the colonial administration assumed yet tighter control and access began to be regulated more strictly.

Mt. Kenya's timber industry expanded with the onset of the Second World War. At the time, demands for fuelwood and timber increased quickly because of nearby dehydration factories, which produced dried food rations for British armed forces (Castro 1995: 174). Initially, such increased demands caused the Forest Department to give out more temporary logging permits, and the number of pit sawyer licences issued to Africans increased steadily. But when European- and Asian-owned sawmills began to protest against these pit sawyer licences, which affected their own income, the Forest Department stopped renewing African permits (*Ibid*.: 75-79). This decision frustrated African pit sawyers, who by the early 1940s were embittered over their exclusion from the profits made in Mt. Kenya's timber industry. This bitterness later found resonance during the Mau Mau upheavals: while the colonial administration tried to suppress the Mau Mau rebellion, former pit sawyers aided the movement's fighters in finding groves and caves for shelter, and shared their intimate knowledge of Mt. Kenya's forests with them (Castro 1995: 83). In fact, some Mau Mau figureheads, such as Dedan Kimathi and Waruhiu Itote, both introduced in more detail in the next chapter, had a background in

forestry: Kimathi used to collect seeds for the Forest Department, and Itote had been a fuelwood merchant offended by racial and unfair forest regulations (*Ibid.*: 82).

Commercial and large-scale logging on Mt. Kenya continued throughout the 1940s and 1950s. By the mid 1960s it became evident that ever-increasing demands for timber began to outstrip supply, and local wood shortages began to emerge (Castro 1995: 98). These shortages increased in the decade that followed and eventually a number of measures were taken. Amongst these measures was the establishment of the Nyayo Tea Zone on Mt. Kenya's southern slopes in 1986, in the vicinity of a town called Embu. Essentially, the Nyayo Tea Zone was a state corporation designed to function as a development scheme, and that was sponsored by the World Bank. It had been founded in light of the high prices for tea at the time, which reached record levels worldwide in 1983 and 1984 (see Castro 1995: 99).

The Nyayo Tea Zone corporation mainly aimed to serve two goals. Firstly, it meant to provide villagers, who were encouraged to cultivate tea in exchange for a percentage of the sale, with an income. In practice, however, this arrangement fed into forms of labour exploitation that recalled the shamba system (see for instance Klopp 2012). Secondly, the Nyayo Tea Zone plantations were to halt forest encroachment, which had intensified ever since the abolition of the shamba system in 1975, by forming a buffer zone between village settlements and forest land (see for instance Castro 1991; VanLeeuwe 2004). Yet, for Mt. Kenya the scheme primarily engendered a different set of consequences: the land around Embu was already densely populated, and in order to make room for tea plantations large tracks of forests were cut down. Moreover, after the Nyayo Tea Zone plantations became productive a number of nearby tea factories were established. These factories required large amounts of fuel wood to dry tea leaves, and as such placed a further burden on Mt. Kenya's already over-stressed forests.

In order to cope with the ever-increasing demand for timber the government expanded Mt. Kenya's tree plantations throughout the 1980s. This again resulted in more logging because forest patches were cleared to make room for such plantations. As the Forest Department failed to supervise these clearings landless pit sawyers moved in and settled in the emptied forestlands (Castro 1995: 102). In 1989, many of these forest dwellers, identified by the Forest Act as illegal squatters, were evicted on government order. According to one source, more than 17,000 people were removed (VanLeeuwe 2004: 188) and the evictions were carried out with much violence. The people who were expelled mostly took up residence just outside Mt. Kenya's forests, on narrow strips of infertile land next to roadsides – little else was available to them because the area was already densely populated. They remained dependent on Mt. Kenya's resources and continued to collect firewood, graze cattle or burn charcoal in Mt. Kenya's forests (Kariuki 2006).

In the years that followed, and related to Kenya's upcoming lobby for forest protection as well as to increased global concerns for environmental conservation more generally, large-scale logging on Mt. Kenya became a matter of public concern. Politicians blamed forest destruction entirely on

villagers, whom they said continued to exploit the forest illegally. Yet, as critical observers such as Bussmann (1996) and Castro (1991) have pointed out, villagers' small-scale offtake arguably had little effect on the mountain's overall grave condition. What really threatened Mt. Kenya, they maintained, was commercial logging carried out with high-tech logging equipment. Politicians turned a blind eye to such practices in exchange for a share in the profits, but in an attempt to save face they deployed what Apter has called the 'formula of blaming the victim' (2005: 33).

The Forest Department steadily increased its influence over Mt. Kenya from the 1930s onwards, but it was not the only institute that claimed authority over the region. In 1949, the National Parks called into existence Mt. Kenya National Park. This Park covered the entire surface above the 11,000 feet boundary of the forest reserve.[24] As such, the National Park was essentially founded as an island in the midst of forests that were under supervision of the Forest Department. The map below shows the situation:

DeVink Mapdesign Ltd

The foundation of Mt. Kenya National Park gave way to an administrative division that eventually proved highly problematic.

52

In the first decades after 1949, the arrangements did not cause many problems. In 1959, Mt. Kenya National Park came under the auspices of Bill Woodley – after he had served under David Sheldrick throughout the 1940s and 1950s he was promoted to chief warden of both Mt. Kenya and the neighbouring Aberdares mountain range. Woodley was familiar with the Mt. Kenya area, which he had come to know well during his contribution to the fight against the Mau Mau (Herne 1999). In fact, after Woodley became warden for Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares, he scouted some of his one-time Mau Mau enemies for his ranger team. It has even been suggested that one of the Mau Mau's former commanders, called Muhangia, eventually became Woodley's right-hand man and closest confidante (*Ibid.*: 279).

Due to its rocky surface, and due to the low temperatures typical for Mt. Kenya's higher altitudes, Mt. Kenya National Park never hosted much wildlife apart from some rodent and bird species. For Bill Woodley this was not necessarily a problem: he considered it his main task to fight poaching (see Steinhart 2006: 200-201) and, although Woodley only had an official mandate over the national park, there was no rule or piece of legislation that prohibited him from pursuing poachers in Mt. Kenya's lower forests.

In 1978, Bill Woodley left his post on Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares mountain range and returned to Tsavo National Park. In the years that followed the management of Mt. Kenya National Park largely stagnated, not least due to the integration of the National Parks and the Game Department that I discussed earlier. The situation changed when Richard Leakey took over the WCMD in 1989. Among the new staff recruited by Leakey was Bongo Woodley, one of Bill Woodley's sons, whom Leakey appointed as the new warden of Mt. Kenya National Park. Leakey demanded that Bongo Woodley follow the KWS's military training camps – it was an experience, Leakey later wrote in his memoirs, that made quite an impression on the young Woodley. He quoted Bongo Woodley saying:

> I had been born and raised in Kenya, but like most white kids I mingled more with white than with black. So there I was in the barracks – all black Kenyans and two whites, me and my brother, Danny.[25] Initially, it was tough: who was I going to talk to besides Danny? But I found out that all of us shared basic issues: worries about our homes and families, those who were sick or who had died. And we shared common goals: protecting the parks, building up KWS, surviving the training. So it gave me a very different feel for what Kenya is about.
>
> Leakey & Morell (2001: 195)

As a son to Bill Woodley, Bongo Woodley had been brought up to care for Kenya's wildlife, and father and son formed a couple that inspired different adventure and travel books (see for instance Caputo 2002; Holman 1978; Ridgeway 1999). More importantly, Bongo Woodley inherited his father's military outlook on wildlife control. In an interview with a South African newspaper Bongo Woodley said that he had always thought of his father as a hero, who had 'an amazing job' (*Mail & Guardian*, 11 June 2003) that 'involved everything' (*Ibid.*) that he himself later did on Mt. Kenya. A

local mountain guide called John Mwangi,[26] who had already been climbing Mt. Kenya for decades by the time we met in the course of 2012 and who had observed how Bongo Woodley had directed Mt. Kenya over the years, said that Bongo had been a strong leader who successfully scared off criminals. 'Bongo used to be very strict so you had to be very good' he stated, and added that Bongo Woodley was very effective in scaring and killing poachers.

After Bongo Woodley had taken the post on Mt. Kenya, relations between the Forest Department and the KWS became more problematic. In the course of the 1990s, emerging global conservation lobbies began to underscore the need to safeguard key wildlife habitats, and slowly old colonial ideas that the protection of wildlife primarily consisted of preventing and tracing poaching began to be complimented with wider ecological concerns. Accordingly, the problems inherent to Mt. Kenya's administrative division began to show: wildlife rangers argued in favour of protecting Mt. Kenya's forests for these were, amongst others, vital habitat for elephants and different antelope species, yet rangers had no power to actually intervene in forest management. In the meantime, the Forest Department was rapidly depleting Mt. Kenya's forests. There was little that wildlife officers could do – the Forest Department had a mandate to carry out its activities while the authority of wildlife rangers was limited to the National Park where, ironically, there was hardly any wildlife due to its rugged terrain and the low temperatures.

In the context of globally changing perceptions about what 'good wildlife conservation' looked like, the ongoing depletion of Mt. Kenya's forests was an eyesore to Bongo Woodley. He could not guard Mt. Kenya's wildlife as long as forests were being felled, and he held Forest Department executives responsible. During one of our conversations in which he recounted his time on Mt. Kenya he indicated that the higher he got in the Forest Department hierarchy, the more difficult it had been for him to seek cooperation. He explained that all managerial issues were forwarded to higher offices, where decision-making was typically delayed or put off entirely. Field officers were simply told to obey orders from above – they generally followed instructions, for their jobs and income depended on the goodwill of their superiors. He added that, in general, he had had a good understanding with the foresters located on Mt. Kenya but stressed that these lower-ranking employees were in no position to challenge the ways in which logging on Mt. Kenya, or in the country at large, had been institutionalized over the decades. From the provincial level up, Bongo Woodley had found that Forest Department staff showed little interest in forest conservation. 'There was a strong cover-up mentality' he concluded. Mt. Kenya's forests were being plundered, he said, but higher officials publicly maintained that logging was not taking place.

Bongo Woodley's hands were tied. As long as the Forest Department was in charge of Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve there was little that he could do to change the situation. In 1992, the KWS and the Forest Department had signed a memorandum of understanding that was supposed to improve the cooperation between the two institutions in areas where, like Mt. Kenya, both were active. But the memorandum was mainly the result of donor pressure, and the agreement never became much more

than an official statement. In the meantime, the struggles between Bongo Woodley and the Forest Department continued. It was against the background of this conflict that Bongo Woodley drafted Mt. Kenya's World Heritage application in 1996.

World Heritage consolidating colonial legacies

Bongo Woodley's frustration over the Forest Department's commercial logging set the contours for the World Heritage application. Woodley indicated to me that he was convinced that it was necessary to withdraw the Forest Department's mandate and to give the KWS full authority to oversee both the national park and the forest reserve. With this in mind, different aspects of the World Heritage application document deserve closer attention.

First, the World Heritage Site that Woodley proposed covered a large area, and far exceeded the national park. Initially, Woodley had suggested including all of Mt. Kenya's forests in the designation, but following Thorsell's field evaluation he had adjusted the boundaries so as to leave out the most severely logged areas. Still, after this revision the World Heritage Site that Woodley proposed continued to include much forest land. In fact, the bigger part of it consisted of land designated as forest reserve (see the full page map at the beginning of this dissertation). Since Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site came to include large parts of a reserve under the supervision of the Forest Department, one might expect that the latter played a vital role in the application. This was not the case. On the contrary, according to Woodley, the Forest Department was never consulted or even informed about the proceedings.

A short factsheet accompanied Mt. Kenya's World Heritage application, which, among other things, made inquiries about the ownership status of the proposed site. It was suggested in this factsheet that the KWS owned the entire area under application (The Government of the Republic of Kenya 1996: 1). Here and there the Forest Department was referred to as the KWS's co-supervisor but no mention was made of the fact that, in practice, the KWS had no mandate whatsoever over the bigger part of the area addressed by the application. Since the application was kept completely within the KWS, with David Western finally authorizing it and sending it off, the Forest Department was never offered an opportunity to object. These conditions illustrate the process of 'rendering technical' – a matter I introduced in the previous chapter. The formal inquiries about Mt. Kenya's ownership status imply that sites have an unmistakable proprietor, which can unproblematically be identified and listed. But this conceals that heritage is a disputed property relation that, by its very nature, forestalls the presence of a self-evident or absolute owner. In the case of World Heritage, disputes are likely to materialize between different government institutes, for the World Heritage Convention endows states with exclusive management rights. By extension, the factsheet thus conceals that states are not

unanimous administrative blocks, and that debates over heritage ownership can pitch different state actors against each another.

Secondly, the application document that Bongo Woodley drafted only spoke of Mt. Kenya's natural features, and focused solely on the mountain's geographical and ecological qualities. Among other things, it stated that the region was extraordinary because Mt. Kenya is a tropical mountain with snow-capped peaks; it mentioned that Mt. Kenya is a vital water catchment area with notable geological formations; and it asserted that Mt. Kenya gives shelter to unique flora and fauna (The Government of the Republic of Kenya 1996: 5). It extolled the mountain's glaciers and tarns, and its richness in alpine and sub-alpine indigenous forests. But not once did the application document mention the human activities carried out on Mt. Kenya: it did not note Mt. Kenya's commercial logging or the presence of shamba system plantations and human settlements, nor did it discuss how people continued to collect firewood and graze cattle. On the contrary – in the document's final section, Bongo Woodley suggested that Mt. Kenya was a pristine wilderness area that 'never has or ever would be used for settlement, agriculture or industry' (*Ibid.*).

Of course, Bongo Woodley knew that a depiction of Mt. Kenya as pristine wilderness was not realistic. In fact, on different occasions he recounted to me how he had spent most of his days actively fighting all of the aforementioned activities. I think that Bongo Woodley nevertheless staged Mt. Kenya as a wilderness area to buttress his own command. After Richard Leakey had founded the KWS in 1990, the organization's wardens and rangers soon emerged as the ultimate and exclusive caretakers of Kenya's nature. This 'nature', in turn, drew heavily on colonial images of Africa as a wild and untamed place where human influences were largely absent. So for Bongo Woodley to appear as Mt. Kenya's only true, legitimate caretaker he only had to make sure that the area, at least on paper, appeared 'natural' enough.

The application document described Mt. Kenya's environment exclusively in the language of the natural sciences. This is another way in which Mt. Kenya's World Heritage nomination 'rendered the mountain technical'. This had various consequences. Among other things, the restricted use of a natural scientific discourse obscured alternative descriptions of Mt. Kenya, such as those that articulate the mountain's political, religious or ethnic histories – these histories form the basis for the next chapter, where I point out that Mt. Kenya's representation as a site of nature silenced other legacies that were politically delicate in the late 1990s. At the same time, the language of the natural sciences offered Bongo Woodley a chance to cover up how political his venture actually was: he was not merely interested in conserving Mt. Kenya's lakes and tarns and animal species, but he aimed to nullify the management mandate of the Forest Department and wanted to assume control over the entire region. And thirdly, the document's use of natural scientific jargon concealed that what the application proposed to conserve was not 'real nature', understood as actually identifiable ecological processes (Soper 1995), but ideals of nature reminiscent of colonial domination. Let me clarify this last point.

Bongo Woodley was one of the implementing agents of KWS policy. Under supervision of KWS director Richard Leakey this policy came to reinforce the colonial stereotypes of an African nature devoid of people and of military fortress conservation that I demonstrated earlier. Bongo Woodley personified these stereotypes. He made no secret of his warlike operations (one of which I describe in more detail in the next section), and he paraded his disciplinary methods and as well as his sternness. Tellingly, after Bongo Woodley retired from the KWS he did not pursue a career in nature conservation. Instead, he worked for security and aviation companies such as the ArmorGroup and Everett Aviation, where he put the military and intelligence skills that he had cultivated on Mt. Kenya to further use. Since Bongo Woodley was responsible for the entire application I argue that Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing reproduced the colonial conservation ideals that Woodley represented. These ideals were based on colour bar distinctions, and poised white conservationists against black offenders (see among others Adams & Hutton 2007; Brockington & Igoe 2006; Carruthers 2006; Duffy 2000).

Although I find it necessary to problematize Bongo Woodley's position and his background, as otherwise we might fail to see how colonial principles of nature and nature conservation became a part of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site, I do not mean to put the burden of this on Bongo Woodley personally. Rather, different structural conditions underpinned his actions. Woodley indeed embodied a militaristic conservation style that characterized colonial conservation efforts, but his practices were sustained by Richard Leakey's reorganization of the KWS. This reorganization was supported by the World Bank, which, in turn, was an effect of the global environmental pessimism that characterized the 1980s and 1990s that itself stemmed from culturally specific ideals of unspoiled nature. I have no intention of defending Woodley's fortress-style conservation, and I disapprove of his military tactics, but I also see how he was part of a larger system kept in place by a set of dynamics far beyond his control or his personal intentions.

This notwithstanding, we should not forget that Mt. Kenya's World Heritage application was the private project of one white officer only. I want to stress this point, for it seems that Mt. Kenya is not unique in this regard. Peter Howard,[27] a conservationist who worked for different large organizations including IUCN, and who established an online database of all of Africa's World Heritage Sites (African World Heritage Sites n.d.), told me that especially during World Heritage's first decades white communities largely controlled the designation of African World Heritage Sites. He clarified that it had mostly been expats and white residents who had nominated African sites for World Heritage listing. They had had little trust in African state administrations, he said, and they had taken World Heritage to be a venue for protecting what they considered valuable African properties against failing state bureaucracies. I believe that this indicates that World Heritage is even more Western-centric than scholars like Byrne (1991) and Smith (2006) have already suggested.

Before moving on, I also want to emphasize that, even though I believe there are good reasons to claim that Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site perpetuates colonial ideals and assumptions, I still maintain

that we must be careful in conceiving of African nature conservation in general as a mere neo-colonial venture. Political ecologists and post-colonial scholars have rightly pointed out how contemporary nature conservation efforts have come to incorporate older North-South inequalities (see for instance Adams & Hutton 2007; Brockington & Scholfied 2010[C]; West et al. 2006), how they expose Africans to top-down Western-centric conservation ideals (see for instance Duffy 2000; Peluso 1993; Strickland 2001), or how they reinforce black-white boundaries (see for instance Garland 2008; McDermott Hughes 2005). Yet, merely understanding African conservation as a colonial relic does not account for the enthusiasm with which many African stakeholders subscribe to conservation stereotypes and welcome conservation NGOs (Drinkwater 1989; Garland 2008; Gibson 1999). So rather than readily accepting that international organizations impose nature conservation programmes on African subjects, I find it more productive to conceive of nature conservation as a form of negotiation. This necessitates that we study the physical settings where conservation 'takes place' (understood as both emerging from and seizing a particular locale), and also that we keep an eye on zones of contestation and constantly shifting positionalities (Brosius 1999: 283). If we refrain from doing so we are likely to perceive of African subjects as mere conservation victims, thereby depriving them of any form of agency (see also Carruthers 2006).

In closing, I want to say a few words on how Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing affected the way in which international observers came to judge Mt. Kenya's plight. In the aftermath of the World Heritage nomination process different global onlookers criticized the Forest Department, not in the least due to Jim Thorsell's evaluation report. In this report, Thorsell, in keeping with Bongo Woodley, spoke fondly of the KWS but demonized the Forest Department's behaviour:

> Current management of Mt. Kenya National Park is judged to be of a high standard. The park has a practical management plan which is being implemented with support from the European Union and others. New staff quarters and entrance gates have been completed with a loan from the World Bank. There is an active research programme and tourism is well-managed. Special plans for a fenced rhino reserve are being carried out and wildlife populations, though reduced from previous years, are still healthy.

> The situation in the surrounding Forest Reserve is in sharp contrast to the high level of management existing in the National Park. During the field inspection IUCN observed the serious levels of encroachment that is [sic.] taking place in the Forest Reserve. The inadequacies of management of the forest reserve have been geographically presented in the recent study by Bussmann (1996) and the problems are widely known within Kenya. Primarily the threats come from overharvesting of forest products and illegal removal of Camphor and Cedar. Some areas have been taken over by settlement and exotic plantations have replaced much indigenous forests. Marijuana plantations have destroyed much natural forest in the south-east of the Reserve and no attempts are being made to control their spread.
>
> (IUCN 1997: 69)

Thorsell presented the KWS as Mt. Kenya's rightful and responsible custodian, and insisted that the Forest Department neglected its conservation responsibilities.

58

Later, World Heritage-related reports on Mt. Kenya echoed Jim Thorsell's. For instance, a 2003 IUCN report expressed worries over the Forest Department's capacities and mentioned being 'concerned about the lack of resources that hinder the Forest Department to make an effective contribution to the protection of the Site' (ICUN 2003: 3). A 2001 UNESCO decision document gave further voice to IUCN's concern over ongoing illegal logging and reprimanded the Kenyan Minister for Environment and Natural Resources, who was the Forest Department's direct supervisor and executive, for his intention to deforest 68,000 hectares for settlement purposes (UNESCO 2001: 25).

Ultimately, Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation had mixed consequences for Bongo Woodley and his crusade against the Forest Department. Most importantly, the World Heritage listing had no juridical force. IUCN supported the KWS's position that the Forest Department exploited Mt. Kenya, but World Heritage status in itself changed nothing in terms of the KWS's authority. As such, the inscription on the World Heritage List did not have the effect that Bongo Woodley had hoped for. Perhaps this was inevitable, as the inscription itself was a derivative of the situation that it meant to solve – consequently, Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation did not offer a solution to existing management problems, but rather recreated the power structures that sustained these problems. At the same time, Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing introduced an additional layer of inspection, and it brought the mountain under closer surveillance of large organizations. As such, World Heritage offered Bongo Woodley a discursive sphere in which the Forest Department's corruption became a global concern, rather than a merely Kenyan affair. How this had an impact on the mountain's administration is the topic of the last section.

Mt. Kenya's tussles over mandate after 1997

In 2000, a revision of Mt. Kenya's administrative boundaries took place, aggravating the opposition between the KWS and the Forest Department. This revision was partially reinforced by Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation, which had given the KWS more international acclaim, but it found its real origins in a set of developments that had started some five years earlier.

In 1995, national and international stakeholders who feared for the future of Kenya's forests founded the Kenya Forest Working Group (KFWG). Among these stakeholders were the East African Wildlife Society, IUCN and UNEP, and soon after foundation the KFWG was funded by Dutch and Swedish NGOs as well as by different UN programmes. The KFWG was essentially a lobby platform founded as a civil society organization and designed to expose the government's share in the country's corrupt timber industry. As such, the KFWG largely targeted an international audience – within Kenya, the general public was already widely aware of these practices. The KFWG used Mt. Kenya for its first shame-and-blame offensive. The choice was deliberate, one of the KFWG's earliest associates[28] told me during a meeting at the ministerial office where he worked in 2013. Mt. Kenya

had given name to the country, he stressed, and therefore it carried an unmistakable iconic value. Besides, by the time that the KFWG came round to planning its first campaign Mt. Kenya had just acquired World Heritage status. As such, international conservation audiences had been freshly reminded of the mountain's merits and importance, and of what would be lost if the mountain was not protected properly.

Although there was widespread talk about Mt. Kenya's grave condition at the time, the KFWG faced a problem: there was no official report with hard data. There were eyewitness accounts as well as a few files on the most severely affected areas, like Imenti on the mountain's northern slopes, but a diagnosis of Mt. Kenya's overall condition did not exist as yet – this was primarily a result of the inaccessibility of the mountain's thick forests, of the vastness of its terrain and of a number of other practical constraints, such as the dangers involved in aerial assessments due to the area's complicated aerodynamics. To fill this gap, the KFWG decided to carry out its own survey. To this end, a Belgian expat called Christian Lambrechts, who at the time worked for UNEP, visited Mt. Kenya in early 1999. During this visit, Lambrechts[29] contacted Bongo Woodley. Lambrechts recounted to me in June 2012 how he informed Mt. Kenya's senior warden of the KFWG's intentions, and managed to implicate Woodley in the KFWG's operation.

Two men subsequently began to make plans for an aerial inspection: Woodley would pilot the two-seater Aviat Huskey that he used for his air patrols, and Lambrechts would assess Mt. Kenya's forests from the passenger's seat. They soon faced the problem of funding, for the KFWG only had a limited budget. Bongo Woodley told me that they had therefore turned to Richard Leakey, who at the time was serving his second term as KWS director. He said that Leakey had agreed to subsidize the survey, and let the two men use the KWS's Aviat Huskey for free. In addition, Leakey promised that the KWS would cover the fuel costs, and that the organization would fund the publication of the survey's final results. Once the cooperation between the KFWG and the KWS had been established, Richard Leakey introduced another KWS officer, Gideon Gathaara, to the project. Gathaara was not meant to contribute to the survey's fieldwork, which was done entirely by Bongo Woodley and Christian Lambrechts. Rather, he was brought in to give the study a black face, one informant who opted to remain anonymous told me. This person explained to me that Gathaara's participation was intended to disguise the fact that, in practice, the survey was a white men's undertaking, and added how Leakey had indicated that the project was likely to be rejected as a neo-colonial conservation initiative if it was carried out entirely by white practitioners. Just before Leakey resigned from the KWS for the first time in 1994 he had personally experienced how Kenyan nature conservation continued to arouse racial critiques, and my informant believed that he had wanted to shield the survey from similar attacks. In the final report, Bongo Woodley and Christian Lambrechts were mentioned by name only once, in the introduction – after that they were anonymized into 'the survey's pilot' and 'the survey's rear seat observer' (Gathaara 1999: 6-7).

The report that resulted from the survey spread an alarmist message: it presented Mt. Kenya's condition as very grave and very urgent. For instance, it stressed the negative effects of charcoal production, overgrazing, marihuana cultivation and extensive illegal logging, and it supported such claims with impressive photographs. Christian Lambrechts told me that he and Bongo Woodley had deliberately made use of a specific survey method, called 'total survey count' (designed in the late 1970s for counting animals), knowing full well that this method would generate dramatic results. Total count surveys rest on data collected in a few relatively small geographic zones, which is used to make calculations for a larger area. Because total count surveys rely entirely on the findings gathered through the aerial inspection of a fairly limited number of demarcated blocks, biases become proportionally much more important (Norton-Griffiths 1978: 87). With respect to Mt. Kenya's survey, these biases were generated on purpose: Woodley and Lambrechts intentionally flew over the most severely affected forest patches, and generalized their findings for the mountain at large. The founder of the total survey count, a man called Mike Norton-Griffiths, later reviewed Bongo Woodley's and Christian Lambrecht's survey. Norton-Griffiths wrote a report on the biases and errors that had occurred (see Norton-Griffiths 2004), and told me in an email about the overall conclusion that he had drawn: Woodley's and Lambrechts's basic interpretation that Mt. Kenya's condition differed substantially from earlier decades was sound, but they had sensationalized their findings.

Bongo Woodley's and Christian Lambrechts's manipulation of survey data should warn us against uncritically receiving the 'evidence' of environmental threats. This is not to suggest that there are no real ecological processes taking place that should concern us, but in the political language that the conservation industry draws on such real ecological processes are easily confused with cultural models of what cannot be lost and should be preserved (Soper 1995: 196). This political language largely derives its authority from scientific material gathered for the purpose (see also Beck 1996: 3), through which it makes claims to objective truths (Feindt & Oels 2005; Hajer 1995; Mühlhäusler & Peace 2006). The problem is that when such 'objective truths' are dramatized in the public sphere, they tend to enable and justify immediate and drastic interventions (see also Bindé 2000; Büscher & Dressler 2007; Mehta 2001) – this is precisely what happened with regards to Mt. Kenya.

The survey report managed to elicit the international attention that the KFWG had aimed for, and it was widely received as an eye-opener. To this day, conservation organizations such as the World Wide Fund,[30] IUCN,[31] and the Convention on Biological Diversity[32] refer to it uncritically, as do scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds (see for instance Kariuki 2006; Kleinschroth et al. 2013; Teklehaimanot et al. 2004). But most importantly in terms of the developments that followed, Richard Leakey ratified the survey. As KWS director he wrote a short introduction to the survey report, in which he stated:

> Kenya is best known as a land of arid and semi-arid habitats with little forest. Sadly, the little there is has
> been the focus of unplanned, usually illegal utilisation with disastrous consequences for bio-diversity,

catchment and loss of soil. As a country, Kenya cannot afford to watch the remaining natural forests being destroyed. The forests are a critical and invaluable national asset that must be protected.

This report is clear and provides unequivocal data on the current situation. I hope that with such evidence, actions will follow to put an end to the wanton degradation of our nation's natural forests.

Gathaara (1999: iii)

Action was indeed taken – by Richard Leakey himself.

In the time between Bongo Woodley's and Christian Lambrecht's fieldwork and the publication of the final results, Richard Leakey had left the KWS again and had become Kenya's Head of Civil Service. In that capacity, and following the shocking outcome of the survey, Leakey announced in July 2000 that Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve was to be reclassified as a national reserve. This reclassification implied important changes: it took the management authority over Mt. Kenya's forests from the Forest Department and located it with the KWS, as the Wildlife Act identifies the KWS as the only lawful supervisor of national reserves. The Forest Act situated control over forest reserves within the Forest Department, but Leakey's intervention meant that Mt. Kenya *was* no longer a forest reserve. The Kenya Gazette, which publishes all government decisions, announced the administrative change in clear language and stated that, from July 2000 onwards, 'the Mt. Kenya National Reserve shall fall under and be managed by Kenya Wildlife Service' (The Government of the Republic of Kenya 2000).

On the very day that Mt. Kenya's forests were re-designated as a national reserve, Bongo Woodley carried out a large operation during which, he told me, about twelve hundred people were arrested on charges of using Mt. Kenya's resources illegally. I got the feeling from Bongo Woodley's account that he had primarily done this to demonstrate to the country that things had changed, and that, in the future, strict rules would be enforced to halt the degradation of Mt. Kenya. I understand the arrest campaign as a way of showing-off newly gained power. However, it soon became evident that the Forest Department had no intention of leaving Mt. Kenya's forests, even though its mandate had been suspended. Senior Forest Department officers took little notice of the legislative change. Instead, they asserted that, since the 1932 decree that had called into existence Mt. Kenya Forest Reserve had not been revoked, Leakey's decision was unlawful – even twelve years later, a regional forest officer[33] based in Nyeri insisted to me that there had never been any administrative change. One of his colleagues, a zonal forest officer[34] stationed at a nearby office, informed me that he continued to tell his staff to ignore the KWS's claim. He said that the re-designation was 'a misinterpretation by the government'.

Christian Lambrechts told me that he and Bongo Woodley quickly came to realize that, as long as the Forest Department refused to accept the judicial changes, the KWS's new mandate was of little value. Once the initial commotion created by the 1999 survey report began to ebb away, they feared that little would change after all. This encouraged the two men to once more take action. Lambrechts

explained to me that he and Bongo Woodley had primarily been concerned that the regazettement of the forest reserve into a national reserve would be swept under the carpet, and that it would end up as a useless document in the drawer of one or other minister. With this in mind, Lambrechts and Woodley decided to carry out another survey.

The second survey of Mt. Kenya took place in 2002. Bongo Woodley and Christian Lambrechts were again the two main instigators, but this time they were supported by a British doctoral candidate called Hilde VanLeeuwe who was affiliated to the Durrell Institute of Conservation and Ecology, and by KFWG coordinator Michael Gachanja. The latter replaced Gideon Gathaara and, as a black Kenyan, assumed the mantle of lending the survey political credibility. This second survey used different methods than the 1999 survey, and it employed a sample collection count rather than a total survey count (VanLeeuwe et al. 2003: 9). As a result, the final output of the second survey was far less dramatic than the results of the 1999 survey, although Mt. Kenya's actual condition had hardly changed – Christian Lambrechts told me that a three-year timespan was far too short to measure the impact of forest regeneration measures. Nevertheless, the second survey was presented as evidence that Mt. Kenya's state of conservation had improved significantly after it had been put under the supervision of the KWS in 2000 (VanLeeuwe et al. 2003: 21-22).

The 2002 survey clearly meant to buttress the KWS's reputation but, according to Christian Lambrechts, this had not been its main purpose. He told me that he and Bongo Woodley had primarily taken the 2002 survey as an opportunity to spread the information that the forest reserve had been re-designated. The survey report's appendix therefore actually carried its main message: it showed a copy of Richard Leakey's decision as it had been announced in the Kenya Gazette, and it displayed a letter signed by the then Minister of Wildlife Francis Nyenze that confirmed that, from July 2000 onwards, the KWS had the sole legal mandate to act. Woodley and Lambrechts had anticipated that the 2002 survey report would reach a global audience, just as the 1999 report had done, and they reasoned that the more parties knew about the re-designation, the more difficult it would be for the Forest Department to pretend that it had not taken place.

Despite Bongo Woodley's and Christian Lambrecht's efforts, the Forest Department's executives never bowed to the re-designation. The situation was further complicated when the government adopted a new Forest Act in 2005. This act dissolved the Forest Department and called into existence the Kenya Forest Service (KFS), which mimicked the corporate structure of the KWS. The act gave the KFS a mandate over all Kenyan forests, regardless of their exact classification, and I have heard many foresters explain that it therefore overrules Richard Leakey's 2000 order. I never found anyone willing to admit that this legislative revision was motivated by the struggles taking place on Mt. Kenya. But it is not hard to imagine that those involved in Kenya's illegal commercial logging sector did not want to see Mt. Kenya's developments repeated elsewhere, and tightened their judicial hold on the country's forests out of precaution.

In 2006, after nearly seventeen years of duty and fighting the Forest Department's mandate, Bongo Woodley retired from the KWS. Different senior wardens followed in his footsteps. One of them, who asked to remain anonymous, having been reprimanded by his superiors shortly before our first meeting for sharing too much information with the public, complained extensively about the serious conflicts between foresters and wildlife rangers. Bongo Woodley had said that during his time the relationship between Mt. Kenya's Forest Department staff and KWS staff had been relatively peaceful, but this warden sketched an entirely different picture. He spoke of violent clashes, and recounted to me how a group of foresters had blocked one of Mt. Kenya's forest roads to prevent a KWS truck from entering. He also told me about arson that had recently destroyed a newly built KWS housing complex, and he was convinced that certain foresters played a key role in the poaching that his teams tried to fight. 'Otherwise, you explain to me why I find elephant carcasses next to their plantations' he noted. Overall, he expected that, sooner or later, foresters and rangers would fight out their disputes by taking up arms against one another.

When I asked foresters and forest guards for their views, they typically underscored their subordinate position vis-à-vis the KWS. For instance, they told me that the KWS has good and strong vehicles while the KFS lacks any mode of transport; they said that the KWS has first-rate arms while the KFS is given police force cast-offs; they complained that the KWS has fancy park gates and ranger quarters, while KFS foresters are confined to forest stations in a deplorable state; and they generally stressed that, while the KWS attracts considerable donor funding because it merchandizes its charismatic wildlife, the KFS's budget is so constrained that many forest stations do not even have a wheelbarrow for planting trees. Thus, both foresters and wildlife rangers uphold the rhetoric that the KWS is superior to the KFS, and that the latter is a mere shadow of the first. This rhetoric is saturated with suspicion, distrust and envy. Only occasionally did a wildlife officer speak fondly of a forester in my presence, or vice versa. Most of the time, both camps provided me with plenty of reasons why they were not on good terms, and illustrated this with examples of when and how they had fallen out.

Contrary to the above statements, which portray Mt. Kenya's KWS and KFS staff as fierce enemies that actively and continuously fight one another, foresters and wildlife rangers are not in a constant state of warfare. In fact, individual rangers and foresters from time to time admitted to me that they patrol together sometimes, or share other work. Still, their decades-old antagonism has established a script of unresolvable hostility that all parties concerned have learned well. One of the effects of this script is that it covers up rivalries with colleagues from the same institute: the enemy is the sister department, not one's colleagues or superiors. But discontent about the functioning of one's own institute is felt nevertheless. For instance, the warden mentioned above, who did not want his identity revealed, complained about how his superiors had made it a habit to play down management problems. He found this troublesome because, in doing so, they deprived him of the opportunity to make his grievances heard. Different foresters and forest guards also told me that they felt cheated by their superiors. The 2005 Forest Act had promised the entire KFS staff better working conditions and

better payment, but by 2012 many had not seen such promises come true. Shortly after the adoption of the act senior officials began to receive higher payment, but employees lower in rank were told to wait because the KFS did not have the means to raise all salaries at once. A number of underpaid employees told me that this had created a severe rift in the organization, and that it had put juniors in an uncomfortable position: they did not want to complain too loudly about how they were discriminated, out of fear of losing their job altogether.

Finally, the ongoing conflict between the KFS and the KWS makes the conservation efforts of numerous organizations and projects in the region difficult, and most initiatives die a slow death due to the administrative chasm – indeed, some organizations downright refuse to collaborate with the KFS such as the Green Belt Movement, which strongly disapproves of how the 2005 Forest Act reintroduced the shamba system, and other organizations simply witness how their projects stall because the KFS and the KWS fail to come to an agreement. One of these organizations is Rhino Ark, which in 2010 announced that it planned to fund the construction of a ring-fence around Mt. Kenya. Rhino Ark knew in advance that the project would be difficult because it had already carried out a similar project on the nearby Aberdares mountain range. And that had taken twenty-one years to finish.

Prior to Rhino Ark's intervention on Mt. Kenya there had been a range of smaller fencing projects on the mountain. These projects had mostly been carried out with funding from either the Bill Woodley Mt. Kenya Trust (BWMKT), founded by Bongo Woodley in remembrance of his father,[35] or from UNDP Compact, a small grants programme sponsored by UNDP and the Global Environment Facility. The building of these fences had not been coordinated, one of BWMKT's employees explained to me, and this had resulted in a number of problems. In some regions, the patchy distribution of fences had, for instance, funnelled wildlife into inhabited areas that were not yet fenced, where human-wildlife conflicts then rapidly increased. Also, the fences were generally of a low quality and therefore had failed to stop larger mammals such as elephants. Because of this, the inhabitants of some villages had come to perceive of the fences not as an intervention that meant to protect them, but as an intervention that meant to demarcate where they were allowed and not allowed to go. Out of protest these people had begun to cut wires, and they continue to do so whenever the fences are repaired.

Rhino Ark's approach differs notably from these small-scale and isolated fencing schemes: the organization plans to build a top-quality ring-fence that goes all the way round the mountain. Rhino Ark claims in different flyers and on its website that the fence will eventually be 400 kilometres long, and that the total operation will cost approximately $12 million.

Not long after Rhino Ark had announced its plans the first problems emerged, one of the project's partners told me in confidence. Most importantly, the KWS and the KFS failed to agree on the fence's location: the KWS wanted it built at a low altitude so that the fence would encompass most of the mountain's forests, but the KFS wanted it built at a high altitude, approximately on the boundaries of

the National Park, because it feared that it would otherwise lose access to forest plantations. Moreover, the KWS and the KFS disagreed over the number of gates that the ring-fence was to have. The first wanted only a few entrance points so as to effectively control access to the area, but the KFS protested. The 2005 Forest Act granted the organization the right to sell permits to villagers for a range of forest activities, such as grazing cattle, collecting firewood, or shamba system cultivation. These were the KFS's only income-generating activities, but limiting villagers' access to the area would make it difficult to pursue them.

In sum, Rhino Ark's fencing project soon got caught in arguments over whether the KWS or the KFS had the power to decide. The project's partner told me that Rhino Ark had found a temporary solution to this: it had decided to start building in an area where it knew that there would be few disputes. This area was Embu, where Rhino Ark could follow the already-fixed boundary of the Nyayo Tea Zone, which was set up between forests and villages decades ago. But the project's partner also indicated to me that he did not know how to continue afterwards and he foresaw that, by the time that the fence passed Embu and headed further north and west, disputes between the KWS and KFS would escalate again. What the outcome of these disputes would be, no one could tell.

III.

A PLACE OF NATURE

Cultural and Political Histories Marginalized

In this chapter I again look into Mt. Kenya's 1997 World Heritage listing, but I shift my focus from the individuals that initiated the designation to the wider political conditions in which it materialized. I have demonstrated that Bongo Woodley played a key role in Mt. Kenya's World Heritage nomination process, but in this chapter I depart from the position that his personal efforts only partially account for the mountain's World Heritage designation. The reason for this is simple: Kenya's ruling political elite *could* have undermined Bongo Woodley's World Heritage project at the time, but did not do so. This is a rather basal observation, but it deserves close attention.

Due to a number of historical events, which I describe in the first part of this chapter, Mt. Kenya came to epitomize the culture, religion and politics of Kenya's Kikuyu population. The mountain came to articulate tribal competition over power, most importantly due to the role it played in the 1950s Mau Mau war, and to this day Mt. Kenya symbolizes the wealth and political sway of the Kikuyu elite that formed under Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta. Interestingly, by the time that Mt. Kenya was nominated for World Heritage status in 1996 this Kikuyu elite was no longer in place. It had been marginalized by Jomo Kenyatta's successor, Daniel Arap Moi, who had taken over the presidency in 1978. By the late 1990s, Moi's regime was openly challenged by a large Kikuyu opposition, which expressed profound dissatisfaction about how it had been marginalized. Given that Mt. Kenya symbolizes the unity and solidarity of what, at the time, was the government's strongest

political rival, one may wonder why the Moi regime did not prevent Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation.

I will argue that Daniel Arap Moi's government endorsed Bongo Woodley's World Heritage project because Woodley's nomination did not address Mt. Kenya's cultural and political potential. On the contrary, it presented the mountain exclusively as a place of nature. As such, Woodley's World Heritage nomination fitted with the censorship of Kikuyu cultural and political histories practiced by the regime, to a greater or lesser degree, ever since it had come to power in 1978. Mt. Kenya's naturalization illustrates just how much the commemoration of Mt. Kenya has been, and continues to be, a source of struggle, and it articulates a post-colonial government's general uncertainty about how to deal with colonial legacies.

Mt. Kenya, Kikuyu homeland

Different explorers and scientists travelled to Mt. Kenya in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to study the area's geological formations and its flora and fauna. In this period, knowledge of Mt. Kenya was largely confined to academics with a professional interest in the region, but in 1938 Mt. Kenya was finally introduced to a larger Western audience. This was due to the publication of *Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu* written by Jomo Kenyatta, who, as other parts of this chapter discuss, became Kenya's first president.

Jomo Kenyatta spent most of his childhood with Scottish missionaries because his parents had passed away when he was young. In 1924, then in his early thirties, Kenyatta joined the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). The KCA was a political organization that aimed to make British administrators in Kenya understand colonialism's destructive impact on Kikuyu people (Shaw 1995). In particular, the KCA raised attention for the grievances caused by land alienation (Berman 1996: 316) – as long as white people came and grabbed Kikuyu land, the KCA argued, Kikuyu would be unable to develop into self-governing modern subjects. At the time, the KCA did not have much impact within the colony itself. For that reason, and in an attempt to make its voice heard in the metropole, it sent Kenyatta oversees in 1929 (Shaw 1995).

During his journeys abroad, Jomo Kenyatta initially had trouble finding a suitable partner willing to help him advance the KCA's cause. Initially, he sought shelter with missionaries, a community familiar to him. But he soon distanced himself from his Christian upbringing, for mission societies in Kenya had begun to take a firm stance against Kikuyu female circumcision (Berman 1996: 318-319). In addition, the missionaries withdrew their support once they learned about Kenyatta's relations with European women and his communist sentiments (*Ibid.*). Kenyatta subsequently sought rapprochement with liberal imperialists, who introduced him to the British education system in order to improve his language skills. Yet, these liberal imperialists were primarily concerned with extending British

colonial power, and Kenyatta soon realized that his agenda and their agenda were irreconcilable (*Ibid.*: 320). Subsequently, Kenyatta visited Russia, where he received further education. At first, he had been encouraged by his communist friends, but he fell out with them as well once he saw that their desire to forge a trans-ethnic movement to overthrow colonialism was at odds with his own intentions to promote Kikuyu traditions and values (*Ibid.*: 322-325). In sum, during those first years abroad Kenyatta had primarily been seeking sympathy and recognition. Consequently, he had largely failed to carry out the advocacy work that the KCA had sent him to do. Moreover, the British authorities continuously undermined his authority and refused to acknowledge him, or the KCA, as true Kikuyu representatives. As a result, Kenyatta faced a profound 'dilemma of representation' (*Ibid.*: 330), which seriously complicated his mission.

Jomo Kenyatta's luck changed for the better when he met Bronislaw Malinowksi in London in December 1934. It was a meeting that was to be beneficial for both men. On the one hand, Kenya's Kikuyu population had long fascinated Malinowski. The anthropologist showed a strong interest in how the Kikuyu rejected conversion to Christianity, as that would mean they had to give up their initiation rituals (Frederiksen 2008), as well as in their outspoken bitterness over land loss. In the years before he met Kenyatta, Malinowski had tried to organize a fieldwork programme in Kenya, but he had never managed to pull it off. Now that Kenyatta was in London, Malinowski finally saw an opportunity to increase his knowledge of the people that intrigued him. Kenyatta, on the other hand, found in Malinowski the mentor that he had been looking for since 1929. In light of his previous disappointment in missionaries, liberal imperialists and communists, Malinowski's scientific approach appealed to Kenyatta, and the latter enrolled himself in the department of social anthropology at the London School of Economics where Malinowski taught. This enabled Kenyatta to further advance his education which, or so he hoped, could gain him credence in the eyes of colonial administrators (Berman 1996: 330). More importantly, anthropology offered Kenyatta a scientific and expert idiom through which he could address colonial injustices and that British authorities could not simply brush aside as anti-colonial African activism (*Ibid.*).

An intimate pupil-instructor relation formed between Jomo Kenyatta and Bronislaw Malinowski. The latter was not only enthusiastic about Kenyatta's knowledge on Kikuyu life, but also appreciated Kenyatta's anthropological education for the methodological argument that it made (Berman 1996: 328). Malinowski advocated the practice of participant observation, which was based on the presumption that anthropologists could grasp the native's point of view through extensive fieldwork that included learning the native's language and observing his customs and social organization. The method assumed that scientifically trained experts could become knowledgeable insiders of other cultures and Malinowski claimed that the method produced objective scientific knowledge (see for instance Pels 2011). If Kenyatta, after his training, proved capable of writing an unbiased ethnography about his own people then this would further validate the soundness of participant observation,

Malinowski reckoned (Berman 1996: 328). In short, Kenyatta and Malinowski both had a stake in having Kenyatta's work accepted as academically 'pure' and 'value-neutral' (see Pels 1999: 109).

At the end of his studies at the London School of Economics, Jomo Kenyatta wrote a thesis in which he described Kikuyu customs and traditions. *Facing Mount Kenya* was an edited version of this thesis, and it became one of the first modern ethnographies written by an African. Malinowski praised Kenyatta's work for its lack of political purpose and its scientificity, and in *Facing Mount Kenya's* introduction he wrote:

> [Bantus and negroes] have been organised into a hatred of European encroachment and into a contempt for the debility of those powers and movements which ranged themselves on the side of Africa, and then, through weakness and incompetence, abandoned the cause of Africa and let it go by default. […] Mr. Kenyatta has wisely refrained from using any such language as appears in my last sentences. He presents the facts objectively, and to a large extent without any passion or feeling.
>
> Malinowski in Kenyatta (1938: x, original emphasis)

Contrary to what Malinowski suggested, *Facing Mount Kenya* was not at all written 'without any passion or feeling' and it certainly did not present the facts objectively – it was a political manifesto against British imperialism, masqueraded as cultural historical analysis.

Facing Mount Kenya positioned Mt. Kenya and its surrounding lands at the heart of Kikuyu culture. Firstly, it depicted the mountain as a Kikuyu spiritual place that served as the residence of the Kikuyu God *Ngai*, or *Mogai*, who founded the Kikuyu tribes. Long ago, Kenyatta wrote, Ngai summoned a male figure called *Gikuyu* upon Mt. Kenya to behold the beauty and the fertility of the area. Ngai then ordered Gikuyu to descend and to establish his homestead in the vicinity of Mt. Kenya. He provided Gikuyu with a wife, *Moombi*, and told them to have many children. Gikuyu and Moombi thereupon had nine daughters who founded nine Kikuyu clans. Ngai gave all these clans their share of land on the foot of Mt. Kenya (Kenyatta 1938: 5-9).

Following this foundation story, *Facing Mount Kenya* emphasized Mt. Kenya's role in Kikuyu sacrifices and prayers. Jomo Kenyatta explained that Mt. Kenya's Kikuyu name *Kere-Nyaga* meant 'mountain of brightness' (Kenyatta 1938: 225), and he portrayed it as a divine place that fulfilled important functions during rituals. For instance, he described how initiates to be circumcised were marked with symbols on the forehead, cheeks, around the eyes, the nose, the throat and the navel that were painted with a particular kind of white chalk called *ira* that was collected on Mt. Kenya (*Ibid*.: 132); he specified how the blood and the content of the stomach of a sheep killed during an engagement ceremony was sprinkled along the gateway of a girl's homestead and towards Mt. Kenya to purify and protect an upcoming marriage against evil, and to cement the bond between the boy's and girl's clan (*Ibid*.: 162); and he described how elders carrying drinking horns filled with beer performed blessing ceremonies towards Mt. Kenya each time a Kikuyu man moved from a first to a second grade of eldership (*Ibid*.: 195). Kenyatta further stressed that, in addition to such exceptional

circumstances, Mt. Kenya played a central role in daily life for Kikuyu always faced the mountain whenever they performed their everyday rituals and prayers (*Ibid.*: 225). All in all, *Facing Mount Kenya* presented Mt. Kenya as the supreme mark of Kikuyu solidarity and alliance.

Jomo Kenyatta used the Kikuyu foundation story and the Kikuyu rituals to argue that his tribe held the exclusive historical, cultural and religious right to populate and cultivate the area around Mt. Kenya (see for instance Kenyatta 1938: xv). Taking into account that by the late 1930s much of the land around Mt. Kenya had come into the possession of European settlers, *Facing Mount Kenya* was essentially a critique on British invasion, as the monograph's conclusion shows:

> [a] culture has no meaning apart from the social organisation of life on which it is built. When the European comes to the Gikuyu country and robs the people of their land, he is taking away not only their livelihood, but the material symbol that holds family and tribe together. In doing this he gives one blow which cuts away the foundations from the whole of Gikuyu life, social, moral, and economic. When he explains, to his own satisfaction and after the most superficial glance at the issues involved, that he is doing this for the sake of the Africans, to "civilise" them, "teach them the disciplinary value of regular work", and "give them the benefit of European progressive ideas", he is adding insult to injury, and need expect to convince no one but himself.
>
> Kenyatta (1938: 305)

Jomo Kenyatta was not unique in making land claims through a narrative of historical affiliation. From roughly the late 1920s onwards the British colonial administration was continuously confronted with tribal groups asserting land rights on the basis of cultural histories (Lonsdale 2008: 307). This played into a colonial logic that divided African subjects into solid and exclusive tribal sections and which concealed the actual negotiations and manipulations of tribal identities by colonial administrators and Africans alike (see for instance Hamilton 1998; Pels 1996). This logic rested on what administrators, missionaries and anthropologists took as cultural markers, and it paved the way for a distinct colonial geography of native reserves that assumed a connection between culture and territory (see also Gupta & Ferguson 1997; for Kenya in particular see Parsons 2012). As we will come to see later, in Kenya such logic laid the basis for an ongoing tribalization of the post-colonial state.

Facing Mount Kenya conveyed one straightforward message: by occupying Kikuyu land white settlers had disrupted previously peaceful and integrated Kikuyu societies, and the monograph has been depicted as an 'angry denunciation of the West' (Shaw 1995: 131). At the same time, Jomo Kenyatta did not reject all that was associated with the advent of colonialism. For instance, he had been keen to gain knowledge and he celebrated the introduction of education. He also welcomed the arrival of sanitation and medicine (Kenyatta 1938: 305). But Kenyatta's point was that Africans themselves should have the freedom to decide what they were, and were not, willing to adopt.

While Jomo Kenyatta tried to establish himself as the expert on Kikuyu culture in the late 1930s he faced competition from Louis Leakey, the father of Richard Leakey. Louis Leakey was a white

Kenyan who had been raised at the missionary station of his father, reverend Harry Leakey, and who had lived amongst Kikuyu for the first sixteen years of his life. He knew their customs and spoke their language fluently, and later in life he claimed he was a Kikuyu himself (Clark 1989: 383).

Louis Leakey was educated at Cambridge after his parents had returned to England in the aftermath of the First World War. Here, he took classes in archaeology and anthropology and soon gained a reputation for being a promising young scholar, especially after he made some important archaeological findings in Kenya early in his career. But in the mid-1930s, Leakey's work and methods began to be disputed: a professor of geology called Percy Boswell pointed out Leakey's sloppy procedures and his careless dating of hominids, and as a result Leakey's British career in archaeology was shattered (Berman & Lonsdale 1991).

In an attempt to recover his academic reputation, Louis Leakey decided to write an ethnography on the Kikuyu, whom he had known all his life. In order to fund further fieldwork, he applied for a grant from the International African Institute. His request ended up with Bronislaw Malinowksi, who dismissed Leakey's application on the grounds that Leakey lacked thorough anthropological training (Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 160). Besides, Malinowski was already Jomo Kenyatta's instructor at the time, and he thought that the latter was in a far better position to analyse Kikuyu culture. This event marked an enduring rivalry between Malinowksi and Kenyatta on the one hand, and Louis Leakey on the other (*Ibid*.: 162). This rivalry had its effect on how Leakey came to interpret the Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s, which in turn had important implications for how the colonial government responded to the upheavals that is described in the next section.

Louis Leakey nevertheless returned to Kenya in early 1937 to carry out his ethnographic studies, albeit without funding. Yet, before he managed to make his findings public, Jomo Kenyatta's *Facing Mount Kenya* was published. Worse still, Kenyatta's monograph included parts of a paper that Leakey had written earlier, but which Kenyatta failed to mention as a source (Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 162). In early 1939 Leakey nevertheless tried to have his own manuscript printed. However, the document was rejected because it ran to 700,000 words, and Leakey refused to reduce its length (*Ibid*.).[36] Seeing that his plans were again in ruins Leakey offered his services to the colonial state, and in mid-1939 he became an officer of the special branch of the Kenya Police (*Ibid*.: 174). This arguably lost him further respect with Malinowski, who depicted colonial administrators in general as practical men without scientific training, who could 'not be trusted to come up with reliable knowledge about the people they administered' (Pels 2011: 788).

Although Louis Leakey failed to earn respect from the academic establishment he did manage to gain the confidence of key colonial administrators, whom regarded Leakey as an expert on all Kikuyu matters. Like Jomo Kenyatta, Leakey portrayed the Kikuyu as a tribe that, prior to colonial rule, had been harmonious and organic (Clark 1989: 384), and that had been governed by strict rules (*Ibid*.: 387). Yet, Leakey drew different conclusions than Kenyatta: he did not support Kenyatta's calls for Kikuyu self-governance but claimed that, before Kikuyu culture and traditions died out due to the

devastating impact of colonialism, the British administration had to facilitate their recovery (*Ibid*.: 395). Leakey based his understandings of Kikuyu culture on data that he had collected during conversations with male elders, which was a standard practice for colonial administrative ethnology at the time (Pels 2011: 796). These elders had offered Leakey an image of pre-colonial Kikuyu society as democratic and orderly but, as Shaw points out, in doing so had tried to consolidate their own power in a changing political and economic landscape. Rather than describing to Louis Leakey the actual state of affairs, these elders had 'collaborated in the construction of a Kikuyu past which put them at the apex of political and juridical power and at the centre of the system of redistribution' (1995: 111).

Essentially, Louis Leakey's and Jomo Kenyatta's accounts on Kikuyu culture both drew on notions of pre-colonial integration and tribal solidarity that had never existed, and throughout the 1930s different Kikuyu factions increasingly quarrelled over the interpretation of their shared history as well as over the severity of the colonial injustices done to them (Berman 1996: 316). In spite of such frictions, Jomo Kenyatta cultivated an image of himself as the spokesman of an undivided tribe (*Ibid*.: 315). To further this cause, he was careful not to reveal too much of his cosmopolitan experiences or his Christian upbringing: he changed his name from Johnstone, which was given to him by the Scottish missionaries, to Jomo and he was photographed in a borrowed monkey-fur cloak with spear in hand for the cover of *Facing Mt. Kenya* (*Ibid*.: 332-333). In Nairobi, Kenyatta had primarily been a detribalized native who had moved to the city, but in London he emphasized his exoticism to advance his political cause (Shaw 1995: 128).

In the end, *Facing Mount Kenya* was not at all successful in summoning together a united Kikuyu people. Instead, by the late 1940s the Kikuyu were fighting amongst themselves as much as they were fighting the colonial regime (c.f. Berman 1991; Branch 2007; Lonsdale 1992[C]). But both Jomo Kenyatta's and Louis Leakey's commentaries had nevertheless installed a narrative that suggested that the Kikuyu were at least supposed to act as one coherent force. This narrative gained dramatic momentum during the Mau Mau emergency of the 1950s.

Mau Mau on Mt. Kenya

In October 1952, the colonial government declared a state of emergency over the Colony of Kenya. This was a response to a sudden upswing of African revolt that largely took the colonial administration by surprise. Between 1952 and 1960 it fought a brutal war to suppress these revolts, which were carried out in name of the Kenya Land and Freedom Army, better known as the Mau Mau. Both Jomo Kenyatta and Louis Leakey were key figures during this period of upheaval.

After Louis Leakey joined the Kenya Police in 1939, he made the investigation of the KCA one of his prime concerns. By December of that year, Leakey presented his superiors with a comprehensive report that argued that the KCA had tried to prevent the colonial administration from carrying out its

duties, and that the organization aimed to arouse anti-government sentiments amongst its Kikuyu followers (Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 174). In the months that followed, Leakey directed searches of KCA's headquarters, of KCA branch offices, and of the homes of KCA leaders. In the aftermath of these searches the colonial administration banned the KCA and two affiliated associations in May 1940. The frontmen of these organizations were arrested and summoned to court in July and August (*Ibid.*: 176). They protested against their imprisonment but Leakey testified against them, claiming that the KCA meant to overthrow the colonial administration (*Ibid.*: 177). He stated that he had evidence that the KCA was collaborating with the Italian enemy, and insisted on the organization's secretive and subversive character by emphasizing its oath practices (*Ibid.*). The colonial court consented to Leakey's evidence and kept the KCA leaders in custody (*Ibid.*: 178).

Louis Leakey claimed that the KCA played a leading role in the coordination of large-scale Kikuyu resistance against the colonial regime. In practice, however, the Kikuyu population that Leakey spoke of as a more or less homogenous lot was divided on a range of topics. In the late 1930s, the colony had gone through economically grim times, and it could hardly pay the metropole the interests on its debts. To increase revenue, the colony had encouraged African agricultural production. This, in turn, had disturbed the relationship between different generations of Kikuyu men, who had previously been joined in patron-client networks (Clark 1989: 388). In the past, senior Kikuyu men had provided young Kikuyu men with the means to marry and to establish a household of their own. But under pressure of raising African production the first had begun to cut such arrangements, and wealthier landowning classes bought out poorer families (Clark 1989: 388) so as to maximize the returns from increasingly scarce and valuable land (Branch 2007: 295). This amplified the contradictions between Kikuyu haves and have-nots, and as impoverished youngsters could no longer count on the support of their elders they had begun to challenge these elders' authority (Lonsdale 2003: 56).

After the Second World War, the colonial government released the KCA leaders, who by then had spent five years in jail, and in 1946 Jomo Kenyatta returned to Kenya. Local KCA figureheads, who generally consisted of older land-owning and affluent Kikuyu men, tried to revitalize their former influential position. In light of this, they administered oaths of loyalty to men they considered responsible household heads, in order to strengthen their overall grip on the Kikuyu constituency (Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 181). But soon Kenyatta and the KCA lost control over this tactic, and by the late 1940s impoverished and dissatisfied young Kikuyu men had begun to copy the KCA's mass oathing campaigns – not to further improve the solidarity among KCA members but to consolidate their own alliance versus elder generations, by whom they felt exploited (*Ibid.*: 182).

All these developments escaped the attention of the colonial government. So when it was confronted with public oathing ceremonies in 1950, which were organized by landless Kikuyu who defied the power of Kikuyu elders and who had begun to call themselves Mau Mau, the government mistook this for a sign of collective Kikuyu revolt against the regime that Louis Leakey had warned

against a decade earlier. It should be noted that, by that time, Leakey's reputation as a Kikuyu expert was far less disputed than it had been in the late 1930s, and he had become the honorary director of the Coryndon Museum[37] in Nairobi – even academic anthropologists, who one and a half decades earlier and under leadership of Bronislaw Malinowski had condemned the kind of administrative ethnography that Leakey practiced (see Pels 2011), had largely come to accept Leakey's expertise (Berman & Londsdale 1991: 180).

The colonial administration took the Mau Mau to be an anti-white and anti-Christian Kikuyu revolt that was grounded in a revival of tribal customs and religion, and banned the organization (see for instance Anderson 2005[A]; Berman 2007). The ban could not suppress the Mau Mau: by 1952 more oathing ceremonies were taking place and some Mau Mau men had begun to raid white settler farms, especially in the highlands around Mt. Kenya that *Facing Mount Kenya* identified as the religious and cultural heartland of the Kikuyu tribe (Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 183). Eventually, the colonial government declared a state of emergency, and moved military troops into the colony in October that year (Anderson 2005[A]: 4).

Immediately after the emergency was announced, Jomo Kenyatta was arrested. The latter had successfully cultivated an image of himself as the leadsmen of all Kikuyu, but in the context of the revolts this image had turned against him and the colonial administration had little doubt about his participation in the Mau Mau uprising. Also, the popularity of *Facing Mount Kenya* made Kenyatta a suspicious character. In 1938, the monograph had sold a mere five hundred copies, but by the 1950s it had become a desirable item and in 1953 it was reprinted to meet the high demand for the book (Shaw 1995: 136). In the context of the Cold War and the rise of Pan-Africanism, British administrators were certain that all Mau Mau followers were 'under the hypnotic control of the demonic Communist and anthropologist Jomo Kenyatta' (Berman 2007: 529).

After his arrest, Jomo Kenyatta was put before a colonial court in Kapenguria, western Kenya, in late November 1952. He was heard together with five other suspected Mau Mau leaders, who together came to be known as the *Kapenguria Six* (Coombes 2011). Initially, Louis Leakey was called in to serve as a Kikuyu interpreter during the trials, but Kenyatta managed to have him removed from the case (Clark 1989: 385)[38] – he understood that his rivalry with Leakey would not work to his advantage, and it has been suggested that the irony of Leakey performing as middleman between him and the colonial government was too much to bear for Kenyatta (*Ibid.*). Although Kenyatta openly disapproved of the Mau Mau, and already before his imprisonment had called Mau Mau followers irresponsible criminals (Berman 1991: 201), colonial officers thought he masterminded the movement and was the 'manager of Mayhem' (Lonsdale 1990: 394). The Kapenguria Six were found guilty and sentenced to jail.

In the meantime, Louis Leakey wrote two books on the Mau Mau: one called *Mau Mau and the Kikuyu* published in 1952, and one called *Defeating Mau Mau* published in 1954. In these two books Leakey portrayed the Mau Mau as delinquents who spoiled the reputation of an otherwise peaceful

and reasonable tribal people. His writings revealed an imperialist nostalgia[39] (Rosaldo 1989) for the loss of what he reckoned had been a 'traditional' Kikuyu culture, and he argued that the Mau Mau deliberately abused Kikuyu traditions and customs in their fight for self-governance. He reduced Mau Mau followers to semi-educated gangster politicians who distorted traditional customs, who undermined colonial improvement schemes, and who manipulated the beliefs of religious peoples to advance their own political cause (Clark 1998: 385). In Leakey's eyes, the Mau Mau was orchestrated by former KCA people, who had begun operating under a new name but who were still under the command of Jomo Kenyatta (Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 146).

Throughout the emergency Louis Leakey had frequent and direct personal contact with senior officials, both in Kenya and in London, whom he advised on the matter (Berman & Lonsdale 1991: 186). As such, he played a pivotal role in how the colonial administration shaped its official narrative on the Mau Mau (Berman 1991). This official narrative depicted the Mau Mau as a savage, violent, depraved and bloodthirsty tribal cult (*Ibid*.: 182). It posited the Mau Mau as agitating against enlightened British rule, and it reduced Kikuyu subjects to a backward people who were ignorant of the advantages that modern civilization offered them.[40] This rhetoric gave way to different positions: while conservatives, for instance, focused on the Mau Mau's terror-laden primitivism, Christian fundamentalists emphasized that the solution was in Kikuyu conversion to Christian values (Lonsdale 1990: 412). Nevertheless, all agreed on the Mau Mau's atavistic, primitive and anti-modern disposition.[41]

The colonial government approached the Mau Mau as a united front, which it fought by force from October 1952 onwards. Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares mountain range were the two main stages where the war against the Mau Mau took place. This further cemented the Mau Mau's depiction as an exclusively Kikuyu revolt, because Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares demarcated an area where the bulk of the colony's Kikuyu population lived, either in native reserves or on the fringes of the white-owned farms that employed them. In reality, the Mau Mau was not limited to Kikuyu and the movement did get support from people with a different tribal affiliation (Lonsdale 1992[C]), such as Jaramogi Oginga Odinga who is introduced later. But the colonial script of Africans organized in tribes largely prevented colonial administrators from noticing this.

Already in August 1952 some Mau Mau leaders had begun to retreat to Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares, to hide in the thick forests and caves to escape the watchful eye of the colonial regime (Anderson 2005[A]: 231). The number of men taking cover on Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares further increased when the emergency was announced, and slowly different Mau Mau forest bands began to take shape. These bands were not immediately the militant troops that they later became. Initially, they largely consisted of men that had simply fled their villages because they had feared prosecution by the colonial administration – they were fugitives rather than soldiers, and they were not used to the forests' wet and cold conditions (Anderson 2005[A]: 237). In fact, most of these men had turned to the Mau Mau only to escape the recruitment campaigns of the Home Guard (*Ibid*.: 253). The Home Guard

was an African brigade that the colonial regime had called into existence to fight Mau Mau rebels (*Ibid.*). It gained supporters quickly, although many early Home Guard adherents had little against the Mau Mau: rather, they had been seduced by Home Guard privileges such as exemption from tax payments or forced labour, they had been intimidated by the threat of punishment such as the confiscation of livestock, or they had simply wanted to avoid suspicion of being Mau Mau (*Ibid.*: 253-254). At least until late 1954 many African Home Guard followers actually sympathized with the Mau Mau, and it has been suggested that about half of them had taken Mau Mau oaths (*Ibid.*: 256).

From early 1953 onwards a draconian war was fought, involving battalions of the King's African Rifles, the Kenya Police, the Home Guard, and different Mau Mau armies that largely operated independently of one another (Anderson 2005[A]: 243-244). All parties involved committed cruel atrocities including torture, mutilation, beheading, cutting of hands and ears, and public hangings. Between twelve thousand and eighteen thousand Mau Mau rebels were killed, and at the peak of the emergency more than seventy thousand alleged Mau Mau supporters were held in detention camps. The Mau Mau in turn killed about eighteen hundred African civilians whom it took as British loyalists, not counting the hundreds of people that went missing and never returned. Relatively few victims fell on the side of white settlers and British troops: records mention 250 killings and casualties (*Ibid.*: 4-5).

The methods employed by the colonial administration, such as the invention of the Home Guard, divided African subjects into British loyalists and Mau Mau followers, and civil war broke out. Most of the fighting took place in villages located on the slopes of Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares – between April 1953 and March 1954 Murang'a, a town south of Mt. Kenya, was one of the worst battlegrounds (Anderson 2005[A]: 263), and at the end of March 1953 a town called Lari, located in Kiambo region, became the scene of a massacre. One night Lari's Home Guard was called out to investigate the murder of a loyalist. Arriving at the scene, the brigade realized it had been fooled – when it returned to Lari it found the entire village in ruins. More than one hundred villagers were killed or gravely injured, and the incident became known as the 'greatest bloodletting of the entire Mau Mau war' (*Ibid.*: 119-139).

During the first two years of the emergency, the Mau Mau armies proved strong forces that were difficult to fight. It was hard to trace their whereabouts due to Mt. Kenya's and the Aberdares' harsh terrain and thick forest cover, and they had developed successful intelligence-gathering techniques. But from mid-1954 onwards these circumstances gradually changed after Waruhiu Itote, better known as General China and the leader of all Mau Mau generals on Mt. Kenya, was captured. Itote became trapped in an ambush organized by the King's African Rifles and the Home Guard in January 1954. He was shot, and surrendered himself. A few weeks later he was called to court and sentenced to death, but he was offered a pardon if he agreed to cooperate in the colonial government's efforts to finish off the Mau Mau (Anderson 2005[A]: 234).

Waruhiu Itote offered his assistance to the regime, and he became pivotal in a large surrender campaign. He wrote more than twenty letters to all Mau Mau leaders on Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares,

asking them to meet with the colonial administration to discuss their capitulation (Anderson 2005[A]: 273). The plan seemed to have potential: more and more Africans had begun to reject the Mau Mau due to its use of extreme violence (see for instance Berman 1991; Branch 2007) and the Mau Mau increasingly received less support from outside, making, for instance, the supply of their forest encampments more difficult. In addition, the Mau Mau had suffered a great number of casualties since October 1952, which further weakened their position.

A handful of Mau Mau leaders responded to Itote's call, and in the first week of April 1954 the first troops came down to announce their surrender. Contrary to what had been agreed, a brigadier of the King's African Rifles called John Reginald Orr opened fire (Anderson 2005[A]: 276). This threw a spanner in the works, and with this event the surrender campaign fell to pieces. Mau Mau leaders no longer trusted Waruhiu Itote, and eventually the latter was sent to a detention camp for he was of no further use. Nevertheless, Itote's intermingling divided the Mau Mau leaders: whereas some openly scolded him, others continued to believe in his innocence (*Ibid.*).

By late 1954, the Mau Mau had largely been defeated. There were only about two thousand fighters left, and the movement no longer posed a real military threat. The colonial government dismissed British troops and installed 'pseudo-gangs' from September 1955 onwards (Anderson 2005[A]: 284-285). These pseudo-gangs largely consisted of former Mau Mau rebels who had changed side, but they also included white highlanders and administrators such as Bill Woodley who painted their faces and disguised themselves as Mau Mau fighters by wearing ragged clothes and dreadlock wigs. By early 1956, these pseudo-gangs had cleared most of Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares of Mau Mau militants (*Ibid.*).

The war officially came to an end in October 1956, when the last standing and most important Mau Mau general on the Aberdares, Dedan Kimathi, was finally arrested. With Kimathi's capture the resistance of the forest armies had been broken and all the Mau Mau figureheads had either been hanged or imprisoned, or were presumed death (Anderson 2005[A]: 328). The civil war came to an end, but Mau Mau detention camps initially continued to exist. However, the horrible conditions within these camps embarrassed the colonial government on different occasions and, fearing more scandals, it finally called off the state of emergency in January 1960. It released all former Mau Mau suspects and began to rehabilitate the region (*Ibid.*: 328-330).

The rehabilitation process had a bearing on Jomo Kenyatta's predicament. After the Kapenguria trial, Kenyatta had been imprisoned for six years, but in 1959 he had been transferred to Lodwar where he continued to live under house arrest. Once the state of emergency was lifted, Kenya's emerging political elite began to lobby for Kenyatta's liberation and his detention was finally cancelled in August 1961. Subsequently, Kenyatta resumed his political career and became the chairman of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), a political party founded the year before.

In anticipation of Kenya's decolonization Jomo Kenyatta launched a charm offensive. He deliberately kept the Kikuyu populism that the Mau Mau represented at bay so as not to offend

loyalists, non-Kikuyu, the colonial government or European settlers (Clough 2003: 255). In a press statement that he gave shortly after his return from Lodwar he echoed Louis Leakey judgement that Mau Mau followers were gangsters, and he declared:

> We are determined to have independence in peace, and we shall not allow hooligans to rule Kenya. We must have no hatred toward one another. Mau Mau was a disease which had been eradicated, and must never be remembered again.
>
> <div align="right">Taken from Clough (2003: 255)</div>

Kenyatta tried to shake off his reputation as the 'demonized leader to darkness and death' (Berman 2007: 536) and he positioned himself as the pillar for reconciliation (*Ibid*.). In the process, he further hardened the division between ex-Mau Mau and Kikuyu loyalists (see for instance Branch 2007), and managed to enhance his reputation in the eyes of colonial officials and white settlers alike – by 1963 they regarded him as the most desirable president of an independent Kenya, who could be trusted to protect Western interests (Berman 2007: 536).

A new nation's troubled past

On 12 December 1963 Kenya was proclaimed independent. Jomo Kenyatta's KANU had won the pre-independence elections, and Kenyatta was inaugurated as the country's first president. On the eve of independence, the British government foresaw an exodus of British settlers who were likely to demand compensation from the public treasury to cover the costs of investments that they had made (Leo 1978: 621). In anticipation of this, the British government funded Kenyatta to buy off some European properties. These land sales were to demonstrate that Europeans would not be chased out, and that their properties would retain their value under the new administrative system (*Ibid*.; see also Branch & Cheeseman 2006). In essence, Jomo Kenyatta meant to communicate that there would be a place for everyone in independent Kenya.

But the Mau Mau history problematized Kenya's cultivation into a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic state (Lonsdale 1992[B]: 267). Not long after Jomo Kenyatta's presidential appointment, different memoirs appeared written by former Mau Mau activists. For instance, there was one by a man called Josiah Mwangi Kariuki that was published in 1963, and one by Waruhiu Itote published in 1967. These memoirs did not depict the Mau Mau as a tribalist movement, like the colonial regime had done, but claimed that the Mau Mau had been a nationalist movement that had stood up against British domination (see for instance Berman 1991: 184). Such a depiction tied in with the publication of different academic works that argued that the Mau Mau had been a rational and instrumental response to grievances caused by the colonial regime. These works described Mau Mau followers as conscious political actors rather than as primitive and uncivilized savages. Especially Nottingham & Rosberg's

The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in Kenya published in 1966 was influential in this regard (Berman 1991).

Mau Mau's characterization as a nationalist liberation movement undermined Jomo Kenyatta's ideology of national unity: to acknowledge former Mau Mau fighters as political activists who had advanced and achieved the cause of decolonialization would make independence appear an exclusively Kikuyu accomplishment, and as such glorify one tribal group over others (Berman 1991: 201). So rather than keeping the Mau Mau's memory alive, Kenyatta downplayed the movement's contribution to self-government and literally called upon Kenyans to 'forgive and forget' the past (Atieno-Odhiambo 1991: 303). He initiated a policy of amnesia (Clough 2003: 256), and constantly reminded Kenyans that they had all fought for the country's liberation collectively. As such, Kenyatta set the tone for the marginal and ambivalent role that the Mau Mau episode continues to play in Kenya's official historical narrative. It was also within this context that Kenyatta sent Kisoi Munyao to plant the national flag on Mt. Kenya's peak on the night of independence – the act meant to transform the mountain from a Kikuyu shrine or Mau Mau hide-out into a symbol of the colonial hardships that all Kenyans had fought against together.

Jomo Kenyatta's rejection of the Mau Mau had various material effects. In the run-up to independence ex-Mau Mau had hoped that Kenyatta would confiscate and redistribute European land among them, but Kenyatta made it clear that he had no such intentions (Clough 2003: 255). He moreover denied former Mau Mau fighters government positions, and largely selected his ministers and statesmen from loyalist Kikuyu and British collaborators. Some ex-Mau Mau protested against how Kenyatta set them apart, and again retreated into Mt. Kenya's forests after 1963. Castro (1995: 83) suggests that these dissenters did not really threaten Kenyatta's rule because they were poorly armed and small in number. Yet, their self-imposed seclusion did give expression to Kenyatta's limited capacity to enforce national order upon each and every citizen (*ibid.*).

It soon became evident that Jomo Kenyatta's regime not only marginalized former Mau Mau but also cultivated unequal access to wealth and political power more generally. Kenyatta left the bureaucratic structures of his colonial predecessors in place and largely built his regime on the principle of tribal elders and patron-client networks. This consolidated a connection between the accumulation of economic and political affluence on the one hand and tribal solidarity on the other (Berman et al. 2009; Branch & Cheeseman 2006), and it generally benefitted Kenyatta's own political associates. These associates largely consisted of former loyalist Kikuyu and, during Kenyatta's first years, of Luo politicians who had joined KANU in 1960 under leadership of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, a Luo spokesman appointed as vice-president by Kenyatta in 1963. Kenyatta presented himself as the country's *Mzee*, the elder of all elders that brought together all different communities (Berman et al. 2009: 473) and he employed a rhetoric of *harambee*, Kiswahili for all working together (Anderson 2005[B]: 547). Yet, in practice, he favoured his own political cadre at the expense of the rest of the country.

Kenyatta's tribal favouritism expressed itself most dramatically through the Million Acre Settlement Scheme. This scheme was implemented in the Rift Valley and essentially meant to divide previously white-owned farms, which Kenyatta had been able to buy with British sponsorship, into small plots owned by African cooperatives. Its main intention was to re-Africanize an area that, during colonialism, had largely been in white hands. This is not to suggest that all white settlers left the Rift Valley after 1963 – many stayed on, or sold their farms to other Europeans who came to Kenya in the years that followed. To this day, the area is home to a significant white population, whose insecure tenant rights have had a critical effect on Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site, as I will explain in chapters four and five.

After independence, land was scarce yet desirable and the Rift Valley's Million Acre Settlement Scheme gave way to fierce competition over who was to benefit from the programme (Berman & Lonsdale 1992: 1). Simplifying matters for clarity's sake, roughly two camps emerged. On the one hand, there were landless Kikuyu for whom there was no place in the overpopulated Kikuyu reserves, or who squatted on the fringes of white-owned farms. They saw the scheme as an opportunity to regain farmland, after the colonial administration had dispossessed them. On the other hand, there were Kalenjin groups who claimed that the Rift Valley was theirs, because they had occupied it prior to colonization. Maasai groups made similar demands, but these are set aside for now as their claims pertained to one specific area that I will deal with in more detail in the coming two chapters.

The Million Acre Settlement Scheme's purchase system favoured the landless Kikuyu over the Kalenjin groups. It prescribed that land-buying companies, founded especially for the purpose, could buy land at market rates – a similar initiative had been tried in 1961 but had failed at the time due to a lack of readily available farmland, which had given way to prices that no African could pay (Leo 1981). But the Million Acre Settlement Scheme adopted lower prices. This primarily enabled landless Kikuyu to buy themselves in since they were typically more affluent than Kalenjin groups, due to their participation in commercial farming under colonial rule. Moreover, Kalenjin groups refused to pay for land they already deemed rightfully theirs due to pre-colonial inhabitancy (see for instance Anderson & Lochery 2008).

The Million Acre Settlement Scheme enabled the steady influx of Kikuyu communities into the Rift Valley. Kalenjin groups protested loudly against these developments. Their most outspoken representative was Daniel Arap Moi, who was a member of the political party Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which had been founded in 1960 in opposition to Jomo Kenyatta's KANU. Between 1960 and 1963, KADU had promoted a politics of *majimboism* as an alternative to nationalism. *Majimbo* is Kiswahili for provinces or counties, and majimboism essentially entailed the devolution of government power to a regional level to prevent larger tribal groups such as the Kikuyu from dominating tribal minorities (Anderson 2005[B]). Through Majimboism, KADU had hoped to curtail KANU's growing influence (*Ibid*.: 552), but this aspiration fell apart with the pre-independence elections. Subsequently, some KADU members, including Daniel Arap Moi, took positions in the

House of Representatives. But they soon realized that without support and funds from central government they were powerless (Anderson 2005[B]: 562). In consideration of this, different KADU politicians took a pragmatic stance and joined KANU. In 1964, KANU absorbed KADU, which ceased to exist, and Kenya effectively became a one-party state. As a member of KANU, Daniel Arap Moi continued to advocate majimboism. Set against Kalenjin frustrations over the new political establishment as well as over the Million Acre Settlement Scheme, majimboism was no longer merely understood as a particular model of rule – rather, it became synonymous with Kalenjin groups' desire to expel Kikuyu from the Rift Valley (Anderson 2005[B]).

In 1967, Daniel Arap Moi's uncompromising tone changed. In March 1966, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga had fallen out with Jomo Kenyatta, and had resigned from his post as vice-president. Kenyatta then offered the position to Moi and gradually the Kikuyu-Luo alliance, against which KADU had originally been founded, was replaced by a coalition between Kikuyu politicians and minority tribes such as the Kalenjin (Lynch 2006[B]: 234). Moi dropped his majimboism advocacy, and instead began to defend the Million Acre Settlement Scheme's capitalist principle that land was a saleable good and not a historical or tribal right (Anderson & Lochery 2008: 336-337). Moi's former Kalenjin supporters reprimanded him for this, and claimed that Moi had paid for his influential position by giving away the Rift Valley to the Kikuyu (*Ibid.*).

In the meantime, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, together with a number of other former allies of Jomo Kenyatta who had come to refute Kenyatta's clientelistic practices, founded an opposition party called the Kenya's People Union (KPU). KPU members condemned Kenyatta's neo-colonial attitude, and disapproved of how his rule concentrated wealth and political sway in the hands of an influential few. Under the leadership of Odinga, KPU sought popular support from the people who suffered most from Kenyatta's tribal favouritism, and it deliberately reached out to ex-Mau Mau. In the process, it accused Kenyatta and his associates of keeping alive colonial rule, and it called upon the masses to again fight for liberation. In response, KANU took a firm stance against its former Luo allies, whom it began to portray as an 'uncircumcised lot' that lacked administrative competence and that was culturally inferior to KANU's new allies, the Kalenjin (Lynch 2006[B]: 237). Much to KPU's detriment, KANU also sought rapprochement with former Mau Mau fighters, and even pressed for the erection of a Mau Mau monument in Nairobi's Uhuru Park (Clough 2003: 257). When the government eventually banned the KPU in 1969 it no longer needed to lure Mau Mau supporters away from Odinga – it again became oblivious to the movement, and returned to its politics of amnesia.

The government's negligence of the Mau Mau came to a head in 1975 when Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, a former Mau Mau who eventually became Jomo Kenyatta's most popular critic, was found murdered in Ngong Hills in western Nairobi. The public believed that Kariuki had been assassinated by the regime, and protesting masses attended Kariuki's funeral in large numbers. These masses claimed that Kenyatta's administration was trying to rid itself from political opponents, just as the British colonial regime had done, and they drew analogies between Kariuki's murder and the colonial

government's war against the Mau Mau (Clough 2003: 258). These protests undermined Kenyatta's authority, which in turn encouraged others to mock him openly. Among them was the novelist Ngugi wa Thiong'o, who saw the Mau Mau upheavals as an archetypical workers and peasants revolution, and who maintained that Kenyatta's rule was little more than a continuation of colonial oppression (see for instance Waller 2001) – in late 1977 he was put in jail for his criticism. Such conditions characterized the last three years of Kenyatta's regime, which ended when the latter died of old age in 1978.

After Jomo Kenyatta passed away vice-president Daniel Arap Moi became president. By that time the mechanisms of clientelism and ethnic favouritism, which hitherto had benefitted Kikuyu elites, were firmly in place. Moi turned these mechanisms to his advantage and replaced sitting politicians with his own political allies, most of whom sharing his Kalenjin roots. Initially, Moi's seizure of the state apparatus was precarious and he only just survived a coup attempt in 1982 (Foeken & Dietz 2000), which implicated Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and his son Raila Odinga. But gradually Moi marginalized what had remained of Kikuyu and Luo control, and over time KANU effectively became 'KADU reborn' (Anderson 2005[B]: 563; see also Throup & Hornsby 1998).

After Daniel Arap Moi assumed the presidency he initially embraced Kenya's Mau Mau history, and sought an alliance with former Mau Mau leaders. It has been suggested that this coalition meant to serve two purposes. On the one hand, Moi's partnership with ex-Mau Mau was part of a broader populist strategy with which Moi hoped to engender nationwide support (Clough: 2003: 259) – Jomo Kenyatta had lost such support during his last years, and Moi had observed first hand how Kenyatta's loss of authority had hampered his ability to govern. Secondly, Moi's open commemoration of Mau Mau history meant to express that the new president would bring the favouritism towards Kikuyu leaders who had been loyal to the British colonial regime to an end (*Ibid.*).

Throughout the 1980s, Daniel Arap Moi's revival of Mau Mau sentiments aroused scholarly debate about how much the movement had actually contributed to decolonialization. Historians were divided over the matter, which culminated in a hostile row during a 1986 meeting of the Historical Association of Kenya (Atieno-Odhiambo 1991). On the one hand, there was a group of revisionists, which included historians such as Bethwell Ogot and William Ochieng, who claimed that all colonial victims had fought their battles. They advocated against romanticizing the Mau Mau uprising as a form of exclusive Kikuyu resistance, for such an image only aided Kikuyu elites in legitimizing the exclusion of all other Kenyans from the fruits of independence (*Ibid.*: 301). On the other hand, there was a group of more radical thinkers, which included the historian Maini wa Kinyatti and Ngugi wa Thiong'o who had been released after Kenyatta's death, who dramatized the Mau Mau's Kikuyu character. They blamed Ogot, Ochieng and likeminded thinkers for refusing to acknowledge Kikuyu heroism, and claimed that Mau Mau rebellion had been the 'highest peak of Kenyan nationalism' (*Ibid.*: 304) and deserved a prominent place in Kenya's collective memory. These radicals received far more grassroots support than revisionists, and figures such as Josiah Mwangi Kariuki and the

Aberdares Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi became the national heroes of the 1980s (Clough 2003: 259).

Daniel Arap Moi's initial celebration of Mau Mau ebbed away in the early 1990s. After the 1982 coup attempt Moi had largely enforced autocratic rule, but in the decade that followed national protest groups increasingly lobbied for multi-party politics and competitive elections. Such lobbying intensified after the assassination of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Ouko in February 1990 (see for instance Grignon et al. 2000) – the murder was clouded in mystery and the rumour spread that Moi had been involved in the killing, which initiated riots in Nairobi. At the same time, international development partners began to call for political reforms (Klopp 2001). It was a time in which different African governments had come to find themselves on the verge of bankruptcy, and in order to receive loans from bilateral financial institutions these country had to commit themselves to widespread democratic reorganizations (Ellis 2000: 42).

Anticipating changes in Kenya's administrative conditions, Kikuyu groups in Central Province once again revived the commemoration of the Mau Mau movement. They began to sing old Mau Mau chants to express their dissatisfaction with Moi's marginalization of Kikuyu politicians, and they called upon all Kikuyu to unite and challenge Moi's rule. In the course of these events the government ordered a ban on Jomo Kenyatta's portrait in May 1990, after which it removed his photo from all government offices and public buildings. The Kikuyu in Central Province reacted angrily, and the measure only added to their discontent (Sabar-Friedman 1995: 113).

National and international pressure groups managed to command political transformations and in 1991, more than twenty-five years after KANU and KADU had merged and Kenya had become a one-party state, multi-party politics was restored. Elections followed in the year after. In the run-up to these elections, Daniel Arap Moi reinvigorated the ideology of majimbo, which he had defended before he had become Jomo Kenyatta's vice-president. Moi and his associates capitalized upon decades-old Kalenjin frustrations over the exclusion from the Rift Valley, and made land distribution a high point on the electoral agenda in an attempt to garner Kalenjin voter support (Anderson & Lochery 2008; Hughes 2005). One of Moi's closest followers, William ole Ntimama, deliberately agitated Kalenjin and Maasai groups, and told them they would lose further access to the Rift Valley if a Kikuyu politician won the elections. He intimidated Kikuyu residents of the area and infamously warned them to 'lie low as envelopes or face grave consequences' (Onoma 2010: 87; see also Klopp 2001), insinuating that they would have to keep calm and vote for Moi or otherwise face Maasai and Kalenjin spears. Eventually, Daniel Arap Moi won the 1992 elections by more than one third of all votes. His victory articulated his control over Kenya's entire political apparatus (Throup & Hornsby 1998: 533) and it further fuelled tensions between Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Maasai groups. This came to a dramatic height in Enoosupukia, a place in Narok county, where William ole Ntimama's incitements resulted in a massive clash between Kikuyu and Maasai residents in 1993. Some people were murdered, and many others fled in fear for their safety (see for instance Klopp 2001).

The reintroduction of multi-party politics changed Kenya's political arena in significant ways. Most importantly, it set the stage for the exaggerated enactment of tribal identities, and it fostered tribal polarization as political parties typically formed in keeping with tribal boundaries. This was partially the result of deliberate techniques employed by politicians such as William ole Ntimama but, as Klopp (2001) suggests, it was also an unplanned and unforeseen side effect of politicians trying to stay in control or trying to regain the power they had had under Jomo Kenyatta. The profound tribalization of Kenya's political domain offered the Moi government opportunities that it exploited, but at the same time it contained a big worry: if KANU could summon popular support by playing up tribal grievances, then so could the Kikuyu opposition (Throup & Hornsby 1998: 533).

This Kikuyu opposition had one trump card with which to engender tribal solidarity, namely Mau Mau. But from the late 1980s onwards, open support for Mau Mau became more complicated due to a nationwide upsurge in sect-like movements. One of these movements was *Mungiki*, the precise origins of which are disputed: some have depicted it as an originally religious movement (see for instance Wamue 2001), while others have claimed that it was founded as a vigilante brigade in the context of Nairobi's high levels of crime (see for instance Anderson 2002). During the first decade of its existence Mungiki accentuated its Kikuyu character. It promoted traditional Kikuyu customs and habits, and it rejected all forms of Westernization. Mungiki leaders even claimed that the organization descended from Mau Mau, and stated: 'we have Mau Mau blood in us and our objectives are similar' (Kagwanja 2003: 30). But it did not take long before Mungiki revealed itself as a hostile gang with criminal intentions. Among other things, it aggressively monopolized Nairobi's minivan sector and began to extort taxes from people in shanty towns (Anderson 2002). At least until roughly the 2000s, when Mungiki became less pronounced on its Kikuyu roots and began to adopt an Islamic identity (Anderson 2002; Kagwanja 2003), one's support for Mau Mau could easily be misunderstood as sympathy for Mungiki.

In 1997, Kenya witnessed its second round of elections since independence. This time, international watchdog organizations monitored the events closely, given the distrust surrounding Daniel Arap Moi's triumph in 1992. The Kikuyu politician Mwai Kibaki was Moi's strongest opponent – initially, Kibaki had been vice-president under Moi, but they had fallen out in 1988. Kibaki had left KANU in December 1991 and had founded his own party, called the Democratic Party (DP). After the votes were counted KANU again pronounced itself winner. In response, riots broke out in the Rift Valley, where Kikuyu groups claimed that Moi and his Kalenjin supporters had sabotaged the electoral process for the second time in a row, and both Kenyans and international observers took the position that Kenyan elections did not foster democracy but merely confirmed Moi's totalitarian rule. This, in turn, encouraged scholars to point out that Kenya's electoral system was as corrupt as the government it served, and attention was drawn to vote buying, selective distribution of identity cards, and the strategic division of constituencies (see for instance Foeken & Dietz 2000).

In subsequent years, KANU realized that, in order to survive another round of elections, it needed a significant proportion of the Kikuyu vote. It found a clever solution to this: in the run-up to the 2002 elections, from which Daniel Arap Moi was constitutionally barred because he had already been elected twice, KANU introduced Jomo Kenyatta's son Uhuru Kenyatta as Moi's successor. Some observers have suggested that this was not only a strategy to appeal to the Kikuyu constituency, but that it also meant to take the sting out of the Rift Valley conflict, where violence was less likely to occur if Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities voted for the same president (see for instance Kanyinga 2009: 336). It seemed that this Kikuyu-Kalenjin alliance had already been planned in the aftermath of the 1997 elections, when KANU had awarded Kikuyu politicians such as Joseph Kamoto and George Saitoti influential governmental positions. Critical observers came to call the appointment of these Kikuyu politicians *kabisa* (absolutely or completely): the move divided the Kikuyu vote, which reinforced KANU's grips on the country's political apparatus (see for instance Grignon et al. 2001: 14).

During the 2002 elections, the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) was KANU's most important competitor. NaRC was a broad alliance of different parties, which had formed a bloc against Uhuru Kenyatta. Amongst others, NaRC included Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga – the latter had been a member of KANU but had left the party the moment that Daniel Arap Moi had pushed forward Uhuru Kenyatta. Through the involvement of Kibaki, NaRC tried to appeal to the Kikuyu vote, and in an attempt to gain broad support in Central Province NaRC took part in the revival of Mau Mau commemoration that had characterized the region ever since the early 1990s. NaRC succeeded, and it won the 2002 elections. Mwai Kibaki became Kenya's third president.

Initially, Kenya celebrated NaRC's victory en masse, optimistic that it would bring an end to decades of political corruption, violent repression and disproportionate enrichment of politicians. But national euphoria was short-lived. NaRC had run on an agenda of legislative reform and during its campaign tours it had promised to draft a new constitution. Civil society groups had demanded legislative changes since the early 1990s, when it became evident that multi-party politics failed to foster democratic leadership (see for instance Lynch 2006[B]). From the late 1990s onwards, KANU claimed that it was working on such reforms, but it failed to deliver results and NaRC took strategic advantage of this in its election campaign.

Like his predecessor, Mwai Kibaki largely lost interest in changing the country's constitution after he became president. The 'business as usual of corruption and patronage' continued (Berman et al. 2009: 464), and Kibaki filled Kenya's cabinet with his own henchmen. In practice this meant that, on the whole, the statesmen who had served under Kenyatta simply resumed their former influential position (*Ibid*.). Kibaki's government made attempts to review the country's legislation but the process soon stalled, and constitution debates became merely another podium on which to express tribal differences and competition (Berman et al. 2009: Hughes 2005) – these developments were partly due to internal NaRC divisions,[42] but they were also bolstered by an increasingly vocal global lobby that

called for the protection of tribal minority rights. The public soon lost its initial enthusiasm for NaRC, and began to take the acronym for 'Nothing actually Really Changed'.

In 2003, Mwai Kibaki lifted the ban on Mau Mau membership. When the British administration had called off the state of emergency in 1956 it had not abolished the legal prohibition on Mau Mau participation, and both Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi had kept the ban in place. Kibaki's repeal had no practical consequences but was highly symbolic: it communicated that his government at last meant to bring an end to the suppression of the country's Mau Mau history (Coombes 2011: 204). In the years that followed, different official Mau Mau commemoration events took place, and throughout 2006 and 2007 the government erected a number of Mau Mau statues and mausolea (Coombes 2011). But Kenya's past remained disputed, and the celebration of Mau Mau continued to be a highly controlled state affair. In February 2006, for instance, the police intervened when a group of people tried to organize a memorial service for Dedan Kimathi in the latters' hometown. The police suspected they were Mungiki, and hence arrested them (*Ibid*.: 213-214). The general public is not unaware of how the commemoration of Mau Mau primarily became a playground for politicians, and the question is whether today there is still much popular enthusiasm for Mau Mau's celebration: when Kibaki revealed a statue of Dedan Kimathi in front of the Hilton Hotel in Nairobi just prior to the 2007 elections, Kenyans largely rejected the act as yet another round of Mau Mau's appropriation in the scramble for votes (*Ibid*.: 217) and paid little attention to it.

So far, I have discussed the ways in which the celebration of Mau Mau waxed and waned since the 1960s in line with a number of power struggles, and I have called attention to politicians' ongoing endeavours to summon tribal solidarity. Before I move on to discuss how this ties in with Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation, I want to make explicit that tribal coalitions are not the sole imperatives in Kenya's political arena – just recall how Daniel Arap Moi formed an opportunistic partnership first with Jomo Kenyatta, and later with Uhuru Kenyatta.[43] But the point is that Kenya's successive political elites have framed the country's administrative difficulties in a discourse that focuses exclusively on tribal division and competition (Anderson & Lochery 2008: 339), which obscures other complicating factors including gender differences, class distinctions or racial segregation (see also Lonsdale 2008). The academic challenge is to problematize rather than to reproduce this discourse, and to be careful not to observe Kenya's political developments purely through an 'ethnic lens' (Lynch 2006[A]: 61).

The ways in which Kenyan politicians exaggerate cultural origins in relation to the country's administration are not unique to Kenya. In fact, different scholars have pointed out how notions of indigeneity and autochthony have become more poignant and pronounced in recent decades, not only in relatively young African nations (see for instance Igoe 2006) but also in Europe, where classifications of cultural insiders and outsiders or distinctions between natives and immigrants have become reiterated themes on the agenda of many a political party (Geschiere 2009; Stolcke 1999). What is particularly troublesome in the case of Kenya, however, is the way in which the rhetoric of

tribal affinity inspires a powerful narrative on land ownership that equates cultural background with rights to land (see also Kuper 2003). This narrative periodically induces violent clashes, especially in times of elections when politicians overdramatize tribal identities in an attempt to rally voter support (Berman 1998). The 2008 elections produced the most disruptive outbreak of tribal conflict over land so far: it lasted for nearly two months, took roughly one thousand lives and created hundreds of thousands international refugees.

In closing, I want to emphasize that I distance myself from primordial understandings of culture and tribe. Rather, I take my cue from scholars who have problematized contemporary processes of belonging, and who have pointed to the inherent tension between the changeable, flexible and contextual nature of cultural identities, on the one hand, and the rigid cultural histories and precepts that such identities can elicit on the other (see for instance Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005; Igoe 2006; Gupta & Ferguson 1992; Geschiere 2009).[44] In Kenya, such tension is obviously at the core of land disputes, but it is also discernable in other developments. For instance, it revealed itself when a famous lawyer called Silvano Meleo Otieno, better known as SM, died unexpectedly in 1986. His widow announced that she wanted to bury him on their farm in Nairobi, but SM's relatives and his Luo age-mates objected. They demanded that SM was buried on family land in Nyamila, Nyanza Province, close to his ancestors. Kenyan media followed the tussles between the widow and SM's relatives closely, and debates over whether SM's cultural background should take precedence over his modern lifestyle or vice versa captivated the public for months. Eventually, the matter was decided upon in court, where a judge ruled that the arguments of SM's Luo relatives outweighed those of his widow. The body was transferred to Nyamila, and laid to rest during a traditional burying ceremony (see Cohen & Atieno-Odhiambo 1992).

The events around SM's death offer another example of how indigeneity can underpin the assertion of rights, in this particular case over a body, and it underscores the political potential of 'strategic essentialism' (Igoe 2006: 417) – in today's geo-political conditions one's ethnic distinctiveness and the mobilization of tradition (see also Meyer 2010) can be effective political tools for giving voice to one's grievances, whether these consist of one's limited access to natural resources, one's marginalized role in decision-making processes, or restrictions in performing one's mode of living openly. But 'cultural distinction' is a process and a mode of positioning rather than an essence (Gupta & Ferguson 1992; Hall 1986), and this demands that we pay close attention to how cultural boundaries are continuously reshaped and re-interpreted. This is not to suggest that temporal cultural identities are devoid of historical depth: Hamilton (1998), for instance, shows that historical events pose limits on cultural invention (see also Hall 1986; Li 2000). As such, she offers a critique on the body of literature that appeared in the wake of Hobsbawm and Ranger's influential *Invention of Tradition* (1983), which, according to Hamilton, overestimated colonialism's influence on the formation of African tribal identities (see also Spear 2003).

Taking note of this, I regard Kenya's 'tribes', 'ethnicities' or 'cultures' as a form of social practice that, among other things, has recourse to socio-economic conditions, political advocacy, historical reference, and adaption to changing circumstances. In the next two chapters, I continue to point out how this practice complicates the country's volatile land issue.

Nature dominating cultural and political pasts

Mt. Kenya's World Heritage nomination came into being at a time when the 1997 elections were pending. KANU politicians and the Central Province Kikuyu opposition competed for power, and in the process both tried to evoke tribal solidarity in order to summon popular support. In this rally for votes, Mt. Kenya offered the Kikuyu opposition a valuable source of symbolic capital for a number of reasons. Firstly, and owing to Jomo Kenyatta's attempt to forge a collective Kikuyu identity in *Facing Mount Kenya* and in his political advocacy more generally, the mountain came to epitomize Kikuyu culture and religion. Secondly, Mt. Kenya was one of the two battlegrounds where the Mau Mau war was fought most fanatically, and as such it became associated with Kikuyu brotherhood and camaraderie. Thirdly, the Kikuyu statesmen that Jomo Kenyatta put in place after he became president largely obtained their wealth in the vicinity of Mt. Kenya, primarily through the Million Acre Settlement Scheme. Thus, the mountain came to denote post-independent Kikuyu entrepreneurship and political sway. In addition, Kenyatta's political associates largely originated from Mt. Kenya, primarily from a town called Nyeri that is located on the mountain's southwestern slope. It is widely believed that not Kenyatta himself but these Kikuyu associates called the shots during Kenyatta's presidency, and they became known as the 'Mt. Kenya Mafia'. When Kibaki obtained power in 2002, many former Mt. Kenya Mafia politicians regained their influential position and thus were able to control the country's administration once more (see for instance Lynch 2006[B]; Murungu & Nasong'o 2006).

In short, for the 1997 Kikuyu opposition Mt. Kenya was a powerful token of tribal liaison, and it tried to capitalize on the mountain's symbolic value in order to encourage the different communities living around Mt. Kenya to vote as one united block (see also Kariuki 2006: 4). In light of this, one might expect that the KANU government would have tried to inhibit Mt. Kenya's World Heritage nomination, as surely World Heritage status could add to the mountain's glorification. But neither President Daniel Arap Moi himself, nor other KANU politicians, prevented Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing. They easily could have done so, and there are examples of World Heritage nominations that resulted in an impasse after sitting politicians refused to endorse it (see for instance Scholze 2008).

I maintain that KANU politicians did not object to Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing because the application that Bongo Woodley drafted focused exclusively on the mountain's natural features. It

confined Mt. Kenya to a natural tableau, and it only dealt with geological and ecological characteristics. Bongo Woodley neither spoke of the mountain's Kikuyu connotation, nor of its role in relation to the Mau Mau episode. Instead, he portrayed Mt. Kenya as a wilderness area and merely discussed tree species, animal records and so forth – Mt. Kenya's World Heritage nomination 'naturalized' the area, and effectively downplayed Kikuyu and Mau Mau histories. Meskell (2012[A]) makes a similar argument for South Africa and points out that, in post-apartheid South Africa, the celebration of cultural heritage is an extremely politicized undertaking because it inevitably evokes a history of racism. In this particular historical context, biodiversity conservation and the celebration of natural heritage could emerge as racially neutral and impartial. Meskell draws attention to different archaeological sites in Kruger National Park that represent apartheid's former racist and repressive regime, and shows that Kruger's depiction as a site of natural marvels placed the park in a discursive realm where this history need not be discussed or even acknowledged. From this she draws the wider conclusion that, in light of the African National Congress's ambition to let South Africa recover from apartheid, the nationwide celebration of nature became a strategy to tone down political pasts (*Ibid*.: 212).

Before moving on, I should say that Bongo Woodley did make one short reference to the strong connection between Mt. Kenya and the country's Kikuyu population. He wrote:

> Mt. Kenya is regarded as a holy mountain by all the communities (Kikuyu and Meru) living adjacent to it. They believe that their traditional God Ngai and his wife Mumbi live on the peak of the mountain. They use it for their traditional rituals.
>
> The Government of the Republic of Kenya (1996: 5)

Woodley's description displays a static and deterministic understanding of culture and religion but, more importantly, it also shows a complete lack of interest for it is fundamentally flawed: in Kikuyu founding stories, Ngai and Mumbi do not relate to one another as husband and wife, but as deity and progenitor (Kenyatta 1938: 5-6). I once discussed this careless statement with a young woman who considered herself half Kikuyu, half Maasai. She took Woodley's description as a great insult, not least because it was stored in UNESCO's online archive where today it continues to mislead readers. 'How can a deity marry?' she asked me, and added that a white man would never accept an African telling him that his God was married. As such, she brought up a pressing concern that ties in with the issue of white control over African World Heritage Sites more generally, which I addressed in the previous chapter: a white man had assumed he knew what Kikuyu culture and religion entailed, while the people he talked about were not consulted or invited to join in the nomination. And UNESCO experts had credulously taken over his perspective.

Mt. Kenya's World Heritage nomination showed the KANU government that Mt. Kenya had the potential to be an icon of nature, untroubled by the country's tribal competition over power and prosperity – it portrayed Mt. Kenya as a place of national pride, instead of as a place that only one

particular tribal faction could legitimately lay claim to. A former statesman [45] once told me confidentially that non-Kikuyu politicians regard Mt. Kenya too big an asset to leave to the Kikuyu. He alluded to the mountain's natural resources and its commercial timber industry, but also to its potential to provoke tribal concord. This explains why the KANU government readily accepted the World Heritage application that Bongo Woodley drafted: it offered a welcome alternative to other, overtly politicized narratives on Mt. Kenya, and it challenged the historically strong link between the mountain and the country's Kikuyu elite. This dynamic is reminiscent of how, shortly after independence, Jomo Kenyatta tried to downplay the link between the Mau Mau uprisings and the country's liberation, and insisted that not only Kikuyu but all Kenyan's had made their contribution to decolonialization.

Interestingly, all but one of the World Heritage experts whom I asked why Mt. Kenya's cultural and political histories were not acknowledged in its World Heritage status said that these were simply not extraordinary enough to merit World Heritage inscription. For instance, a monuments expert located at the National Museums of Kenya said that although Mt. Kenya is considered a Kikuyu sacred mountain this is not enough to build an entire World Heritage nomination on. He added that Mt. Kenya simply does not have outstanding cultural value. A conservationist working for IUCN in Nairobi gave me a similar explanation, and underscored that the mountain's cultural values are too insignificant to live up to UNESCO standards. Only George Abungu, a World Heritage advisor that I introduce in more detail in chapter five, admitted that Mt. Kenya should have been designated as a cultural landscape rather than only as a natural heritage site.

To spell out just how remarkable this near-total rejection of Mt. Kenya's cultural heritage values is I briefly draw attention to another Kenyan World Heritage Site, the Sacred Mijikenda Kaya Forests. This site consists of a strip of forest land two hundred kilometres long, located on the coastline in Kenya's Coast Province, in which one finds the remains of abandoned fortified villages (*kayas*) that were used by the Mijikenda community around the beginning of the twentieth century. The Mijikenda Kaya Forests resemble Mt. Kenya's forests in important ways, but contrary to Mt. Kenya they were added to the World Heritage List specifically for their cultural relevance: UNESCO claims that the Kaya forests have a 'metonymic significance to Mijikenda and are a fundamental source of Mijikenda's sense of 'being-in-the-world' and of place within the cultural landscape of contemporary Kenya' (UNESCO 2008[A]: 191), and the organization suggests that the area is defining for Mijikenda identity (*Ibid.*).

The Mijikenda Kaya Forests became a World Heritage Site in 2007. At the time, Mwai Kibaki's government faced elections, and it tried to summon popular support from tribal groups other than its relatively stable Kikuyu constituency. In the run-up to the 2007 elections Kibaki therefore visited Mijikenda kayas and received blessings from Mijikenda elders (McIntosh 2009). These events were explained as a win-win arrangement: Kibaki anticipated that respect for Mijikenda elders would win him Mijikenda votes, and for Mijikenda elders a partnership with Kibaki was a boost to their local

reputation and social standing (*Ibid*.: 42). The timing of the Mijikenda Kaya Forests World Heritage designation suggests that the official national ratification of Mijikenda culture meant to further consolidate the coalition between Kibaki's government and Mijikenda groups. As such, I suggest that the World Heritage designation of the Mijikenda Kaya Forests was closely entwined with the election politics that have characterized the country since 1992, just like Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation had been. I want to stress that the two sites are surprisingly similar in terms of both natural landscape and cultural-religious significance, but that only the cultural relevance of the Mijikenda Kaya Forests was acknowledged and celebrated. I believe that this underscores the importance of considering the exact timing of World Heritage listings, in order to see how the selection of a site's heritage qualities ties in with a country's prevailing political circumstances.

Before closing this chapter, I want to emphasize that even though I maintain that the KANU government only allowed for Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation because it diverted attention away from uncomfortable cultural and political histories, I do not intend to give the impression that Kenya's political elite deliberately engineered Mt. Kenya's naturalization. I do not understand Mt. Kenya's natural World Heritage designation as a well-planned and preconceived political campaign, directed at supressing Kikuyu cultural and political history – such an explanation would take too little notice of Bongo Woodley's role and his personal struggles, and it would sketch too rigid relations of cause and effect. Rather, Mt. Kenya's 1996 World Heritage nomination could materialize because the circumstances provided for it: Bongo Woodley and the wider KWS saw potential in Mt. Kenya's World Heritage application for reasons related to their rivalry with the Forest Department, and Kenya's incumbent political elite did not stop the application because it just happened to fit its electoral agenda. Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site was simply the outcome of a combination of events that, in fact, had little to do with one another.

WHITE PERILS

Racial struggles over Land in Mt. Kenya's Shadow

In the course of the 2000s a group of stakeholders began to call upon UNESCO to revise Mt. Kenya's World Heritage status, and in 2013 the boundaries of the site changed. Before I discuss this in detail in the next chapter I first deal with an issue that was paramount in these developments, namely Laikipia's racialized land debate.

Laikipia is a highland plateau located east and northeast of Mt. Kenya. Under colonial rule it became the exclusive territory of white settlers, whose status and authority were protected by colonialism's institutionalized racism and the colour bar. I argue that the colour bar is still prevalent in Laikipia, but that its significance has reversed: whereas in the past it served to protect white privileges, today it calls into question and challenges the ongoing presence of white communities. I will demonstrate that this manifests itself, among other things, in criticism on Laikipia's wildlife conservation industry, in incidental property invasions, and in recent legislative changes.

Laikipia's colour bar is not the sole driving force in Laikipia's land debate, and tribal competition over land rights between different African groups is at least as important. Nevertheless, colour bar politics do have important repercussions for the position of white landowners because the colour bar gives way to heated debates over legal tenant rights, legitimate proprietorship, and adequate land use, and as such it fuels white anxieties over land loss and expulsion. As the next chapter reveals, it was these anxieties that brought about the modification of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site.

Below, I examine Laikipia's particular colonial history, I trace how this history installed a narrative that continues to pit the area's white inhabitants against its black inhabitants, and I problematize the ways in which contemporary colour bar politics obscure the complicatedness of Kenya's land question. In doing so, I largely draw on conversations with roughly a dozen white landowners and white conservationists who, due to the sensitivity of the topic, typically demanded anonymity. This means that it often remains unclear how, when and where I obtained my data. In light of the issues at stake I have tried to be discreet – I hope that even critical readers will respect this.

White Highlands

In the early 1860s, the German explorer Baron Karl Klau von der Drecken made a first attempt to travel into the interior of what would become the East African Protectorate. His expedition led him to an area called Masai Land where his journey ended, allegedly because it had run into several thousands of Masaai warriors (Thomson 1968 [1887]: 4). A handful of adventurers followed Von der Drecken, including a missionary called New and a German explorer-cum-collector called Johannes Hildebrandt (*Ibid.*). But not long after Von der Drecken's misfortunes the imperial interest in the area died down. Expeditions into Masai Land were considered too dangerous and too expensive, and between the late 1860s and early 1880s only native traders dared to visit the region (*Ibid.*: 4-5).

The situation changed in 1883 when, in anticipation of the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference, the area again attracted attention. In particular, the British Royal Geographical Society (RGS) wanted to examine whether it was feasible to establish a direct route from Kenya's coast to Lake Victoria through Masai Land, and meant to ascertain whether Masai Land could be prepared for white settlement (Thomson 1968 [1887]: 6). In light of these considerations, the RGS's African Committee invited the Scottish geologist Joseph Thomson to organize another expedition into Masai Land. Thomson accepted the job. According to his own journals, he primarily did so because he was fascinated with the possible existence of Mt. Kenya: the missionary Johan Ludwig Krapf claimed he had spotted the mountain in 1849 when he travelled from a district east of Nairobi called Kitui to Mombasa, but ever since no one had been able to confirm his claim. In fact, geologists widely ridiculed Krapf's so-called discovery because they had no scientific explanation for the presence of a snow-capped mountain in the tropics. Contrary to earlier expeditions, Thomson's journey succeeded – he reached Lake Victoria and, much to his delight, caught a glimpse of Mt. Kenya on his way up (*Ibid.* chapter ix).[46]

After returning from Masai Land, Joseph Thomson subscribed to Von der Drecken's image of Maasai warriors as a bloodthirsty and ferocious people. This had serious implications for how the British colonial administration set about disciplining the tribe (Kantai 2007: 108), and shortly after Thomson's expedition it began to subject the Maasai to internal relocation policies. These policies hit

the Maasai at a time when they were already vulnerable for a number of reasons. Firstly, from the 1880s, African peasants had begun to take possession of Masai Land's border areas. Secondly, some Maasai communities had disintegrated and fought amongst themselves (Waller 1976: 533-535). Thirdly, different outbreaks of bovine pleuro-pneumonia had reduced Maasai herds, which in turn fuelled aggressive cattle raids. And in 1891 the plight of the Maasai deteriorated further when rinderpest broke out: the disease practically wiped out all herds, and according to oral tradition Maasai only survived because they ate donkeys and cattle hides (*Ibid*.: 530).

The unfortunate condition of Maasai communities in the late 1880s and early 1890s made different Maasai leaders susceptible to British calls for an alliance. Among these leaders was a *laibon* (a ritual expert) who was called Olonana. Olonana had fallen out with his brother Senteu, who was based in German territory in present-day Tanzania, and Olonana hoped that with British support he stood a better chance of defeating his sibling. Olonana moreover realized that his position as a laibon was vulnerable, and he employed all the resources at his disposal to secure his standing among his peers. By 1896, the British colonial administration largely had Olonana under command (Waller 1976: 540), yet it still feared the potential outbreak of Maasai revolt against colonial rule. Consequently, it let the battles between Olonana and Senteu take their course in anticipation that the fights would weaken Olonana's troops, and would keep Olonana concentrated on other things (*Ibid*.: 540-543).

Roughly from 1900 onwards, the nature of the alliance between the colonial administration and Olonana changed. By that time, Olonana had beaten his brother and had lost interest in a British partnership, not least because his covenant with colonial administrators had damaged his reputation amongst his own people. The British, in turn, had also lost interest in cooperation with Olonana. Since the late 1880s, the colonial administration had strengthened its grip on the protectorate and it was no longer dependent on the goodwill of Maasai leaders (Waller 1976: 548-549).

In the early twentieth century, the plight of Maasai communities changed drastically. The British administration had invested a great deal of money in the construction of the Mombasa-Uganda railroad, which had turned out to be extremely expensive and, in an attempt to earn back some of its investments, it began to encourage European settlement in Masai Land (Morgan 1963: 144, see also chapter two). Yet, to enable such settlement, the Maasai first had to leave the area. The colonial administration therefore concluded a treaty with Olonana in 1904 that compelled the Maasai to leave the Central Rift Valley, as the British had come to call the larger part of Masai Land, and forced them to take up residency in two Maasai reserves. One was located north of the Mombasa-Uganda railroad in an area called Laikipia, and one was located in the south. This agreement was unique to British East Africa for it granted the Maasai control over both reserves 'for so long as the Masai as race shall exist' (Hughes 2000: 224).

The 1904 treaty brought about a major exodus: some 11,200 Maasai and more than two million heads of cattle left the Central Rift Valley. Only forty-eight Europeans replaced them (Klopp 2001: 487). These Europeans shunned the areas that were already densely populated by African farmers, and

instead ventured into regions that were not yet cultivated due to low fertility. Aided by innovations such as the ox-drawn plough and boreholes, pioneer settlers nevertheless managed to till these barren lands (Morgan 1963: 146) – especially Hugh Cholmondeley, 3rd Baron Delamere, who had come to the area in 1905, spent vast amounts of money trying to work out how to farm efficiently (*Ibid*.: 150).

The successes of Lord Delamere and other farmers attracted more Europeans, and the protectorate's white settler community grew steadily. In response, the colonial administration revoked the 1904 Maasai treaty. It needed more land to accommodate the increasing number of white settlers, and in 1911 it instructed the Maasai communities that had migrated to Laikipia to move to yet another reserve further south (Kantai 2007; Hughes 2005). The grazing grounds here were inferior to those in Laikipia and the Rift Valley, and the Maasai were bitter about this second forced relocation. In 1913, they sued the colonial administration, but the case was dismissed on technical grounds and the British government refused to offer compensation for pastoralist grievances (Hughes 2006). In the meantime, European settlers established farms all over Laikipia. They soon found that Laikipia's soil was even less fertile than in other parts of the Rift Valley, and they turned en masse to livestock farming.

By the late 1910s, European settlement in the Rift Valley and Laikipia had expanded significantly. Especially after the First World War many Europeans came to Laikipia, and to the area around the town of Nanyuki more specifically (Ochieng' & Maxon 1992: 139). This was a result of the Ex-Soldier Settlement Scheme, which granted demobilized British army officers land in exchange for the services they had delivered between 1914 and 1918. The British government had come up with the scheme to solve two problems at once. First, it meant to strengthen Kenya's white minority in the face of upcoming African unrest, which had resulted from the battles between German and allied armies on African territory. Second, Britain suddenly had to shelter large numbers of demilitarized men for whom it had little room, and it gladly sent a proportion of them to the protectorate (Duder 1993: 70). From the perspective of ex-soldiers, the settlement scheme also offered benefits: it provided them an opportunity to farm, which had become increasingly difficult in Britain (Hodge 2010: 29); it offered them a possibility to escape Britain's high inflation and unemployment rates (Duder 1993); and it gave them a chance to retain at least a middle-class standard of living, which their superior racial status guaranteed them on colonial territory (*Ibid*.: 86). In the end, many participants in the Ex-Soldier Settlement Scheme lingered in Nairobi and they never claimed their plots. Many sold out, thus enabling better-off farmers in Laikipia to build ever-larger estates.

By the 1920s, former Masai Land had become one large European reserve, popularly referred to as the White Highlands, which roughly stretched from Machakos and Athi Plains in the south to Trans-Nzoia in the north (Morgan 1963). For decades, only people of European origin were allowed to settle in the White Highlands,[47] and the region attracted various aristocrats who quickly gained the reputation of doing little else but hunting, partying and playing polo. These aristocrats largely settled on the slopes of the Aberdares mountain range and they became known as the Happy Valley jet set, which included prominent figures such as Lord Delamere, Denys Finch Hatton and Josslyn Hay, also

known as Lord Erroll. Happy Valley was associated with promiscuity, adultery, and widespread drug abuse – this reputation further consolidated when, in 1941, the noted lady-killer Lord Erroll was murdered by a single shot in the head and rumours on who had killed him captivated the public for quite some time.[48]

The conditions of the average highland farmer or rancher were far less glamorous than those of the Happy Valley jet set, and many found themselves caught in the ambivalences of the imperial project. For one thing, farming was only profitable if it exploited African labour and White Highland farmers therefore offered African wage labourers tenant contracts. At the same time, they feared that such tenant contracts would foster class awareness, and as such inspire otherwise fragmented and isolated African tribes to challenge colonial rule together. For that reason, White Highland farmers imposed strict control over their African work forces, and supervised them closely (Berman & Lonsdale 1992). This estranged them from the colonial administration, which publicly defended African labour interests and claimed that White Highland farmers mistreated their staff (*Ibid*.).

The colonial administration's critique on White Highland farmers intensified in the 1950s, when African nationalist sentiments were on the rise. These sentiments created unrest among the African tenants in the White Highlands, but rather than waiting for colonial officers to intervene, farmers typically penalized disobedient employees themselves. Already from the beginning of the twentieth century farmers had been discontent with colonial legislation: they claimed it was ill-suited to tackling their situation, amongst other things because it failed to discipline Africans effectively and as such played into increased African criminality (Shadle 2010: 516). By the 1950s, such discontent had made way for defiance, and most White Highland farmers had simply begun to take the law into their own hands. Berman & Lonsdale (1992) suggest that this was more of an immediate threat to white hegemony than African nationalist movements, as the friction between farmers and administrators demonstrated that white rulers were not a strong, united block but rather divided on issues of authority and control.

After 1963, thousands of European settlers left the White Highlands on 'willing buyer, willing seller' principle (McIntosh 2015: 256). The lands that thus became vacant soon fell prey to the struggles between Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities and politicians that I described in the previous chapter. The situation was somewhat different for Laikipia though, which mainly consisted of ranches that required far less manpower than farms. As such, Laikipia had not attracted as many African labourers as the Rift Valley had (see Duder & Youé 1994: 265), and because the region was relatively infertile it largely failed to attract the interest of Africans seeking land. But there was one group that did lay claim to Laikipia: the Maasai. Shortly before independence, Maasai leaders gathered in Thomson Falls and called upon the forthcoming government to give them back Laikipia, Nanyuki and an area further north called Samburu. These leaders stressed that the 1904 treaty had promised them the reserve for as long as they lived, and they threatened to take the land by force if the new government ignored their demands (Anderson 2005[B]: 559).

Despite these warnings, Jomo Kenyatta's government did not redress Maasai grievances. Rather, it subjected Laikipia's vacant lands to a variety of other purposes. The least infertile properties were included in the Million Acre Settlement Scheme and were largely bought by Kikuyu land-buying companies (see for instance Carey Jones 1965). Land not suited for agriculture was sometimes divided into small African ranches, which soon failed to be productive and later typically turned into informal grazing grounds (Graham 2012: 5). On other occasions, such lands were sold again to Europeans, who moved to Kenya in the course of the late 1960s and the early 1970s (Sundaresan & Riginos 2010: 18).

After independence, then, Laikipia turned into a patchwork hosting small-scale African farming and pastoral communities on the one hand, and massive privately owned ranches on the other. These ranches are mostly white-owned but not exclusively, for different members of Kenya's post-independent political elite confiscated parts of the former White Highlands – until recently, for instance, Daniel Arap Moi owned a ranch in the heart of Laikipia, and Mwai Kibaki continues to possess a large track of land just outside the town of Naro Moru. Nevertheless, Laikipia's colonial history installed an image of the area as the land of 'Kenyan cowboys', the colonial nickname for white rangers. This image sustains a narrative that pits Laikipia's white residents against Laikipia's black residents, which obscures the fact that after independence the bigger part of Laikipia turned into African smallholder ranches, group ranches or government land (Graham 2012: 15). In short, the history of the White Highlands put in place colour bar politics that continue to this day. Amongst others, these politics find expression in white landowners' recent conversion to wildlife conservation.

From ranches to wildlife sanctuaries

In the course of the 1990s, Laikipia's white ranchers massively cut back on their cattle ranching activities, and some of them left ranching all together. This was a result of the collapse of Kenya's livestock industry in the late 1980s, which was due to a number of developments. Among others, the input costs for cattle farming increased; Kenya lost access to important export markets because of revised import regulations and hygiene requirements; and in the mid-1980s the Kenya Meat Commission dissolved, which was the country's main outlet to export markets and the most important customer of many ranchers (Heath 2001; Sundaresan & Riginos 2010). Consequently, by the 1990s, Laikipia's white landowners began to look for alternative ways to make their land profitable.

The options of these landowners were limited because much of Laikipia's land was infertile. But wildlife offered them a prospect. For decades, landowners had fought Kenya's large mammals because they interfered with their businesses, and in chapter two I already indicated that the colonial Game Department, later the WCMD, considered it one of its prime tasks to protect white settler properties against destructive and dangerous wild animals. But when the ranching industry collapsed some pioneers, one of which I discuss in full detail in the next chapter, began to realize that Laikipia's

wildlife was one of the few resources that the area had to offer and that it could be turned into an asset: it could attract international conservation funds and it could sustain a game viewing wildlife industry. Slowly, some landowners began to welcome wildlife into their properties, and turned former ranches into wildlife sanctuaries.

The KWS was not particularly fond of these developments, different wardens and rangers told me. From its foundation in 1990, the KWS had sole authority over Kenya's wildlife. When more and more private conservancies popped up in Laikipia, roughly from the late 1990s and early 2000s onwards, the KWS retained its position of sole lawful supervisor but in practice the organization increasingly experienced difficulties in enforcing its rule: some private conservancies attracted large sums of donor money, and as such became more powerful than the underfinanced and understaffed KWS. Among other things, this resulted in the KWS becoming extra strict about its mandate – the organization continuously stressed that, since the Kenyan state was the sole lawful owner of all of Kenya's wildlife, only the KWS was licensed to manage it, and it typically accused white landowners of illegally dealing with a state resource over which they had no rights. Both rangers and landowners told me that this caused serious friction with those who had founded wildlife conservancies. Conservancy owners, in turn, maintained that the KWS was an amateurish organization that lacked the skills and funds to manage Kenya's wildlife effectively. There was one issue that bothered them specifically: the KWS's imposition of a hunting ban.

In 1977, Jomo Kenyatta initiated a nationwide ban on hunting. According to Gibson (1999: 74), Kenyatta had been under pressure from the World Bank, which at the time tried to implement a programme to develop Kenya's tourist sector. Indeed, various observers believe that Kenyatta never had any intention to banish hunting for a prolonged period of time. But shortly after the introduction of the restriction Kenyatta passed away – his successor Daniel Arap Moi left the ban intact, and even expanded it with a ban on the sale of wildlife products (*Ibid*.). The 1989 Wildlife Act, which was drafted under the supervision of Richard Leakey after he had become WCMD's director, adopted both prohibitions and further consolidated restrictions regarding the use of wildlife.

Laikipia's white landowners, who were still ranching in the late 1970s, opposed the hunting ban from the beginning. Prior to 1977, different forms of wildlife killing had been permitted, including sports hunting, bird shooting, cropping and culling. After 1977, all of this was prohibited and, for instance, ranchers were no longer allowed to shoot the lions that killed their cattle or the elephants that fed on their crops. To Kenya's black population such limitations were nothing new, it should be noted: their hunting activities had been criminalized ever since colonial game laws had come into force in the early twentieth century, and their crops and animals had never received any form of legal protection (see for instance Steinhart 2006).

When Laikipia's white landowners eventually left ranching and turned to wildlife conservation the ban proved problematic for yet another reason, different conservationists told me: it stripped wildlife of economic value because it could not be used or sold, and this, in turn, deprived conservation of a

commercial incentive. In other African countries, such as Namibia, Zambia, Mozambique and South Africa, hunting and the sale of hides and tusks finances conservation programmes (see for instance Snijders 2014), or pays for community projects in the hope that this will make people more agreeable to conservation efforts. The latter is based on the presumption that when people benefit from wildlife economically, they will have a greater stake in safeguarding it (but see Van der Ploeg 2013 chapter 3; Zia et al. 2011) – Büscher (2011) sees this as one of the effects of what he has labelled 'the neoliberalization of nature'. Yet, in Kenya, the ban on hunting and selling wildlife products largely prevents wildlife from bringing in money. The only income it can generate here is through game-viewing tourism, and in recent years numerous luxury game lodges have appeared on Laikipia's former ranches. But tourism is a shaky industry, Laikipia's white landowners emphasized to me, for it depends in large measure on the country's economic and political conditions.

In 1992, the Kenyan government briefly experimented with the reintroduction of legal hunting and it launched a cropping programme in a few selected regions (Sundaresan & Riginos 2010), of which Laikipia was one. Jonathan Moss,[49] an ecologist and conservationist living in the area, had been involved in the Laikipia cropping programme, and had allocated cropping quota among farmers and ranchers. He told me that he believed that the programme was quite effective. At the same time, however, it suffered from hunting's association with rich white men, which undermined its acceptance as a sound conservation method. Eventually, the cropping programme was called off again in 2003, due to, among other things, serious criticism from the international animal rights lobby.

The animal rights lobby, which finds its origins in the United States, has long been present in Kenya and became a powerful actor in the country's conservation scene. It vehemently opposes all forms of killing wildlife and it maintains that each and every individual animal has a right to live. It thus extends human ethics to animals, and draws the latter into a moral community where all members have equal rights to life and liberty (Neumann 2004: 820) – in doing so, it discredits nature-culture dichotomies (Haraway 1991). Desmond Morris has traced the rise of the animal rights movement to a prominent Kenyan couple called George and Joy Adamson (Martin 2012: 24). George Adamson worked for the Kenya Game Department as a senior warden, and together with his wife raised three orphaned lion cubs. The couple took the cubs into their home, and Joy Adamson wrote a book on their escapades called *Born Free: A Lioness of Two Worlds* (1960) that was made into a movie in 1966. Both the book and the film were a huge success, and fundamentally changed the way in which an entire generation looked at wildlife: before the Adamsons, wildlife conservation was an issue for the mind, but with *Born Free* it became an issue of the heart. (Martin 2012: 24). The work of George and Joy Adamson resonated with ethologists and zoologists such as Jane Goodall, Dian Fossey and Iain Douglas-Hamilton, who further anthropomorphized animal habits and used their research results to underscore the sentient capacities of, in this case, chimpanzees, gorillas and elephants. To this day, the animal rights movement uses the outcomes of this and similar research to underscore the cruelty and immorality of hunting (*Ibid.*: 91).

100

Different conservationists and white landowners told me that over the years the animal rights movements largely came to control the KWS, as the little international funding the organization received came from animal rights organizations. The International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), perhaps the most vocal animal rights movement in Kenya, for instance, sponsored a number of KWS patrol cars and formed a partnership with the organization to jointly manage two National Parks (IFAW n.d.). White landowners indicated to me that the animal rights lobby's grip on, among others, the KWS manifested itself in how the organization dealt with problem animals that had destroyed properties, or that had injured or killed people. In the past, such animals were simply shot, but the hunting ban made the KWS turn to relocation projects instead. Landowners and conservationists stressed that such operations are very costly and largely ineffective, for problem animals usually continue to create problems after they are moved elsewhere. Also, the bureaucratic hoops that landowners need to leap through to get such relocations organized are time-consuming, and to some seem never-ending (see also Martin 2012: 185). In exceptional cases, for instance when wildlife causes havoc to entire villages, the KWS does shoot animals. But according to a young white landowner who has a property close to Mt. Kenya such shoots are appalling, for untrained KWS rangers do not know how to do the job and cause unnecessary harm and suffering to animals. His statement echoed an old colonial sportsmen's attitude (see Steinhart 2006: 69), but also resembled the animal rights movement in the sense that it likewise applied ethic standards to the handling of wildlife.

In sum, the various ranchers-turned-conservationists whom I spoke to all considered the 1989 Wildlife Act to be outdated and inappropriate for the various conservation dilemmas that the country faced – their dissatisfaction with Kenya's legislation is slightly reminiscent of how White Highland settlers had opposed the colonial administration's legislation in the 1950s that I discussed earlier. On many occasions, Laikipia's white landowners and conservationists told me that the government should reintroduce hunting, for Kenya could then adopt conservation models that also worked in South Africa and Namibia. Again and again they juxtaposed Kenya's rampant poaching with the prosperity of wildlife in these countries, and they argued that Kenya's steady decline in wildlife numbers could only he halted if the 1989 Wildlife Act was revised. Yet, the animal rights movement's hold on the KWS hindered this.

In the mid-2000s, the 1989 Wildlife Act was subjected to a review process. Norton-Griffiths (2007) suggests that Kenya's politicians were not necessarily opposed to legal changes that would allow for certain forms of hunting, but that they were continuously restrained by NGOs like IFAW, Born Free, Action Aid and Humane Society, which funded the larger part of Kenya's conservation programmes. In 2004, an amendment to the 1989 Wildlife Act passed, but the president refused to sign it – according to Norton-Griffiths this was again due to NGOs threatening to withdraw their funds. In September 2006, the review process continued, but by that time animal rights organizations had had ample opportunity to think up a strategy and IFAW launched a nationwide anti-hunting campaign that proved quite effective. Norton-Griffiths further suggests that large animal rights organizations paid

local activists to disturb seminars and meetings (2010: 30), and established undercover branches that pretended to be grassroots NGOs (*Ibid.*). One of these NGOs was particularly aggressive, and its members threatened to shoot hunters if the government dropped the ban (*Ibid.*).

In 2007, the government finally announced it would vote on a bill that meant to revise the 1989 Wildlife Act. Yet, the bill was almost entirely drafted by one IFAW consultant (Norton-Griffiths 2010: 30) and it left the hunting ban untouched. It did not pass parliament and, although other bills were drafted in subsequent years, nothing effectively changed: the hunting ban continued to pit pro-hunting conservationists and landowners against animal rights organizations and the KWS. Anthony King,[50] the former director of a conservation platform called the Laikipia Wildlife Forum that intends to bring together Laikipia's various inhabitants on the theme of wildlife conservation, to whom I have spoken on several occasions, was once quoted by Martin (2012) as saying that IFAW's presence in Kenya is highly problematic because it experiences little resistance from counter groups. 'Though it is small potatoes in Washington or London, IFAW is very big in Nairobi' he said (Martin 2012: 83), and stressed that organizations like IFAW managed to secure their position in Kenya through buying the support of politicians. Another conservationist told me that there are organizations in the country that do not support the agenda of the animal rights movement, but that they keep a low profile out of fear that incumbent politicians or animal rights defenders might otherwise sabotage their work. He added that he knew quite a number of frontmen of such organizations – in private, these frontmen agreed with his own pro-hunting attitude, but in public they defended the ban on hunting.

Due to a number of developments, which I will discuss in the next chapter, the alliance between animal rights organizations and the KWS weakened after 2010. One effect was that the KWS sought closer cooperation with private conservancy owners, and the former hostility between them was partially replaced by an increasing number of private-public partnerships. At the same time, the unease between the KWS and Laikipian conservancy owners continued. The latter, for instance, typically quote sources that suggest that about 60 to 70 percent of Kenya's wildlife is currently found on privately owned lands (see for instance Martin 2012: 32; or Norton-Griffiths n.d.) – according to the KWS officials I spoke to, such statics are flawed, and exaggerate the proportion of wildlife that exists outside national parks and reserves. They added that private landowners deliberately dramatize numbers to make themselves look more important and to attract more funding from international donor organizations. Whoever is right in this discussion, at present all but two of Laikipia's former ranches have converted to wildlife conservation. Today, most white landowners host game viewing lodges, organize safari tours, or provide for conservation and research programmes. Some, such as Ol Pejeta Conservancy and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, have even managed to establish high-profile wildlife reserves that operate on a budget of a few million dollars (see for instance Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's 2011 annual report).

Today, wildlife conservation enables Laikipia's white landowners to make their lands productive in the wake of the collapse of the ranching industry. But from a government perspective it is not clear

what all these private conservancies bring to the table, Anthony King once explained to me. He stressed that in the main private conservancies do not offer much jobs, and also fail to generate much revenue – on the contrary, many struggle to survive. He added moreover that a few conservancies are located on land that is just fertile enough to cultivate, which gives way to the question whether one should aspire to keep wildlife when one could also grow crops and contribute to the national food supply. Jonathan Moss further stressed how controversial this matter is and explained that, in a country that experiences recurrent droughts and famine, a landowner can hardly justify giving up arable land for tourist recreation. Such an argument was not only made for farming but also for ranching and Jackie Kenyon, one of the two landowners who thus far refuses to participate in Laikipia's wildlife conservation industry, applied exactly the same rhetoric in an interview with an environmental reporter:

> Wildlife is not the issue of primary concern. What is primary concern? Food. People are growing hungry in Kenya. A thousand sacks of grain were distributed for famine relief in Nanyuki alone last week, and conditions are much worse in the north. […] We can't afford to turn all the rangelands into conservancies. Even with multiple-use management – cattle production as well as wildlife preservation […] – you simply can't produce enough meat to satisfy domestic needs. Feeding the nation has to be paramount.
>
> Martin (2012: 182-183)

Such a moral rejection of Laikipia's near-total conversion to wildlife conservation resonated with the fact that, for a long time, private conservancies had no legal foundation.[51] 'Private conservation' was an informal type of land use not acknowledged in any law. In the late 1990s, the government adopted an act that could endow private land with an environmental easement,[52] which stated:

> The object of an environmental easement is to further the principals of environmental management set out in this Act by facilitating the conservation and enhancement of the environment, in this Act referred to as the benefited environment, through the imposition of one or more obligations in respect of the use of land, in this Act referred to as the burdened land, being the land in the vicinity of the benefited environment.
>
> Environmental Management and Coordination Act Kenya (1999: section 1112)

But the landowners I talked to had been especially wary of the 'imposition of one or more obligations in respect of the use of land', and no one had dared to apply for an environmental easement for it was not at all obvious how such an easement could inhibit future land use changes if, at a certain point, wildlife conservation proved no longer feasible or possible. As such, Laikipia's conservancy owners found themselves in an ambivalent position: on the one hand, different international conservation organizations supported and funded their work; on the other hand, there was always a risk that the government would intervene since their activities were technically illegal.

In addition to such legal uncertainties, Laikipia's wildlife conservancies were also criticized by neighbouring African communities that had never opted to be surrounded by more wildlife, but which

nevertheless had to deal with it. Most importantly, once ranchers en bloc turned to wildlife conservation many nearby community settlements were increasingly affected by human-wildlife conflicts – from the perspective of a subsistence farmer whose crops got smashed by elephants, or from the perspective of a pastoralist whose cows were killed by large predators, Laikipia's transformation into one big wildlife plain was hardly an improvement. Small-scale African farmers in particular expressed their dissatisfaction to me numerous times, and the typical complaint was that white landowners cared more for wildlife than for the well-being of their African neighbours. Besides, people soon realized that Laikipia's conservation industry benefited lodge owners and conservancy owners, but left the majority of the region's residents empty-handed. All this reinforced the colonial stereotype of wildlife protection being only a white men's affair.

Some conservancy owners tried to ameliorate such a reputation, and over the years different initiatives were implemented designed to enthuse Laikipia's African communities for wildlife conservation. Amongst these initiatives was the construction of a fence, called the Laikipia West Fence, which stretched over more than 160 kilometres and which was meant to keep wildlife away from villages. There were also projects that tried to encourage pastoralists to build *bomas*, predator-proof livestock enclosures, in order to keep cattle safe at night. But sooner or later these initiatives ran into trouble for a variety of reasons, including lack of funding, technical difficulties, or an overall lack of community support. In recent years, conservancy owners have taken a different approach and began to implement corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes. In 2011 and 2012, when I lived in Nanyuki, CSR and the variant 'community work' had become the buzzwords of Laikipia's conservation scene.

Because Kenya's wildlife is a state-owned asset and due to the hunting ban, different conservancy owners and conservationists stressed the importance of CSR programmes to me: it offers one of the few opportunities to let local communities experience the benefits of conservation and, as such, it can motivate them not to fight against but sympathize with Laikipia's conservation industry. Charlie Wheeler,[53] chairman of a trust that looks after a patch of forest located close to Mt. Kenya, explained to me that conservancy owners who sit back and watch people around them grow discontent will inevitably run into trouble. 'A poor neighbour is a bad neighbour,' he indicated, and he called for a proactive attitude towards building community credit. This could be done, for instance, through opening clinics and schools, or proving for micro-credit, which all had the potential to cultivate goodwill and hence improve the relation between Laikipia's black and white inhabitants. Yet, only the most successful conservancies, such as Ol Pejeta Conservancy and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, had the budgets to make any significant contributions to community work – others typically already struggled to cover operational costs alone, and as such CSR further reinforced the separation of flourishing and affluent conservancies on the one hand and the less fortunate on the other.

Laikipia's CSR programmes turned several of Laikipia's conservancies into powerful development agents and some, such as Ol Pejeta Conservancy, came to invest millions of dollars in

community development programmes (Ol Pejeta Conservancy n.d.). But contrary to what the websites of this and other conservancies suggest, Laikipia's CSR programmes do not have a straightforward positive effect and they certainly do not make communities more appreciative of nature conservation per se. Ben Wandago[54] from the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), an organization that sponsored Ol Pejeta's transition from ranching to conservation, told me that communities often realize very well that CSR programmes reinforce power inequalities – the 'gifts' that communities receive come with strings attached (see also Rajak 2011, especially chapter one) and aim to manipulate recipients into becoming environmentally-friendly subjects (see also Agrawal 2005 on environmentality). AWF's employee added that there is a paradox in Laikipia's CSR projects. Communities do need funding to establish schools, clinics and so forth, he maintained, but they would arguably be better off if they received such funding directly, rather than through wildlife conservancies that, ironically, are themselves dependent on donor money – when wildlife conservancies carry out community work, they add an unnecessary level of administration to an already complicated affair.

Different people offered me examples of situations in which CSR programmes had backfired. Someone who himself participated in community work for instance claimed that the huge amounts of money that some conservancies spend on CSR raise expectations among communities. He said that some of these communities had become quite demanding, and sometimes even bullied conservancy owners until they were promised further financial support. He underscored that this was particularly troublesome for conservancies that operated on a small budget and struggled to survive economically – large and successful conservancies like Lewa Wildlife Conservancy or Ol Pejeta Conservancy had the funds to meet community demands, but many others had not.

In sum, CSR is an ambivalent yet indispensible tool for conservancy owners who intend to remain on good terms with their neighbours. Yet, there are a few white landowners with such a bad reputation that community work cannot redeem them. Among them is Kuki Gallmann, an Italian-born who came to Laikipia in 1972. She wrote different novels on her emigration to Kenya[55] that became instant bestsellers, one of which was turned into a movie. Gallmann is the owner of a property called Ol Ari Nyiro, which used to be a cattle ranch, but was converted into a wildlife reserve known today as the Laikipia Nature Conservancy. By 2012, many Laikipian landowners and conservationists had come to conceive of Gallmann as the epitome of conservation gone wrong. Apparently, Gallmann lacked the tact and diplomatic skills necessary to win over communities and politicians, and she crossed swords with one particular Member of Parliament called Mwangi Kiunjuri. The recounting of Gallmann's precarious situation that follows below is a compilation of the various pieces of the story told to me by a dozen landowners, conservancy managers and conservationists working in the area.

In 2012, elections were again pending. After these elections, Kenya's government system would decentralize and the country would be divided into forty-seven counties, all headed by a governor who would be given a certain degree of decision-making power. Mwangi Kiunjuri aspired to become the governor of Laikipia County, and already in early 2012 he began campaigning for votes. He knew that

most votes could be won from Laikipia's African communities, as they far outnumbered white landowners, and so he tried to appeal to these communities by openly sympathizing with their grievances about human-wildlife conflict. Conservancy owners had expected Kiunjuri to do this, because he had long been known as a fierce opponent of wildlife conservation: in 2007, for instance, he allegedly instigated communities to invade Ol Jogi, a conservancy in the heart of Laikipia owned by a billionaire family from New York.

To buttress his governorship campaign, Mwangi Kiunjuri singled out Kuki Gallmann and used her as a 'punch bag', as one of my informants put it. It was no secret that Gallmann had a particularly troublesome relationship with her neighbours. On different occasions, animals coming from the Laikipia Nature Conservancy had attacked villagers, and some victims had died of their injuries. The villagers living in the vicinity of Laikipia Nature Conservancy accused Gallmann of not taking responsibility for her animals, and demanded that she put up a fence. For a long time Gallmann refused to do so – when a fence was eventually constructed Gallmann failed to maintain it properly and the wildlife on Laikipia Nature Conservancy continued to stray outside the property. A geographer from Cambridge, who did research on Laikipia's fence network, told me that this had encouraged villagers to collect funding themselves and build a second fence. Yet, this fence was also not maintained and similarly failed to solve the problem.

Kiunjuri capitalized on the existing tensions between Kuki Gallmann and her neighbours, and used Laikipia Nature Conservancy to illustrate the harm that wildlife conservation did to Africans. At a certain point, Kiunjuri even threatened to sue Gallmann for failing to address the issue and for causing human suffering, and he told her and other former ranchers to keep *their* wildlife on *their* properties. Meanwhile, newspapers regularly published articles with headlines such as 'Kiunjuri Strengthens Case Against Ranchers' (*The Star*, 22 February 2012) and 'Elephant Raid Victim Buried in Laikipia' (*The Star*, 2 January 2012), pouring further oil on the fire.

Mwangi Kiunjuri's hostility towards Laikipian conservancies in general and towards Kuki Gallmann in particular paid off, and it gave him widespread popular support. Mordecai Ogada,[56] who directed the Laikipia Wildlife Forum after Anthony King, explained that Kiunjuri realized very well that the vast majority of Kenya is rather poor and looks for someone to blame its poverty on. 'He decided to offer them a scapegoat', Ogada pointed out. Gallmann, in the meantime, used the events to demonstrate to her fans and her donors the hardships of her condition, and promoted an image of herself as a tenacious fighter who would not succumb to bullying and intimidation. Contrary to private conservancy owners who try to cultivate relations of dependency through CSR projects, Gallmann explicitly took a position against her African neighbours. Ogada summarized her plight as follows:

> Her fame, her acclaim, is like the movie about her. It's all about a single white woman, surrounded by enemies. The problems she faces serve her image well, it suits her narrative. […] People [abroad] admire

her. They admire that she doesn't go back to Italy. This all feeds into the hype, and the story about her is now bigger than herself.

In the course of 2012, Mwangi Kiunjuri's initially harsh tone softened. He continued to demonize Kuki Gallmann, but he also became more amiable to other white conservancy owners. Max Graham,[57] a British environmentalist and founder of a local conservation organization, interpreted this change as an indication that Kiunjuri had realized that Laikipia's conservancies could be of service to him after all, for instance because he could impose high taxes and expensive permit systems on them once he was Laikipia county governor. Besides, the manager of Ol Pejeta Conservancy told me, Kiunjuri was made to understand that if white landowners were forced to leave Laikipia then their manifold CSR programmes would also come to an end. Ol Pejeta Conservancy had explained this carefully to the neighbouring communities that it supported, and had told villagers that a vote for Kiunjuri could mean the end of their schools and hospitals. As soon as Kiunjuri got wind of this he sought an alliance with Ol Pejeta Conservancy, and the manager concluded: 'Kiunjuri will not attack us, for if he would he would lose the votes of all the communities that we have invested in'.

In the end, Mwangi Kiunjuri did not win the elections. Nevertheless, the events around his campaign tour had once again exposed the vulnerable and uncertain position of conservancies, related to, among other things, the lack of an adequate legal framework, the difficulty of encouraging communities for wildlife preservation, and the image of the conservation industry as a white man's concern. Different conservationists and landowners underscored to me that the political capital and goodwill that Laikipia's conservancy owners will be able to cultivate in the near future is going to be decisive for their individual prospects: Max Graham indicated that although Kuki Gallmann's conservancy is one of the most interesting properties from an ecological perspective, it is also the least likely to survive. If political opposition against Laikipia's conservationists revives she will be amongst the first to leave, he said, for 'those that don't engage will definitely be immediate targets'.

Mwangi Kiunjuri's rhetoric, which portrayed Laikipia's conservation industry as an area of conflict that pits white beneficiaries against African victims, was not exceptional. I encountered it in the offices of conservation NGOs, during community meetings, and in KWS quarters – even conservancy owners themselves employed a similar logic in their promotion of CSR projects. This illustrates how Laikipia's relatively recent transformation from cattle ranching to wildlife conservation reinforced and consolidated old frictions between the region's black and white residents. At the same time, the racial politics that came to characterize Laikipia's conservation industry were not confined to the topic of wildlife and, as the next section discusses, there have been other events that illustrate how the colour bar continues to complicate the coexistence of Laikipia's diverse residents.

Maasai grievances and legislative changes

In mid-August 2004, precisely one hundred years after the British government and Olonana had agreed that the Maasai would leave Masai Land and settle in two Maasai reserves, there was a Maasai protest in Nairobi. Participants had dressed up in the red and blue *mashuka* (loincloths) that are considered typical Maasai dress, and marched on the streets of the capital towards the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Land. They carried with them a petition, in which they stated that Olonana had signed an agreement that lasted ninety-nine years and that, anno 2004, the land rights of Laikipia's white residents had expired. The demand of the demonstrators was simple: they wanted the Kibaki government to expel Laikipia's white landowners, and give the Maasai back the plains that once had been promised to them (Kantai 2007).

It was suggested that the protest was the brainchild of a group of prominent Maasai lawyers, journalists and NGO activists who pragmatically capitalized on the upcoming worldwide attention for the rights of indigenous peoples (Hughes 2005: 216). Among them were Elijah Marima ole Sempeta, a human rights attorney who had hit the headlines the year before when he had sued a mining firm called Magadi Soda Company demanding compensation for the people whose land it had destroyed, and Johnson ole Kaunga,[58] founding father of the Indigenous Movement for Peace Advancement and Conflict Transformation (IMPACT) (Kantai 2007: 113). The latter also had a track record in indigenous rights affairs, and became known for his provocative methods, his extremist ideology, and his primordialist understanding of Maasai culture (see for instance ole Kaunga 2001). The figureheads behind the protest carefully and deliberately staged contemporary Maasai grievances as being a direct result of colonial land dispossession, and newspapers that reported on the event showed pictures of Maasai protesters carrying placards with texts such as '*we demand our land back from the British!*' and '*100 years is enough!*' (Kantai 2007: 110).

A week after the Nairobi protest, a group of Maasai herdsmen cut the fence of a white-owned Laikipian estate called Lolldaiga to let their cattle graze. The past few months had been extremely dry and grazing land was scarce – as such, pastoralists from Kenya's northern most regions had come down to Laikipia to prevent their animals from starving, just like they usually did during dry spells (see Heath 2001). In the event of such extreme weather conditions, landowners generally condoned pastoralists' trespassing. But on this particular occasion Lolldaiga's staff reacted aggressively and opened fire once they spotted the intruders, perhaps because the Nairobi protest had made them wary of further Maasai rebellion. They killed one herdsman on the spot, and left three others severely injured (Kantai 2007: 115-116).

After the incident, tensions between pastoralists, Laikipia's white landowners, and the Kenyan government escalated. More invasions occurred, after which the government raised the level of security: it organized ground patrols, initiated helicopter surveillances, and arrested more than a

hundred pastoralists for violating white landowners' private property rights (Kantai 2007: 116). Politicians such as William ole Ntimama, in turn, defended the pastoralists and scolded the police (Hughes 2005: 219). In the meantime, international media picked up on the situation. These media put anti-white sentiments at the centre of attention and drew parallels with Zimbabwe, where, in 2000, land reforms had largely resulted in the end of white landownership. They produced headlines such as 'Tribe, Claiming Whites' Land, Confronts Kenya's Government' (*The New York Times*, 25 August 2004) and 'Masai Invaders Target Last White Farmers' (*The Daily Telegraph*, 13 September 2004).

In light of these developments, the group of prominent Maasai figures that had been behind the mid-August Maasai march organized another demonstration at the end of the month. During this second protest demonstrators again set out for the Ministry of Land, to get hold of minister Amos Kimunya who had been out of office the first time they had tried to deliver the petition. The protesters never reached their destination as soon after they took off police forces intervened and arrested them in a brutal manner. Camera crews were again present and the police's violent actions were broadcast all over the country. That same evening, minister Amos Kimunya held a press conference, during which he discarded the demands that the protesters made. He stated that the 1904 treaty had not been signed for a period of ninety-nine years but for a period of nine-*hundred*-ninety-nine years, and he stressed that the Maasai encroachment of white lands was illegal and criminal. In hindsight, some observers added that the entire affair had rested on yet another misunderstanding: in 1904 Laikipia was given to the Maasai not taken from them, and protesters had confused the 1904 treaty with the events of 1911 (see for instance Hughes 2005). But in the heat of the moment the parties involved in the conflict had little attention for the historical accuracy of the Maasai activists' claims, and instead had concentrated on defending their interests (*Ibid*.: 221).

After Amos Kimunya's television appearance the farm invasions stopped, and the agitation that plagued Laikipia for several weeks died down. Nevertheless, the damage had been done: the incidents had reinforced Laikipia's image as neo-colonial territory where black fights white and vice versa. Such an image oversimplifies the complexity of the Maasai land debate, and it has been suggested that contemporary Maasai resentments are not only the effect of colonial land displacement policies, but also relate to how successive post-colonial governments have shown little interest in redressing the colonial injustices done to Maasai groups (Hughes 2005; Kantai 2007). After all, the 1962 meeting at Thomson Falls had not convinced Jomo Kenyatta of the need to attend to Maasai hardships, and since then Maasai groups have largely been denied the political space to make their grievances heard (Kantai 2007: 109). But the colour bar politics that came to characterize the 2004 Maasai campaign effectively obscured this.

Although Kibaki's government managed to abate the Maasai uprisings in 2004, there continued to be rumours about Africans organizing themselves to reclaim white-owned lands in 2011 and 2012. One afternoon, for instance, I chatted with a Kikuyu friend in front of the house that I rented, who told me she had just overheard people talking about confiscating white properties during the *matatu*

(minivan) ride home. Such talk was arguably boosted by a set of legislative changes that hung over white landowners' property rights at the time, and which followed the adoption of a new constitution in 2010.

As mentioned earlier, during its 2002 electoral campaign, NaRC had promised to review the existing constitution. Yet almost immediately after he was appointed, Mwai Kibaki largely lost interest in changing legislation. Nevertheless, in 2005 there was a national referendum on a draft constitution that had been drawn up by the Attorney-General Amos Wako, and which became known as the Wako Bill (see also Berman et al. 2009; Lynch 2006[B]). Although it was expected that the Wako Bill would decentralize the central government's authority, it continued to vest decision-making power largely in the presidential seat. Different NaRC politicians who had fallen out with Kibaki, among whom Raila Odinga, therefore claimed that the bill had no intention of changing anything at all, and that it only further consolidated Kikuyu power. These politicians organized a provocative and powerful campaign against the Wako Bill (Lynch 2006[B]), and during the referendum the majority of Kenyans indeed voted against. After that, the constitutional reform process again came to a standstill.

The situation changed in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. At the time, Mwai Kibaki had formed an alliance with several parties that supported his re-election, called the Party of National Unity (PNU). PNU's main opponent was Raila Odinga, who after the 2005 constitutional referendum had founded his own party called the Orange Democratic Party (ODM).[59] Immediately after the votes had been counted Kibaki announced that PNU had won, and he immediately took the presidential oath. ODM found Kibaki's hurried inauguration suspicious and accused PNU of election fraud. Violent riots broke out, primarily in certain neighbourhoods of Nairobi and the Rift Valley, during which PNU's Kikuyu followers and ODM's Kalenjin and Luo followers came to blows. These riots were not so much a reaction to the election outcome itself, it has been suggested, but to how PNU and ODM election campaigns had again appealed to tribal unity and solidarity, and had again revived decades-old Kalenjin frustrations over the Million Acre Settlement Scheme (Anderson & Lochery 2008).

The riots between PNU and ODM followers continued for weeks. Eventually, former United Nations' Secretary-General Kofi Annan intervened and mediated between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga. At the end of February 2008, when more than a thousand citizens had been killed and hundreds of thousands of people were fleeing the violence, Kibaki and Odinga finally signed an agreement to form a coalition government. Within this coalition Kibaki continued to be president, but Odinga was given the post of prime minister that did not yet exist in Kenya but was created for the purpose. The UN demanded that this coalition government would at last carry through the legislative changes that politicians had promised the Kenyan public, ever since the late 1990s. This eventually resulted in a number of reforms, including the adoption of a new constitution in 2010 and the revision of the Land Act in 2012.

110

Both the 2010 Constitution and the 2012 Land Act engender a set of problems for Laikipia's white landowners. Firstly, the constitution prescribes that one can purchase land and obtain title deeds over it, but that the government is at all times entitled to cancel property rights. It reads:

> The state may regulate the use of any land, or any interest in or right over land, in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, or land use planning.
>
> The Constitution of Kenya (2010, article 66)

This is not a new arrangement, and regulations similar to this one have existed ever since British colonial occupation. Kenyatta's government left them intact, and state control over land rights has complicated white proprietorship from 1963 onwards. One second-generation landowner offered me a telling example in this regard, and recounted the following story to me.

In 1966, his parents had come to Kenya and had bought a cattle farm located west of Mt. Kenya and east of the Aberdares mountain range. They intended to ranch but there was too much wildlife on the property, which restricted the possibilities of livestock farming. After some deliberation his parents had decided to cut the ranch in two: all the wildlife would be brought to one part, which would be turned into a game park, so that the other part could be used for cattle farming. He stressed that his parents had not been conservation idealists, but had merely acted out of a business interest – without finding a solution for the abundance of wildlife, the ranch could simply not become operational. A few years later, at the height of Kenya's 1970s poaching crisis, the Kenyatta government approached his parents and told them it wanted to bring rhinos to their game park. His parents initially refused for they feared that these rhinos would attract criminal poaching syndicates, and they anticipated that their game park-cum-ranch would turn into a combat zone. But the government's response to their objections was simple: either his parents accepted the decision and receive the animals, or the title deeds of their property would be repealed and they would be told to leave the country. They chose the first option, and later their game park developed into one of Laikipia's largest rhino breeding grounds.

Although white landowners' property rights have long since been subjected to the vagaries of incumbent politicians, the 2010 Constitution and the 2012 Land Act made white anxieties over the possible loss of title deeds more urgent for a number of reasons. Firstly, like the former constitution the new constitution defines two types of properties rights: freehold tenure and leasehold tenure. The first entails an 'unlimited right to use and dispose of land in perpetuity subject to the rights of others and the regulatory powers of national government, country government and other relevant state organs' (Land Act 2012, article 2), while the second entails 'the grant, with or without consideration, by the proprietor of land of the right to the exclusive possession of his or her land, and includes the right so granted and the instrument granting it, and also includes a sublease but does not include an agreement for lease' (*Ibid.*). Put simply, freehold tenure is an infinite right to land that includes use

and sale, while leasehold tenure grants one the right of access and use but does not give one legal ownership entitlements.

In the past, Kenya's white landowners were eligible for both freehold and leasehold tenure but the 2010 Constitution changed this. It restricts freehold to Kenyan citizens, which some white landowners are but others are not, and it states:

> A person who is not a citizen may hold land on the basis of leasehold tenure only, and any such lease, however granted, shall not exceed ninety-nine years.
>
> The Constitution of Kenya, article 65

For landowners who do not have a Kenyan passport this provision is highly problematic, because it may imply a conversion of former freehold title deeds into leasehold title deeds with an end date. One of the consequences would be that their properties would become unsaleable, and therefore without economic value (see also Norton-Griffiths 2010: 31). But also, white landowners who do have a Kenyan passport have explained this as an intimidating development, for it could be indicative of a changing political landscape – taking into account that today Kenya hosts a population that exceeds forty-five million, and in the context of an ever-growing hunger for land throughout country, these legislative changes could be the first steps towards intensified control over white land use, or even the abolishment of large white estates.

To this day, the Kenyan government has not challenged white landownership rights on the basis of these two pieces of legislation, but different landowners have told me that they have been holding their breath ever since 2010. One afternoon, for instance, I discussed the situation with a second-generation landowner who inherited his father's ranch. He tried to explain to me just how uncomfortable he felt, and discussed his options with me. One of the things he could do is become a full Kenyan citizen, but he anticipated problems in relation to obtaining a travel visa for Europe or the United States. He could also acquire dual citizenship and appeal to either his parents' nationality or his Kenyan nationality depending on the circumstances, yet he foresaw that this would also be problematic: he owned business ventures registered abroad and expected that, in case of dual citizenship, two countries would make tax demands. His last option was to lie low, follow the developments closely, and endure the consequences when they presented themselves. This is what he had done thus far, but especially the maximum lease term of ninety-nine years continued to bother him. He explained to me that the constitution mentions a maximum lease period but not a minimum lease period and he feared that, in the end, white leases would only cover a few years. Besides, he doubted whether leases would begin on their date of issue, or whether they would be given out with retrospective effect – in case of the latter, one's title deed could already have expired before one actually obtained it.

On another occasion I drove out to one of Laikipia's few large-scale agricultural farms,[60] located on Mt. Kenya's northern slopes in an area called Timau. The owner, a young man in his thirties, had

inherited the land from his grandparents, who had come to Kenya in the early 1920s. He drove me around his property in his pickup truck while pointing out all the different activities he engaged in, which included cattle ranching, the cultivation of canola and the pressing of canola oil, and the cultivation of peas and wheat. He continuously stressed how efficient he was, and how well he managed to make the most out of every acre he possessed. At the time, one of Kenya's infamous maize diseases had just broken out and African farmers subsequently suffered great food losses – this added a sense of urgency to his statements. In the eyes of this landowner, efficient management offered the best protection against land seizure and he said: 'If someone [from the government] comes they can compare my productivity with other landowners. If I am producing less I will go, but if I am producing more than let me stay and do my work'. He knew that the colonial roots of his presence compromised the moral credibility of his land rights (McIntosh 2015: 252), but by underscoring his attempts to feed the nation in the context of recurrent food shortages his proprietorship turned from an ethical dilemma of the past into an ethical dilemma of the present. Just before I left, I asked him whether he thought he would still be in Kenya in ten years time. 'I don't know' he responded, and after a short silence added: 'actually, it depends on how I get up in the morning'.

One may, or may not, empathize with the plight of either of these two landowners. But what is important for my argument is that their fears, uncertainties, and ways of dealing with these uncertainties illustrate a mode of living that is ingrained in a sense of unpredictability, and that revolves around colour bar politics. This sense of unpredictability affects landowners in Laikipia as well as elsewhere in the country, and it underscores their ambivalent and dubious position. This position is partly the result of particular legislative arrangements; at the same time, it also pertains to a black majority that continues to denounce their presence – even though this same majority blames the impoverishment of a large part of society at least as much on the greed and corruption of post-colonial politicians as on the history of white domination. The public reception of the 'Malcolm Bell case' is exemplary in this regard. In 2012, Malcolm Bell, a white farmer from Nakuru in the Rift Valley, won a court case against former president Daniel Arap Moi over land rights. Moi was never popular and he was widely associated with the repression, torture and murder of political opponents as well as with the accumulation of excessive wealth that impeded national progress. But in spite of this, McIntosh (2015: 261-262) suggests, the general public displayed more dismay over a white man winning land from a black man than over Moi's former crimes and offences.

Ever since independence, white landowners have employed a variety of strategies to minimize the risk of expulsion: some bowed to government authority and kept in step with national regulations; some counted on the support and political capital of donor organizations or private investors; and some deliberately sought alliances with high-ranking politicians. All these strategies have one thing in common: they highlight that owning land in Kenya is primarily a political matter. Often, I have heard landowners or other observers drawing parallels between white landowners in Kenya and white landowners in Zimbabwe, just as journalists did when they had reported on the 2004 Maasai

campaign. On the one hand, the land reforms that the Zimbabwean government implemented in 2000, which caused a rampant storming of white farms (see for instance Wolmer 2007), did not precisely reassure Laikipia's white landowners. On the other hand, a certain degree of resignation seemed prevalent, stemming from the fact that, although white land rights have been at stake for over five decades, a large-scale eviction thus far has not taken place. In the end, many deemed it unlikely that a 'Zimbabwe-thing' would happen in Kenya, especially because the expulsion of white farmers and ranchers would scare off foreign investments. The depth of these comments only sank in after I had returned from my fieldwork. In September 2013, the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi became the target of a terrorist attack that eventually lasted several days – immediately after news on the raid spread, the president held a press conference in which he reassured the safety of all tourists and investors.

Still, in the face of looming uncertainties some white landowners have indicated to me that they are prepared to take drastic measures if need be. 'I don't think that a Zimbabwe-thing will happen here' a third-generation landowner for instance told me, 'but if it would I will fight it with my life'. Contained in this statement is the idea that land is a non-transferable family asset that merits the utmost protection, and this landowner's strong reaction suggests that his property is crucial for his identity and his place in Kenyan society.[61] While Boer groups in South Africa already in the 1990s claimed that, after so many generations of settlement, they are as indigenous to South Africa as the country's black population (Kuper 2003: 389), the historical presence of the descendants of White Highland settlers still seems too frail to make a convincing case for autochthony. Nevertheless, some, like the landowner above, are drawing on arguments that link rights to soil to historical occupation and kinship relations (see also McIntosh 2015). As such, the contemporary opponents of continued white presence are beginning to be fought with their own weapons.

A spectrum of white

So far I have concentrated on how Laikipia's colonial history engendered colour bar politics, and I have discussed a variety of ways in which the colour bar continues to divide black and white. Here and there I have argued that the colour bar oversimplifies the complexity of Kenya's political arena – among other things I have drawn attention to Mwangi Kiunjuri's alliance with Ol Pejeta, and I have pointed out that contemporary Maasai grievances are partially but not exclusively the result of colonial relocation policies. In this section, I continue to focus on something that colour bar politics obscure: namely, that Laikipia's white landowners are not a homogeneous, undifferentiated group. Rather, they are divided on a range of topics, and individual endeavours to be accepted as legitimate residents have come to alienate some landowners from others.

114

Firstly, Laikipia's recent transformation to wildlife conservation gave way to upcoming tourism, and the number of Laikipian lodges and camps grew steadily over the years – according to Mordecai Ogada, by 2012, approximately 90% of Laikipia's former ranches offered some sort of tourist shelter. But tourism is an unpredictable and fickle source of income. After the political violence of 2007 and 2008, for instance, the country's entire tourist industry collapsed and took years to recover. Besides, in comparison with other Kenyan safari destinations, such as Masai Mara or Amboseli, tourism in Laikipia is still in its infancy. The region is not, or at least not yet, the type of visitor hotspot that these two areas came to be. Due to these circumstances, there is competition over clients, and in mid-2012 Ogada offered me an example of how this affected relations between white neighbours. He told me of a landowner who had pitched a camp that could be seen from the lodge on the property of an adjacent landowner. The latter, whom had been in business first, felt disadvantaged because the camp had spoiled the view from his lodge, which he could no longer advertise as located in a 'wild' and 'pristine' area. I was told he was determined to recover the estimated financial losses from his neighbour.

Because tourism does not offer a reliable income, most white-owned lands are also subjected to other activities. For instance, a small number of landowners continues to ranch. Critical observers ridicule this and maintain that cattle breeding and wildlife conservation are two irreconcilable activities, due to, among other things, the transmission of diseases and competition over grazing lands (see also Martin 2012: 182). But those who do combine the two, such as Ol Pejeta Conservancy, maintain that the activities can go hand in hand – the manager of Ol Pejeta Conservancy even indicated that more and more landowners are considering a reintroduction of cattle, primarily because the presence of livestock seems to decrease thick infections amongst certain wildlife species. In areas that receive relatively much rainfall, typically those located close to Mt. Kenya, landowners have converted to flower farming or have handed out flower farming leases to third parties – especially the northwestern and southwestern side of the mountain witnessed an influx of flower farming businesses in recent years. Today, there are many disputes over whether or not these flower farms should be allowed to make use of the region's constrained water sources and each dry season, when the water surface of rivers falls dramatically and some rivers dry up entirely, flower farmers are castigated by both black and white water-deprived residents. In response, flower farmers now play up the results of water offtake studies[62] that suggest that it is not they, but small-scale African farmers who use inefficient and irresponsible irrigation methods that deplete Laikipia's water sources.

The presence of British Army training troops is another issue that complicates the relationship between white landowners. The British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK) has long had a base camp in Nanyuki, as well as several training camps located further north where it prepares soldiers for war zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the area permanently hosts a large number of British soldiers: according to the wife of a former BATUK officer, groups of approximately one

thousand trainees rotate every six weeks; in addition, there is a training crew that stays for six months as well as a small permanent staff on two-year contracts that usually come with families.

Traditionally, BATUK trained its soldiers in a camp in the vicinity of Archer's Post in Samburu region, and in a camp close to Dol Dol in northern Laikipia. But between 2001 and 2011 these camps got caught up in two controversial court cases. In the first, Maasai communities living in the area claimed that BATUK had been reckless with its ammunition and had left unused explosives in the field. Pastoralists maintained that this had caused severe injuries to more than two hundred people over the past decades, and that it had killed another fifty. In the second, Maasai women claimed that BATUK soldiers had raped them for years, and they pointed to their half-blood children as evidence.

In both court cases Johnson ole Kaunga, who also played a pivotal role in the 2004 Maasai campaign, took a leading role and he presented himself as the spokesman of all Maasai victims. He formed a partnership with a London-based solicitor called Martyn Day, who came from a law firm with a track record in handling international scandals: his company, for instance, sued Anglo American South Africa Ltd. for the bad working conditions of South African miners, and it represented Guantanamo Bay prisoners. Martyn Day pressed charges against the British government for the misbehavior of its soldiers, but the latter denied responsibility. In the end, the case on the injuries was settled in 2002, and about thirteen hundred pastoralists received compensation that amounted to £4.500.000 (LeighDay n.d.). The case on the sexual abuses lasted much longer, and was eventually dropped due to lack of evidence in 2011.

In Nanyuki, people seemed uncertain about how to judge the situation. Many felt ambivalent about the fact that only Maasai groups had complained about BATUK's ill practices, and there was considerable talk about how the compensation money that the British government had paid in 2002 had primarily been spent on alcohol. Some indicated that army discipline ensures that ammunition stocks are recorded with the greatest precision, and these people did not believe that BATUK had been sloppy. A wife of an ex-army officer told me that it is no secret that BATUK busses in prostitutes from Nairobi and Mombasa, in order to prevent its men from harassing women. She did not believe the rape claims and attributed the half-blood children to a nearby catholic mission, where it was alleged that the pastors were perhaps not as celibate as they claimed to be.

Whether or not the court cases against BATUK were justified, they at least gave the two training camps bad reputations and the continued presence of British soldiers in Dol Dol and Archer's Post became a sensitive issue. Both camps are still in use today, but after the Martyn Day affair BATUK also began looking for other training grounds. Different landowners offered them leases, and BATUK soldiers subsequently moved to various parts of Laikipia. But a side effect emerged: the noise of explosives and shootings scared wildlife that typically bolted to neighbouring properties, trampling the surroundings in the process. This for instance happened to Enasoit, a property not too far from Dol Dol, which was crushed by wildlife after a neighbouring property called Lolldaiga had invited BATUK. Enasoit was not pleased and sued the owners of Lolldaiga. Ole Naishu, a ranch that today is

owned by the CEO of a large Kenyan coffee roaster and exporter, had also made a deal with BATUK in the past. 'When they were training there', one of Ole Naishu's neighbours said, 'it seemed as if the Third World War was being fought next door'. BATUK, in turn, responded by implementing its own CSR programme, in the hope of ameliorating its presence and improving its reputation after the court cases.

When the combined efforts of ranching, conservation, tourism, and handing out leases to entrepreneurs or to the British Army did not work, a landowner still had one last resort: sell land. Yet, it seemed that when a descendant of a colonial or early-postcolonial settler family did so, he or she would be ostracized by the rest of Laikipia's settler community – in general, it seemed that in such cases land sales were not taken as an indication of Laikipia's economic and political plight, but as demonstrating a lack of character and perseverance. The owner of Solio[63] ranch, for instance, bore the brunt of such emotions, and he recounted to me how he became Laikipia's black sheep after he had decided to sell a considerable part of his ranch to the Kenyan government.

In the mid-2000s, Mwai Kibaki's government had made the owner of Solio ranch an offer to buy three thousand acres of land. The government's official reason for this request was that it finally wanted to relocate the people who had been evicted from Mt. Kenya's forests in 1989, as I discussed in chapter two, and who had been living on the roadside between the village of Naro Moru and Mt. Kenya ever since. Allegedly, the poor conditions of these forest evictees had distressed some members of the Kibaki family, who came to the area now and then because the president owned a large estate there. The story goes that these family members lobbied for a resettlement programme.

Solio's owner had agreed to the proposal, but the selling process was tedious and took about eighteen months – politicians who also owned land in Laikipia learned of the deal, and they tried to frustrate the agreement with Solio to sell their own plots instead. But these politicians could not provide as vast a territory as Solio's owner could, and eventually the latter won the bid. He clarified to me that he had had different motivations for the transaction. On the one hand, the government's offer had come at a time when he was just turning his ranch from a beef cattle operation into a milk cattle operation. The latter brought in more money, which meant he needed less livestock, which in turn meant he needed less terrain. Secondly, he indicated that he had realized all too well just how difficult it is to dispose of large ranchlands, for they offer little potential and are politically vulnerable. He had understood the government's offer as an opportunity that only comes once. And thirdly, he pointed out that the piece of land he had sold was of the most vulnerable category: it was fertile enough to farm yet he used it for cattle, and he anticipated that one day someone would have imposed land use restrictions upon it. Like other former ranchers, Solio's owner believed that large landownership in Laikipia is on its last legs and he aimed to make the most out of it before it finally collapsed.

The rest of Laikipia's white landowners were not particularly enthusiastic about Solio's move, its owner told me. Some had painted him as a money grabber, but there was another side to the story as well. The three thousand acres that Solio had sold had been teeming with wildlife, which needed to be

moved elsewhere in order to enable the government's relocation programme. Initially, the KWS had tried to move all the animals to what remained of the Solio Ranch, but Solio's owner had fiercely objected to this because he needed the land for his milk cattle. Like other former ranchers he did not seem to think much of the KWS, and he told me that he been clear to the organization that the wildlife was their problem, not his – the argument took place at a time when the KWS still claimed the exclusive mandate over Kenya's state-owned wildlife and criminalized private conservancies. Against the background of these conditions, Solio's owner had said to KWS officers something along the lines of 'this is a good exercise for you, now show us that you can manage your assets effectively'.

It was not the first time that Solio's owner and the KWS had had a different perspective on things, and their antagonism already had a history. The 1989 Wildlife Act indicated that the Kenyan state owned all Kenya's indigenous wildlife species, yet it said nothing about exotic species. Solio's owner had taken advantage of this: he had begun to farm white rhinos, which unlike the black rhino is not endemic,[64] and sold these animals to ranches in countries such as South Africa. He compared it with old French families taking down a painting from the wall when short of funds – when he needed money because his cattle ranch did not bring in enough, he simply sold a rhino. For a while all went well. But then the Kenyan government changed its export regulations, after which he could no longer move the animals out of the country. By 2012, Solio's owner was still stuck with approximately 180 white rhinos. They had no economic value in Kenya, and he had no purpose for them.

While the KWS and Solio's owner argued over who was responsible for the wildlife on the three thousand acres of sold land, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy and Ol Pejeta Conservancy eventually meddled in the dispute. Both agreed to take some animals, and partially funded the relocation of wildlife to other conservancies that the KWS had no budget for. Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had been especially keen on adopting a particular kind of antelope, but after the animals had been moved lions and leopards killed them almost instantly: the antelopes had come from a relatively predator-free environment, and as such were unaccustomed to Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's circumstances. All in all the relocations had been expensive, and both Ol Pejeta Conservancy and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy were somewhat angry with Solio's owner for refusing to pay. According to Solio's owner the entire affair caused bad blood – by 2012 he still largely avoided Nanyuki town, and often kept away from social gatherings.

Who exactly came to inhabit the resettlement programme that Solio's land sale enabled remains a matter of discussion: some say that current inhabitants came from Nyeri and acquired plots from politicians in exchange for votes, and others say that the programme turned into an Internally Displaced People (IDP) camp for the victims of the 2007 and 2008 election riots. Either way, many plots within the settlement have been bought and sold since 2009, and at present even residents themselves seem uncertain about to whom the land was initially given. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the programme not only benefitted the landless and the poor, and when I visited the place in mid-2012 under guidance of Anthony Ochino,[65] a forester from the Laikipia Wildlife Forum, I observed how

simple huts alternated with flamboyant houses. During that visit I heard various complaints about the hardships of the settlement, and people described, among other things, how permanent wind covers everything in dust; how the entire area turns into a gigantic mud pool in the rainy season; how there are only a few access roads that are all in bad condition; how farming plots are of low quality, which makes people largely dependent on relief food; and how in some places pastoralists have moved in to graze their cattle, which in itself became a source of conflict.

Although Solio's land sale received much criticism from other white landowners, it seemed that by the early 2010s such sales had become more common. These were usually not as drastic as Solio's, yet different owners had sold plots, or were in the process of doing so, to wealthy foreigners looking for an idyllic holiday getaway or a family retreat – Ol Pejeta Conservancy even announced opening an entire holiday park with about one hundred houses (see Mount Kenya Wildlife Estate at Ol Pejeta Conservancy n.d.). This development concerns conservationists who foresee extra pressure on Laikipia's already-scarce resources. Mordecai Ogada, for instance, explained that many such luxury homes will have swimming pools and lush green gardens, and he feared how that would affect the availability of water to African farmers and pastoralists further downstream. 'The demand on natural resources goes up, and up, and up' he said. He added that Laikipia is becoming the victim of the success of its wildlife and safari industry, which attracts more and more people to the area. 'We will be strangling ourselves' he concluded.

Is Laikipia's colour bar inescapable?

Today, forty-eight large estates cover about forty percent of Laikipia's surface. The rest consists of African settlements and government land (Graham 2012: 15). The owners of these large estates differ greatly in origin, success and financial means. For example, there are those who have been born and raised in Laikipia and who belong to settler families such as the Craig family, the Dyer family or the Murray family. There are also owners from families that came to Laikipia not long after independence. Kuki Gallmann is an example in this regard, or Edward Parfet, son of mining magnate Courtland Parfet who bought Solio Ranch in 1966. One could also count former presidents Daniel Arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki among them who, like a number of other politicians, took possession of large tracks of lands on Mt. Kenya's slopes and in Laikipia after 1963.

Those landowners who have been in Laikipia for a prolonged period typically experienced different setbacks, such as the collapse of the ranching industry. How they recovered from such setbacks varies: today, some are well off, while others struggle to survive financially, and there are yet others who have had to sell, such as Daniel Arap Moi. In addition to these long-time occupants, Laikipia is also home to a handful of successful and wealthy entrepreneurs who have bought their estate recently, and who, in general, have little financial incentive to make their lands productive.

Among them is, for instance, the Kenyan Jeremy Block, hotelier and chairman of the coffee chain Dorman Ltd, who bought Ole Naishu in the early 2000s (see Rees 2002: 145), or Jochen Zeitz, former chief executive of the brand Puma and currently director of the Kering group, who bought a property called Segera in 2006 (see for instance Financial Times, 10 May 2013). One could also count Alec Wildenstein among them, although he obtained his estate through his family, which made a fortune in art dealing and bought a Laikipian property called Ol Jogi Ranch in 1977 (see for instance How To Spend It n.d.). Landowners such as these tend to keep their estates private, or occasionally rent out their sumptuous homes for exorbitant prices.

The properties that offer high-end and extremely luxurious safaris, such as Ol Jogi Ranch (see for instance *Forbes*, 8 September 2014), reinforce the image that Laikipia continues to be the playground of the rich and the famous. 'Many people still regard Laikipia as some sort of Happy Valley with Kenyan Cowboys' Max Graham said to me, after we discussed the area's land division and its land use patterns extensively. But Laikipia is not a Happy Valley: the region's colonial history and the ongoing presence of a few wealthy and influential individuals consolidates the idea that Laikipia is exclusively white and rich, yet in practice the area is highly diverse and heterogeneous. Nevertheless, the narrative of white domination and white opulence has come to demand from all white landowners that they should continuously point out what they are worth or how they are contributing to the well-being of the nation at large – in short, it asks them to substantiate why they should not be expelled.

One result of these dynamics is that many white landowners are cautious. Mordecai Ogada once explained to me that most former ranchers and farmers are exceptionally careful about complying with all government rules and regulations, for they understand very well that people who would rather see them leave will use even the smallest mistake as a 'stick to hit them with'. At the same time, colour bar politics have made white landowners outspoken on a range of topics: especially the country's inability to feed its own citizens and the state's failure to bring about social improvement have become two strong arguments in debates over the legitimacy of white estates, for it enables white landowners to raise themselves as food producers and/or CSR development agents. The transformation of former ranches into conservation sanctuaries also became a powerful rhetorical device – though in light of Kenya's colonial history, during which nature protection served as one oppressive regulatory mechanism amongst many, such reasoning seems primarily directed at international audiences and funding organizations and is used less in domestic land discussions. Yet there are exceptions, such as the Laikipia Wildlife Conservation Strategy.

In January 2013, the Laikipia Wildlife Forum, in cooperation with a local conservation organization called Space for Giants, launched a document entitled *Wildlife Conservation Strategy for Laikipia County 2012-2030* (Graham 2012). It was a management plan that had been developed with an eye to the 2013 elections, and that aimed to buffer the anti-conservation rhetoric of politicians such as Mwangi Kiunjuri. The document primarily targeted what many conservationists and former ranchers consider to be one of the main obstacles to Laikipian wildlife conservation, namely the

widespread presence of wastelands. Max Graham, who drafted the document, explained the situation to me as follows.

At present, approximately half of Laikipia's land is not claimed or used by its legal owner. There are various reasons for this. For one, after independence, the Million Acres Settlement Scheme and various group ranch initiatives lured African farmers and pastoralists to the area. Yet many of these farmers and pastoralists soon found Laikipia too dry and infertile, and left again. There are also the properties owned by Kenya's political elite, or the properties acquired by wealthy foreigners who only visit occasionally, which are typically not managed and left vacant. As a result, large parts of Laikipia have become deserted.

These deserted lands bring about a number of problems. Most importantly, under changed circumstances of an ever-growing population, Laikipia's empty lands came to attract the attention of pastoralist groups in search of grazing lands. These groups took advantage of the ownership vacuum, and took possession of the areas that no one else wants or uses. But as there are more deprived pastoralists than empty lands, different pastoral groups have come into conflict over access rights. Such conflicts are generally fought with arms, which made certain parts of Laikipia unsafe and dangerous, and today some areas are in a state of anarchy. In addition to such hazards, pastoralists' usage of empty lands is also problematic from a conservation point of view, Max Graham stressed: since pastoral groups do not have legal title deeds they lack the incentive to use Laikipia's land in a sustainable manner, he insisted, echoing Garrett Hardin's principle of the tragedy of the commons.[66]

Max Graham and other conservationists anticipate that the depletion of Laikipia's vacant lands will eventually have various negative consequences. Firstly, by the time that these areas are stripped of resources, pastoralists might decide to move into properties with more resources and invade white-owned conservancies. Secondly, the depletion of about half of Laikipia will pose serious limits to the habitat available to wildlife. Conservationists and landowners have indicated that, if current trends continue, Laikipia's private conservancies are likely to become isolated conservation islands located in an otherwise barren environment. In short, those involved in Laikipia's wildlife conservation industry have at least two strong motives to prevent pastoralists from exhausting Laikipia's wastelands, and in an attempt to alter current circumstances a handful of landowners and conservationists teamed up to devise a conservation strategy.

Although all the initiators behind the *Wildlife Conservation Strategy for Laikipia Country 2012-2030* deemed pastoralist invasions an urgent matter, it was not easy to draft the document in a way that all parties involved approved of it. In fact, different draft versions were rejected, primarily because they posed the problem in 'us/them' language, an insider told me. Commentators feared that if the strategy discussed the situation in terms of conservationists versus pastoralists, it would further reinforce Laikipia's black/white polarization. Alternatively, they wanted to present Laikipia as a region where all inhabitants, black and white, work together to achieve the best conservation results. By focusing on unity, Laikipia's Wildlife Conservation strategy tried to deconstruct and undo colour

bar politics: it aimed to initiate a discussion of Laikipia's plight in which race is not the main point of departure, and in which white landowners' discursive space is not limited to pointing out how present-day white landownership differs from the 1930s Happy Valley jet set. The document deliberately foregrounded what would be the consequence if no one intervened in the current state of affairs (i.e. the environmental deterioration of large parts of Laikipia), rather than detail the activities that were supposed to prevent such consequences (i.e. conservationists curtailing and controlling pastoralists' movements). Like the poverty alleviation programmes that Ferguson (1990) studied, the Wildlife Conservation Strategy turned Laikipia's management into a technical discussion: it foregrounded ecosystem integrity and ecological connectivity, and as such drew attention away from racial inequalities.

Presenting Laikipia as a whole offers conservationists the dialectics for arguing in favour of large-scale and widespread conservation measures, but the sense of regional integrity and cooperation might be lost on other residents, especially those whose live under the harshest and least favourable conditions. I realized this during a chat with James Mwangi, one of the Laikipia Wildlife Forum's conservation officers. He told me that, a few days before we met, his car had broken down when he had been on the way to one of the forum's conservation projects. He was stranded on the roadside in the vicinity of a place called Endana, located on the way from Nanyuki to Rumuruti. As he waited for a repair team he got into conversation with a group of people from the area, and he took the opportunity to discuss Laikipia's environmental issues with them. He said he soon realized that the people he talked to did not at all identify with Laikipia, but spoke of it as if it were Nairobi – a faraway place they had heard of, but never came. An older woman had even asked him if he knew Laikipia, to which he had responded that she herself, and all the others present, were themselves Laikipians. But people said he was wrong, and they maintained they were not from Laikipia but from Endana. 'People from remote areas think that Laikipia is Nanyuki, or that Laikipia is Dol Dol' he indicated, and he concluded: 'they don't understand that Laikipia is right where they are'.

Laikipia's white landowners have employed a variety of strategies to escape colour bar politics, this chapter pointed out, but in the main they have been unable to break away from the discursive patterns set by Laikipia's colonial past. History is inevitable to them, one could say. I consciously phrase it like this, for it acknowledges that these landowners are at least partially the victims of a historical record for which they were not responsible. There are landowners who live up to the stereotype of neo-colonial landlords who think little of their African neighbours, but there are also plenty of landowners who try to be responsible citizens of a country that is highly ambivalent about their presence. Third-generation farmers, or third-generation rancher-turned-conservationists, simply cannot help being the descendants of colonial settlers, yet they continuously carry the burden of their forefathers' actions.

Thus far, anthropology as a discipline has largely failed to address this issue, and it mostly continues depicting white Africans as neo-colonial relics of a troublesome past. I believe that this is

partly the result of an ethnographic void: anthropologists have studied the role of colonial administrators, settlers, and missionaries at great length, but after the continent de-colonized, whites in Africa have largely been excluded from the ethnographic gaze (with the exception of Crapanzano 1985; McIntosh 2006 & 2015; Teppo 2009; Uusihakala 1999; Van der Waal & Robins 2011). This reinforces stereotypes on white presence in Africa, simply because we lack accounts that prove otherwise. Terence Ranger once commented on this:

> My desire is to see both whites and blacks in Africa as human beings, each with a fully human capacity for heroism and villainy and mediocrity. And one cannot see either whites or blacks as fully human in the framework of conventional colonial historiography, where white humanity is distorted by the burden of power, and black humanity is distorted by the image of submission.
>
> Ranger (1998: 256)

Like Ranger, I call for social analyses that do not merely reiterate colonial idioms, but that make a sincere effort to come to grips with the ambiguities of post-colonial African societies. To achieve this, we should award honest ethnographic attention to all parties involved and welcome white residents, white development workers, and white conservationists, to mention just a few, into our studies as ethnographic subjects. I have tried to do this in this chapter and continue to do so in the next, where I discuss how Mt. Kenya was implicated in Laikipia's white landowners' perils and struggles.

MT. KENYA WORLD HERITAGE SITE REVISITED

A Conservancy's Quest for Perpetual Safekeeping

Nearly sixteen years after designation, the original boundaries of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site changed. This event was the outcome of a longer process that had started in 2007. At the time, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, a property located on the eastern-most outskirts of the former White Highlands and bordering Mt. Kenya in the north, began lobbying for World Heritage recognition. The managers of the property soon realized that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy only stood a chance of obtaining World Heritage status if it managed to join the existing Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site. Subsequently, they started to file different applications for a site extension to the World Heritage Centre. Eventually, the World Heritage Committee agreed to Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's request, and in July 2013 it was included in Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation.

Those behind the petition for Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site's extension assumed that World Heritage status would improve Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's position within Laikipia's precarious land question. Like other private conservancies, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy is affected by the contemporary political implications of the area's colonial history, and like other landowners the conservancy's executives aim to ward off risks of land alienation. They believed that World Heritage could contribute to this end as it could mobilize a global community calling for Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's continued existence, in case the Kenyan government decided to cancel title deeds or demand different land use.

In what follows, I discuss how Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site comments upon the constitution of Kenya's political arena in the late 2000s and early 2010s. I undertook a similar effort for 1996 and 1997 in chapter three, where I argued that Mt. Kenya's original World Heritage designation served the interests of incumbent politicians. Below I take an opposite stand, and draw attention to how World Heritage might play a role in challenging a country's state administration. It follows that World Heritage's relationship to state power is not absolute: on the one hand, it can give expression to state sovereignty; on the other hand, it may also defy it. In both cases, World Heritage is likely to reproduce a country's power hierarchies, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's World Heritage mission suggests, and I will argue that the conservancy could only capitalize on Mt. Kenya's World Heritage status because it was already an influential and authoritative player in Kenya's conservation industry.

The making of a conservation titan

In 1922, Alexander Douglas, born in South Africa to a Scottish father, settled on the northern foothills of Mt. Kenya. He established a ranch that he called Lewa Downs (Breed 2011). In 1952, Lewa Downs passed to one of Douglas's daughters, Delia Douglas, who together with her husband David Craig continued ranching. In 1972, the couple established a tourist camp on Lewa Downs – according to their own records, this was the first tourist camp located on a private conservancy in the entire country (see Lewa Wilderness n.d.[B]). A few years later, Lewa Downs passed to one of Delia and David Craig's sons, called Ian Craig. He was the main architect of what is today Lewa Wildlife Conservancy.

When Ian Craig took over Lewa Downs in 1977 it was still operating as a cattle ranch. This changed from 1983, when Lewa Downs gave up a far corner of its land to establish a rhino sanctuary. This sanctuary was the brainchild of Anna Merz, a British-born philanthropist who had primarily worked as a racehorse trainer and chimpanzee conservationist in Ghana. Merz moved to Kenya in 1976 to retire but, the story goes, after she arrived in the country she was appalled by the large number of rhinos that were poached. She decided to spend her retirement protecting these animals and began looking for a place to start a rhino sanctuary. Different landowners turned a deaf ear to her pleas she later recounted, but Merz persisted (see for instance *The New York Times*, 21 April 2013). Her unrelenting advocacy established her reputation as Kenya's rhino patron, and Desmond Morris once described her as: 'what Joy Adams was to lions, Dian Fossey was to gorillas, and Jane Goodall is to chimpanzees, Anna Merz is to rhino' (Morris in Merz 1991: 9).

Eventually, Anna Merz convinced David and Ian Craig to cooperate, and they allowed her to build a small rhino park on Lewa Downs. The reserve covered a fenced-off area of approximately five thousand acres: it became operative in 1986, and it was called Ngare Sergoi (Lewa Wilderness n.d.[A]). Merz allegedly paid for the establishment of Ngare Sergoi with a family inheritance, and she recruited game-trackers and veterinarians to bring rhinos to her reserve (see for instance *The Daily Telegraph*,

27 May 2013). But since Kenya was in the midst of one of its severest poaching crises it proved difficult to find any animals left to protect, and during Ngare Sergoi's first years its main task was survey what was left (see also American Association of Zoo Keepers n.d.[A]). Michael Dyer,[67] owner of a family property located next to that of the Craig's, remembered the period well. He told me that his brother and Anna Merz had collected the last two rhinos in the Matthews,[68] the last two in Isiolo, and so on. 'It was fun in those days', he stressed, and those who had been involved in the project had felt like pioneers, he said.

Rhinos from all over the region were brought to Ngare Sergoi and over the years the reserve grew steadily. By 1988, the initial five thousand acres no longer sufficed, and Ngare Sergoi doubled in size (Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.[E]) – at the time, cattle ranching was in retreat, and Lewa Downs had plenty of land available. In the meantime, Anna Merz began looking for donors and private investors to help funding the operation, and entered into a partnership with, among others, the American Association of Zoo Keepers (American Association of Zoo Keepers n.d.[B]). This marked the beginning of the Craig family's close relations with American nature conservation lobbies, which I discuss in more detail later.

Ngare Sergoi's rhino population kept growing, and in the mid-1990s the number of animals again exceeded the reserve's carrying capacity. In response, the Craig family took a drastic decision. It turned the whole of Lewa Downs into a nature park, which it called Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. It was a groundbreaking move, for hardly any privately owned conservancies existed in Kenya at the time. In later years, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy advertised itself as the founder of an entirely new conservation model, but critical observers stressed to me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had never been established for that aim: rather, it was said that the Craig family simply faced bankruptcy after the collapse of the cattle industry and had made the radical transition to prevent an execution sale of the land.

When Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was officially established in 1995 it replaced Ngare Sergoi, which ceased to exist. Apart from the former territory of Lewa Downs, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy also came to include a government forest reserve called Ngare Ndare. The Craig family already became involved in the management of Ngare Ndare in the early 1990s, when the forest's adjacent large landowners had raised money to fence off the government reserve (see Ngare Ndare Forest Trust n.d., although the website does not mention the sponsors by name). I was told that these landowners had meant to curtail the access to Ngare Ndare, because they were of the opinion that both the Forest Department and the African communities living around it depleted its resources. The fence was erected in stages throughout the 1990s, but the northern border, where Ngare Ndare touches the property of the Craig family, was left open. Thus, Ngare Ndare effectively became a part of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, and the latter assumed management control over the area.

Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's start-up phase resembled that of Ngare Sergoi, and at first it was largely without wildlife. It then began retrieving animals from elsewhere. A senior KWS official, who

did not want to be mentioned by name, told me that this had irritated the KWS, because Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's managers had not asked permission from the institute – in fact, they had failed to consult them at all, and had not informed the KWS about the operations. Instead, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy people had captured animals under the false pretence that they were ill and needed treatment, he said. They 'just darted wildlife' and moved them to the conservancy, he told me. I once had the opportunity to ask Ian Craig[69] himself about this affair but he largely avoided the matter. Instead he said that, in general, wildlife does not need much more than the right environment, plenty of nutrition and protection against poaching – if one offered that, it would come on its own. A few moments later he commented 'if wildlife is not hassled it will stop moving around' and immediately added that, if I understood the full extent of what he was saying, I was 'really very smart'.[70] This left me with the impression that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had collected animals by actively chasing them from neighbouring properties into the conservancy, where it was left in peace in the hope that it would stay. I shared my thoughts, but Ian Craig refused to give further clarifications.

In only a few years' time the Craig family property no longer looked like a livestock farm, but measured up to the image of a wild East African savanna with lone acacia trees, extensive grasslands and charismatic wildlife species such as elephant, rhino and lion as well as grazing herds of all sorts of herbivores including zebra, gazelle, giraffe and buffalo. In essence, the Craig family had created what Soper called 'nature as appearance' (1995: 180). This was a 'new' nature that did not derive its credibility from the historical absence of human interference, but from deliberate landscape engineering that created the potential for spontaneous biophysical processes (see Onneweer 2009: 54-55) – the presence of these biophysical processes made the conservancy appear natural, even though it was patently man-made.

As the Craig family property's landscape changed, so did its business model. Unlike the former ranch, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was founded as a non-profit organization (Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.[B]), and soon its operation was paid for with money from international organizations such as the American Association of Zoo Keepers, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, the World Bank, and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (*Ibid.*). Over time, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy became fully donor dependent, meaning that it failed to generate money of its own and instead relied on the gifts of others. Many other former ranchers as well as conservationists considered this a regrettable development, they told me. On the one hand, it had made Lewa Wildlife Conservancy a sloppy and irresponsible spender, they maintained, for money simply came in too easily. One critical observer, for instance, told me that one of Lewa's managers had told him that, whenever Lewa Wildlife Conservancy needed building materials, it did not bother to check prices – it just went where it was easiest. The person in question explained to me that he deemed this highly problematic, because it sent out the wrong message to suppliers: it suggested that whites had money and would pay any price, which put the rest of Laikipia's white landowners with less financial means in a difficult situation.

On the other hand, critical observers indicated, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's total reliance on donor money stimulates dishonest and aggressive marketing practices. A former employee clarified to me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy organizes fundraising events in the United States and Britain, which rest entirely on the idea that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy is the sole successful private conservation initiative in the entire country, and that without it Kenya's wildlife would be doomed. He explained to me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy needs huge amounts of money to cover their costs, and that in order to raise such amounts it continuously exaggerates its importance and influence. 'Lewa tries its best to let donors believe that no one else exists but Lewa' he said, and added that he condemns this as it disregards and downplays the merits of all of Laikipia's other conservation initiatives. A conservationist who requested anonymity, as he did not want to antagonize Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, said that the conservancy's main point of departure is making itself look bigger by making others look smaller. He described Ian Craig as a 'Rambo conservationist', i.e. someone who is only interested in sensation and spectacle. He said that the things that really matter for conservation, such as butterflies and beetles, were of no interest to Ian Craig, who only concerned himself with fancy cars, private airplanes, and large charismatic mammals. Documentaries and television series that feature Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, such as *Game Ranger Diaries* (2006),[71] *Drawing the Line* (2014),[72] and *Earth, a New Wild* (2015)[73] largely subscribed to such an image, and further reinforced the idea that the conservancy is all-important and decisive for Kenyan conservation.

Over time, Laikipia's endangered charismatic mammals became Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's main asset and came to generate the most donor money. Mordecai Ogada from the Laikipia Wildlife Forum, for instance, indicated to me that the endemic black rhino, a critically endangered IUCN Red List Species,[74] can produce about $60,000 in funding per year. He pointed out that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy understands the economic potential of endangered species quite well, and that it makes a habit out of accumulating as much IUCN Red List species as possible: it has the black rhino, the Grevy's Zebra, and in mid-2012 there was talk that it was preparing the translocation of the critically endangered Hirola from an area north of the Tana River. There are conservationists who strongly disapprove of this, because it makes it nearly impossible for other private conservancies to obtain international donor money – by taking full control over the conservation of certain species, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy simply corners conservation money.

In addition to being funding magnets, iconic species can also be a form of political capital to Laikipia's landowners, as the following account reveals. From roughly 2010 onwards, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy again hosted more rhinos than its environment could sustain. A neighbouring property called Borana Ranch, which since the late 2000s had been making preparations to host rhinos on its property (see Save the Rhino n.d.), offered to take in a proportion of the animals. In July 2012, the manager of Borana[75] told me that the ranch had taken all the necessary steps: among other things, it had upgrade its ring-fence to keep out poachers, it had hired extra staff, and it had trained its personnel

under supervision of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. Yet, each time that Borana Ranch thought that the animals would be brought in, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy objected for one reason or another.

According to one conservationist, who regularly cooperates with Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, Borana Ranch failed to meet Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's high security standards. He underscored that the latter's safety system is state-of-the-art and extremely expensive and that, in comparison, Borana Ranch's measures were simply insufficient. Mentioning this, he touched upon a broader problem: rhino conservation was so risky and expensive that the KWS has largely walked away from it, and today gladly leaves the animals in the care of private landowners. But most of these landowners do not have sufficient resources either, and in 2012 two private conservancies pulled out of rhino conservation due to the costs and dangers involved. After that, Laikipia's rhino population confined to three properties only, namely Solio Ranch, Ol Pejeta Conservancy, and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy.

One of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's former employees offered an additional explanation for the continuous delay in the relocation of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's rhinos. He told me that the latter not only doubted the quality of Borana Ranch's security standards, but that it also was unsure about how to organize the translocation itself. He clarified that different experts held different opinions: some advised putting the rhinos in a small enclosure on Borana Ranch so that the animals could get used to the environment, while others suggested simply lowering the fence between the two properties and letting rhinos wander in by themselves. The latter strategy was obviously the easiest, the former employee told me, but it had a downside: in this way, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy could not attract much media attention. He underscored just how keen Lewa Wildlife Conservancy is on publicity, and he said that the conservation preferred 'some big deal, a big hoopla rhino introduction'.

In the meantime, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy questioned Borana Ranch's motivation for the rhino relocation project. It maintained that Borana Ranch was not so much interested in the continued existence of the species itself, as in the political support of influential conservation lobbies that do everything in their power to protect rhino habitat. Borana Ranch was only interested in the black rhino because the animals would give the property a stronger position if the Kenyan government decided to target privately owned land, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's CEO suggested to me. He stressed that if the government confiscated Laikipia's large estates, then those hosting black rhinos would be among the last to fall, for conservation organizations would fight for them till the bitter end. Of course, this rationale was also applicable to Lewa Wildlife Conservancy – however, its PR machine effectively covered such incentives up.

In 2014, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy finally agreed to bring rhinos to Borana Ranch. As expected, the conservancy dramatized the event and announced on its website that the translocation had created the 'biggest rhino sanctuary in the country' (see Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.[A]). Lewa Wildlife Conservancy also shot a sensational promotion film that showed how rhinos were darted from a helicopter, how they were put in big containers and transported, and how the animals were finally released amid much loud trampling and snorting (YouTube 2014). The promotion clip constantly

showed Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's name and logo, but information on Borana Ranch's contributions was kept to a minimum.

The way in which Lewa Wildlife Conservancy branded the rhino relocation project almost entirely as its own was illustrative of the conservancy's powerful position – Ian Craig tended to get his way, I was told on several occasions, and over the years both he and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy became increasingly authoritative. This manifested in different ways. For example, Ian Craig initiated another conservation initiative in 2004. This was the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT), which he established in cooperation with the politician Francis ole Kaparo, an influential statesman who had, among other things, served as the speaker of the lower house of parliament between 1993 and 2008. NRT aimed to offer conservation support to those community ranches located north of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy that were in the hands of pastoralist groups. In essence, NRT was an extension of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy under a different name, and one of NRT's main objectives was to make the communities around Lewa Wildlife Conservancy agreeable to conservation. This was necessary because the safety of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's wildlife depended on their goodwill and cooperation (see also Northern Rangelands Trust 2013: 6).

Initially, NRT worked with some ten or eleven pastoral communities. It supported them in the management of wildlife and in setting up ecotourism businesses. Il Ngwesi, a community ranch that borders on Lewa Wildlife Conservancy in the northwest, became NRT's showpiece: it established a luxurious lodge, and with the marketing support of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, Il Ngwesi managed to attract a steady stream of tourists. Yet, in later years, NRT and Il Ngwesi fell out. Someone from the Lewa Wildlife Conservancy bandwagon told me that Il Ngwesi's community felt exploited, and that pastoralists claimed that NRT had profited too much from their work. In response, these pastoralists had demanded full control over Il Ngwesi's lodge and no longer wished to work with NRT. Despite such setbacks, the number of community conservancies that NRT worked with expanded rapidly. At the time of writing the organization cooperated with more than twenty-seven community ranches. It had expanded into areas further north as well as into Kenya's coast region, and in total controlled more than 7,600,000 acres (Northern Rangelands Trust n.d.).

But Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's influence over other conservation areas did not stop there. In the mid-2000s, the British conservation organization Flora and Fauna International (FFI)[76] bought Ol Pejeta Ranch, where it wanted to establish a conservancy modelled on Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. Ol Pejeta Ranch had a turbulent history: it had been owned by, among others, Thomas Cholmondeley, 4th Baron Delamere (son of Hugh Cholmondeley, 3rd Baron Delamere, introduced in the previous chapter), by the father-in-law of Christina Onassis, daughter of Aristotle Onassis, and by infamous weapons dealer Adnan Khashoggi (Pearce 2012). After FFI bought Ol Pejeta Ranch it contracted Lewa Wildlife Conservancy to organize Ol Pejeta Conservancy's management. Batian Craig, Ian Craig's son, became overall supervisor and Ian Craig himself took a seat on Ol Pejeta Conservancy's board of directors. Within a few years, Ol Pejeta Conservancy became very successful and today some

130

even consider it more prosperous than Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, for Ol Pejeta Conservancy generates its own income through livestock farming and does not depend on donor money.[77] In any case, together Ol Pejeta Conservancy and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy became Laikipia's two conservation giants – and Ian Craig stood at the helm of both.

Ian Craig's influence over Laikipia's conservation scene also showed in his appointment to the KWS board of trustees in 2008, where he served six consecutive years (KWS annual report 2008: 9). In this period, Ian Craig promoted cooperation between the KWS and private conservancy owners in general, and cultivated a stronger relation between the KWS and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy in particular – I return to the latter development later in this chapter. In recent years, the KWS certainly seems to have become more agreeable to Laikipia's large white landowners, and it might have realized that it cannot compete with influential stakeholders such as Ol Pejeta Conservancy and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. In fact, the organization is dependent on such private conservancies, as the outsourcing of rhino conservation suggests. Former Mt. Kenya senior warden Robert Obrien[78] realized this all too well, and he indicated to me that although Lewa Wildlife Conservancy does not need the KWS the KWS certainly needs them. He said that Mt. Kenya should consider itself lucky with a neighbour such as Lewa Wildlife Conservancy: the effect of the latter's tight security system spilled over, and ensured that the overall region was safer and better protected against poaching.

Ian Craig's position on the KWS board of trustees and his partnership with politicians such as Francis ole Kaparo granted Lewa Wildlife Conservancy a favourable lobby position. Mike Watson,[79] Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's CEO since April 2011 (see Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.[D]), told me that the conservancy's staff and board had invested in reinforcing state relations for a long time. This had rendered Lewa Wildlife Conservancy considerable political leverage, which revealed itself, for example, during the design phase of a KETRACO power line. In 2006, the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia had signed a memorandum of understanding on the construction of a transmission line that would run from the Ethiopia-Kenya border to the plains east of Mt. Longonot. On its way it would traverse the regions Marsabit, Samburu, Isiolo, Laikipia, Nyandarua and Nakuru (see KETRACO Kenya Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd. n.d.). The initial design for the power line suggested that it would scrape Laikipia in the east. As such, it would go over Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. Watson told me that once the conservancy had realized this it had begun lobbying to have the design changed, as a power line over its property would affect its pristine-looking landscape. Lewa Wildlife Conservancy managed to persuade the politicians involved to adjust the KETRACO line's course, and eventually it moved further north (to the detriment of private conservancies located in that region).

All together, Ian Craig had turned the former Lewa Downs into a conservation titan. Many conservationists and landowners saw him as a visionary who had understood the potential of private conservation long before others. Yet they did not necessarily like working with him, as he was known as a man who did not tolerate contradiction and who let no one stand in his way. One conservationist told me in private that he truly disliked Ian Craig, but that he had to make do with his presence and

influence. 'I have to live here and work here, and so I have to make the best of it', he said. In line with this, another conservationist later told me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy does not hire people to think for themselves, but to promote Ian Craig's vision. The greatest source of frustration seemed to be that Ian Craig's and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's behaviour as the grand dame of Kenyan conservation undermined endeavours to strengthen Laikipia's conservation industry as a whole, and belittled the efforts of other private conservancies. At the same time, those involved in Laikipian conservation were well aware of Ian Craig's range of influence, and especially conservationists and landowners who relied on Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's goodwill or financial support were careful not to state their criticism in public (which is why many of the informants in this section have been anonymized).

But although Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had a powerful position it was not invincible, and critical observers pointed out, in particular, the risks of its business model. A former employee who once worked at the top of the conservancy's administration told me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's managers were always worried about reaching income targets. This made the conservancy incredibly donor pleasing, he said, and the organizations that fund the conservancy largely came to direct its conservation agenda. As a result, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy got caught between what American and British donor organizations want on the one hand, and what its Kenyan staff deems appropriate and suitable on the other. Brockington & Scholfield (2010[C]) have identified such dynamics for Sub-Saharan conservation efforts more generally, and stress that conservation funding is a powerful tool with which the North enforces its conservation ambitions on the South.

In addition to how the principles of international organizations affected Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's daily operation, the conservancy had another vulnerability related to its complicated and fragmented ownership arrangements. After Lewa Downs became a conservancy, the non-profit organization Lewa Wildlife Conservancy came to supervise about 62,000 acres of land. Of these, approximately 40,000 acres were owned by Craig family members; about 8,000 acres were in the hands of other private owners who had bought properties from the Craig family in the past; and the remaining 14,000 acres largely covered Ngare Ndare forest reserve (Lewa Milele n.d.[B]). During Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's initial years, the supervision of all this land rested solely on informal agreements. This changed in 1999 when Craig family members signed an easement that gave Lewa Wildlife Conservancy full management control over the land in their possession, but in legal terms this easement was not very strong and it only lasted for thirty years (*Ibid.*). Moreover, the easement did not cover the 8,000 acres not owned by Craig family members, and on these properties informal agreements continued. At a certain point, these informal and fragile arrangements began to unsettle donors, I was told – Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's sponsors wanted a more secure future for their investment, and they demanded that the risks be averted. In response, the conservancy's managers developed a strategy that consisted of a number of measures, of which two are discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

A devilish land sale?

As long as Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's land question was not settled, the conservancy's future was uncertain. On the one hand, there were the informal and legally weak arrangements between those who owned the land and the non-profit organization; at the same time, there was also the risk of political expulsion confronting all Laikipia's white landowners. In the run-up to the new constitution and Land Act it became obvious that private property rights would be curtailed, but little was said about corporate property rights. As such, the executives of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy believed that land would be less vulnerable to government confiscation if owned by a firm, rather than one or more white individuals, and thus they decided to transfer landownership to a Kenyan shareholding company. They thought up the following plan: a shareholding company would be founded, called Chikwe Ltd. (see Government of Kenya 2012: 54), which would buy 32,000 acres of the approximately 40,000 acres that the Craig family in total possessed (Lewa Milele n.d.[B]). After the sale, Chikwe Ltd. would allocate the management right to the non-profit organization Lewa Wildlife Conservancy – the organization would supervise the entire area, with the exclusion of the residences and tourist lodges owned by individual Craig family members who would have the opportunity to lease such real estate back.

In order to pay for the land sale, as well as for the employment of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy as general overseer, Chikwe Ltd. had to accumulate money: Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's executives estimated that the shareholding company needed nearly $30 million to get through the first years, of which roughly $17.5 million was needed for land acquisition (Lewa Milele n.d.[A]). It was decided to generate this money through donor funding, and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy partnered with the American conservation organization The Nature Conservancy (TNC): TNC would partially finance the project; in addition, the two organizations would launch a fundraising campaign to collect the rest of the money. This fundraising campaign was given the name *Lewa Milele*, Kiswahili for Lewa Forever, and was primarily meant to attract private investors and philanthropists.

Lewa Wildlife Conservancy began cultivating an alliance with TNC from 2008 onwards (see Lewa Milele n.d.[C]). At the time, TNC was new to Kenyan conservation. The American organization had been founded in 1951, but for a long time it concentrated its activities in North and South America, with an occasional project in Asia. Today, TNC is considered one of the wealthiest and most powerful environmental conservation organizations worldwide (see Forbes 2011). According to its own website, TNC pursues 'non-confrontational, pragmatic, market-based solutions to conservation challenges' (The Nature Conservancy n.d.[C]) – in practice, the organization buys up vast tracks of land with government funds and money from the private sector, and subjects these lands to authoritative management plans.

In the United States, TNC is primarily known for its controversial methods. Especially its aggressive land-acquisition strategies, and its reselling of land to the United States government at increased rates gave way to different scandals. In 1993, for instance, TNC hit the headlines after it bought a farm from the elderly Frederic Gibbs, a well-known neurologist and scientist. Gibbs's heirs, his two sons, then sued TNC: they maintained that their father had not been mentally competent when he signed the agreement, and they argued that the organization was fraudulent and manipulative. Gibbs's sons won the court case, and TNC had to give back the property. Another often-heard critique of TNC is that its board includes directors of oil companies, chemical producers and mining concerns – it is believed that TNC prioritizes the interests of the corporate sector and has conservation only as secondary concern, illustrated, for instance, by the organization's condoning of logging and drilling for oil.[80] Holmes (2011) notes that, in general, the roles of NGOs, corporations, and the state have become increasingly indistinguishable in nature conservation (see also Spierenburg & Wels 2010): TNC is a perfect example of this.

In 2006, TNC began to invest in African conservation programmes. It soon entered Kenya, where it immediately got caught up in another scandal that roughly went as follows. In 2008, former president Daniel Arap Moi announced the sale of his Laikipian ranch, Eland Downs, which had been in his possession since 1997. The announcement alarmed Eland Downs's adjacent landowners, Ol Pejeta Conservancy's CEO Richard Vigne[81] told me. It was shortly after the 2007 and 2008 election violence, and at the time politicians were looking for land to settle hundreds of thousands of displaced people. Laikipia's white conservancy owners worried that Eland Downs would turn into a refugee camp, and they feared the effect that this would have on their properties.

To prevent Eland Downs from becoming an African refugee camp, an organization called African Wildlife Fund (AWF) offered to buy Daniel Arap Moi's property. AWF did not have the money to finance the purchase but TNC, which at the time was trying to get a foothold in Kenya, volunteered to sponsor the buy. The two organizations sided, and AWF bought Eland Downs with the intention of turning it into another conservancy. Yet, shortly after the transaction, a group of Samburu pastoralists began to protest. They said they lived on Eland Downs, and maintained that they were the property's rightful owners. Moi had grabbed their land decennia earlier, they stated, and as such the sale between the former president and AWF was unlawful.

AWF rejected the pastoralists' objections. The organization declared that it had paid Daniel Arap Moi and had thus gained legal possession of Eland Downs, but the pastoralists refused to leave the ranch. In 2011, Channel 4 ran a documentary on the situation, called 'Conservation's Dirty Secrets'.[82] The documentary featured Samburu men who claimed that the Kenya Police had tried to evict them in a violent manner, and witnesses declared that police forces had beaten people up, had stolen money, had burned huts, had raped women, and had killed one man. After the documentary was broadcast, international media and organizations jumped on AWF. *The Guardian,* for instance, headlined 'Kenya's Samburu People Violently Evicted After US Charities Buy Land' (14 December 2011); the

indigenous rights organizations Just Conservation and Cultural Survival publicly condemned the proceedings (see Just Conservation n.d.; Cultural Survival n.d.); the German travel branch organization threatened to discourage tourism to Kenya (see Deutscher ReiseVerband n.d.); and the indigenous rights organization Survival International sent a petition to the United Nations (see Survival International n.d.).

International rights movements portrayed AWF's land purchase as a human rights violation, but their reports were sensational, confusing, and sometimes downright contradictory. Cultural Survival, for instance, said that the evictions had affected three hundred pastoral families (Cultural Survival n.d.), while Survival International spoke of two to three thousand households (Survival International n.d.). Also, the organizations seemed uncertain about how long the pastoralists had actually been living on Eland Downs before AWF interfered. In the meantime, AWF fought back, and it presented a 2008 court file in which the same group of Samburu pastoralists claimed to be living next to Moi's ranch instead of on it. But the pastoralists received public support, and with the help of international organizations they took AWF and Daniel Arap Moi to court. TNC was spared because it had never been a party to the sale – it had merely made funding available.

By November 2011, AWF was tired of the witch-hunt. It donated Eland Downs to the Kenyan government, after which Moi's former ranch turned into a National Park under supervision of the KWS (*Daily Nation*, 11 November 2011). The affair had driven a serious wedge between AWF and TNC and, shortly after international rights movements had begun to target AWF, TNC moved out of the organizations' shared office in Karen, Nairobi. After AWF had taken its hands off Eland Downs, TNC also published a public statement in which it said:

> The Conservancy has never approved or enabled the evictions of Indigenous Peoples from this property. Moreover, the Conservancy condemns the use of violence or any forcible removal of Indigenous Peoples from their land or territories.
>
> […]
>
> We are shocked and saddened by reports of abuse to Samburu pastoralists in the Samburu district, and we are investigating the matter. In such a highly charged environment, emotions and rumors are running high, and ascertaining the facts is a challenge. However, we remain committed to transparency and openness, and we will communicate updates on this issue as developments occur.
>
> The Nature Conservancy, 16 December 2011

In August 2012, I visited Charles Oluchina,[83] TNC's Kenyan director, in the organization's new headquarters in another neighbourhood of Nairobi. He said that AWF had abused TNC's trust, and that he did not believe that AWF had not known about the politics in advance. Maybe he was right, or maybe not – in any case, the partnership with AWF had put TNC's introduction in Kenya in a bad light.

At the time that the Eland Downs affair unfolded, TNC's cooperation with Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was already well underway. Chikwe Ltd. had been founded, and the land sale was in process – the two organizations had cut the vending process in two so that funding could be raised in steps (Lewa Milele n.d.[B]), and by the time that the Channel 4 documentary began to cause upheaval the first phase of the sale was nearing completion. On the one hand, the developments around Eland Downs certainly affected TNC's reputation; at the same time, the organization had already made headway by then – it had become Chikwe Ltd.'s biggest shareholder, and as such it had secured major influence over Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. During a conversation in August 2012 Charles Oluchina highlighted TNC's control over Lewa Wildlife Conservancy and said that, if the conservancy's CEO failed to manage the property well, TNC would fire him. 'It's tough love,' he stressed.

Laikipia's landowners and conservationists seemed worried about TNC's growing control. Mordecai Ogada told me, for instance, that he feared that TNC's mode of working would do serious harm to the country's conservation industry, because in the context of Kenya's land scarcity the organization's land-buying principle was likely to fuel African resistance to white conservation efforts. Another conservationist, who had worked for Lewa Wildlife Conservancy in the conservancy's early days, also underscored the dangers of working with TNC. He admitted that TNC has the money that Laikipia needs, but at the same time the organization's rigid and autocratic approach to conservation was likely to cause more harm than good. He concluded that working with TNC was like 'dancing with the Devil'.

After Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's land sale to Chikwe Ltd., TNC's power expanded rapidly both in Laikipia as well as in the country at large. Firstly, TNC followed Ian Craig's lines of influence and became a partner to both Ol Pejeta Conservancy and NRT (see The Nature Conservancy n.d.[A]). On the one hand, this seemed to constrain the decision-making power of these organizations' former executives, and an employee from a regional NGO who had visited one of NRT's management meetings said that TNC had ruled the entire session. 'It came up with a conservation strategy and it simply dictated it without any room for discussion', he stated. On the other hand, TNC's approbation seemed to boost confidence, and Ol Pejeta Conservancy's Richard Vigne emphasized to me that TNC's interest in Ol Pejeta Conservancy confirmed the latter's good work – while critical observers insisted that wildlife conservation and cattle ranching were incompatible, Ol Pejeta Conservancy had showed them otherwise and TNC had recognized the potential of their business model.

Here is may be noted that Ol Pejeta Conservancy's success also seemed to have another effect: it encouraged Richard Vigne to advocate in favour of implementing stricter land use regulations that centred on maximum gain. He suggested that Laikipia's land debate should no longer focus on acreages but on efficiency, and he claimed that the region needed a method to enforce productivity upon landowners. 'If a landowner fails to manage his or her land effectively', he said, 'then transfer the management to a better manager'. This did not necessarily have to infringe upon ownership rights – even without title deeds, Vigne stressed, Ol Pejeta Conservancy's staff was very willing to take over

136

the daily management of properties such as Kuki Gallmann's Laikipia Nature Conservancy, or even that of Eland Downs.

Such calls for what may be dubbed 'management imperialism' seemed to echo TNC's ambitions and, like Ol Pejeta Conservancy, TNC did not make a secret of its ambitions. Charles Oluchina indicated to me that TNC did not believe in fragmented conservation projects and that the organization meant to gain control over a vast terrain, ideally over the whole of Laikipia. To this end, TNC continuously tried to enter into new partnerships. Sometimes its lobbying paid off and in April 2014 the organization Space for Giants announced that, in cooperation with TNC, it would take over the management of a property called Loisaba Conservancy (see Space for Giants n.d.).

Meanwhile, TNC also gained a hold over the KWS. The KWS had long been under the spell of the animal rights lobby, as I indicated in the previous chapter, which, among other things, had prevented the revision of the 1989 Wildlife Act. But when TNC began to finance the KWS's operations, the latter largely broke its ties with animal rights organizations. When I asked Charles Oluchina what he expected from TNC's partnership with the KWS, Oluchina responded that, in future, all organizations working in Kenya should be accountable to TNC. 'We will not kick out NGOs with expertise', he said, but added that the core of Kenyan conservation was to be with TNC, the KWS, and private conservancies.

It was clear that if such a partnership was to work, the 1989 Wildlife Act first had to be updated as it estranged the KWS and private landowners from one another. Changing Kenya's regulations thus became a priority for TNC, according to Oluchina, and like most Laikipian conservancy owners he took a firm stance against the hunting ban – TNC in general opposed such bans because they deprived wildlife of economic value, and this was at odds with the organization's principle of market-based conservation. Moreover, Oluchina found the legal backing of Laikipia's private conservancies too weak and he advocated in favour of strengthening conservancies' tenure rights. I learned during a stakeholder meeting organized jointly by TNC and the KWS in 2012 that, in order to motivate the KWS to initiate such legislative changes, TNC had invited KWS executives to its headquarters in Washington and had sponsored 'educational trips' to Namibia where hunting was permitted and private conservancies flourished.[84]

In late December 2013, the Kenyan government finally adopted a new Wildlife Act. The 2013 Wildlife Act demonstrated TNC's impact: it reintroduced culling and cropping licences (article 80), and it offered a legal basis for private conservancies (article 39). I suspect that, after more than two decades of advocacy and negotiation, Laikipia's conservancy owners celebrated this as a victory. At the same time, I take it that some also had mixed feelings because the legislative changes further illustrated TNC's climb to power. The position of private conservancies had finally improved, if only slightly, but it remained to be seen at what cost.

A first attempt to become World Heritage

The Craig family's land sale to Chikwe Ltd. constituted one strategy to help secure Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's conservation prospects but, as Ian Craig once formulated it to me, one should not put all one's eggs in one basket. Thus, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy undertook additional measures to bolster its conservation status. Most prominent among these measures was the conservancy's endeavour to obtain World Heritage status.

Jonathan Moss,[85] CEO of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy at the time that the conservancy filed its first World Heritage nomination to UNESCO, told me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's executives had considered World Heritage status an extra layer of protection against land grabbing. If the conservancy was on the World Heritage List, he explained, then it would arguably be more difficult for the Kenyan government to cancel title deeds or confiscate the land, for such an event would then not only matter to Kenya but to the world at large. Moss stressed that, with the help of World Heritage status, the ongoing existence of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy would be a 'public and global concern'. As such, he reiterated World Heritage's official discourse that underscores that World Heritage Sites belong to 'mankind as a whole' (UNESCO 1972: 1), and he highlighted the political potential of addressing a global community via World Heritage – if there was ever a day that the Kenyan government challenged Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's existence then this global community could be motivated to become an active citizenry (see also Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2006: 189), and defend the conservancy's survival. World Heritage listing could thus be promising, but obtaining World Heritage status was not an easy task, as the coming two sections point out.

Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's World Heritage adventure began in 2007 when it hired a Kenyan consultancy firm, Okello Abungu Heritage Consultants, directed by archaeologist George Abungu. At the time, Abungu was the Kenyan representative to the World Heritage Committee and hence was closely involved in the World Heritage programme. Furthermore, between 1999 and 2002, Abungu had been the director of the National Museums of Kenya in Nairobi, and in addition he was involved in numerous heritage initiatives such as the World Monument Watch,[86] the International Council of Museums[87] and the Global Heritage Fund.[88] Abungu was obviously well informed about cultural heritage, but he had little experience in natural heritage conservation. Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's executives had been aware of this, someone who had been involved in the project at an early stage said to me, but they had felt that Abungu's contacts and network would outweigh his lack of expertise and they had hoped that Abungu's relations would help shorten the application process.

Since George Abungu was unfamiliar with natural heritage he asked a second man, Maurice Nyaligu, to carry out a feasibility study on Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's World Heritage potential. Nyaligu had worked for the KWS and IUCN in the past, and he had even been stationed at IUCN's headquarters in Gland, Switzerland, where he had served as a World Heritage monitoring officer.

After carrying out the study, Nyaligu concluded that, on its own, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy stood little chance of obtaining World Heritage status – the conservancy was simply not unique enough (Abungu & Nyaligu 2008: iv). Nevertheless, Nyaligu proposed an alternative course of action. He advised Lewa Wildlife Conservancy to join Mt. Kenya's World Heritage status, and to apply for an extension of the existing site (*Ibid*.: iv-v).

Based on Maurice Nyaligu's advice, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy contacted the KWS to gauge their view on the matter, Jonathan Moss told me. If the conservancy wanted to apply for an extension it would need the backing of a state institution, and the project's chances depended on the KWS's willingness to cooperate. An insider told me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy made the KWS an offer: if the latter drafted and submitted the application, then the conservancy would cover the costs and pay the KWS a fee. The KWS accepted the offer, but for a different reason, an insider later suggested to me. In 2008, the organization was still in conflict with the Forest Service over Mt. Kenya's management mandate – if anything, as I suggested in chapter two, their antagonism had only increased after the adoption of the 2005 Forest Act. So when Lewa Wildlife Conservancy sought cooperation, some people within the KWS had taken that as an opportunity to extend Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site not only with the conservancy, but also with the lower forest ring that Bongo Woodley had been told to remove from his application (see chapter two). In this way, Mt. Kenya's KWS team hoped to reinforce its authority over the area, and to gain the upper hand over the Forest Service.

Although the KWS had initially agreed to participate, it soon lost interest. Someone from Lewa Wildlife Conservancy told me he recalled that the KWS became increasingly suspicious of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's intentions. Also, for reasons that I never learned, the KWS's initial plan to include Mt. Kenya's lower forests in the extension disappeared. The organization put the application on the back burner and the process stalled. Geoffrey Chege,[89] one of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's conservation officers who played a central role throughout the entire application procedure, told me that eventually one individual KWS staff member had drafted the application at home, in his own time. The document that this staff member produced carried the logo of the Kenyan government and included the necessary official credentials, but in practice the KWS had taken its hands off the project. I had this confirmed when I visited the National Museums of Kenya to speak to Hoseah Wanderi,[90] the museums' World Heritage contact. While waiting for Wanderi a helpful secretary wanted to hand me the original application file, but she struggled to locate it in the museum's database. Then, Wanderi came in and told her she would not find it – since the application had not been written by the KWS as an institute, it had never been filed.

In January 2010, the application for an extension to Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site finally reached the World Heritage Centre in Paris. The request for a revision to the existing site primarily rested on two arguments. First, the application highlighted Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's black rhino and Grevy's Zebra population, and it argued that Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site's overall biodiversity record would become more unique if the site came to include the conservancy (The Government of the

Republic of Kenya 2010[A]: 35-36). Second, the application went out of its way to argue that there was an unmistakable symbiotic relationship between Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. To strengthen this argument, the application file displayed various maps. For instance, it included a map that blotted out all the other private conservancies, thus giving the impression that Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy were two heavily-dependent conservation islands in otherwise empty surroundings (*Ibid*.: 16). There were also maps that underscored Mt. Kenya's and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's ecological connectivity by showing the movement of elephants between the two properties (*Ibid*.: 27-28). But like the first one, the latter maps were misleading – they were based on the journeys of a single bull elephant, notorious for his wanderings between the two properties, and they failed to show that elephants moved in other directions as well. But more important even than the maps, the application tried to brace the argument of ecological connectivity by highlighting the presence of a wildlife corridor that connected Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy (*Ibid*.: 4).

The wildlife corridor had a history of its own. In 2006, two farm owners and two local conservation organizations, the Bill Woodley Mount Kenya Trust (BWMKT) and the Ngare Ndare Forest Trust (NNFT), had agreed to build a fenced-off elephant passage that would connect Mt. Kenya's northernmost forests with the adjacent Ngare Ndare forest reserve, and which meant to centralize elephant movement in the area. All four parties believed they would gain from the corridor: the two farms wanted to control elephant migration because the animals invaded their lands and destroyed their crops, and BWMKT and NNFT wanted to control elephant migration to offer better protection against poaching and to reduce human-wildlife conflicts in neighbouring African villages. Due to its close relationship with Ngare Ndare forest, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was also affiliated to the project (see Bill Woodley Mount Kenya Trust et al. 2006).

BWMKT, NNFT and the two farmers reasoned that the elephant corridor was an important conservation investment because it would re-establish and protect traditional elephant migration routes that colonial settlement had disturbed (see also Avery 2006). Among other things, proponents of the project argued, the recovery of these traditional routes would contribute to the diversification of the area's elephant gene pool (*Ibid*.). But a number of observing conservationists questioned this. One of them, a trained zoologist,[91] was especially critical of the idea of historical elephant routes. When we met, he told me he was working on an article in which he meant to show that there is little scientific evidence that explains how elephants pick their migration routes. As such, he emphasized, it would be premature to assume that 'historical' elephant routes exist. The zoologist had also worked on a number of elephant fencing projects throughout Laikipia, which had given him the impression that the elephant herds on Mt. Kenya's highlands and the elephant herds on the lowlands north of Mt. Kenya were isolated from one another. From the perspective of elephant conservation, therefore, he saw little benefit in connecting the two areas.

The zoologist was sceptical about the corridor's utility but had observed the negotiation process between the stakeholders involved with slight amusement, he told me. All stakeholders coped with

dense elephant populations, and all hoped that the corridor would bring relief: lowland stakeholders anticipated that the corridor would lead elephants into Mt. Kenya's forests, while the stakeholders on Mt. Kenya anticipated that the corridor would lead elephants into the northern rangelands. There was clearly a conflict of interest, but that did not inhibit the corridor project – rather, it stimulated and shaped it (see also Tsing 2005: 10). In the meantime, the zoologist hoped that the corridor would indeed fail to achieve anything at all, for if it caused two thousand Mt. Kenyan elephants to head for the lowlands, or vice versa, pressure on the environment and human-wildlife conflicts would only further increase.

Alternatively, there were also conservationists who supported the corridor plan for reasons other than its conceivable capacity to direct elephant migration. These conservationists focused more on the project's potential political capital than on its possible conservation merits, and they stressed that the corridor could enhance Laikipia's conservation reputation. Anthony King, for instance, suggested to me that the corridor would show the rest of the world that Kenya spoke the language of conservation, and would demonstrate Laikipia's innovative outlook. He underscored that, apart from a possible ecological effect, the corridor could generate a psychological effect and he called it 'a piece of conservation bling'.[92] As such, Anthony King tapped into the current popularity of wildlife corridors more generally. Goldman (2009) suggests that this popularity may be a result of corridors' ability to satisfy different conservation philosophies: they connect otherwise isolated conservation enclaves, but ideally do so in a manner that least affects surrounding communities. Thus, she suggests, corridors appeal to both fortress and community-based conservationists (2009: 336).

That, on the whole, and with the exception of only a few critical observers, there was such enthusiasm for the Mt. Kenya-Ngare Ndare corridor may need to be seen in light of the failure of an earlier corridor project. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a man called Mike Prettejohn, the owner of a property called Sangare, had meant to build a corridor between Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares mountain range. Someone who had followed Prettejohn's proposal closely told me in confidence that there had been no scientific justification for Prettejohn's plan: there was only one source that suggested that there had been elephant movement between Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares in the past, and that was the diary of a colonial administrator called Richard Meinertzhagen (Meinertzhagen 1983 [1957]: 107) – Meinertzhagen had come to the White Highlands in 1905, but not long after the British government had ordered him back because it considered his mode of administration too violent and too brutal (Garfield 2007: 61).

The corridor between Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares mountain range differed from the corridor between Mt. Kenya and Ngare Ndare forest in at least one important respect: it had meant to cut through a densely populated area with African smallholdings. Thus, African farmers had had to be relocated, and the initiators of the corridor project had thought up a compensation scheme. Max Graham, who became involved because he was doing a PhD on elephant movement at the time, told me that these farmers had initially received the scheme well, although matters complicated when more

and more people had demanded payment. But as the 2002 elections drew closer, the corridor had become a political target: a regional politician had managed to convince the farmers that the corridor was a cover-up for whites taking over African land, and the farmers had turned against Prettejohn. Graham stressed that these farmers became increasingly aggressive and violent, and that for reasons of safety the project was eventually abandoned.

The corridor between Mt. Kenya and Ngare Ndare was more fortunate. It only ran over two white-owned farms, and its biggest challenge was financial rather than political. Stakeholders predicted that the construction of the corridor would be unusually expensive, most importantly because it required an underpass to cross the Nanyuki-Meru highway, and the estimated costs totalled one million dollars. Even so, stakeholders managed to collect enough funding, among others with the help of gifts from Richard Branson's Virgin Atlantic and the Royal Netherlands Embassy. In 2008, building began (see for instance Nyaligu & Weeks 2013).

When the application for Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site's extension reached the World Heritage Centre in early 2010, the construction of the corridor was in progress. In stressing the corridor's importance, the application summed up all the arguments that BWMKT, NNFT and the two farmers also used: it claimed that the corridor would re-open former migration routes; that it would relieve elephant population pressure; that it would alleviate human-wildlife conflicts; and that it would diversify gene pools (see for instance The Government of the Republic of Kenya 2010[A]: 12). But the application also obscured one important thing, namely that the corridor did not link Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy *directly* – rather, Ngare Ndare forest reserve was positioned between them. This meant that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy could only join Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site if Ngare Ndare did so as well, and hence the application requested the designation of both (*Ibid*.: 51).

By October 2011, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had not yet heard back from the UNESCO World Heritage Centre, and the status of the application was still unclear. This changed as a result of my own interference: after I met Jonathan Moss, who was the first to inform me about Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's World Heritage project,[93] I checked World Heritage's online archive and I found that the World Heritage Centre had viewed the application as incomplete (UNESCO 2011: 20). I sent my findings to Moss, who, in turn, forwarded them to Mike Watson, his successor as Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's CEO, who was apparently unaware of the developments. Sceptics told me that this aptly illustrated Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's irresponsible spending: first the conservancy invested a lot of money in a World Heritage application, and then it forgot to follow-up on the results.

Since World Heritage's online archive did not say much about why the application had been considered incomplete, Mike Watson began an inquiry of his own. He later showed me his email correspondence, which revealed that his investigations had brought him to IUCN's regional director for East and Southern Africa Ali Kaka; to a staff member of the IUCN office in Nairobi called Leo Niskanen; to staff of IUCN's headquarters in Switzerland, including director of the World Heritage Programme Tim Badman; and to a World Heritage nominations manager called Alessandro

Balsamo,[94] who was located at the World Heritage Centre in Paris. Together, these World Heritage experts raised a number of concerns. Firstly, they told Watson that there had been several administrative flaws. Among other things, the information on the surface acreages had been imprecise, and there was a lack of adequate maps and photographs. Also, the request for extension had not been put on Kenya's World Heritage tentative list prior to submission.

In addition to these shortcomings, which could easily be rectified, there were more problematic issues. Firstly, the World Heritage Centre had not accepted the application's argument that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's black rhinos and Grevy's Zebras would add to the overall biodiversity of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site. It had turned down this argument, not because of its content, but because it rested on World Heritage nomination criterion (x),[95] which had not been part of the original designation of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site. Instead, the 1997 designation only made mention of World Heritage criteria (vii) and (ix), and therefore the World Heritage Centre maintained that the alterations proposed were too drastic to pass as a simple site extension – either Lewa Wildlife Conservancy and Mt. Kenya needed to apply for an entirely new World Heritage listing that did include criterion (x), or Lewa Wildlife Conservancy needed to adjust its argument to fit criterion (vii) or criterion (ix). This illustrates World Heritage's remarkably static understanding of heritage sites, as well as its rigid enforcement of such an understanding. The World Heritage experts that Mike Watson had contacted furthermore indicated that they had reservations concerning the validity of the corridor argument: since the corridor had not yet been finished when Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's application had reached the World Heritage Centre, experts had considered it too early to pass judgement on the its ecological merits.

Needless to say, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was not happy with the outcome. It had spent approximately $150,000 to $200,000 on the application, only to find that the document had been doomed in advance because the KWS had not followed World Heritage's bureaucratic procedure properly. In light of this, Mike Watson consulted a colleague to discuss whether he could hold the KWS responsible and whether it would be of any use to file another application. He forwarded me the emails, of which a part read:

> [The KWS] were far from transparent, and failed to share the document until well after the fact – so I regret I have no expectation that you will get anything further without throwing money at it. I would suggest you get as much detail as you can from IUCN in the first instance. If the inscription criteria is a deal breaker then there is no point in pursuing this further. If it is simply a case of missing paperwork, mapping – and indeed procedure – then it should be fairly straight forward [*sic*]. Even so you will need KWS support and would need to fund the resubmission. I doubt there will be much appetite amongst donors unless prospects look good. I also fear that the KWS were not particularly interested in the Lewa extension – and were simply using [Lewa] to try and expand the WHS on the mountain to cover the entire reserve – and even that is seen of only limited value given the limited return KWS see from the WH inscription of Mt. Kenya (in financial terms).

It appeared as if Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's World Heritage venture was stranded, not least because Mike Watson left me with the impression that he was not very motivated to go through the entire application process again – it would cost more time and more money, and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had already improved its position vis-à-vis the Kenyan government through the Chikwe Ltd. land sale. To Watson, World Heritage appeared as 'just another box to tick' when it came to securing the conservation status of the land. But after Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's ownership arrangements had changed, this box had lost most of its appeal.

All this happened shortly before I left Nanyuki for a few months. I expected that, by the time I returned, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy would have moved on to other things. I got it completely wrong.

A former cattle ranch as World Heritage

In December 2011, Geoffrey Chege rewrote the application for Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site's extension with Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. Apparently, the conservancy had not trusted the KWS with the task and had taken matters into its own hands. Chege primarily made two modifications to the initial application: he deleted all references to criterion (x), and put more emphasis on the ecological connection between Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy (see The Government of the Republic of Kenya 2012[A]) Accordingly, the corridor between the mountain and Ngare Ndare forest came to serve an even stronger rhetorical purpose. Yet, this time round, that seemed less problematic: the corridor had been finished, and from early 2011 there had been reports of elephants using it (see for instance African Conservation Foundation 2011; *The Huffington Post*, 30 January 2011).

While Lewa Wildlife Conservancy showed little confidence in the KWS's ability to rewrite the application in such a way that the World Heritage Centre would accept it, the KWS also seemed reluctant to assist the conservancy a second time. On different occasions KWS officers told me that they did not see the point of uniting Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy in one World Heritage Site: they underscored that the properties were completely different, for instance in terms of habitat, conservation problems or management capacities, and they maintained that the two were not supposed to be connected. In the course of the process, moreover, a number of people within the KWS had become increasingly suspicious of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's intentions. For instance, one warden[96] told me that he was certain that the conservancy had clear reasons for its interest in World Heritage status, yet he had no idea what these reasons were. He stressed that Mt. Kenya had long been a World Heritage Site, but that this status had never delivered anything, either in terms of management mandate, or in terms of financial support. In fact, he was so disappointed with the World Heritage programme in general that he suggested removing UNESCO's logo from Mt. Kenya's gates entirely. His own scepticism about World Heritage had made him wary of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's objectives, for he suspected that the conservancy knew things that he did not know. If the site

extension was truly beneficial to all parties involved, he reasoned, then Lewa Wildlife Conservancy would have been less secretive about it.

Despite this warden's mistrust, the conservancy nevertheless managed to get the institute's approval for Geoffrey Chege's rewritten application, and KWS director Julius Kipng'etich[97] signed the document himself (The Government of the Republic of Kenya 2012[A]: 82). Still, the warden had made valid remarks about the application's lack of transparency and openness. From the beginning, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had largely kept the venture to itself – not only had it kept the KWS in the dark about it motivations, it had also failed to involve affected parties such as corridor stakeholders. This became evident when I visited NNFT's office and spoke to the trust's project manager, Dominic Maringa,[98] in May 2012. By that time, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had already submitted the rewritten application to the World Heritage Centre, and I asked Maringa how he or other members of the trust had contributed to the revision process. In response, he raised his eyebrows, and said: 'I was not aware of all this'. Apparently, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had requested World Heritage status for Ngare Ndare forest, but without notifying the forest's daily management team.

Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had also not put much energy in informing the two farm owners who had made available land for the corridor. Both[99] told me that they had heard one or two things about the extension project, but had not known what to expect from it. Since the corridor ran over their lands they would inevitably be drawn into a World Heritage extension, yet neither of them knew how, or even if, World Heritage status would affect their land use possibilities – one of them grew crops in the corridor and the other had real estate plans, and both were uncertain about UNESCO's power to curtail such activities. They indicated that they would only condone Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's World Heritage campaign if it did not affect their individual businesses. But since the conservancy hardly engaged them they could not assess the situation.

In addition to the reservations of immediately affected parties, there were also onlookers who were not directly involved but who were nevertheless critical. Different observers told me they disapproved of how Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had acted alone, and had turned the entire undertaking into a one-man affair. At the same time, people tended to dismiss the request for Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site's extension as just another event that illustrated Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's over-the-top marketing practices. One conservationist, for example, told me that he considered the conservancy's quest for World Heritage status a 'typical Lewa thing', and he repudiated it as 'mainly bullshit'. He clarified that he did not see why, if Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site had to be expanded, it should only include Lewa Wildlife Conservancy and not all the other private conservancies as well. He emphasized that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had once again acted at the cost of other people. A colleague of his, whom I talked to a few days later, agreed with this point of view and said that it was about time someone told Lewa Wildlife Conservancy to stop growing and disadvantaging others.

IUCN also entertained the idea that if Lewa Wildlife Conservancy could be added to Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site then other conservancies could be as well. When Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had

just submitted the rewritten application to the World Heritage Centre, one of IUCN's technical advisors located in Nairobi[100] indicated to me that the conservancy could only obtain World Heritage status if it could demonstrate that, of all possible extensions, the one they proposed would create *the most extraordinary* World Heritage Site. He speculated that this would be difficult, not in the last place because the conservancy's application rested entirely on the argument of the corridor, while the corridor only had limited ecological potential. It linked Mt. Kenya to Ngare Ndare, he clarified, but it only enabled the movement of one particular wildlife species, namely elephants. The technical advisor therefore stressed that, contrary to what the application suggested, the corridor did not 'link' two ecosystems – instead it just offered elephants a safer passage. In theory, the corridor could also be opened to other species such as rhinos or Grevy's Zebras, but different conservationists indicated to me that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy would never let such valuable species off its property, and even the application itself explicitly mentioned that the conservancy had no such intentions (The Government of the Republic of Kenya 2012[A]: 18).

In addition to the corridor's limited ecological benefits, IUCN's technical advisor pointed out, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's complex ownership issues further problematized the application. The proposed extension included land owned by Chikwe Ltd. and supervised by the non-profit organization Lewa Wildlife Conservancy; land owned by Chikwe Ltd. but leased back by Craig family members; land that Chikwe Ltd. had not (yet) bought and that was owned by different third parties; corridor land that belonged to two different private landowners; and Ngare Ndare forestland in possession of the Kenyan government. IUCN's technical advisor stressed that, in general, IUCN is not in favour of such complicated arrangements, because the involvement of many different stakeholders typically hinders effective management. Besides, he stressed, if Mt. Kenya and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy were united in one World Heritage designation then their individual management plans also had to be fine-tuned. He doubted whether that was feasible, because the two had completely different modes of operation and completely different budgets. In sum, he did not seem to believe that the extension would actually happen.

Nevertheless, in late May 2012, Mike Watson notified me that he had heard indirectly that the World Heritage Centre had accepted Geoffrey Chege's revised application, and that IUCN was making preparations for a field evaluation. This evaluation eventually took place in October 2012 and was carried out by a South African called Roger Porter. Through others I heard that Porter had spent two or three days on Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, and that there had been one stakeholder meeting to which all corridor partners had been invited. It was said that none of these partners had raised any serious concerns, and the report that Porter later produced stated:

> The LWC-NNFR [Lewa Wildlife Conservancy – Ngare Ndare forest reserve] extension brings an additional set of ecosystem processes and biodiversity that are currently not part of the Mount Kenya World Heritage Site by incorporating the lower lying, scenic foothills and arid habitats of high biological

richness and diversity. Of particular significance and value is that LWC-NNFR lies at the ecotone or ecological transition zone between the Afro Tropical Montane ecosystem and its associated biodiversity and that of the semi-arid East African Savannah Grasslands. It thus provides for a more ecologically intact World Heritage site especially in its incorporation of the complete and diverse range of outstanding ecological processes.

<div align="right">IUCN (2013: 9)</div>

Despite all the complications, including the intricate landownership arrangements, the weak arguments for ecological connectivity, and the failure to include affected stakeholder, Porter supported the extension.

Perhaps Roger Porter's uncritical approval of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's proposal for extension must be understood in light of IUCN's willingness to help secure the conservancy's future. Roughly nine months after Porter's site evaluation I briefly met Tim Badman,[101] the director of IUCN's World Heritage Programme, at the World Heritage Centre in Paris. Badman told me that, for IUCN, the World Heritage initiative is essentially one conservation scheme amongst many others. It is primarily of interest to IUCN, he explained, because it assists in setting aside as many areas as possible for conservation. He commented that, in recent years, World Heritage status had inflated, and he stressed that quite a few natural sites had been added to the list of which the management and state of conservation was insufficient – as such, IUCN officially maintained that the number of new World Heritage inscriptions had to be curtailed (see for instance IUCN 2012). But Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was a different case entirely, I realized after the talk – the conservancy controls the management of its property to the very last detail, and perhaps IUCN hoped that the Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's best practices would trickle down to Mt. Kenya if the two were joined in one World Heritage designation. In addition, at the end of July 2012 a former IUCN employee told me that IUCN had a longstanding interest in NRT's community conservancies. Yet due to some unfortunate event in the past, the organization had fallen out with either the wider management of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, or with Ian Craig personally. Already in July the person expressed to me his expectation that IUCN would write a favourable report either way – he stressed that the organization would want to re-establish contact, strengthen the links, and finally gain a foothold in the northern rangelands.

Regardless of how and why Roger Porter had arrived at his positive assessment, the World Heritage Committee adopted IUCN's advice and in July 2013 it voted in favour of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site's extension with Ngare Ndare forest reserve and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy (UNESCO 2013: 155). After more than five years of trying, the latter's efforts had finally paid off, and a former white cattle ranch had been accepted as natural World Heritage.[102] Some of Laikipia's conservationists found this staggering, they told me: they could not understand that land, which less than twenty years ago had still hosted a cattle business, had ended up on the World Heritage List. Different World Heritage experts, however, took a completely different perspective. IUCN's Roger Porter had clearly supported the extension, but also Hoseah Wanderi from the National Museums of Kenya told me that

Lewa Wildlife Conservancy fully deserved World Heritage status. He did not find the conservancy's short existence troubling, and he underscored that World Heritage was primarily about unique features and enhancing conservation – from his point of view, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy fulfilled both. George Abungu[103] even went a step further. Not only did he not take Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's ranching history as an obstacle to becoming World Heritage, he turned the whole thing upside-down: he said to me that the conservancy deserved heritage status all the more, because after so many years of colonial occupation it had finally returned to its original landscape and it had welcomed back the wildlife that had always been there. To him, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was a showpiece example of pre-colonial land use.

Like Mt. Kenya's original World Heritage designation in 1997, for which Bongo Woodley argued that the mountain was a pristine wilderness area unaffected by human interference (see chapter two), Mt. Kenya's 2013 World Heritage Site extension was vested in visions of an ideal landscape. These visions outweighed Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's actual history and, notably, after World Heritage listing the conservancy actively began to cover up its own cattle ranching past. Prior to mid-2013, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's website openly mentioned that the conservancy had grown out of Lewa Downs livestock farm. If anything, the website revealed a certain pride in how the Craig family had managed to turn an unprofitable cattle ranch into a world-renowned nature reserve, and pictures of rhinos featured alongside pictures of colonial cattle caravans (see for instance Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.[B]; Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.[C]). But after World Heritage listing, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy redesigned its website: it deleted most references to how the property had been used in the past, and presented the foundation of Anna Merz's rhino sanctuary as its historical moment of origin (see Lewa Wildlife Conservancy n.d.[E]). After it obtained World Heritage status Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had apparently found it necessary to reinvent itself – in the process, it disposed of those parts of history that could impair its World Heritage credibility.

A brand in the hands of elites

Initially, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy became interested in gaining World Heritage status because it aimed to strengthen the conservation status of its land. This ambition reverted to the colour bar politics that I discussed in the previous chapter, which continue to inspire a persistent nervousness on behalf of many white landowners over their title deeds, and which lay bare the Kenyan government's ambivalent stance on the future of white property rights. During the 2004 Maasai campaigns, the government sided with Laikipia's landowners and refused to redress Maasai grievances over colonial injustices, but the 2010 Constitution and the 2012 Land Act suggest that tides may be turning. In any case, Laikipia's white landowners are careful to minimize risks of confiscation and they have

developed a variety of land securing strategies, such as being as productive as possible, or investing in community work.

Within this context, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy conceived of World Heritage as yet another strategy to avert the threat of expropriation. Its managers hoped that if the conservancy was acknowledged as one of the world's most extraordinary natural treasures under the World Heritage Convention, then it would be able to summon a sense of collective global ownership. This sense of ownership could subsequently translate into political capital: if the Kenyan government decided to interfere with the conservancy's land use or cancel its title deeds, then World Heritage status could activate a global community urging for and defending Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's preservation. The pressure that such a community could exert is limited, for UNESCO has no legal sanction to enforce the World Heritage Convention. In fact, there are numerous examples of governments that take little notice of the lobbying of World Heritage advocates. The Australian government mining in Kakadu National Park (see Maswood 2000) and the Tanzanian government building a highway through Serengeti National Park (see Death 2013) are exemplary in this regard. Even so, in light of Laikipia's landowners' limited means to improve their position, even the smallest opportunities are exploited.

These dynamics are not unique to Kenya. Maurice Nyaligu[104] told me that, immediately after the release of Nelson Mandela, different South African farmers put forward World Heritage nominations for their private estates. Like Laikipia's white landowners today, these farmers had feared losing rights of possession, and they had tried to stay one step ahead of possible land reform policies. Nyaligu recounted that such nominations had caused heated debates within the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, for different state representatives had taken the firm stance that World Heritage should not serve as a political tool in domestic struggles over land distribution. Of course, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy aimed to employ World Heritage in exactly the same way, but unlike the South African nominations this never revealed itself as a problem. There might be several possible explanations for this; perhaps Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was more successful in covering up the politics at play due to its heavy reliance on nature conservation rhetoric; perhaps state representatives were less aware of current developments in Laikipia and in Kenya at large; or perhaps state representatives were simply less critical than they had been in the early 1990s, which might be an effect of the overall increasing politicization of the World Heritage Committee and its present-day tendency to prioritize inscription over thorough research and evaluation (see Brumann 2014[B]; Meskell 2012 & 2013).

At the same time, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's interest in World Heritage status cannot entirely be explained through the ambition to secure ownership rights. By the time that the conservancy learned of the World Heritage Centre's rejection of the first application, which was in late October 2011, the Craig family's land sale to Chikwe Ltd. was about to be concluded. This land sale generated far more legal protection against colour bar politics than World Heritage status ever could, Mike Watson suggested to me, and also Ian Craig indicated that the transfer of ownership was more of a boost to Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's conservation future than a UNESCO designation. Nevertheless,

Geoffrey Chege rewrote and resubmitted the application and the conservancy continued pursuing World Heritage status. This was arguably partially motivated by the investments that had already been made, for when the World Heritage Centre turned the application down Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had already spent between $150,000 and $200,000 on the project. At the same time, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy may have been interested in World Heritage status for yet another reason – World Heritage offers a trademark, which the conservancy could employ for marketing purposes.

Over the years, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy put great effort into advertising itself, and to this day it continues to invest heavily in improving name awareness both inside and outside Kenya. To put it in the words of one informant, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy simply 'puts its name on everything'. The relocation of rhinos to the neighbouring Borana Ranch, which was accompanied by dramatic media announcements as well as a sensational video that almost entirely focused on Lewa Wildlife Conservancy and marginalized Borana Ranch's efforts, is exemplary in this regard. But such branding activities also mark the conservancy's CSR programme; the flamboyant charity events and galas that it organizes or that its representatives attend (see for instance Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 2015); the yearly Safaricom Marathon (see Safaricom Marathon n.d.); or the conservancy's regular appearance in nature documentaries and films. In short, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy is keen on media attention and it presumably intended to employ World Heritage status for this purpose. In fact, both the applications that the conservancy submitted to the World Heritage Centre proposed to alter the name 'Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site' to 'Mt. Kenya-Lewa Wildlife Conservancy World Heritage Site' (see The Government of the Republic of Kenya 2010[A] & 2012[A]). The World Heritage Committee did not grant this request, and the name remained unchanged – even so, after designation, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy quickly redesigned its logo, and since then features its World Heritage status prominently. This suggests that even if the conservancy no longer needed World Heritage for securing land rights, its managers still felt that the UNESCO brand name could contribute to summoning the large amounts of donor money that its operation depends on.

Although Lewa Wildlife Conservancy immediately employed World Heritage for marketing purposes, and despite having paraded its World Heritage status ever since July 2013, I do not mean to reduce World Heritage listing to mere branding in the way that tourism or administration studies sometimes do (see for instance Poria et al. 2011; Ryan & Silvanto 2009). More than just a prestigious label, the case of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy shows that World Heritage is a catalyst and mobilizer in its own right (this is comparable with how Mosse 2005 approaches development). Besides, the way in which Lewa Wildlife Conservancy today promotes its uniqueness and extraordinariness via World Heritage seems to exemplify more structural conditions, namely the conservancy's ruling position in Laikipia's wildlife conservation industry. This finds expression in, among other things, how Lewa Wildlife Conservancy monopolizes the donor money for certain wildlife species, or in how it changed the design of the KETRACO power line.

I believe that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's success in obtaining World Heritage status was itself an effect of the conservancy's strong network and overall dominance. Already at an early stage, the conservancy managed to secure the support of influential stakeholders such as Julius Kipng'etich and George Abungu. Despite the suspicion of various wardens and rangers, the conservancy's plea for extension received official KWS support; and despite arguments that called into question both the extension's ecological value as well as its ownership complexity, IUCN evaluator Roger Porter backed the application. From the start, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had the necessary key figures on its side, and it seemed that its World Heritage project could hardly fail. It was Maurice Nyaligu who pointed this out to me most vividly. In August 2012 he said that, without doubt, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy would end up on the World Heritage List – every person within Kenya who either had the knowledge, the capabilities and the power to halt the nomination had been won over.

The joined World Heritage designation tightened the bond between Lewa Wildlife Conservancy and the KWS, and in theory it even authorized the latter to meddle with the conservancy's management (because the World Heritage Convention allocates state parties the exclusive right to supervise World Heritage Sites). Yet, this did not seem to worry Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, even though the KWS only recently softened its previously hostile attitude towards private conservancies in general. Mike Watson once pointed out that the KWS can be fairly robust with regard to rights of ownership, management and utilization, but he added that, in the end, the organization does not have the capacity to enforce any of its rules. From his perspective, the KWS was hardly a threat to Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's hegemony. Besides, the revised 2013 Wildlife Act suggests that the conservancy's largest shareholder, TNC, already gained considerable control over the KWS's conservation agenda as well as over its policy-setting. Moreover, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's executives have direct connections to the KWS: in 2012 Julius Kipng'etich, for instance, joined the conservancy's board of directors (see Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 2012) and in 2013 he was accompanied by Paula Kahumbu (see Lewa Wildlife Conservancy 2013), a protégé of Richard Leakey who himself took a place on the KWS's board of trustees in 2015.

The case of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy thus suggests that World Heritage reifies existing power structures. If the conservancy had not been as influential as it is, it probably would have been unable to capitalize on Mt. Kenya's World Heritage status. It seems to me that Laikipian landowners and conservationists disapproved of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's World Heritage campaign so strongly, precisely because the undertaking underscored something they already understood quite well – namely that Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's political and economic capital surpasses theirs, and that the conservancy continues to grow at the expense of others. This illustrates just how much World Heritage is in the hands of national elites, but it also immediately reveals that such elites are not necessarily within the state apparatus. It also calls into question the work of scholars who foreground World Heritage's top-down implementation structures (see for instance Byrne 1991; Smith 2006; Rowlands & Butler 2007), for here the World Heritage label was not imposed but seized. I agree that the World

Heritage programme does set strict and rigid parameters for heritage conservation, and that it does rely on narrow understandings of heritage, but this should not draw our attention away from how stakeholders put such parameters and understandings to good use to get what they want. In the process, World Heritage's technical idiom may enable such stakeholders to conceal what is actually at stake – even if that is colour bar politics and white anxieties over property rights.

CONCLUSION

MONUMENT OF NATURE?

In December 1997, Mt. Kenya obtained World Heritage status on the basis of its natural characteristics. The designation's apolitical appearance, vested in the representation of 'nature' and 'state party' as technical categories, has been the central theme of this dissertation. Throughout this work I endeavoured to bring into focus what the rhetoric of nature conservation and natural heritage preservation obscures, and I unpacked the Kenyan state party involved in Mt. Kenya's 1997 designation as well as the Kenyan state party that directed Mt. Kenya's 2013 site extension. In doing so, I drew attention to Bongo Woodley's key role in the late 1990s and dealt with Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's current dominant position; I made explicit the issues at stake, and pointed out how the ongoing rivalry between the KWS and the KFS as well as the competition between Laikipia's private conservancies affected Mt. Kenya's World Heritage status; and I situated Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site in Kikuyu and Kalenjin political elites' struggles over power as well as in Laikipia's White Highlands' history and the present day implications of that history. Each chapter made its own contributions to this exercise.

In chapter one, I identified a number of key concerns for studying World Heritage Sites. Among others, I historicized heritage's central role in nation-building and state-making, and I emphasized the authority that the 1972 World Heritage Convention ascribes to national state parties. I suggested that many World Heritage studies echo this official discourse of state authority over World Heritage Sites, thus failing to address the notion of World Heritage state party critically. Based on the work of

scholars such as Abrams (1988), Mitchell (1991), Taussig (1993), Trouillot (2001), and Radcliffe-Brown (1940), I took the position that there is no such thing as 'the state' – there are constantly changing networks of individuals who deploy power in the name of the state, yet whose command very much depends on the extent to which an image of the state as a unified and collective source of intention is upheld. Translating this to World Heritage, I argued that it is crucial to deconstruct specific World Heritage nominations and designations to the level of the actual individuals involved. When we fail to do this we are likely to miss how World Heritage articulates and reinforces struggles over power, for instance between different state representatives and institutions, and thus we risk misunderstanding World Heritage's workings and effects.

One consequence of the typical reluctance to problematize notions of the state and state actors in relation to World Heritage is that it has become generally accepted that World Heritage is a nationalist instrument that buttresses state ideologies (see for instance Askew 2010, or the case studies of Hevia 2001; Long & Sweet 2006; Scott 2002; Silverman 2011). However, the case of Mt. Kenya suggests that World Heritage's relation to the state and nationalism is not straightforward: when we closely examine who contributed to a World Heritage designation when, for what purposes, and under which circumstances, we might find that World Heritage serves a range of purposes, of which giving expression to nationalist sentiments is only one.

Finally, I considered the tendency in many World Heritage studies to treat 'the state' as a given (rather than as a problem) in light of how World Heritage at large depoliticizes (Ferguson 1990) heritage identification and preservation. That is to say, it reduces complex social and political matters to an expert discourse that makes believe that heritage management is technical rather than political (see also Li 2007 on 'rendering technical'). World Heritage's technical idiom reduces state parties to administrative entities that merely serve a bureaucratic purpose, but it also, for instance, depicts 'nature' and 'ecological integrity' as simple scientific facts to be recovered by trained specialists. In doing so, it makes invisible the politicking over what is and is not accepted as natural, and it obscures that nature is a culturally defined category that in itself might be considered a form of cultural property.

In chapter two, I introduced Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) warden Bongo Woodley, who served on Mt. Kenya between 1989 and 2006, as the mastermind of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site. Throughout his term, Woodley was in conflict with the Forest Department over the authority to supervise the mountain. Due to former colonial policies, both institutes had an official mandate over the area, yet their intentions with Mt. Kenya differed notably: the KWS practiced colonial ideals of fortress conservation and meant to protect the mountain's forests against human exploitation, but the Forest Department carried out large-scale logging operations.

In the mid-1990s, KWS director David Western asked Bongo Woodley to draft a document to nominate Mt. Kenya for World Heritage status. The latter took this as an opportunity to outwit the Forest Department and grab control over Mt. Kenya's management. In the World Heritage nomination

154

document, Woodley deliberately depicted the mountain as a pristine wilderness area – this image did not correspond with Mt. Kenya's actual condition, but it did offer a canvas for demonizing the Forest Department's ongoing logging in front of a global World Heritage audience. In this way, Woodley hoped to mobilize an international lobby that would urge Kenya to remove the Forest Department from office.

Not long after Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation, the KWS, in cooperation with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and a conservation platform called the Kenya Forest Working Group (KFWG), carried out two aerial surveys on Mt. Kenya. Both surveys underscored the Forest Department's mismanagement, and both called for the need to curtail the Forest Department's rights over Mt. Kenya's forests. In 2000, the Kenyan government finally cancelled the Forest Department's mandate, after which the KWS became Mt. Kenya's sole official overseer. However, the Forest Department denounced the decision: it never left Mt. Kenya's forest stations and to this day the two institutes fight over the mountain's resources. Mt. Kenya's 1997 World Heritage listing thus did not remedy the area's management conundrum. Indeed, instead of the World Heritage designation offering a solution to Bongo Woodley's problems it was itself the product of his predicament. World Heritage status did not change the power dynamics at play – instead it reproduced them and offered them a new outlet.

In chapter three, I examined Mt. Kenya's cultural and political histories. I explained that the political establishment in place when Mt. Kenya became a World Heritage Site did not allow for a celebration of these histories because they were central to the symbolic capital of its strongest opponents, the country's Kikuyu population. In the late 1930s, Kikuyu spokesman Jomo Kenyatta published a monograph called *Facing Mt. Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu*. This work, together with Mt. Kenya's role in the Mau Mau uprisings of the 1950s, which at the time were interpreted as a Kikuyu revolt against colonial domination, consolidated the mountain's image as a Kikuyu place. Jomo Kenyatta's inauguration as Kenya's first president further reinforced this, and in due time Mt. Kenya came to symbolize the control that Kikuyu politicians gained over Kenya's post-independent political apparatus.

When Jomo Kenyatta passed away in 1978 Daniel Arap Moi took over the presidency. The latter continued the clientelistic politics that Jomo Kenyatta had put in place, but turned them to benefit his Kalenjin constituency. Moi marginalized Jomo Kenyatta's former Kikuyu affiliates, and instituted a strict regime that did not tolerate opposition parties. These conditions changed in 1991 after international organizations such as the World Bank cut off aid and demanded political reforms. In response, President Moi re-introduced a multi-party political system as well as quadrennial elections. These reforms fostered tribal oppositions, and especially from the second half of the 1990s, ethnic competition over administrative power has intensified.

When the KWS submitted Mt. Kenya's World Heritage nomination to the World Heritage Committee, Kenya's second round of multi-party elections was pending. In those days, President Moi

was most strongly challenged by the country's Kikuyu population: the Kikuyu politicians who had been replaced after Jomo Kenyatta's death encouraged Kikuyu communities to vote as one united block, and former Mau Mau war songs were revived in the region around Mt. Kenya. With elections drawing nearer, the Moi regime did everything in its power to subvert Kikuyu solidarity. However, it did not prevent Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation. I argued that this was because the nomination that Bongo Woodley drafted 'naturalized' the mountain: it exclusively spoke of Mt. Kenya's natural features, and in doing so it gave the impression that there was nothing else to discuss. Thus, it tied in with incumbent politicians' larger efforts to downplay Kikuyu cohesion, and the Moi regime therefore had no incentive to arrest Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing. This is not to suggest that Mt. Kenya's natural World Heritage status was the result of deliberate political engineering. Rather, Moi and his allies just let the nomination run its course because it fitted their political ambitions – had the nomination proposed to celebrate Mt. Kenya's cultural history, the situation would certainly have been different.

At the end of chapter three, I warned against seeing politics everywhere, in everything. Mt. Kenya's natural World Heritage designation came to serve a larger political purpose, but its manifestation cannot be explained in terms of this purpose – it was Bongo Woodley and the KWS that pushed for Mt. Kenya's World Heritage listing, for reasons that had nothing to do with nation-building or tribal competition over decision-making power. This illustrates that World Heritage studies should be cautious in explaining the progression of World Heritage processes in terms of the outcome, for Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site reveals that even when a designation is of service to office-holding politicians it does not necessarily mean it was also plotted as such.

In chapter four, I examined how racial colonial histories continue to inform Laikipia's land debate. With the Maasai movements of 1904 and 1911 the British colonial administration opened former Masai Land to white settlement. Subsequently, the area turned into a hub of colonial immigrants who founded farms or cattle ranches, and the region became known as the White Highlands. After independence, a part of these European settlers returned to their country of origin. The lands that became vacant were subjected to state-orchestrated resettlement programmes, although the areas that were too arid for agriculture were typically sold to other European settlers or acquired by members of Kenya's upcoming political elite. In sum, certain parts of the former White Highlands land subdivided in small African settlements while at the same time a significant number of large white-owned estates remained intact.

Apart from the few white-owned estates that were fertile enough to farm, most Europeans continued ranching. But in the late 1980s and early 1990s Kenya's cattle farming industry collapsed. As a result, ranch owners collectively sought alternative ways to make their lands profitable. In Laikipia, the part of the former White Highlands that is closest to Mt. Kenya, most ranches converted to private conservancies: in the course of the past twenty-five years, nature conservation became Laikipia's core business, and today there are many NGO projects as well as an upcoming safari

industry. But the future of Laikipia's conservancies is uncertain. Firstly, Maasai groups continue to challenge white landowners' property rights and from time to time they call upon the Kenyan government to redress colonial injustices. In addition, large landownership came under further pressure due to recent legislative changes. In August 2010, the Kenyan government adopted a new Constitution and in May 2012 it introduced a new Land Act. These statutes made land ownership rights the preserve of Kenyan citizens, and they restrict land leases by non-citizens to a maximum period of ninety-nine years.

Under these conditions, Laikipia's white landowners have developed a range of strategies to ward off the risk of expulsion, but their endeavours are complicated by colour bar politics. In the past, the colour bar served to protect the privileges of Europeans but today it has an opposite effect: in contemporary Kenya white descent marks the need to constantly account for and legitimize one's presence. In light of this, Laikipia's white landowners typically emphasize how they improve national well-being, for instance because they pay taxes or because they contribute to the country's food security. But the specific history of the White Highlands installed a narrative of white dominance that complicates such justifications. Most importantly, this narrative exaggerates Laikipia's present-day whiteness and it downplays the presence of African pastoralists and small-scale farmers since 1963 – as a result, Laikipia still has not managed to shake off the image of being almost exclusively white. On occasion, this image translates into calls for retaliation, and from time to time Laikipia's white residents are faced with politicians or protest groups who demand their eviction.

The actions against Laikipia's white landowners illustrate just how precarious the position of white residents in present-day African societies can be. Unfortunately, this has only received scant attention from social scientists (with the exception of Crapanzano 1985; McIntosh 2006 & 2015; Teppo 2009; Uusihakala 1999; Van der Waal & Robins 2011). Post-colonial scholars have tended to examine whites in Africa historically rather than ethnographically: colonial agents such as missionaries, administrators and explorers have been studied in great depth, but only rarely are white Africans welcomed into anthropological fieldwork as informants and subjects of investigation. As a result, the discipline runs the risk of reiterating colonial idioms rather than analysing their place in contemporary African societies, thus playing into racists stereotyping. To prevent this, I argued at the end of chapter four, we need more ethnographic work that asks what it means to be a descendent of a colonial settler in Africa today.

In chapter five, I discussed how Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site was drawn into the ongoing reproduction of Laikipia's colonial and racist past. In 2010, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, which borders Mt. Kenya in the north, requested an extension of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site to include them. Like the rest of Laikipia's conservancies, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had grown out of a cattle ranch, which had been founded in the early 1900s by a settler family named Craig. It had been one of the first to recognize the potential of wildlife conservation, and already in 1983 it had begun hosting a small rhino project. This project expanded rapidly, and in the mid-1990s the entire ranch was turned

into a wildlife sanctuary. This wholesale transformation was unprecedented in Kenya, and its success set an example for Laikipia's wildlife industry that developed in its wake. Eventually, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy became a powerful player within this industry, primarily due to its stake in the foundation of other conservancies and conservation platforms, and because of its leading role in the preservation of iconic species.

Despite Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's relatively strong position, its executives nevertheless worried about the unpredictability of Laikipia's colour bar politics as well as about the curtailment of white landownership rights more generally. To prevent the conservancy's confiscation, either by discontent African farmer and pastoralists of by the state administration, these executives implemented a number of measures. Among others, they invested in community work and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes; they cultivated partnerships with influential politicians; and with the help of the American organization The Nature Conservancy (TNC) they staged a land sale to change the conservancy's legal status from private to corporate. Moreover, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy applied for World Heritage designation. The initiators behind the conservancy's World Heritage quest anticipated that World Heritage status would reinforce Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's political capital: if the conservancy became the collective property of a global heritage community, then this community could be mobilized to demand ongoing preservation if the Kenyan government announced plans to cancel title deeds or alter present land use. World Heritage thus offered Lewa Wildlife Conservancy an international podium on which to call for perpetual safekeeping, should Kenya's landownership issue or Laikipia's land debate escalate.

Initially, the World Heritage Centre rejected Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's application for the extension of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site due to a number of procedural inaccuracies. Most importantly, the application was stranded because it did not match Mt. Kenya's original World Heritage designation – the way in which Bongo Woodley had described Mt. Kenya in the late 1990s served as a *fait accompli*, and the World Heritage Committee could only consider the application if it fitted this description. This demonstrates World Heritage's static understanding of heritage, which assumes that a site's meaning is fixed in time and exists in isolation of social and political developments. After Lewa Wildlife Conservancy received the World Heritage Centre's feedback it rewrote and resubmitted the application, even though the Craig family's land sale had already helped to secure the property's conservation future by then. Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's second World Heritage application was also troublesome for a number of reasons, including the land's complicated ownership arrangements and the disputable ecological merits of a site extension, yet IUCN backed the request. The World Heritage Committee adopted the organization's advice, and in July 2013 Lewa Wildlife Conservancy was finally added to Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site.

After designation, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy began to employ its World Heritage status for fundraising purposes. Among other things, the conservancy changed its logo and launched a new website on which it now highlights its place on the World Heritage List and conceals its ranching

history. Although Lewa Wildlife Conservancy immediately turned its newly obtained World Heritage status into a PR tool, I argue against viewing the event as a mere merchandizing or branding exercise. On the one hand, the World Heritage label acted as a mobilizer in its own right, as it encouraged stakeholders seeking the attention of international spectators to take action. On the other hand, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's World Heritage designation gives expression to the conservancy's powerful position both regionally and nationally, for without the right contacts and the necessary support of key figures it would not have been able to follow World Heritage's strict bureaucratic procedures (which, for instance, demand state approval). The case of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy then illustrates that World Heritage is not a mere trademark – it is a catalyst, and it is likely to reproduce existing power structures.

<center>***</center>

Several larger arguments ran through this dissertation. First, every chapter in one way or another problematized the notion of the Kenyan state, and by extension stressed that there is little sense in understanding World Heritage as a mere state tool (as for instance Askew 2010 suggests). In the late 1990s, the government institute KWS requested World Heritage status for Mt. Kenya because it hoped that this would help to curtail the management rights of another government institute, the Forest Department. This demonstrates that World Heritage can simultaneously serve, and hinder, different arms of the state. That the Moi government endorsed Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation adds a dimension to this: it suggests that, even in those cases where different state representatives support one and the same World Heritage application, they might do so for completely different reasons. Chapters four and five further dealt with World Heritage's ambivalent relation to the state, for they revealed how a conservancy started a lobby for World Heritage status with the deliberate intention to oppose Kenya's state administration if necessary. In addition, these chapters included a variety of examples that emphasized just how problematic it is to conceive of the Kenyan state as an exclusive and unified source of power. For instance, they described how the politician Mwangi Kiunjuri attacked private conservancy owners, which sat uncomfortably with the KWS's official policy to improve private-public partnerships; they showed that although Lewa Wildlife Conservancy is not a state actor it does have close relations with state representatives such as Francis ole Kaparo and Julius Kipng'etich, which guarantees them certain privileges; and they described how the non-governmental organization TNC took up state responsibilities and behaved like a state agent when it directed the revision of the 2013 Wildlife Act. All these examples underscore that boundaries between state and non-state actors, as well as boundaries between private and national agendas, are constantly reshaped and continuously under negotiation (see also Li 2005; Mitchell 1991; Trouillot 2001).

Another theme that introduced itself both during Mt. Kenya's original World Heritage designation as well as during the 2013 site adjustment is what I call the 'ownership paradox'. With this I refer to

how stakeholders tried to capitalize on World Heritage's idea of global collective ownership, but with the explicit intention to impound management rights rather than share them. Both Bongo Woodley, who aspired to gain full control over Mt. Kenya's forests, and the executives of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, who wanted to prevent a transfer of property to the Kenyan government or pastoralist groups, interpreted the notion of 'collective heritage' as a status that would not diminish but rather reinforce their private control – sharing their treasures with the world at large, they believed, could mobilize a lobby defending their exclusive management authority. I began the first chapter pointing out that World Heritage is vested in inconsistent ownership principles, i.e. collective ownership and state ownership, and I underscored that both principles leave undecided who precisely is endowed with the privilege to supervise. Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site illustrates what such uncertainties may come to look like in practice: when a place belongs to everyone, and when there are no clear arrangements on administrative control, we may all be pulled into the competition over ownership rights.

Finally, all chapters drew attention to the struggles and processes that the technical and depoliticized narrative of Mt. Kenya's World Heritage designation obscures. Now that these struggles and processes have been discussed in detail, I take the position that Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site articulates Kenya's colonial history in various ways. First, the 1997 designation was enmeshed in an administrative conflict between the KWS and the Forest Department, which found its origins in the colonial separation of forest and wildlife management. In addition, the way in which Mt. Kenya eventually came to feature on the World Heritage List subscribed to colonial conceptions of a pristine African wilderness and reinforced colonial ideas about what conservation should be: that is, a military undertaking that protects nature against human exploitation. Secondly, Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site was drawn into the tribal competition over power between Kikuyu and Kalenjin political elites. This competition is vested in how colonialism played up and consolidated tribal identities, as well as in how the British administration helped establish Kikuyu control after independence through Jomo Kenyatta. Third, the 2013 modifications to Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site articulate white landowners' worries over potential expulsion. These worries characterize the controversy over the ongoing presence of colonial descendants in contemporary Kenya, and they revert to colonialism's colour bar.

Here, it may be noted that my suggestion that Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site articulates racial boundaries is, in light of World Heritage's institutional anchor in UNESCO,[105] paradoxical: ever since its foundation in 1945 UNESCO has been preoccupied with race issues, and the organization actively fought racism in different ways. In the 1950s, for instance, it aimed to formulate an alternative to scientific racism, which had provided for the hierarchical race typologies on which Nazism and colonialism thrived (see Brattain 2007; Stoczkowski 2009). This endeavour was closely entwined with the development of anthropology as a discipline, due to the involvement of, among others, Franz Boas's student Ashley Montagu, who rejected racial divisions as a social myth.[106] In later years,

UNESCO adopted Lévi-Strauss's relativist definitions of culture and ethnicity in the hope to foster intercultural respect (Erikson 2001: 128). Yet, such attempts notwithstanding, Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site suggests that UNESCO still has a task ahead. As long as the World Heritage programme does not scrutinize and problematize the actual architects of World Heritage Sites, and consequently fails to recognize the social and political dynamics that individual heritage designations play into, then the organization may sustain the conditions for ongoing racial struggles, perhaps without even being aware of it.

From a natural heritage point of view, Mt. Kenya may be a monument of nature – it is a place of extraordinary natural beauty with particular conservation demands that arouses a sense of awe and veneration in conservationists and nature-loving observers alike. Simultaneously, Mt. Kenya is a range of other things. It serves, for instance, as a cultural and political icon, it has been and continues to be a source of administrative struggle over management authority, it inspires nationalist propaganda (recall the hikes of Kisoi Munyao and Teddy Munyao that opened this dissertation), and it is a reminder of imperial expansion and former British rule. At times these different understandings merge, at times they collide, and at times they are simply ignorant of one another. In all cases, they make for messy social realities. Throughout this dissertation I have embraced this messiness. In fact, I am of the opinion that it forms the very tissue of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site.

[1] This service is offered since 2012 and, according to Meskell & Brumann, has had some notable effects. Live streaming of World Heritage meetings for instance led to home ministries following the proceedings closely while instructing their representatives on the spot. Also, aware of the increased visibility, some speakers now tailor their speeches to online audiences (2015: 35).

[2] The upcoming body of literature on organizations (see for instance Gellner & Hirsch 2001; Harper 1998; Hilhorst 2003) and the upcoming body of literature on elites (see for instance Lutz 2005; Salverda & Abbink 2013; Shore & Nugent 2002) suggest that anthropologists are increasingly making efforts in this direction.

[3] Publications may destroy the relationship with one's informants and anthropological writing may alienate the researcher from the researched. Mosse (2006) maintains that, even though this can create very uncomfortable situations, it should not be taken as an indicator of the quality of one's work – he suggests that the social does not necessarily have to be analysed socially, and rejects the idea that evidence is always a matter of consensus (*Ibid.*: 947).

[4] The situation in England was entirely different from the situation on the main land: here, law already allowed for the free alienation of all one's possessions as early as the second half of the twelfth century (MacFarlane 1998: 109-111).

[5] Conversation on 31 October 2011, UNESCO Regional Office for Eastern Africa in Nairobi.

[6] Mandler (1997) notes that the British country house only began to be respected as a source of national pride from roughly the 1930s onwards. In the 1850s and 1860s, and encouraged by the advocacy of John Ruskin and William Morris, the British country house briefly received the admiration of the larger public. But by the 1870s such popular interest dwindled: commoners increasingly took a hostile position against British aristocrats and country houses turned into symbols of upper-class seclusion and privilege.

[7] This modern ideology of naturalism is contradicted by recent technological improvements that have enabled human manipulation of nature to unprecedented degrees (see for instance Haraway 1991; Rabinow 1996). Taking notice of this Escobar (1999) suggests that the modern ideology of naturalism is currently experiencing its decline.

[8] UNESCO introduced the category 'cultural landscape' in 1992 (UNESCO 2008[B]: 8).

[9] Brumann (2014[A]) further suggests that cultural heritage scholars are divided into two strands of thought: first there are heritage believers who aim to preserve heritage and accept that heritage has an intrinsic value, and second there are heritage atheists who take a critical position and seek to undermine contemporary conservation practices. Perhaps such a separation is discernable among scholars, yet it seems unsustainable in the heritage conservation scene. Chapter two shows that the initiator of Mt. Kenya's 1997 World Heritage designation was neither a heritage believer, nor a heritage critic – rather he responded to the call to nominate Mt. Kenya opportunistically, and simply let the process take its course.

[10] In the mid-1970s, only some twenty countries endorsed the convention. In the early 1980s, this number increased to sixty, and by the late 1980s more than a hundred countries acknowledged the convention.

[11] Conversation on 4 July 2012, Nairobi.

[12] Conversation on 12 July 2012, Naro Moru.

[13] In 2007, the *Arabian Oryx Sanctuary* in Oman lost World Heritage status, officially because the sanctuary hosted no more Oryx (UNESCO n.d.[B]) and unofficially because the Oman government announced it would drill for oil (different people who had been present at the meeting conveyed this information to me in person). The *Dresden Elbe Valley* in Germany lost World heritage status in 2009, after the *Waldschlössen Bridge* was built. The World Heritage Committee considered this bridge to spoil the landscape so much that the valley no longer merited World Heritage recognition.

162

[14] These debates again fostered the production of authoritative texts, including the IUCN report *Outstanding Universal Value, Standards for Natural Heritage, a Compendium on Standards for Inscription on the World Heritage List* published in 2008; the ICOMOS report *What is OUV? Defining the Outstanding Value of Cultural World Heritage Properties* also published in 2008; and document WHC.06/30.COM/9 published by the World Heritage Centre in 2006 on the evaluation of Outstanding Universal Value.

[15] At the time of writing the World Heritage List counted 1031 heritage sites.

[16] Conversation on 17 July 2012, phone call.

[17] Conversations on 2 June 2012, Nanyuki Airport; 13 June 2012, Nanyuki Airport.

[18] Together with Lake Turkana that was also designated in 1997.

[19] Nearly a century later, the American journalist and author Keith Caputo set out to retrace the myth created by Patterson's memoir in *Ghosts of Tsavo: Stalking the Mystery Lions of East Africa* (2002).

[20] In particular, chapter eight 'From Preservation to Conservation: Legislation and the International Dimension'.

[21] In *Born in Africa: the Quest for the Origins of Human Life* (2011) Meredith discusses the professional rivalry and competition between father and son.

[22] This idea is also challenged in the landmark study of Fairhead & Leach (1996).

[23] Conversation 31 May 2012, Nanyuki town.

[24] In 1965, the boundaries of Mt. Kenya National Park were slightly lowered to 10,500 feet, and in 1968, two tourist tracks leading to the Sirimon Gate and the Naro Moru Gate were added (VanLeeuwe 2004: 175).

[25] Bongo Woodley's brother Danny later became warden of Tsavo National Park.

[26] Conversations on 13 September 2011, Nanyuki Town; 7 November 2011, Nanyuki Town; 23 May 2012, Nanyuki Town; 20 August 2012, Nanyuki Town.

[27] Conversation on 4 July 2012, Nairobi.

[28] Conversation on 15 August 2012.

[29] Conversations on 26 May 2012, Nanyuki Town; 20 August 2012, Nanyuki Town.

[30] See WWF (n.d.).

[31] See for instance Mogake et al. (2001).

[32] See Convention on Biological Diversity (n.d.).

[33] Conversation on 6 August 2012, Forest Station Nyeri.

[34] Conversation on 6 August 2012, DC Compound Nyeri.

[35] In 2012 the trust's CEO expressed to me her dissatisfaction about the colonial and military associations that the name Bill Woodley invoked. By the end of 2014 Bill Woodley's name was removed from the trust's website and logo, and today the organization continues under the name Mt. Kenya Trust.

[36] The manuscript was published posthumously under the title *The Southern Kikuyu Before 1903* (1977).

[37] The Coryndon Museum was the forerunner of the National Museums of Kenya that, as the previous chapter pointed out, Louis Leakey's son Richard Leakey directed until 1989.

[38] But see Berman & Lonsdale (1991: 184) who suggest that Leakey walked out of the trial himself after the defendants' leading counsel, called Dennis Pritt, had complained about his impartiality.

[39] A nostalgia among colonial agents for colonized cultures as they 'traditionally' were, which is paradoxical for the colonial encounter itself affected these cultures (Rosaldo 1989: 107). Rosaldo deliberately uses the term nostalgia because it comes with strong emotions of longing and has an innocent touch to it, which effectively draws attention away from the fundamental inequality that set the conditions for the emergence of such emotions in the first place (*Ibid*.:120).

[40] The psychiatrist J.C. Carothers as well as the sensational writings of authors such as Robert Ruark further cemented this official narrative (Clough 2003: 254), as did political scientists who clung to the modernization theory of political evolution (Lonsdale 1992[C]: 270-272).

[41] Already in 1954 the anthropologist Max Gluckman rejected this official narrative. Newspapers habitually reported on the Mau Mau as back-to-the-bush, but Gluckman suggested that the Mau Mau rebellion was the product of a clash between cultures rather than a revitalization of pre-colonial religious and cultural practices (Gluckman 1963).

[42] Soon after NaRC's election victory Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga fell out with one another. It has been suggested that this was largely caused by dissatisfaction on Odinga's side. In the run-up to the elections Odinga had stayed in the background and had publicly endorsed Kibaki's presidential candidateship, on the agreement that afterwards he would have his share in the division of ministerial posts and other influential positions. When Kibaki began to shape his government Odinga felt he was not rewarded sufficiently – tensions worsened further when Kibaki invited some former KANU politicians into cabinet (Lynch 2006[B]: 242).

[43] Coombes & Hughes (2014) have also warned against understanding the alliances of Kenyan politicians only in terms of tribal background.

[44] Scholars working on the recent revival of occultism in various parts of Africa have offered valuable insights into notions of belonging in relation to culture and tradition, and they have drawn attention to how particular modern conditions provide for the blossoming of occult reasoning (see for instance Bähre 2002; Comaroff & Comaroff 1999; Geschiere 1997; Meyer 1999).

[45] Conversation on 5 July 2012.

[46] After Joseph Thomson spotted Mt. Kenya in December 1883 different adventurers followed in his footsteps and attempted to explore the mountain. Among them were Sámuel Teleki, who visited in 1887 (Mackinder 1900: 453); John Walter Gregory, who visited in 1893 (see *The Geographical Journal* of 1893 p. 326-327, author unknown); Captain F.G. Dundas, who visited in 1892 (Gedge 1892); Georg Kolb, who visited some time between 1894 and 1896 (see *The Geographical Journal* of 1899 p. 672, author unknown); Halford John Mackinder, who visited in 1899 (see Barbour 1991); and John W. Arthur, who visited no less than six times between 1909 and 1923 (see Arthur 1923). Of all these men only Mackinder managed to scale Mt. Kenya's highest peak. Yet for more than ninety years little was known about this particular expedition, and Mackinder's logbooks were only published posthumously in the early 1990s (Barbour 1991).

[47] Indians, who had been brought to the protectorate as railroad workers, also tried to obtain land but the colonial administration prohibited this until it opened up the highlands for African and Indian settlement in 1960 (Morgan 1963; Carey Jones 1965).

[48] The Happy Valley lifestyle inspired a number of publications including *White Mischief* (1982) by James Fox, *The Life and Death of Lord Erroll: The Truth Behind the Happy Valley Murder* (2000) by Errol Trzebinksi and Emma Pery, and recently *The Temptress: The Scandalous Life and Death of Alice de Janzé and the Mysterious Death of Lord Erroll* (2010) by Paul Spicer.

[49] Conversations on 28 October 2011, Kisima Farm; 22 November 2011, Kisima Farm; 18 April 2012, Kisima Farm.

[50] Conversations on 16 August 2011, LWF office Nanyuki; 16 September 2011, Nanyuki Town; 23 November 2011, Nanyuki Town; 23 August 2012, TNC & KWS Stakeholder Meeting Nairobi. Anthony King tragically died after a plane crash on Mt. Kenya in February 2013.

[51] This changed in 2013 when a new Wildlife Act was adopted. In the next chapter, I devote more attention to this.

[52] Cambridge Dictionary defines an easement as 'the use of someone else's property or land for a stated reason'.

[53] Conversation on 16 July 2012, Ngare Ndare Forest Platform.

[54] Conversation on 23 July 2012, AWF office Nanyuki.

[55] Such as *I dreamed of Africa* (1991), *African Nights* (1994) and *Night of the Lions* (1999).

[56] Conversations on 25 May 2012, LWF office Nanyuki; 9 July 2012, LWF office Nanyuki.

[57] Conversations on 7 June 2012, Space for Giants office Nanyuki; 26 July 2012, Space for Giants office Nanyuki.

[58] I briefly met Johnson ole Kaunga on 5 October 2011, Nanyuki Town.

[59] The name of Raila Odinga's party was inspired by the constitutional referendum, during which bananas symbolized a yes-vote and oranges a no-vote.

[60] Conversation on 5 June 2012.

[61] This is reminiscent of Wiener's (1992) category of inalienable artefacts, where possession assigns social identity as well as political rank and authority.

[62] These studies were carried out by Rural Focus Ltd., a Nanyuki-based consultancy firm founded by two American engineers. I talked to founder Tom Traexler on 5 October 2011, Rural Focus Ltd. office Nanyuki; 9 November 2011, Rural Focus Ltd. office Nanyuki.

[63] Conversations on 8 October 2011, Solio Ranch; 19 July 2012, Solio Ranch.

[64] White rhinos used to exist in Uganda, Chad, Sudan, Congo and South Africa. Today they are only found in the latter two countries (see The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species).

[65] Conversations on 30 May 2012, LWF office Nanyuki; 6 June 2012, Community Meeting Naro Moru; 10 July 2012, Solio Settlement visit.

[66] Hardin (1968) argued that all public natural resources will deplete sooner or later for individuals will pursue maximum gain, which will result in deterioration. Ecologists and environmentalists continue to use Hardin's work, but his strong focus on the need to limit population growth in order to prevent tragedies of the commons make the article controversial – in fact, one could read it as a manifesto for state control over family planning.

[67] Conversation on 17 July 2012, Borana Ranch.

[68] Short for the Matthews Range, a strip of mountains north of Lewa that covers about 150 kilometres.

[69] Conversation on 27 April 2012, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy.

[70] Afterwards different people told me that these kinds of comments were typical for Ian Craig, and they called him 'arrogant', 'bold' and 'full of himself'.

[71] See Tigress Productions (n.d.).

[72] See The Watering Hole Foundation (n.d.).

[73] See The Nature Conservancy (n.d.[B]).

[74] IUCN introduced the *Red List of Threatened Species* in the mid-1990s, which became the main global guideline on endangered species.

[75] Conversation on 17 July 2012, Borana Ranch.

[76] Flora and Fauna International was the successor of the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire (SPWFE), which was established in 1903. Edward North Buxton, whom I briefly introduced in chapter two, cofounded the SPWFE.

[77] Like Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, Ol Pejeta Conservancy came to feature in different documentaries and television shows. It even got its own three-season series, called *Ol Pejeta Diaries* (see Smithsonian Channel n.d.).

[78] Conversations on 19 October 2011, Naro Moru Gate Mt. Kenya National Park; 21 November 2011, Naro Moru Gate Mt. Kenya National Park; 25 April 2012, Naro Moru Gate Mt. Kenya National Park.

[79] Conversations on 28 November 2011, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy office; 22 May 2012, Nanyuki Airport.

[80] There appeared a critical essay on TNC in the Washington Post in May 2003 that sums up these concerns (The Washington Post, 4 May 2003).

[81] Conversation on 6 August 2012, Ol Pejeta Conservancy office.

[82] For a clip from the documentary see Vimeo (n.d.).

[83] Conversations on 13 August 2012, TNC office Nairobi; 23 August 2012, TNC & KWS Stakeholder Meeting Nairobi.

[84] The meeting took place in the Sarova Panafric Hotel in Nairobi on 23 August 2012, and was attended by approximately one hundred people. Fifteen of these were white representatives of private conservancies or conservation organizations, the remainder largely consisted of representatives of African community ranches and KWS staff.

[85] Conversations on 28 October 2011, Kisima Farm; 22 November 2011, Kisima Farm; 18 April 2012, Kisima Farm.

[86] A biennial event that means to call attention to cultural heritage sites under threat (see World Monuments Fund n.d.).

[87] An organization for museum professionals that is committed to the preservation of cultural goods (see ICON n.d.).

[88] An organization that means to protect cultural heritage in the developing world (see Global Heritage Fund n.d.).

[89] Conversations on 12 November 2011, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy; 19 April 2012, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy; 21 August 2012, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy.

[90] Conversation on 3 July 2012, National Museums of Kenya Nairobi.

[91] Conversation on 18 August 2012, Nanyuki town.

[92] Anthony King might have borrowed that term from Norton-Griffiths, who already used it in 2009 (see Martin 2012: 65).

[93] The UNESCO online archive does not show the applications of World Heritage Sites still in preparation, and as such I had not known about Lewa Wildlife Conservancy's ambitions until Jonathan Moss informed me.

[94] Conversation 29 May 2013, World Heritage Centre Paris.

[95] Which concerns 'the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation' (UNESCO 2015, article 77).

[96] We discussed the subject on 21 November 2011, when Lewa Wildlife Conservancy had just found out that the World Heritage Centre had turned down the first application for extension.

[97] Conversation on 20 June 2012, KWS Headquarters Nairobi.

[98] Conversation on 28 May 2012, NNFT office in Ngare Ndare Forest.

[99] Conversations on 18 October 2011, Kisima Farm; 24 April 2012, Kisima Farm; 5 June 2012, Marania Farm.

[100] Conversation on 10 May 2012, IUCN office Nairobi.

[101] Conversation on 29 May 2013, World Heritage Centre Paris.

[102] The problem of the complex ownership arrangements was solved through the identification of no less than seventeen 'exclusion zones' that were exempted from the designation (see The Government of the Republic of Kenya 2012[A]: 7).

[103] Conversation on 12 July 2012, Naro Moru (Deirdre Prins-Solani, independent heritage consultant and former executive director of the Center for Heritage Development in Africa, was also present).

[104] Conversation on 1 August 2012, Nanyuki Airport.

[105] UNESCO finds its origins in the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation (ICIC) that was founded in 1922 and roughly operated between 1936 and 1946 (Meskell & Brumann 2015: 24). In 1945 the ICIC became part of the United Nations institutional structure and changed into UNESCO. Originally UNESCO aimed to promote literacy and disseminate Western agricultural models (Stoczkowski 2009) – only later did it begin to concern itself with the preservation of heritage sites.

[106] See Visweswaran (1998) for inconsistencies in the anti-racist rhetoric of Franz Boas himself.

Abrams, P. (1988). Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, *1*(1), 58-89.

Abungu, G., & Nyaligu, M. (2008). *Feasibility Report on the Assessment of Lewa Wildlife Conservancy as a Possible Extension to the Mount Kenya World Heritage Property*. Nairobi: Okello Abungu Heritage Consultants.

Adams, J. S., & McShane, T. O. (1996). *The Myth of Wild Africa: Conservation Without Illusion*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Adams, W. M., & Hutton, J. (2007). People, Parks and Poverty: Political Ecology and Biodiversity Conservation. *Conservation and Society*, *5*(2), 147-183.

Africa Confidential (1999). *Leakey's Big Game*, 6 August 1999. Retrieved 6 December 2015 from http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/2100/Leakey%27s_big_game.

African Conservation Foundation (2011). *Historic Breakthrough – First Elephant Passes Through New Mt. Kenya Underpass*, 28 January 2011. Retrieved 4 December 2015 from http://www .africanconservation.org/wildlife-news/historic-breakthrough-first-elephant-passes-through-new-mt-kenya-underpass-2.

African World Heritage Sites (n.d.). *Welcome*. Retrieved 7 December 2014 from http://www.african worldheritagesites.org.

Agrawal, A. (2005). Environmentality: Community, Intimate Government, and the Making of Environmental Subjects in Kumaon, India. *Current Anthropology*, *46*(12), 161-190.

American Association of Zoo Keepers (n.d.[A]). *Lewa Wildlife Conservancy: Bowling for Rhinos*. Retrieved 19 January 2015 from http://bfr.aazk.org/lewa/php.

— (n.d.[B]). *Bowling for Rhinos*. Retrieved 1 December 2015 from https://www.aazk.org/bowling-for-rhinos/.

Anders, G. (2008). The Normativity of Numbers: World Bank and IMF Conditionality. *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, *31*(2), 187-202.

Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Anderson, D. M. (1991). Policing, Prosecution and the Law in Colonial Kenya, c. 1905-39. In D. M. Anderson, & D. Killingray (Eds.), *Policing the Empire: Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940* (pp. 183-200). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

— (2002). Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Order in Kenya. *African Affairs*, *101*(405), 531-555.

— (2005[A]). *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of the Empire*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

— (2005[B]). 'Yours in the Struggle for Majimbo'. Nationalism and the Party Politics of Decolonialization in Kenya, 1955-1964. *Journal of Contemporary History, 40*(3), 547-564.

Anderson, D. M., & Lochery, E. (2008). Violence and Exodus in Kenya's Rift Valley, 2008: Predictable and Preventable?. *Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2*(2), 328-343.

Anthamatten, P., & Hazen, H. (2007). Unnatural Selection: An Analysis of the Ecological

Representativeness of Natural World Heritage Sites. *The Professional Geographer, 59*(2), 256-268.

Apter, A. (2005). *The Pan-African Nation: Oil and the Spectacle of Culture in Nigeria*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Arthur, J. W. (1923). A Sixth Attempt on Mount Kenya. *The Geographical Journal*, *62*(3), 205-209.

Askew, M. (2010). The Magic List of Global Status; UNESCO, World Heritage and the Agendas of States. In S. Labadi, & C. Long (Eds.), *Heritage and Globalisation* (pp. 19-44). New York: Routledge.

Atieno-Odhiambo, E. S. (1991). The Production of History: The Mau Mau Debate. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, *25*(2), 300-307.

Avery, S. (2006). *Fenced Game Corridor Linking the Mount Kenya National Reserve and the Ngare Ndare Forest Reserve: Project Report to Assess Environmental Impact of an Electric Fenced Corridor*. Nairobi: GIBB Africa Ltd.

Bähre, E. (2002). Witchcraft and the Exchange of Sex, Blood, and Money among Africans in Cape Town, South Africa. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, *32*(3), 300-334.

Barbour, K. M. (1991). *H.J. Mackinder. The First Ascent of Mount Kenya*. London: Hurst & Company.

Barth, F. (1975). *Ritual and Knowledge Among the Baktaman of New Guinea*. Yale: Yale University Press.

Basu, P., & Modest, W. (2015). Museums, Heritage and International Development: A Critical Conversation. In P. Basu, & W. Modest (Eds.), *Museums, Heritage and International Development* (pp. 1-31). New York: Routledge.

Beck, U. (1996). World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society? Ecological Questions in a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainties. *Theory, Culture & Society*, *13*(4), 1-32.

Beinart, W. (1989). Introduction: The Politics of Colonial Conservation. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *15*(2), 143-162.

— (2003). *The Rise of Conservation in South Africa: Settlers, Livestock, and the Environment 1770-1950*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bender, B. (2002). Time and Landscape. *Current Anthropology*, *43*(S4), S103-S112.

Bennett, T. (1995). *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics*. London: Routledge.

Berg, L. (1972). *The Salvage of the Abu Simbel Temples*. Retrieved on 16 December 2015 from http://www.icomos.org/monumentum/vol17/vol17_2.pdf.

Berliner, D. (2012). Multiple Nostalgias: The Fabric of Heritage in Luang Prabang (Lao PDR). *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, *18*(4), 769-786.

Berman, B. J. (1991). Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Modernity: The Paradox of Mau Mau. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, *25*(2), 181-206.

— (1996). Ethnography as Politics, Politics as Ethnography: Kenyatta, Malinowski, and the Making of Facing Mount Kenya. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, *30*(3), 313-344.

— (1998). Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism. *African Affairs*, *97*(388), 305-341.

— (2007). Mau Mau and the Politics of Knowledge: The Struggle Continues. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, *41*(3), 529-545.

Berman, B. J., Cottrell, J., & Ghai, Y. (2009). Patrons, Clients, and Constitutions: Ethnic Politics and Political Reform in Kenya. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, *43*(3), 462-506.

Berman, B. J., & Lonsdale, J. (1991). Louis Leakey's Mau Mau: A Study in the Politics of Knowledge. *History and Anthropology*, *5*(2), 143-204.

Berman, B. J., & Lonsdale, J. (1992). *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa, Book One: State & Class*. London: James Currey.

Bianchi, R. (2002). The Contested Landscapes of World Heritage on a Tourist Island: The Case of Garajonay National Park, La Gomera. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, *8*(2), 81-97.

Bill Woodley Mount Kenya Trust, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, Ngare Ndare Forest Trust, Marania Limited, & Kisima Farm Limited (2006). *Memorandum of Understanding between Bill Woodley Mount Kenya Trust, Lewa Wildlife Conservancy, Ngare Ndare Forest Trust, Marania Limited & Kisima Limited*.

Bindé, J. (2000). Towards an Ethics of the Future. *Public Culture*, *12*(1), 51-72.

Birch, T. H. (1998). The Incarceration of Wildness: Wilderness Areas as Prisons. In J. Baird Callicott, & M. P. Nelson (Eds.), *The Great New Wilderness Debate* (pp. 443-470). Athens: The University of Georgia Press.

Boyle, P. G. (Ed.) (2005). *The Eden-Eisenhower Correspondence, 1955-1957*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Branch, D. (2007). The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War against Mau Mau in Kenya. *The Journal of African History*, *48*(2), 291-315.

Branch, D., & Cheeseman, N. (2006). The Politics of Control in Kenya: Understanding the Bureaucratic-Executive State, 1952-78. *Review of African Political Economy*, *33*(107), 11-31.

Brantlinger, P. (1988). *Rule of Darkness: British Literature and Imperialism, 1830-1914*. London: Cornell University Press.

Brattain, M. (2007). Race, Racism and Antiracism: UNESCO and the Politics of Presenting Science to the Postwar Public. *The American Historical Review*, *112*(5), 1386-1413.

Breed, N. (2011). *From Ox Cart to Email: The Kenya Story of Delia Craig*. Brighton: Book Guild Publishing.

Breen, C. (2007). Advocacy, International Development and World Heritage Sites in Sub-Saharan Africa. *World Archaeology*, *39*(3), 355-370.

Brockington, D. (2004). *Fortress Conservation: The Preservation of the Mkomazi Game Reserve, Tanzania*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Brockington, D., & Igoe, J. (2006). Eviction for Conservation: A Global Overview. *Conservation and Society*, *4*(3), 424-470.

Brockington, D., & Scholfield, K. (2010). The Work of Conservation Organisations in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, *48*(1), 1-33.

Brooks, S. (2005). Images of 'Wild Africa': Nature Tourism and the (Re)creation of Hluhluwe Game Reserve, 1930-1945. *Journal of Historical Geography*, *31*(2), 220-240.

Brosius, J. P. (1999). Analyses and Interventions: Anthropological Engagements with Environment. *Current Anthropology*, *40*(3), 277-309.

Brosius, J. P., Tsing, A. L., & Zerner, C. (1998). Representing Communities: Histories and Politics of Community-Based Natural Resource Management. *Society & Natural Resources*, *11*(2), 157-168.

Brown, R. (2008). *Blood Ivory: The Massacre of the African Elephant*. Gloucestershire: The History Press.

Brumann, C. (2014[A]). Heritage Agnosticism: A Third Path for the Study of Cultural Heritage. *Social Anthropology*, *22*(2), 173-188.

— (2014[B]). Shifting Tides of World-Making in the UNESCO World Heritage Convention: Cosmopolitanism Colliding. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *37*(12), 2176-2192.

Burns, W. C. G. (2009). Belt and Suspender? The World Heritage Convention's Role in Confronting Climate Change. *RECIEL*, *18*(2), 148-163.

Büscher, B. (2011). The Neoliberalization of Nature in Africa. In T. Dietz, K. Havnevik, M. Kaag, & T. Ostigard (Eds.), *New Topographies of Power? Africa Negotiating and Emerging Multi-Polar World* (pp. 84-109). Leiden: Brill.

Büscher, B., & Dressler, W. (2007). Linking Neoprotectionism and Environmental Governance: on the Rapid Increasing Tensions between Actors in the Environment-Development Nexus. *Conservation and Society*, *5*(4), 586-611.

Bussmann, R. W. (1996). Destruction and Management of Mount Kenya's Forests. *Ambio*, *25*(5), 314-317.

Butler, B. (2007). 'Taking on a Tradition': African Heritage and the Testimony of Memory. In F. de Jong, & M. Rowlands (Eds.), *Reclaiming Heritage: Alternative Imaginaries of Memory in West Africa* (pp. 31-70). California: Left Coast Press.

Byrne, D. (1991). Western Hegemony in Archaeological Heritage Management. *History and Anthropology*, *5*(2), 269-276.

Byrne, D., & Ween, G. (2015). Bridging Cultural and Natural Heritage. In L. Meskell (Ed.), *Global Heritage: A Reader* (pp. 94-111). Malden: John Wiley & Sons.

Caputo, P. (2002). *Ghosts of Tsavo: Stalking the Mystery Lions of East Africa*. Washington D.C.: National Geographic Society.

Carey Jones, N. S. (1965). The Decolonialization of the White Highlands of Kenya. *The Geographical*

Journal, *131*(2), 186-201.

Carruthers, J. (1989). Creating a National Park. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *15*(2), 188-216.

― (2006). Black Poachers, White Hunters: A History of Hunting in Colonial Kenya by Edward I. Steinhart. *African Studies Review*, *49*(3), 102-104.

Castro, A. P. (1991). The Southern Mount Kenya Forest Since Independence: A Social Analysis of Resource Competition. *World Development*, *19*(12), 1695-1704.

― (1995). *Facing Kirinyaga: A Social History of Forest Commons in Southern Mount Kenya*. Rugby: ITDG Publishing.

Ceuppens, B., & Geschiere, P. (2005). Autochthony: Local or Global? New Modes in the Struggle over Citizenship and Belonging in Africa and Europe. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, *34*, 385-405.

Clark, C. M. (1989). Louis Leakey as Ethnographer: on the Southern Kikuyu Before 1903. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, *23*(3), 380-398.

Clough, M. S. (2003). Mau Mau & the Contest for Memory. In E. S. Atieno-Odhiambo, & J. Lonsdale (Eds.), *Mau Mau & Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration* (pp. 251-267). Oxford: James Currey.

Cohen, D. W., & Atieno-Odhiambo, E. S. (1992). *Burying SM: The Politics and Sociology of Power in Africa*. London: James Currey.

Colony and Protectorate of Kenya (1920). The Colony and Protectorate of Kenya. *The Geographical Journal*, *56*(5), 403-411.

Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, (1944). *The Official Gazette of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya Vol. XLVI, No. 37, 31 October*. Nairobi: Colony and Protectorate of Kenya.

Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J. L. (1991). *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

― (1999). Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African Postcolony. *American Ethnologist*, *26*(2), 279-303.

Convention on Biological Diversity (n.d.). *Forest Biodiversity Case Studies*. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from https://www.cbd.int/programmes/areas/forest/case-studies.aspx.

Cooke, B., & Kothari, U. (2001). *Participation: The New Tyranny?* London: Zed Books.

Coombes, A. E. (2011). Monumental Histories: Commemorating Mau Mau with the Statue of Dedan Kimathi. *African Studies*, *70*(2), 202-223.

Coombes, A. E., & Hughes, L. (2014). Introduction. In A. E. Coombes, L. Hughes, & Karega-Munene (Eds.), *Managing Heritage, Making Peace: History, Identity and Memory in Contemporary Kenya* (pp. 1-15). London: I.B. Tauris.

Cowie, M. (1955). Preserve or Destroy? *Oryx*, *3*(1), 9-11.

Crapanzano, V. (1985). *Waiting: The Whites of South Africa*. London: Granada.

Creighton, O. (2007). Contested Townscapes: The Walled City as World Heritage. *World Archaeology*, *39*(3), 339-354.

Cultural Survival (n.d.). *Samburu Evicted for 'Conservation'*. Retrieved 11 September 2014 from https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/kenya/samburu-evicted-conservation-kenya.

Daily Nation (2010[A]). *Independence in the Air All Over Again as Flag Goes to Mt Kenya After 47 Years*, 24 August 2010. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from http://www.nation.co.ke/Kenya-Referendum/Flag-goes-to-Mt-Kenya-after-47-years-/-/926046/996204/-/ms21j2z/-/index.html.

― (2010[B]). *Son Emulates His Father to Hoist Flag on Mt. Kenya*, 29 August 2010. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Son-emulates-his-father-to-hoist-flag-on-Mt-Kenya--/-/1056/999254/-/view/printVersion/-/cvhwbjz/-/index.html.

― (2011) *Kenya's Newest National Park* 11 September 2011.

Death, C. (2013). Environmental Mainstreaming and Post-Sovereign Governance in Tanzania. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *7*(1), 1-20.

Derrida, J. (2002). *Ethics, Institutions and the Right to Philosophy*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Descola, P. (1996). Constructing Natures: Symbolic Ecology and Social Practice. In P. Descola, & G. Pálsson (Eds.), *Nature and Society* (pp. 82-102). London: Routledge.

Deutscher ReiseVerband (n.d.). *Situation of the Samburu People in Laikipia District*. Retrieved 2 December 2015 from http://assets.survivalinternational.org/documents/699/letter-to-president-kibaki-by-drv-president-bchy.pdf.

Drinkwater, M. (1989). Technical Development and Peasant Impoverishment: Land Use Policy in Zimbabwe's Midlands Province. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *15*(2), 287-305.

Duder, C. J. (1993). 'Men of the Officer Class': The Participants in the 1919 Soldier Settlement Scheme in Kenya. *African Affairs*, *92*(366), 69-87.

Duder, C. J., & Youé, C. P. (1994). Paice's Place: Race and Politics in Nanyuki District, Kenya, in the 1920s. *African Affairs*, *93*(371), 253-278.

Duffy, R. (1999). The Role and Limitations of State Coercion: Anti-Poaching Policies in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *17*(1), 97-121.

— (2000). *Killing for Conservation: Wildlife Policy in Zimbabwe*. Oxford: James Currey.

Dzingirai, V. (2003). 'CAMPFIRE is not for Ndebele Migrants': The Impact of Excluding Outsiders from CAMPFIRE in the Zambezi Valley, Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *29*(2), 445-459.

Elliot, M. A., & Schmutz, V. (2012). World Heritage: Constructing a Universal Cultural Order. *Poetics*, *40*(3), 256-277.

Ellis, S. (1994). Of Elephants and Men: Politics and Nature Conservation in South Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *20*(1), 53-69.

— (2000). Elections in Africa in Historical Context. In J. Abbink, & G. S. C. M. Hesseling (Eds.), *Election Observation and Democratization in Africa* (pp. 37-49). Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Emerton, L. (1998). Mount Kenya: The Economics of Community Conservation. *Community Conservation Research in Africa: Principles and Comparative Practice*, *Paper No. 6*, 1-18.

Eriksen, T. H. (2001). Between Universalism and Relativism: A Critique of the UNESCO Concept of Culture. In J. K. Cowan, M. B. Dembour, & R. A. Wilson (Eds.), *Culture and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives* (pp. 127-148). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Escobar, A. (1999). After Nature: Steps to an Antiessentialist Political Economy. *Current Anthropology*, *40*(1), 1-30.

Fairhead, J., & Leach, M. (1996). *Misreading the African Landscape: Society and Ecology in a Forest-Savanna Mosaic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Feindt, P. H., & Oels, A. (2005). Does Discourse Matter? Discourse Analysis in Environmental Policy Making. *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, *7*(3), 161-173.

Ferguson, J. (1990). *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development", Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ferguson, J., & Gupta, A. (2002). Spatializing States: Towards an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality. *American Ethnologist*, *29*(4), 981-1002.

Financial Times (2013). *African Destinations,* 10 May 2013. Retrieved 30 November 2015 from http:// www.ft.com/cms/s/2/6b606850-b6f9-11e2-a249-00144feabdc0.html.

Foeken, D. W. J., & Dietz, A. J. (2000). Of Ethnicity, Manipulation and Observation: The 1992 and 1997 Elections in Kenya. In J. Abbink, & G. S. C. M. Hesseling (Eds.), *Election Observation and Democratization in Africa* (pp. 122-149). London: Macmillan Press.

Forbes (2011). *The 200 Largest U.S. Charities*. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/14/200-largest-us-charities-11_rank.html.

— (2014). *The $210.000 Safari: Ol Jogi Ranch in Kenya,* 8 September 2014. Retrieved 30 November 2015 from http://www.forbes.com/sites/annabel/2014/08/20/the-210000-safari-ol-jogi-ranch-in-kenya/.

Foucault, M. (1978). Governmentality. In P. Rabinow, & N. Rose (Eds.), *The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984* (pp. 229-245). New York: The New Press.

Frederiksen, B. F. (2008). Jomo Kenyatta, Marie Bonaparte and Bronislaw Malinowski on Clitoridectomy and Female Sexuality. *History Workshop Journal*, *65*(1), 23-48.

Garfield, B. (2007). *The Meinertzhagen Mystery: The Life and Death of a Colossal Fraud*. Washington DC: Potomac Books.

Garland, E. (2008). The Elephant in the Room: Confronting the Colonial Character of Wildlife Conservation in Africa. *African Studies Review*, *51*(3), 51-74.

Gathaara, G. N. (1999). *Aerial Survey of the Destruction of Mt. Kenya, Imenti and Ngare Ndare Forest Reserves*. Nairobi: Kenya Wildlife Service.

Gedge, E. (1892). A Recent Exploration, under Captain F.G. Dundas, R.N., up the River Tana to Mount Kenia. *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Montly Report of Geography*, *14*(8), 513-533.

Gellner, E., & Hirsch, E. (2001). *Inside Organizations: Anthropologists at Work*. Oxford: Berg.

Geschiere, P. (1997). *The Modernity of Witchcraft: Politics and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa*. Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia.

— (2009). *The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gibson, C. (1999). *Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gibson, C., & Marks, S. (1995). Transforming Rural Hunters into Conservationists: An Assessment of Community-Based Wildlife Management Programs in Africa. *World Development*, *23*(6), 941-957.

Global Heritage Fund (n.d.). *Global Heritage Fund Mission*. Retrieved 26 August 2015 from http://globalheritagefund.org/about_us/ghf_mission.

Gluckman, M. (1963). The Magic of Despair. In M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa* (pp. 137-145). London: Cohen & West Ltd.

Goldman, M. (2009). Constructing Connectivity: Conservation Corridors and Conservation Politics in East African Rangelands. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *99*(2), 335-359.

Graham, M. (2012). *A Wildlife Conservation Strategy for Laikipia County, Kenya; 2011-2020*. Nanyuki: Laikipia Wildlife Forum.

Grignon, F., Rutten, M., & Mazrui, A. (2001). Observing and Analyzing the 1997 Elections: an Introduction. In M. Rutten, A. Mazrui, & F. Grignon (Eds.), *Out for the Count: the 1997 General Elections and Prospects for Democracy in Kenya* (pp. 1-27). Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Grijzenhout, F. (2007). Inleiding. In F. Grijzenhout (Ed.), *Erfgoed: de Geschiedenis van een Begrip* (pp. 1-20). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Grove, R. (1989). Scottish Missionaries, Evangelical Discourses and the Origins of Conservation Thinking in Southern Africa 1820-1900. *Journal of African Studies*, *15*(2), 163-187.

Gupta, A. (2012). *Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Gupta, A., & Ferguson, J. (1992). Beyond 'Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference. *Cultural Anthropology*, *7*(1), 6-23.

— (1997). Discipline and Practice: "the Field" as Site, Method and Location in Anthropology. In A. Gupta, & J. Ferguson (Eds.), *Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science* (pp. 1-46). Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gusterson, H. (1997). Studying Up Revisited. *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, *20*(1), 114-119.

Haila, Y. (1997). 'Wilderness' and the Multiple Layers of Environmental Thought. *Environment and History*, *3*(2), 129-147.

— (2000). Beyond the Nature-Culture Dualism. *Biology and Philosophy*, *15*(2), 155-175.

Hajer, M. (1995). *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hall, S. (1986). On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall, edited by L. Grossberg. *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, *10*(2), 45-60.

Hamilton, C. (1998). *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Handler, R. (1985). On Having a Culture: Nationalism and the Preservation of Quebec's Patrimoine. In G. W. Stocking (Ed.), *Objects and Others: Essays on Museums and Material Culture* (pp. 193-217). Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press.

— (2003). Cultural Property and Culture Theory. *Journal of Social Archaeology*, *3*(3), 353-365.

Hannerz, U. (2003). Being There…and There...and There! Reflections on Multi-Sited Ethnography. *Ethnography*, *4*(2), 201-216.

Haraway, D. J. (1991). A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and the Socialist-Feminism in the

Late Twentieth Century. In D. J. Haraway (Ed.), *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (pp. 149-181). London: Free Association Books.

Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science*, *162*(3859), 1243-1248.

Harper, R. (1998). *Inside the IMF: An Ethnography of Documents, Technology and Organizational Action*. New York: Academic.

Harrison, D. (2004). Introduction: Contested Narratives in the Domain of World Heritage. *Current Issues in Tourism*, *7*(4-5), 281-290.

Harvey, D. (2001). Heritage Pasts and Heritage Presents: Temporality, Meaning and the Scope of Heritage Studies. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, *7*(4), 319-338.

Hassan, F. A. (2007). The Aswan High Dam and the International Rescue Nubia Campaign. *African Archaeological Review*, *24*(3), 73-94.

Haynes, J. (1999). Power, Politics and Environmental Movements in the Third World. *Environmental Politics*, *8*(1), 222-242.

Heath, B. (2001). *The Feasibility of Establishing Cow-Calf Camps on Private Ranches as a Drought Mitigation Measure*. Nairobi: StockWatch Ltd.

Herne, B. (1999). *White Hunters: The Golden Age of African Safaris*. New York: Holt Paperbacks.

Herzfeld, M. (1991). *A Place in History: Monumental and Social Time in a Cretan Town*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

— (2015). The Village in the World and the World in the Village: Reflections on Ethnographic Epistemology. *Critique of Anthropology*, *35*(3), 338-343.

Hevia, J. L. (2001). World Heritage, National Culture, and the Restoration of Chengde. *Positions: East Asian Cultures Critique*, *9*(1), 219-243.

Hilhorst, T. (2003). *The Real World of NGOs: Discourses, Diversity, and Development*. London: Zed Books.

Hill, K. A. (1996). Zimbabwe's Wildlife Utilization Programs: Grassroots Democracy or an Extension of State Power? *African Studies Review*, *39*(1), 103-121.

Hitchcock, M. (2004). Afterword. *Current Issues in Tourism*, *7*(4-5), 461-466.

Hobsbawm, E. J. (1983). Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914. In E. J. Hobsbawm, & T. O. Ranger (Eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (pp. 263-307). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hodge, J. M. (2010). British Colonial Expertise: Post-Colonial Careering and the Early History of International Development. *Journal of Modern European History*, *8*(1), 24-46.

Holman, D. (1978). *Elephants at Sundown: The Story of Bill Woodley*. London: W.H. Allen.

Holmes, G. (2011). Conservation's Friends in High Places: Neoliberalism, Networks, and the Transnational Conservation Elite. *Global Environmental Politics*, *11*(4), 1-21.

How To Spend It (n.d.). *Game Changer*. Retrieved 30 November 2015 from http://howtospendit.ft.com /destinations/32863-game-changer.

Hughes, L. (2000). Moving the Maasai. *Azania: Archaeological Research in Africa*, *35*(1), 224-225.

— (2005). Malice in Maasailand: The Historical Roots of Current Political Struggles. *African Affairs*, *104*(415), 207-224.

— (2006). *Moving the Maasai: A Colonial Misadventure*. Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hull, M. S. (2012). Documents and Bureaucracy. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, *41*(1), 251-267.

Huyssen, A. (2000). Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia. *Public Culture*, *12*(1), 12-38.

ICOM (n.d.). *ICOM in brief*. Retrieved 26 August 2015 from http://icom.museum/the-organisation/icom-in-brief/.

IFAW (n.d.). *Model Park Restoration Projects – Kenya's Meru and Tsavo Conservation Areas*. Retrieved 30 September 2014 from http://www.ifaw.org/united-states/our-work/elephants/model-park-restoration-projects-–-kenya's-meru-tsavo-conservation-areas.

Igoe, J. (2004). *Conservation and Globalization: A Study of National Parks and Indigenous Communities from East Africa to South Dakota*. Belmont: Thomson/Wadsworth.

— (2006). Becoming Indigenous Peoples: Difference, Inequality, and the Globalization of East African Identity Politics. *African Affairs*, *105*(420), 399-420.

Ingold, T. (1993). The Temporality of the Landscape. *World Archaeology*, *25*(2), 152-174.

IUCN (n.d.). *Jim Thorsell: From Pioneer to Veteran of IUCN's Work on World Heritage*. Retrieved 4 November 2015 from http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/gpap_home/pas_gpap/gpap perspective/?14287/Jim-Thorsell-from-pioneer-to-veteran-of-IUCNs-work-on-World-Heritage.

— (1997). *World Heritage Nomination - IUCN Technical Evaluation Mount Kenya (Kenya)*. Gland: IUCN.

— (2003). *UNESCO-IUCN Monitoring Mission to Mount Kenya National Park/Natural Forest World Heritage Site, Kenya, 13-17 January 2003*. Gland: IUCN.

— (2005). *Special Expert Meeting of the World Heritage Convention: The Concept of Outstanding Universal Value*. Gland: IUCN

— (2012). *A Future for World Heritage: Challenges and Responses to Assure the Credibility of the World Heritage Convention*. Gland: IUCN.

— (2013). *IUCN Evaluations of Nominations of Natural and Mixed Properties to the World Heritage List*. Gland: IUCN.

Jones, S. (2006). A Political Ecology of Wildlife Conservation in Africa. *Review of African Political Economy*, *33*(109), 483-495.

Joyce, R. (2005). Solid Histories for Fragile Nations: Archaeology as Cultural Patrimony. In L. Meskell, & P. Pels (Eds.), *Embedding Ethics* (pp. 253-273). Oxford: Berg.

Just Conservation (n.d.). *Conservation and the Violation of the Rights of the Samburu*. Retrieved 2 December 2015 from http://www.justconservation.org/conservation-and-the-violation-of-the-rights-of-the-samburu.

Kagwanja, P. M. (2003). Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca? The Mungiki, Ethnic Violence and the Politics of the Moi Succession in Kenya 1987-2002. *African Affairs*, *102*(406), 25-49.

Kantai, P. (2007). In the Grip of the Vampire State: Maasai Land Struggles in Kenyan Politics. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *1*(1), 107-122.

Kanyinga, K. (2009). The Legacy of the White Highlands: Land Rights, Ethnicity and the Post-2007 Election Violence in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *27*(3), 325-344.

Kariuki, J. (2006). Common Heritage, Diverse Interests: Deforestation and Conservation Alternatives for Mount Kenya. *Les Cahiers d'Outre-Mer*, *59*(235), 347-370.

Kenyatta, J. (1938). *Facing Mt. Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu*. New York: Martin Secker & Warburg.

Kenya Wildlife Service (2008). *Annual Report 2008*. Retrieved 6 December 2015 from http://www.kws.go.ke/downloads.

Kersel, M., & Luke, C. (2015). Civil Societies? Heritage Diplomacy and Neo-Imperialism. In L. Meskell (Ed.), *Global Heritage: A Reader* (pp. 70-93). Malden: John Wiley & Sons.

KETRACO Kenya Electricity Transmission Co. Ltd. (n.d.). *Eastern Africa Interconnector (Ethiopia-Kenya)*. Retrieved 16 September 2014 from http://ketraco.co.ke/projects/ongoing/ethiopia-suswa-k.html.

Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, B. (1998). *Destination Culture: Tourism, Museums, and Heritage*. London: University of California Press.

— (2004). Intangible Heritage as Metacultural Production. *Museum International*, *56*(1-2), 52-65.

— (2006). World Heritage and Cultural Economics. In I. Karp, C. Kratz, L. Szwaja, & T. Ybarra-Frausto (Eds.), *Museum Frictions: Public Cultures/Global Transformations* (pp. 161-202). Durham: Duke University Press.

Kleinschroth, F., Schöning, C, James, B., Kowarik, I., & Cierjacks, A. (2013). Regeneration of the East African Timber Tree Ocotea usambarensis in Relation to Historical Logging. *Forest Ecology and Management*, *291*, 396-403.

Klopp, J. M. (2000). Pilfering the Public: The Problem of Land Grabbing in Contemporary Kenya. *Africa Today*, *47*(1), 7-26.

— (2001). "Ethnic Clashes" and Winning the Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, *35*(3), 473-517.

— (2012). Deforestation and Democratization: Patronage, Politics and Forests in Kenya. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *6*(2), 351-370.

Konrad, M. (2002). Pre-Symptomatic Networks: Tracking Experts Across Medical Science and the New Genetics. In C. Shore, & S. Nugent (Eds.), *Elite Cultures: Anthropological Perspectives* (pp. 227-248). London: Routledge.

Kuper, A. (2003). The Return of the Native. *Current Anthropology*, *44*(3), 389-401.

Labadi, S. (2005). A Review of the Global Strategy for a Balanced, Representative and Credible World Heritage List 1994-2004. *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites*, *7*(2), 89-

102.

— (2007). Representations of the Nation and Cultural Diversity in Discourses on World Heritage. *Journal of Social Archaeology*, *7*(2), 147-170.

Latour, B. (1993). *We Have Never Been Modern*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

— (2004). *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Leakey, R., & Morell, V. (2001). *Wildlife Wars: My Fight to Save Africa's Natural Treasures*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

LeighDay (n.d.). *Kenya*. Retrieved 9 October 2014 from http://www.leighday.co.uk/International-and-group-claims/Kenya.

Leo, C. (1978). The Failure of the 'Progressive Farmer' in Kenya's Million-Acre Settlement Scheme. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *16*(4), 619-638.

— (1981). Who Benefited from the Million-Acre Scheme? Towards a Class Analysis of Kenya's Transition to Independence. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, *15*(2), 201-222.

Milele (n.d.[A]). *Campaign Plan*. Retrieved 11 September 2014 from http://web.archive.org/web/20111208205654/http://lewacampaign.org/Campaign_Plan.html.

— (n.d.[B]). *FAQs*. Retrieved 10 September 2014 from http://web.archive.org/web/20111208204901/http://lewacampaign.org/FAQs.html.

— (n.d.[C]). *Growing Conservation*. Retrieved 2 December 2015 from http://web.archive.org/web/20110512185838/http://lewacampaign.org/Growing_Conservation.html.

Lewa Wilderness (n.d.[A]). *Conservation*. Retrieved 1 December 2015 from http://lewawilderness.com/conservation/.

— (n.d.[B]). *The Legacy*. Retrieved 3 August 2014 from http://lewawilderness.com/about-us/legacy/.

Lewa Wildlife Conservancy (n.d.[A]). *A First for Conservation in Kenya: Lewa and Borana Remove Fence to Form the Biggest Rhino Sanctuary in the Country*. Retrieved 17 August 2015 from http://www.lewa.org/nc/stay-connected/news-on-lewa/news-on-lewa/article/a-first-for-conservation-in-kenya-two-private-rhino-sanctuaries-remove-fence-to-form-the-biggest-rh/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=75.

— (n.d.[B]). *All About Lewa.* Retrieved 20 September 2014 from http://web.archive.org/web/20110805112103/http://www.lewa.org/all-about-lewa.

— (n.d.[C]). *Lewa History*. Retrieved 20 September 2014 from http://web.archive.org/web/20110729045532/http://www.lewa.org/all-about-lewa/lewa-history/.

— (n.d.[D]). *Mike Watson Appointed New CEO of the Lewa Wildlife Conservancy*. Retrieved 2 December 2015 from http://www.lewa.org/stay-connected/news-on-lewa/news-on-lewa/article/-f6e2a132d1/.

— (n.d.[E]). *Take a Trip Through the Years*. Retrieved 20 September 2014 from http://www.lewa.org/about-lewa/take-a-trip-through-the-years/.

— (2011). *Annual Report 2011*. Retrieved 6 December 2015 from http://www.lewa.org/fileadmin/user/pdf/AnnualReport_Final_SinglePages.pdf.

— (2012). *Annual Report 2012*. Retrieved 6 December 2015 from http://www.lewa.org/fileadmin/user/pdf/2012LewaAnnualReport_Spread_Final.pdf.

— (2013). *Annual Report 2013*. Retrieved 8 December 2015 from http://www.lewa.org/fileadmin/user/pdf/2013LewaAnnualReport-finalPDF.pdf.

— (2015). *Recognition of Anti-Poaching Excellence*. Retrieved 9 December 2015 from http://lewawildlifeconservancy.cmail19.com/t/ViewEmail/r/44447DA2879EA5892540EF23F30FEDED/F3251E42016DD6F2DCC9454293137CA2.

Li, T. M. (1996). Images of Community: Discourse and Strategy in Property Relations. *Development and Change*, *27*(3), 501-527.

— (2000). Articulating Indigenous Identity in Indonesia: Resource Politics and the Tribal Slot. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, *42*(1), 149-179.

— (2005). Beyond "the State" and Failed Schemes. *American Anthropologist*, *107*(3), 383-394.

— (2007). *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Long, C., & Sweet, J. (2006). Globalization, Nationalism and World Heritage. *South East Asia Research*, *14*(3), 445-469.

Lonsdale, J. (1990). Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya. *Journal of African History*, *31*(3), 393-421.

— (1992[A]). The Conquest State of Kenya 1895-1905. In B. J. Berman, & J. Lonsdale (Eds.), *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa* (pp. 13-44). London: James Currey.

— (1992[B]). The Moral Economy of the Mau Mau: The Problem. In B. J. Berman, & J. Lonsdale (Eds.), *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa* (pp. 265-314). London: James Currey.

— (1992[C]). The Moral Economy of the Mau Mau: Wealth, Poverty & Civic Virtue in Kikuyu Political Thought. In B. J. Berman, & J. Lonsdale (Eds.), *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya & Africa* (pp. 315-504). London: James Currey.

— (2003). Authority, Gender & Violence: The War Within Mau Mau's Fight for Land & Freedom. In E. S. Atieno-Odhiambo, & J. Lonsdale (Eds.), *Mau Mau & Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration* (pp. 46-75). Oxford: James Currey.

— (2008). Soil, Work, Civilisation, and Citizenship in Kenya. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *2*(2), 305-314.

Lowenthal, D. (1998). *The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History*. London: Viking.

— (2005). Natural and Cultural Heritage. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, *11*(1), 81-92.

Lutz, C. (2005). Military Bases and Ethnographies of the New Militarization. *Anthropology News*, *46*(1), 11.

Lynch, G. (2006[A]). Negotiating Ethnicity: Identity Politics in Contemporary Kenya. *Review of African Political Economy*, *33*(107), 49-65.

— (2006[B]). The Fruits of Perception: 'Ethnic Politics' and the Case of Kenya's Constitutional Referendum. *African Studies*, *65*(2), 233-270.

MacFarlane, A. (1998). The Mystery of Property: Inheritance and Industrialization in England and Japan. In C. M. Hann (Ed.), *Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition* (pp. 104-123). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MacKenzie, J. M. (1988). *The Empire of Nature: Hunting, Conservation and the British Empire*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Mackinder, H. J. (1900). A Journey to the Summit of Mount Kenya, British East Africa. *The Geographical Journal*, *15*(5), 453-476.

MacPherson, C. B. (1978). The Meaning of Property. In C. B. MacPherson (Ed.), *Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions* (pp. 1-13). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Mail & Guardian (2003). *Kenyan Game Warden Continues Family Tradition*, 11 June 2003. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from http://mg.co.za/article/2003-06-11-kenyan-game-warden-continues-family-tradition.

Mandler, P. (1997). *The Fall and Rise of the Stately Home*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Marcus, G. E. (1995). Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, *24*(1), 95-117.

— (1999). What is at Stake – and is not – in the Idea and Practice of Multi-Sited Ethnography. *Canberra Anthropology*, *22*(2), 6-14.

Marks, S. A. (2001). Back to the Future: Some Unintended Consequences of Zambia's Community-Based Wildlife Program (ADMADE). *Africa Today*, *48*(1), 121-141.

Martin, G. (2012). *Game Changer: Animal Rights and the Fate of Africa's Wildlife*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Maswood, S. J. (2000). Kakadu and the Politics of World Heritage Listing. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, *54*(3), 357-372.

Matheka, R. M. (2008). The International Dimension of the Politics of Wildlife Conservation in Kenya, 1958-1968. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *2*(1), 112-133.

McDermott Hughes, D. (2005). Third Nature: Making Space and Time in the Great Limpopo Conservation Area. *Cultural Anthropology*, *20*(2), 157-184.

McIntosh, J. (2006). 'Going Bush': Black Magic, White Ambivalence and Boundaries of Belief in Postcolonial Kenya. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, *36*(3-4), 254-295.

— (2009). Elders and 'Frauds': Commodified Expertise and Politicized Authenticity among Mijikenda. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, *79*(1), 35-52.

— (2015). Autochthony and "Family": The Politics of Kinship in White Kenyan Bids to Belong. *Anthropological Quarterly*, *88*(2), 251-280.

Mehta, L. (2001). The Manufacture of Popular Perceptions of Scarcity: Dams and Water-Related Narratives in Gujarat, India. *World Development*, *29*(12), 2025-2041.

Meinertzhagen, R. (1983). *Kenya Diary (1902-1906)*. London: Eland Books.

Meredith, M. (2011). *Born in Africa: The Quest for the Origins of Human Life*. New York: PublicAffairs.

Merz, A. (1991). *Rhino: at the Brink of Extinction*. London: HarperCollins.

Meskell, L. (2002). Negative Heritage and Past Mastering in Archaeology. *Anthropological Quarterly*, *75*(3), 557-574.

— (2012[A]). *The Nature of Heritage: The New South Africa*. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

— (2012[B]). The Rush to Inscribe: Reflections on the 35th Session of the World Heritage Committee, UNESCO Paris, 2011. *Journal of Field Archaeology*, *37*(2), 145-151.

— (2013). UNESCO's World Heritage Convention at 40. *Current Anthropology*, *54*(4), 483-494.

Meskell, L., & Brumann, C. (2015). UNESCO and New World Orders. In L. Meskell (Ed.), *Global Heritage: A Reader* (pp. 22-42). Malden: John Wiley & Sons.

Meyer, B. (1999). *Translating the Devil: Religion and Modernity Among the Ewe in Ghana*. London: Edinburgh University Press.

— (2010). 'Tradition and Colour at its Best': 'Tradition' and 'Heritage' in Ghanaian Video-Movies. *Journal of African Cultural Studies*, *22*(1), 7-23.

Meyer, B., & de Witte, M. (2013). Heritage and the Sacred: Introduction. *Material Religion*, *9*(3), 274-281.

Mitchell, T. (1991). The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics. *American Political Science Review*, *85*(1), 77-96.

— (2002). *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mogaka, H., Simons, G., Turpie, J., Emerton, L., & Karanja, F. (2001). *Economic Aspects of Community Involvement in Sustainable Forest Management in Eastern and Southern Africa*. Gland: IUCN.

Morgan, W. T. W. (1963). The 'White Highlands' of Kenya. *The Geographical Journal*, *129*(2), 140-155.

Mosse, D. (2005). *Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice*. London: Pluto Press.

— (2006). Anti-Social Anthropology? Objectivity, Objection, and the Ethnography of Public Policy and Professional Communities. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, *12*(4), 935-956.

Mount Kenya Wildlife Estate at Ol Pejeta (n.d.). *About.* Retrieved 16 August 2015 from http://mountkenyawe.com/sample-page/.

Mühlhäusler, P., & Peace, A. (2006). Environmental Discourses. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, *35*, 457-479.

Müller, B. (2013). Lifting the Veil of Harmony: Anthropologists Approach International Organisations. In B. Müller (Ed.), *The Gloss of Harmony: The Politics of Policy Making in Multilateral Organisations* (pp. 1-20). London: Pluto Press.

Murunga, G. R., & Nasong'o, S. W. (2006). Bent on Self-Destruction: The Kibaki Regime in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *24*(1), 1-28.

Nader, L. (1972). Up the Anthropologist: Perspectives Gained From Studying Up. In D. Hymes (Ed.), *Reinventing Anthropology* (pp. 284-311). New York: Pantheon Books.

Nash, R. (1967). *Wilderness and the American Mind*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Neumann, R. P. (1996). Duke, Earls, and Ersatz Edens: Aristocratic Nature Preservationists in Colonial Africa. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, *14*(1), 79-98.

— (1998). *Imposing Wilderness: Struggles over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

— (2004). Moral and Discursive Geographies in the War for Biodiversity in Africa. *Political Geography*, *23*(7), 813-837.

— (2013). Churchill and Roosevelt in Africa: Performing and Writing Landscapes of Race, Empire, Nation. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *103*(6), 1371-1388.

Ngare Ndare Forest Trust (n.d.). *About Us.* Retrieved 1 December 2015 from http://website.ngarendare.org/aboutus.html.

Ng'weno, H. (1964). A Letter from Kenya: Uhuru Diary. *Transition*, *No. 12*, 36-38.

Nishizaki, N. (2004). Resisting Imposed Wildlife Conservation: Arssi Oromo and the Senkelle Swayne's Hartebeest Sanctuary, Ethiopia. *African Studies Monographs*, *25*(2), 61-77.

Northern Rangelands Trust (n.d.). *Home*. Retrieved 1 December 2015 from http://www.nrt-kenya.org.

— (2013). *The Story of the Northern Rangelands Trust*. Retrieved 7 December 2015 from http://www.nrt-kenya.org/NRTBooklet_Final_SinglePages.pdf.

Norton-Griffiths, M. (n.d.). *Some Wildlife Conservation Concerns*. Retrieved 3 October 2014 from http://www.mng5.com/concerns.htm.

— (1978). *Counting Animals*. Nairobi: African Wildlife Leadership Foundation.

— (2004). *Technical Evaluation of the Aerial Surveys of Illegal Impacts and Threats to the Forests of Mount Kenya, the Aberdares and Mount Kilimanjaro carried out by the Kenya Wildlife Service and UNEP/DEWA 1999-2003*. Langata: UNEP.

— (2007). Whose Wildlife is it Anyway? *New Scientist*, *193*(2596), 24.

— (2010). The Growing Involvement of Foreign NGOs in Setting Policy Agendas and Political Decision-Making in Africa. *Economic Affairs*, *30*(3), 29-34.

Nyaligu, M., & Weeks, S. (2013). An Elephant Corridor in a Fragmented Conservation Landscape: Preventing the Isolation of Mount Kenya National Park and National Reserve. *Parks*, *19*(1), 91-102.

Nyamweru, C. (2012). Natural Cultural Sites of Kenya: Changing Contexts, Changing Meanings. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *6*(2), 270-302.

Ochieng', W. R., & Maxon, R. M. (1992). *An Economic History of Kenya*. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers Ltd.

Ofcansky, T. P. (1984). Kenya Forestry under British Colonial Administration, 1895-1963. *Journal of Forest History*, *28*(3), 136-143.

Ole Kaunga, J. (2001). The Impact of Local and Foreign Military Training Exercises on the Indigenous Peoples of Northern Kenya. *Indigenous Affairs*, *2*(1), 54-59.

Ol Pejeta Conservancy (n.d.). *Ol Pejeta Communities*. Retrieved 25 November 2015 from http://www.olpejetaconservancy.org/community/ol-pejeta-communities/.

Onneweer, M. (2009). New Nature: On the Production of a Paradox. In J. G. Carrier, & P. West (Eds.), *Virtualism, Governance and Practice: Vision and Execution in Environmental Conservation* (pp. 45-65). New York: Berghahn Books.

Onoma, A. K. (2010). The Contradictory Potential of Institutions: The Rise and Decline of Land Documentation in Kenya. In J. Mahoney, & K. Thelen (Eds.), *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power* (pp. 63-93). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Paris, M. (2003). Africa in Post-1945 British Cinema. *South African Historical Journal*, *48*(1), 61-70.

Parsons, T. H. (2012). Being Kikuyu in Meru: Challenging the Tribal Geography of Colonial Kenya. *The Journal of African History*, *53*(1), 65-86.

Pearce, F. (2012). *The Land Grabbers: The New Fight Over Who Owns the Earth*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Pels, P. (1996). The Pidginization of Luguru Politics: Administrative Ethnography and the Paradoxes of Indirect Rule. *American Ethnologist*, *23*(4), 738-761.

— (1999). Professions of Duplexity: A Prehistory of Ethical Codes in Anthropology. *Current Anthropology*, *40*(20), 101-136.

— (2011). Global 'Experts' and 'African' Minds: Tanganyika Anthropology as Public and Secret Service, 1925-61. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, *17*(4), 788-810.

Peluso, N. L. (1993). Coercing Conservation? The Politics of State Resource Control. *Global Environmental Change*, *3*(2), 199-217.

Poole, J. H., & Leakey, R. (1996). Kenya. In E. Lutz, & J. O. Caldecott (Eds.), *Decentralization and Biodiversity Conservation – A World Bank Symposium* (pp. 55-64). Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

Poria, Y., Reichel, A., & Cohen, R. (2011). World Heritage Site – is it an Effective Brand Name? A Case Study of a Religious Heritage Site. *Journal of Travel Research*, *50*(5), 482-495.

Prendergast, D. K., & Adams, W. M. (2003). Colonial Wildlife Conservation and the Origins of the Society for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire (1903-1914). *Oryx*, *37*(2), 251-260.

Probst, P. (2011). *Osogbo and the Art of Heritage: Monuments, Deities and Money*. Bloomington:

Indiana University Press.

— (2012). Iconoclash in the Age of Heritage. *African Arts*, *45*(3), 10-13.

Rabinow, P. (1996). *Making PCR: A Story of Biotechnology*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago.

Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. (1940). Preface. In M. Fortes, & E. E. Evans-Pritchard (Eds.), *African Political Systems* (pp. xi-xxiii). London: Oxford University Press.

Rajak, D. (2011). *In Good Company: An Anatomy of Corporate Social Responsibility*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Rajan, R. (1997). Imperial Environmentalism or Environmental Imperialism? European Forestry, Colonial Foresters and the Agendas of Forest Management in British India 1800-1900. In R. Grove, V. Damodaran, & S. Sangwan (Eds.), *Nature and the Orient: The Environmental History of South and Southeast Asia* (pp. 324-372). Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Ranger, T. O. (1989). Whose Heritage? The Case of the Matobo National Park. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *15*(2), 217-249.

— (1998). Europeans in Black Africa. *Journal of World History*, *9*(2), 255-268.

Rees, T. D. (2002). *Daktari: A Surgeon's Adventures with the Flying Doctors of East Africa*. Sante Fe: Sunstone Press.

Rico, T. (2008). Negative Heritage: The Place of Conflict in World Heritage. *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites*, *10*(4), 344-352.

Ridgeway, R. (1999). *The Shadow of Kilimanjaro: on Foot Across East Africa*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Ronayne, M. (2001). The Political Economy of Landscape: Conflict and Value in a Prehistoric Landscape in the Republic of Ireland – Ways of Telling. In B. Bender, & M. Winer (Eds.), *Contested Landscapes: Movement, Exile and Place* (pp. 149-164). Oxford: Berg.

Rosaldo, R. (1989). Imperialist Nostalgia. *Representations*, *26*(special issue), 107-122.

Rowlands, M. & Butler, B. (2007). Conflict and Heritage Care. *Anthropology Today*, *23*(1), 1-2.

Rowlands, M., & Jong, F. de (2007). Reconsidering Heritage and Memory. In F. de Jong, & M. Rowlands (Eds.), *Reclaiming Heritage: Alternative Imaginaries of Memory in West Africa* (pp. 13-29). California: Left Coast Press.

Ryan, J., & Silvanto, S. (2009). The World Heritage List: The Making and Management of a Brand. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, *5*(4), 290-300.

Sabar-Friedman, G. (1995). The Mau Mau Myth: Kenyan Political Discourse in Search of Democracy. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, *35*(137), 101-131.

Safaricom Marathon (n.d.). *Home*. Retrieved 8 December 2015 from https://www.safaricommarathon.com.

Salverda, T., & Abbink, J. (2013). Introduction: An Anthropological Perspective on Elite Power and the Cultural Politics of Elites. In J. Abbink, & T. Salverda (Eds.), *The Anthropology of Elites: Power, Culture, and the Complexities of Distinction* (pp. 1-28). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Save the Rhino (n.d.). *Creation of Kenya's Largest Rhino Sanctuary*. Retrieved 1 December 2015 from https://www.savetherhino.org/latest_news/news/1091_creation_of_kenyas_largest_rhino_sanctuary.

Sax, J. L. (1990). Heritage Preservation as a Public Duty: The Abbé Grégoire and the Origins of an Idea. *Michigan Law Review*, *88*(5), 1142-1169.

Schama, S. (1995). *Landscape and Memory*. New York: A.A. Knopf.

Scholze, M. (2008). Arrested Heritage: The Politics of Inscription into the UNESCO World Heritage List: The Case of Agadez in Niger. *Journal of Material Culture*, *13*(2), 215-231.

Schrijvers, J. (1991). Dialectics of a Dialogical Ideal. Studying Down, Studying Sideways and Studying Up. In L. Nencel, & P. Pels (Eds.), *Constructing Knowledge: Authority and Critique in Social Science* (pp. 162-179). London: Sage Publications.

Scott, J. (2002). World Heritage as a Model for Citizenship: The Case of Cyprus. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, *8*(2), 99-115.

Shadle, B. (2010). White Settlers and the Law in Early Colonial Kenya. *Journal of East African Studies*, *4*(3), 510-524.

Sharma, A., & Gupta, A. (2006). Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in the Age of Globalization. In A. Sharma, & A. Gupta (Eds.), *The Anthropology of the State* (pp. 1-41). Oxford: Blackwell.

Shaw, C. M. (1995). *Colonial Inscriptions: Race, Sex, and Class in Kenya*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Shiva, V. (1992). Resources. In W. Sachs (Ed.), *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (pp. 228-242). London: Zed Books.

Shore, C. (2002). Towards an Anthropology of Elites. In C. Shore, & S. Nugent (Eds.), *Elite Cultures. Anthropological Perspectives* (pp. 1-21). London: Routledge.

Shore, C., & Wright, S. (1997). Policy: A New Field of Anthropology. In C. Shore, & S. Wright (Eds.), *Anthropology of Policy: Critical Perspectives on Governance and Power* (pp. 3-39). London & New York: Routledge.

Silverman, H. (2011). Border Wars: The Ongoing Temple Dispute Between Thailand and Cambodia and UNESCO's World Heritage List. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, *17*(1), 1-21.

Smith, L. J. (2006). *Uses of Heritage*. Routledge: London.

Smithsonian Channel (n.d.). *Ol Pejeta Diaries*. Retrieved 4 December 2015 from http://www.smithsonian channel.ca/shows/ol-pejeta-diaries/.

Snijders, D. (2014). Wildlife Policy Matters: Inclusion and Exclusion by Means of Organisational and Discursive Boundaries. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *32*(2), 173-189.

Soper, K. (1995). *What is Nature? Culture, Politics and the Non-Human*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Space for Giants (n.d.). *Securing Space: The Loisaba Wilderness*. Retrieved 17 September 2014 from http://spaceforgiants.org/?q=blog/2014/04/29/securing-space-the-loisaba-wilderness.

Spear, T. (2003). Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa. *Journal of African History*, *44*(1), 3-27.

Spierenburg, M., & Wels, H. (2010). Conservative Philanthropists: Royalty and Business Elites in Nature Conservation in Southern Africa. *Antipode*, *42*(3), 647-670.

Standard Media (2010). *Group Plans to Hoist Flag on Top of Mt. Kenya*, 24 August 2010. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000016649/group-plans-to-hoist-flag-on-top-of-mt-kenya.

Standing, A., & Gachanja, M. (2014). *The Political Economy of REDD+ in Kenya*. Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.

Steinhart, E. I. (1989). Hunters, Poachers and Gamekeepers: Towards a Social History of Hunting in Colonial Kenya. *Journal of African History*, *30*(2), 247-264.

— (1994). National Parks and Anti-Poaching in Kenya, 1947-1957. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, *27*(1), 59-76.

— (2006). *Black Poachers, White Hunters: A Social History of Hunting in Colonial Kenya*. Oxford: James Currey.

Stoczkowski, W. (2009). UNESCO's Doctrine of Human Diversity: A Secular Soteriology? *Anthropology Today*, *25*(3), 7-11.

Stolcke, V. (1999). New Rhetorics of Exclusion in Europe. *Institutional Social Science Journal*, *51*(1), 25-35.

Strathern, M. (1980). No Nature, No Culture: The Hagen Case. In C. P. MacCormack, & M. Strathern (Eds.), *Nature, Culture and Gender* (pp. 174-222). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Strickland, B. (2001). My Grandfather's Gun was Called 'Field of Children': Ecological History as Indictment of State Development Policy. *Africa Today*, *48*(1), 111-119.

Strother, Z. S. (2012). Iconoclash: From 'Tradition' to 'Heritage' in Global Africa. *African Arts*, *45*(3), 1-6.

Sundaresan, S. R., & Riginos, C. (2010). Lessons Learned from Biodiversity Conservation in the Private Lands of Laikipia, Kenya. *Great Plains Research: A Journal of Natural and Social Sciences*, *20*, 17-27.

Survival International (n.d.). *Violence Engulfs Kenyan Tribe Just Miles Away From Royal Hideaway*. Retrieved 11 September 2014 from http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/7946.

Taussig, M. (1993). Maleficium: State Fetishism. In E. Apter, & W. Pietz (Eds.), *Fetishism as Cultural Discourse* (pp. 217-250). London: Cornell University Press.

Teklehaimanot, Z., Mwang'ingo, P. I., Mugasha, A. G., & Ruffo, C. K. (2004). Influence of the Origin of Stem Cutting, Season of Collection and Auxin Application on the Vegetative Propagation of African Sandal Wood (Osyris lanceolata) in Tanzania. *The Southern African Forestry Journal*, *201*(1), 13-24.

Teppo, A. (2009). My House is Protected by a Dragon: White South Africans, Magic and Sacred Spaces in Post-Apartheid Cape Town. *Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society*, *34*(1), 19-41.

Ter Keurs, P. (2011). Materiële Cultuur en Vergankelijkheid. *Oratie*, Leiden University.

The David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust (n.d.). *The Early History of Kenya's National Parks by Dame Daphne Sheldrick*. Retrieved 6 December 2015 from http://www.dswtwildernessjournal.com/the-early-history-of-kenyas-national-parks-by-dame-daphne-sheldrick/.

— (1998). *Newsletter for 1998*. Retrieved 6 December from https://www.sheldrickwildlifetrust.org/Newsletters/1998.html.

The Government of the Republic of Kenya (1996). *Nomination Mt. Kenya for World Heritage List.* The Government of the Republic of Kenya.

— (1999). *Environmental and Management Coordination Act.* The Government of the Republic of Kenya.

— (2000). *Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 48, Legislative Supplement No. 32*. The Government of the Republic of Kenya.

— (2010[A]). *Mt. Kenya-Lewa World Heritage Site – A Proposal for Extension of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site to Include Lewa Wildlife Conservancy*. The Government of the Republic of Kenya.

— (2010[B]). *The Constitution of Kenya*. The Government of the Republic of Kenya.

— (2012[A]). *Mt. Kenya-Lewa World Heritage Site – A Proposal for Extension of Mt. Kenya World Heritage Site to Include Lewa Wildlife Conservancy*. The Government of the Republic of Kenya.

— (2012[B]). *The Land Act*. The Government of the Republic of Kenya.

— (2013). *The Wildlife Conservation and Management Act*. The Government of the Republic of Kenya.

The Guardian (2011). *Kenya's Samburu People Violently Evicted After US Charities Buy Land*, 14 December 2011. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/14/kenya-samburu-people-evicted-land.

The Huffington Post (2011). *Elephant Underpass Created in Mt. Kenya Succeeds*, 30 January 2011. Retrieved 4 December 2011 from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/30/elephant-underpass-in-mt-n815322.html.

The Nature Conservancy (n.d.[A]). *Africa Our Partners*. Retrieved 2 December 2015 from http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/africa/partners/.

— (n.d.[B]). *Finally, A Nature Documentary That Shows The Whole Picture.* Retrieved 4 December from http://blog.nature.org/conservancy/2015/02/03/finally-a-nature-documentary-that-shows-the-whole-picture/.

— (n.d.[C]). *Our Partners in Conservation.* Retrieved 11 September 2014 from http://www.nature.org/about-us/our-partners/index.htm?intc=nature.tnav.about.list.

The New York Times (2004). *Tribe, Claiming Whites' Land, Confronts Kenya's Government*, 25 August 2004. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/25/world/tribe-claiming-whites-land-confronts-kenya-s-government.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.

— (2013). *Anna Merz, Rhino Guardian and Champion, Dies at 81*, 21 April 2013. Retrieved 1 December 2015 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/world/africa/anna-merz-protector-of-black-rhinos-dies-at-81.html?_r=0.

The Star (2012[A]). *Kiunjuri Strengthens Case Against Ranchers*, 22 February 2012. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from http://allafrica.com/stories/201202230538.html.

— (2012[B]). *Elephant Raid Victim Buried in Laikipia*, 2 January 2012. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from http://allafrica.com/stories/201201030894.html.

The Telegraph (2004). *Maasai Invaders Target Last White Farmers*, 13 September 2014. Retrieved 1 December 2015 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/1471645/Masai-invaders-target-last-white-farmers.html.

— (2013) *Anna Merz* 27 May 2013, retrieved 1 December 2015 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/10082966/Anna-Merz.html.

The Washington Post (2003). *Non-profit Land Bank Amasses Billions*, 4 May 2003. Retrieved 11 September 2014 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/26/AR2007062600803.html.

The Watering Hole Foundation (n.d.). *Video Archive*. Retrieved 4 December 2015 from http://www.wateringholefoundation.org/#!video-archive/c1d98.

Thomson, J. (1968). *Through Masai Land: A Journey of Exploration Among the Snowclad Volcanic Mountains and Strange Tribes of Eastern Equatorial Africa*. London: Cass.

Throup, D., & Hornsby, C. (1998). *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Elections*. Oxford: James Currey.

Tigress Productions (n.d.). *Game Ranger Diaries*. Retrieved 4 December 2015 from https://www.tigress productions.co.uk/productions/game-ranger-diaries/.

Trouillot, M. R. (2001). The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalization: Close Encounters of the Deceptive Kind. *Current Anthropology*, *42*(1), 125-138.

Tsing, A. L. (2005). *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*. Princeton University Press: Princeton.

UNESCO (n.d.[A]). *37th Session of the Committee*. Retrieved 21 October 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/ en/sessions/37COM/records/.

— (n.d.[B]). *Arabian Oryx Sanctuary*. Retrieved 21 January 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/654.

— (1972). *Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage*. Paris: UNESCO.

— (1994[A]). *Expert Meeting on the "Global Strategy" and Thematic Studies for a Representative World Heritage List*. Retrieved 17 December 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/archive/global94.htm.

— (1994[B]). *Nara Document on Authenticity*. Retrieved 17 December 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/archive/nara94.htm.

— (1996). *Map Mount Kenya Ecosystem*. Retrieved 10 December 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/800/multiple=1&unique_number=1902.

— (1997). *Decision Document WHC-97/CONF.208/17*. Retrieved 7 December 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/en/sessions/21COM/documents/.

— (2001). *Decision Document WHC-2001/CONF.205/10*. Retrieved 7 December 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/5864.

— (2008[A]). *Decision Document WHC-08/32.COM/24Rev*. Retrieved 7 December 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/4265.

— (2008[B]). *World Heritage Information Kit*. Retrieved 17 December 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/567/.

— (2011). *Decision Document WHC-11/35.COM/7B*. Retrieved 7 December 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/4410.

— (2012). *Decision Document WHC-12/36.COM/19*. Retrieved 7 December 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/en/sessions/36COM/documents/.

— (2013). *Decision Document WHC-13/37.COM/20*. Retrieved 7 December 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/5125.

— (2015). *Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention*. Retrieved 17 December 2015 from http://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines/.

Unknown (1893). Mr. Gregory's Expedition to Mount Kenya. *The Geographical Journal*, *2*(4), 326-327.

— (1899). The Monthly Record. *The Geographical Journal*, *14*(6), 658-672.

Uusihakala, K. (1999). From Impulsive Adventure to Postcolonial Commitment: Making White Identity in Contemporary Kenya. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, *2*(1), 27-45.

Van den Berg, P. (2007). Erfgoed: de Juridische Herkomst van een Metafoor. In F. Grijzenhout (Ed.), *Erfgoed: de Geschiedenis van een Begrip* (pp. 21-43). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Van der Ploeg, J. (2013). *Swallowed By a Cayman: Integrating Cultural Values in Philippine Crocodile Conservation*. PhD Dissertation: Leiden University.

Van der Waal, C. S., & Robins, S. (2011). 'De la Rey' and the Revival of 'Boer Heritage': Nostalgia in the Post-Apartheid Afrikaner Culture Industry. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, *37*(4), 763-779.

Vandergeest, P., & Peluso, N. L. (2006). Empires of Forestry: Professional Forestry and State Power in Southeast Asia, Part I. *Environment and History*, *12*(1), 31-64.

VanLeeuwe, H. (2004). *Managing the Mount Kenya Environment for People and Elephants*. PhD Dissertation: University of Kent.

VanLeeuwe, H., Woodley, B., Lambrechts, C., & Gachanja, M. (2003). *Changes in the State of Conservation of Mt. Kenya Forests: 1999-2002*. Nairobi: DICE University of Kent, Kenya Wildlife Service, UNEP, Kenya Forest Working Group.

Vimeo (n.d.). *Clip from 'Conservation's Dirty Secrets' – Channel 4*. Retrieved 3 December 2015 from https://vimeo.com/33539626.

Visweswaran, K. (1998). Race and the Culture of Anthropology. *American Anthropologist*, *100*(1), 70-83.

Walker, A., & Leakey, R. (1993). *The Nariokotome Homo Erectus Skeleton*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Waller, R. (1976). The Maasai and the British 1895-1905: The Origins of an Alliance. *Journal of African History*, *17*(4), 529-553.

— (2001). Marshall S. Clough, Mau Mau Memoirs: History, Memory and Politics. *Africa*, *71*(3), 514-516.

— (2010). Towards a Contextualization of Policing in Colonial Kenya. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *4*(3), 525-541.

Wamue, G. N. (2001). Revisiting Our Indigenous Shrines Through Mungiki. *African Affairs*, *100*(400), 453-467.

Wedel, J. R., Shore, C., Feldman, G., & Lathrop, S. (2005). Toward an Anthropology of Public Policy. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *600*, 30-51.

Weiss, L. (2007). Heritage-Making and Political Identity. *Journal of Social Archaeology*, *7*(413), 413-431.

West, P., Igoe, J., & Brockington, D. (2006). Parks and Peoples: The Social Impact of Protected Areas. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, *35*(1), 251-277.

Western, D., & Pearl, M. C. (1989). *Conservation for the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wiener, A. B. (1992). *Inalienable Possessions: The Paradox of Keeping-While-Giving*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Willems, W. J. H., & Comer, D. (2011). Africa, Archaeology, and World Heritage. *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites*, *13*(2-3), 160-173.

Williams, R. (1973). *The Country and the City*. New York: Oxford University Press.

— (1980). Ideas of Nature. In R. Williams (Ed.), *Problems in Materialism and Culture* (pp. 67-85). London: Verso.

Wolmer, W. (2007). *From Wilderness Vision to Farm Invasions*. Oxford: James Currey.

World Monuments Fund (n.d.). *The Watch*. Retrieved on 26 August 2015 from http://www.wmf.org/watch/about-watch.

WWF (n.d.). *Eastern Africa: Southern Sudan, Central Kenya, Int*. Retrieved 3 December from http://www.worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/at0108.

YouTube (2014). *Lewa Borana Rhino Translocation Final Render*. Retrieved 2 October 2014 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3oW_OhHDa4w.

Zia, A., Hirsch, P., Songorwa, A., Mutekanga, D. R., O'Connor, S., Mcshane, T., Brosius, P., & Norton, B. (2011). Cross-Scale Value Trade-Offs in Managing Social-Ecological Systems: The Politics of Scale in Ruaha National Park, Tanzania. *Ecology and Society*, *16*(4), 7.

Natuurmonument? Een Etnografie over Mt. Kenya Werelderfgoed

Dit proefschrift bespreekt Mt. Kenya's benoeming tot Werelderfgoed in 1997 en latere wijzigingen in de geografische grenzen van die benoeming. Het werk zoomt in op de initiatiefnemers achter beide aangelegenheden en analyseert onder meer met welke ambities en verwachtingen betrokken partijen lobbyden voor Werelderfgoed status, hoe deze partijen zich positioneerden in relatie tot bredere maatschappelijke debatten, en hoe de politieke omstandigheden van zowel de late jaren '90 als die van het eerste decennium van deze eeuw van invloed zijn geweest op hoe Mt. Kenya Werelderfgoed er vandaag uitziet.

Hoofdstuk één van dit proefschrift legt de basis voor twee thema's die in dit werk herhaaldelijk maar in verschillende gedaantes aan bod komen. Het eerste thema is de manier waarop de bureaucratische en, in het geval van natuurlijk erfgoed, de natuurwetenschappelijke retoriek die kenmerkend is voor de Werelderfgoed Conventie Werelderfgoed presenteert als een louter technische en zuiver professionele aangelegenheid. Deze retoriek suggereert dat Werelderfgoed een non-politieke kwestie is. Op die manier verhult het bijvoorbeeld de onderhandelingen en allianties die de benoeming tot en het behoud van Werelderfgoed compliceren. Aangemoedigd door het werk van onder andere James Ferguson (1991) en Tania Murray Li (2007) doet dit proefschrift een poging deze onderhandelingen, allianties en andere politieke beslommeringen rondom Mt. Kenya's Werelderfgoed status zichtbaar te maken.

Het tweede thema is de ideologische verwevenheid van erfgoed, staat en nationalisme die haar oorsprong vindt in de Franse Revolutie. De Werelderfgoed Conventie bezegelt deze verwevenheid door alle Werelderfgoed besluitvorming neer te leggen bij overheden en staatsrepresentanten. Als gevolg van deze richtlijnen beschouwen veel Werelderfgoed studies en Werelderfgoed critici de conventie als een top-down staatsaangelegenheid dat in hoofdzaak nationalistische doeleinden dient. Het probleem met dergelijk commentaar, zo stelt dit proefschrift, is dat het stoelt op een idee van 'staat' als een coherente entiteit met een eenduidige (patriottistische) agenda. Op basis van onder meer

het werk van Philip Abrams (1988) en Timothy Mitchell (1991) spreekt hoofdstuk één dit idee tegen en onderschrijft de noodzaak het concept 'staat' te problematiseren door het te ontleden in de specifieke individuen, instanties, politici enzovoorts die handelen uit naam van een regering. Dit ontleden is nodig om beter inzicht te krijgen in hoe Werelderfgoed zich precies voltrekt, om te kunnen herkennen voor welk streven Werelderfgoed status wordt ingezet, of om de sociale en politieke consequenties van een Werelderfgoed benoeming te kunnen duiden.

Hoofdstuk twee beschrijft het proces dat in 1997 resulteerde in Mt. Kenya's toetreding tot de Werelderfgoed Lijst. Het introduceert Bongo Woodley, een voormalig wildlife beheerder indertijd verbonden aan de *Kenya Wildlife Service* (KWS) en gestationeerd op Mt. Kenya, als sleutelfiguur – hij kreeg de opdracht om Mt. Kenya's Werelderfgoed nominatiedossier samen te stellen en de uniciteit van de berg te documenteren. Het verslag dat Woodley uiteindelijk schreef was in de eerste plaats een afspiegeling van een slepend conflict tussen de KWS en een andere overheidsinstantie, de *Forest Department* (FD). Al sinds het begin van de twintigste eeuw hebben zowel de KWS als de FD een mandaat over Mt. Kenya. Maar terwijl de KWS Mt. Kenya's natuurlijke landschap probeert te conserveren en menselijke activiteit probeert te weren pleegt de FD commerciële bosbouw. Als gevolg hiervan liggen de twee instanties al decennialang met elkaar overhoop.

Op het moment dat Bongo Woodley Mt. Kenya's Werelderfgoed aanvraag voorbereidde waren flinke delen van Mt. Kenya ontbost. Desalniettemin presenteerde Woodley in zijn rapport de regio als één van ongerepte en onaangetaste natuur. Hij deed dit in een poging de internationale beeldvorming te sturen – Woodley hoopte dat, wanneer een internationaal publiek Mt. Kenya zou zien als oorspronkelijk natuurgebied, er een lobby op gang zou komen die zou protesteren tegen ontbossing en zou pleiten voor het intrekken van de FD's licentie. Mt. Kenya's Werelderfgoed benoeming had echter niet het gewenste resultaat en tot op heden vechten de KWS en de FD over managementrechten.

Hoofdstuk drie schenkt aandacht aan de culturele en politieke geschiedenissen die buiten beschouwing zijn gelaten in Mt. Kenya's Werelderfgoed omschrijving, welke zich volledig richt op de ecologische en geologische eigenschappen van het gebied. Dit is deels een gevolg van de manier waarop Bongo Woodley het nominatiedossier opstelde en deels grijpt het terug op UNESCO's strikte scheiding tussen natuurlijk en cultureel erfgoed, maar tegelijkertijd is het ook nauw verbonden met Kenia's nationale politieke arena zoals die er eind jaren '90 uitzag zo stelt hoofdstuk drie. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat Mt. Kenya vanwege verschillende historische ontwikkelingen zoals de publicatie van *Facing Mt. Kenya: the Tribal Life of the Gikuyu* in 1938 en Mt. Kenya's plek in de Mau Mau opstanden van de jaren '50 sterk wordt geassocieerd met Kenia's Kikuyu bevolking. Daarbij, na onafhankelijkheid in 1963 wisten met name Kikuyu politici zich het staatsapparaat toe te eigenen en sindsdien staat Mt. Kenya symbool voor Kikuyu macht en politieke overheersing. Dit heeft de berg tot politiek kapitaal gemaakt en nog steeds speelt Mt. Kenya een centrale rol tijdens Kikuyu verkiezingscampagnes, waarin politici proberen stemmen te vergaren door het aanboren van etnische solidariteit.

Na de dood van Kenia's eerste president Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 werd vicepresident Daniel Arap Moi staatshoofd. Moi profileerde zich als Kalenjin en binnen mum van tijd verving hij Kenyatta's Kikuyu bondgenoten voor politici uit zijn eigen etnische kringen. Moi bouwde een dictatoriaal regiem dat geen tegenspraak duldde en dat berucht werd vanwege repressie en politieke vervolging. Vanaf het begin van de jaren '90 dwongen internationale organisaties zoals de Wereld Bank politieke hervormingen af, op sanctie van het stopzetten van ontwikkelingshulp. Enerzijds leidde deze internationale druk tot de herintroductie van een meerpartijenstelsel en verkiezingen in 1992. Anderzijds resulteerde het ook in een binnenlandse politiek die de principes van tribale identiteit en etnische saamhorigheid dramatiseert, met onder meer terugkerend verkiezingsgeweld als gevolg.

Toen Bongo Woodley in 1996 Mt. Kenya's Werelderfgoed aanvraag schreef was het regiem van Daniel Arap Moi nog van kracht. Tegelijkertijd ondervond het groeiende tegenstand van Kenia's Kikuyu bevolking, die in de nieuwe democratische spelregels een mogelijkheid zag de oude politieke status quo te herstellen. Hoofdstuk drie stelt dat, in het licht van deze ontwikkelingen, het begrijpelijk is dat Mt. Kenya's Werelderfgoed benoeming uitsluitend rept over ecologische en geologische kwaliteiten – een Werelderfgoed nominatie die had ingezoomd op de culturele en politieke geschiedenissen van het gebied, en die de verkiezingsretoriek van de Kikuyu oppositie had gevoed, was ongetwijfeld tegengehouden op presidentieel niveau. Mt. Kenya's 'vernatuurlijking' zoals opgetekend door Woodley daarentegen deed culturele en politieke geschiedenissen voorkomen als onbelangrijk en irrelevant. Op die manier sloot Woodley's Werelderfgoed voorstel naadloos aan bij de belangen van de regerende Kalenjin elite, zonder wiens goedkeuring Werelderfgoed benoeming geen doorgang kon vinden.

Hoofdstuk vier maakt een sprong in de tijd en behandelt actuele landvraagstukken in Laikipia, een regio die in het westen aan Mt. Kenya grenst. Het bespreekt deze thematiek omdat, zo laat hoofdstuk vijf uiteindelijk zien, het de aanzet is geweest voor de herziening van Mt. Kenya's Werelderfgoed grenzen in 2013. Laikipia's huidige landdebat wordt gekenmerkt door raciale tegenstellingen en conflicten die teruggrijpen op de regio's koloniale geschiedenis. Toen in 1895 het Oost Afrikaanse protectoraat werd opgericht werd het grotere gebied waar Laikipia onderdeel van is hoofdzakelijk bewoond door verschillende groepen veehouders. Tijdens twee grootschalige en gedwongen verhuiscampagnes in 1904 en 1911 werden deze veehouders uit de regio geweerd en gegroepeerd in speciaal daarvoor aangelegde reservaten elders in het protectoraat. Na dit ingrijpen namen blanke kolonisten het gebied over. Met name Laikipia werd een favoriete bestemming onder zowel Europese boeren als blanke welgestelden, en het kreeg al snel de bijnaam *White Highlands*. Na onafhankelijkheid vertrok een aanzienlijk deel van Laikipia's blanke bevolking. De grond die zo vrijkwam werd deels herverdeeld onder degenen die achterbleven, deels opgeëist door Keniaanse politici en deels opgedragen aan emigratie projecten die tot doel hadden het gebied te herbevolken met Afrikaanse landbouwers.

Voor de blanken die na onafhankelijkheid wel in Laikipia achterbleven, of die er op een later

moment naartoe emigreerden, is Laikipia's imago als voormalige White Highlands echter hardnekkig gebleken. De meeste van deze blanke bewoners boeren allang niet meer, of hooguit nog op kleine schaal – eind jaren '80 en begin jaren '90 stortte Kenia's veeteeltindustrie in, mede omdat een aantal afzetlanden de voorschriften rondom vleesimport verscherpten. Sindsdien zijn vrijwel alle blanke veehouderijen deels of geheel omgevormd tot natuurreservaten die momenteel een inkomen genereren uit toerisme of uit donorgelden. Het politieke draagvlak voor deze natuurreservaten is echter wisselend en hun voortbestaan staat continu ter discussie. Een aantal politici draagt de boodschap uit dat de reservaten een erfenis zijn van Laikipia's koloniale geschiedenis en verdedigt de stelling dat hedendaags blank grondbezit in feite neokoloniaal is. Dit maakt dat blanke grootgrondbezitters over het algemeen vrezen voor politieke repercussies of landonteigening, niet in de laatste plaats vanwege mazen in wet, vanwege recente wijzigen in nationale regelgeving, en vanwege een reeks Maasai protesten waarin betogers compensatie hebben geëist voor koloniale misstanden. Onder deze omstandigheden proberen blanke grootgrondbezitters hun aanwezigheid legitiem te maken door te wijzen op hun bijdrage aan het Bruto Nationaal Product of de nationale voedselvoorraad, of door hun betrokkenheid in *Corporate Social Responsibility* (CSR) projecten te benadrukken. De effectiviteit van zulke argumenten is echter moeilijk in te schatten en lijkt vooral af te hangen van de mate van politieke goodwill die individuele landeigenaren weten te cultiveren bij regionale en nationale politici.

Hoofdstuk vijf borduurt ten slotte voort op hoofdstuk vier en beschrijft hoe, met het oog op Laikipia's roerige en raciale landpolitiek, één bepaald reservaat genaamd *Lewa Wildlife Conservancy* (LWC) in Werelderfgoed een mogelijkheid zag eigendomsrechten bekrachtigen. Net als vrijwel alle andere natuurreservaten in Laikipia was LWC vroeger een veehouderij, gesticht aan het begin van de twintigste eeuw door een Britse kolonist en sindsdien in handen van zijn nazaten. Deze nazaten, de grondleggers van LWC, waren pioniers tijdens Laikipia's recente transformatie naar natuurbeheer en het reservaat heeft zich weten te ontwikkelen tot één van de meest invloedrijke spelers in Kenia's natuurbeschermingsindustrie. Niettemin neemt ook LWC de dreiging van onteigening serieus. Een aantal jaar geleden bedachten de eigenaren daarom een aantal ingrepen om de toekomst van het reservaat veilig te stellen. Zo richtten zij, in samenwerking met de veelbesproken Amerikaanse natuurbeschermingsorganisatie *The Nature Conservancy* (TNC), een corporatie op met deels Keniaanse aandeelhouders die de grond van de blanke familie afkocht – op deze manier probeert LWC het imago van neokolonialisme van zich af te schudden. LWC deed eveneens een poging om Werelderfgoed status te verwerven. De bedenkers van dit plan anticipeerden dat een plek op de Werelderfgoed Lijst het belang van het reservaat zou onderschrijven en internationale steun zou kunnen mobiliseren, mocht de dreiging van uitzetting of onteigening overgaan in gerichte acties.

In de aanloop naar een Werelderfgoed aanvraag realiseerde LWC zich al snel dat het waarschijnlijk niet 'uniek' genoeg was om aan de Werelderfgoed selectiecriteria te voldoen. Een erfgoeddeskundige wees LWC op een alternatief: omdat LWC in het noorden aan Mt. Kenya grenst kon het bij het Werelderfgoed Comité een verzoekschrift indienen om de grenzen van Mt. Kenya

Werelderfgoed wat op te rekken en LWC in de bestaande benoeming op te nemen. In 2010 bereikte dit verzoekschrift het Werelderfgoed Centrum in Parijs. Het werd afgewezen vanwege een aantal administratieve en bureaucratische gebreken. In 2012 diende LWC een herziene aanvraag in en deze werd wel geaccepteerd. Gedurende het evaluatieproces dat volgde uitten verschillende Werelderfgoed specialisten hun bedenkingen over een eventuele uitbreiding van Mt. Kenya's Werelderfgoed grenzen. Zij wezen onder meer op de beperkte ecologische link tussen Mt. Kenya en LWC, op LWC's gecompliceerde eigendomsregelingen, en op de recente stichting van het reservaat. Met name dat laatste stuitte critici tegen de borst omdat het niet strookt met de uitgangspunten van historisch erfgoed. Ondanks deze bezwaren stemde het Werelderfgoed Comité toch in met uitbreiding en in de zomer van 2013 werd LWC toegevoegd aan Mt. Kenya Werelderfgoed. Sindsdien doet LWC haar uiterste best om haar koloniale veehoudergeschiedenis te vergeten en het reservaat laat geen mogelijkheid onbenut zich te profileren als Werelderfgoed pronkstuk.

Op basis van deze vijf hoofdstukken stelt dit proefschrift dat Werelderfgoed niet uitsluitend een staatsaangelegenheid is en dat het ook niet per se nationalistisch gedachtegoed onderschrijft – Bongo Woodley had interesse in Werelderfgoed status om zijn mandaat over Mt. Kenya te verstevigen, en LWC zag in Werelderfgoed status een mogelijke bescherming tegen aanvallende politici en een onberekenbaar overheidsapparaat. In het verlengde hiervan wijst dit proefschrift op een schijnbare paradox: zowel tijdens Mt. Kenya's oorspronkelijke Werelderfgoed benoeming in 1997 als tijdens de uitbreiding van die benoeming in 2013 werd het idee van collectief en globaal bezit, dat aan de basis ligt van de Werelderfgoed filosofie, ingezet om privé-rechten over land kracht bij te zetten.

Dit proefschrift betoogt ook dat Mt. Kenya Werelderfgoed op verschillende manieren Kenia's koloniale verleden met zich meedraagt. De recente uitbreiding met LWC, die niet los te zien is van Laikipia's geracialiseerde landdebat, verbeeldt dit wellicht het meest sprekend. Maar ook het conflict tussen de KWS en de FD waar Woodley in verwikkeld was, en welke een sturende rol heeft gespeeld tijdens de totstandkoming van Mt. Kenya's Werelderfgoed nominatiedossier, vindt zijn oorsprong in koloniaal beleid over bosbeheer en het managen van wild. Bovendien bleek Woodley's Werelderfgoed nominatiedossier een afspiegeling van koloniale ideaalbeelden van een Afrikaanse natuur onaangetast door menselijk handelen. Daarbij, de etnische verdeeldheid die Kenia's politieke schouwspel typeert, en die de randvoorwaarden schepten voor Woodley's Werelderfgoed aanvraag, is nauw verweven met de manier waarop het koloniale bewind het grondbeginsel van gescheiden inheemse stammen introduceerde en institutionaliseerde.

Enerzijds is Mt. Kenya een natuurmonument, zo concludeert dit proefschrift – het is een prachtig en deels bedreigd landschap dat de aandacht heeft weten te trekken van menig natuurbeschermer en natuurliefhebber. Maar anderzijds is Mt. Kenya ook een cultureel en politiek icoon, het is het middelpunt van administratief getouwtrek over managementrechten, het is een inspiratiebron voor politieke propaganda en het herinnert aan Brits imperialisme. Al die lagen van betekenis bestaan naast elkaar en allemaal liggen ze ten grondslag aan Mt. Kenya Werelderfgoed.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Marlous van den Akker was born in Gouda in 1983. Between 1996 and 2002 she attended the Coenecoop College Waddinxveen where she finished her secondary education (VWO). In the two years that followed Marlous had different jobs, travelled through South Africa for three months where she developed an interest in wildlife conservation, and obtained a first-year diploma in animal management at Hogeschool Van Hall Larenstein in Leeuwarden. In 2004, Marlous began her studies at the Institute of Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology at Leiden University. After finishing a thesis that discussed the political implications of nature conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa she obtained her Bachelor's degree in 2008. In early 2009, Marlous carried out fieldwork in the region around Narena, southwestern Mali. Subsequently, she wrote a thesis that dealt with conflicts between groups of pastoralists and peasants, which earned her a Master's degree. In 2010, the Leiden Global Interactions Research Profile selected her as one of four PhD candidates working on the larger themes of heritage and migration, and sponsored her PhD position for which Marlous conducted fieldwork in Kenya in January 2011, from July to December 2011, and from April to September 2012. Currently, she lectures at the Institute of Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology at Leiden University.